So sure was Israel in its southern security that intelligence reports were downplayed; the military even redeployed troops from Gaza prior to the October 7. The brutality of the attack and horror at the hostage crisis left Israel so shocked that it delayed a ground invasion for 20 days.

Despite the delay, calls for ceasefire and accusations of genocide existed before Israel’s offensive began. All the same, every first-semester international relations student knew what would happen next: with Hamas no longer deterred, Israel’s only recourse was compellence.

Compellence theory is simply acting on the threat that keeps your adversary deterred. Israel needed to compel Hamas to surrender the hostages, disarm, and realize that attacking Israel is a bad idea—restoring deterrence. For nearly two years since, Israel has tested compellence theory; at best, with mixed results, not only with Hamas, but across the region.

The Lebanese terror group Hezbollah launched its own attack on October 8, 2023, which by the end saw the launch of approximately 10,000–15,000 rockets and 2,500 drone attacks that displaced at least 70,000 Israelis and killed 75 soldiers and 45 civilians. Israel’s effort to restore deterrence devastated Hezbollah, killing 2,500–3,000 fighters, eliminating the majority of its leadership, through an exploding beeper attack in advance of a ground invasion. Seeing their losses, the group agreed to partially disarm and stay out of further hostilities, being effectively compelled.

In Yemen, the Houthis likewise joined the attack on Israel with rocket and drone attacks, as well as targeting ships off its coast, causing significant supply-chain disruptions. The attacks prompted the United States (US) to designate them a terrorist group and launch an aerial campaign alongside the United Kingdom—on top of Israel’s responses.

The Houthis endured severe damage to its offensive infrastructure and lost hundreds of fighters but still managed to occasionally launch limited attacks. The Houthis are more weakened than compelled.

Iran, the financier of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, for the first time acted against Israel directly. Retaliating against Israeli strikes, Iran launched ballistic missile and drone salvos against Israel in April and October of 2024. The tit-for-tat came to a head over 12 days in June 2025, as the two exchanged strikes while Israel tried to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Though the damage Iran’s nuclear capability took is debated, what is known is Israel’s air superiority destroyed nearly all of Iran’s defense framework and eliminated several senior military staff.

Israel endured significant damage as Iran managed to breach its defenses on a few occasions, and the two have since agreed to a ceasefire, while simultaneously pledging readiness to attack in the future. So perhaps, they are mutually deterred for now.

Syria recently entered a new phase of its civil war following the downfall of Assad, an Israeli push to expand its buffer region, and the emergence of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction. HTS is led by Abu Mohammed al-Julani, an Islamic State affiliate who recently began targeting members of Syria’s minority populations, largely the Druze.

Israel intervened to protect the Druze, striking HTS sites until Julani quickly agreed to withdraw his troops from the Druze-populated areas. Prior to that intervention, there were rumors of Syria joining the Abraham Accords. While compellence worked to protect the Druze in the short term, it may have derailed a long-term peace deal.

Hamas remains the outlier. Ceasefire talks are again looking to collapse. The message is that despite the devastation, loss of leadership, approximately 17,000 lost fighters, and thousands of civilians killed in the crossfire, it can endure more. Israel’s attempt at compellence was so intense, that it sparked worldwide protests and allegations of genocide. Yet, rather than agree to Israel’s terms, Hamas continues to hold out, giving a statement that they will continue to fight until a Palestinian state is established.

The US attempted to broker multiple ceasefires, with some success in November 2023 and January 2025, but a deal to end the conflict remains elusive. If the US wants real results, compellence should target Hamas’ hosts and financiers, Turkey and Qatar.

While publicly on good terms with the US, the argument that Turkey and Qatar are state sponsors of terrorism would not be difficult to make given the support and protection they have offered Hamas. President Trump could threaten to add Turkey and Qatar to the list of state sponsors of terror unless Hamas agrees to Israel’s terms of ending the war.

There are indications that this could work. At least publicly, the two countries recently joined with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in a call on Hamas to disarm and relinquish control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. This is a good first step, but the call has no “or else”–type clause that would actually pressure Hamas.

With that support gone, Hamas’ political leadership’s only choice would be deportation from its hosts which would likely jeopardize their finances and potentially put them within Mossad’s reach or accede to Israel’s conditions. Ever self-interested, the hope is they would be compelled to the latter. This type of diplomatic pressure directed at Hamas’ sponsors could trickle down to Hamas’ leadership and potentially be the last best hope for Gazan civilians as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signals plans for a renewed military offensive in the enclave.

Whether deterrence is restored by Israel is yet to be determined. For the sake of civilians on both sides, let us hope it is restored and soon.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. He has written widely on national and international security issues for outlets including Small Wars Journal, the Wavell Room, and Inkstick Media. Any views expressed in the article are his own and not representative of, or endorsed by, any organization or government.

Failed Deterrence and Misplaced Compellence in Gaza was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consider his transformation since February’s Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump and Vice President JD Vance chastised Zelensky for being “disrespectful,” admonished Zelensky’s efforts to rally international support as “propaganda,” suggested it was Zelensky’s responsibility “to end the destruction of your country,” and described Zelensky as “buried.” Six months later, Trump is praising Ukraine’s “unbreakable spirit,” supports its “future as an independent nation,” and appears to realize that Zelensky is not to blame for Vladimir Putin’s war. It is clear that Putin is not entranced by “the art of the deal,” and that America must play a role in securing any postwar peace. The outlines of that peace are starting to come into focus.

Lurching

In early 2025, French military commanders floated the possibility of forming a “coalition of the willing” to send troops to Ukraine. Other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members expressed support for the idea. By summer, 10 European nations offered to contribute troops to a 30,000-man “reassurance force” in postwar Ukraine. However, the Europeans emphasized they would need the US to provide “backstop” capabilities.

That was a nonstarter for Trump—at least until the hastily-arranged summit that brought the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Ukraine, NATO, and the EU to the White House on August 18. Whether they came out of panic over the unsettling Trump-Putin Alaska meeting or in solidarity with Zelensky, or both, the result of the White House summit was positive.

For example, while Trump emphasized that he would not deploy American ground forces and explained that “European nations are going to take a lot of the burden,” he added, “We’re going to help them…we’ll be involved” in any peacekeeping mission.

Toward that end, he ordered Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine to work with allied militaries on the specifics of a European-led peacekeeping force. Perhaps with the US shouldering command-and-control responsibilities; offering American airpower and other enabling capabilities; and signaling support for a security guarantee for postwar Ukraine, peace may prevail. Predictably, administration officials then hedged on Trump’s promise to support the postwar peacekeeping mission in Ukraine—prompting a NATO diplomat to conclude, “The US is not fully committed to anything.”

What Trump’s transatlantic counterparts and those of us who are critical of Trump’s policies need to keep in mind is that this lurching, two-steps-forward-one-step-back approach to Ukraine’s security is better than what Ukraine endured between January and July. There was the Oval Office meeting, the suspension of military aid and intelligence-sharing, the mineral deal, the moral relativism, outright moral inversion, and the inexplicable deference to Putin. Trump now appears to be moving in the right direction.

Lessons

Zelensky made clear that Ukraine cannot sign a peace deal without concrete security guarantees—given Putin’s brazen violation of the Budapest Memorandum in 2014 and 2022. Eleven years of occupation and war have taught Ukrainians that words are not enough to ensure their security. A genuine security guarantee, bolstered by multinational peacekeepers and sustained military aid, is what Ukraine needs going forward—not to roll back Putin’s army to pre-2014 borders, but to deter it from another landgrab. The rest of Europe needs this too. A strong, stable, secure Ukraine will only enhance NATO’s ability to deter Moscow.

Such a guarantee will not be embodied by Ukraine’s accession to NATO—at least not anytime soon—but instead will be a thatch of bilateral commitments from individual NATO members and partners. “A group of now 30 countries, including Japan and Australia, are working on this concept of security guarantees,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently revealed.

To be sure, an American contingent on the ground in postwar Ukraine—working alongside partners that collaborated in other warzones under acronyms such as MFO, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF—would be preferable to what Trump is offering.

After all, American boots on the ground send an unmistakable message to aggressor nations. However, given where Trump was in February, it is important to look at the bright side; rather than taking an ambivalent or even antagonistic position towards Ukraine, Trump appears willing to support America’s closest allies as they secure a postwar peace. The Ukrainian people can then harden their territory against another Russian invasion. There are also two important historical realities.

First, American airpower has a proven track record of making a positive impact on the ground—whether in humanitarian, peacekeeping, deterrent, or combat-support missions. Consider the Berlin Airlift, which sustained a besieged city for 15 months and dealt Stalin a humbling blow. Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, which protected Iraqi civilians from Saddam Hussein’s vengeance for 12 years and allowed Iraq’s Kurds to build an all-but-sovereign state is another. Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force, which, in coordination with partners on the ground, brought Serb paramilitaries to heel in Bosnia, pushed Serb regulars out of Kosovo, and hastened the end of Slobodan Milosevic’s genocidal rule. The toppling of the Taliban after 9/11, which saw the US use airpower as a force-multiplier for indigenous fighters on the ground is but one more example. Finally, Operation Inherent Resolve leveraged airpower to assist ground units in rolling back ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Of course, no one wants American warplanes directly engaging the Russian military. But it pays to recall that it is already happening on a routine basis—near Alaskan airspace, over the Baltic Sea, across Pacific Ocean, and in the Middle East. Moreover, given recent encounters between American and Russian forces—and American and Russian hardware—it seems unlikely Putin’s high command will want to challenge American airpower along or above a future Ukraine-Russia DMZ.

That brings to light a second set of historical lessons. Neither lingering territorial disputes nor simmering hostilities are dealbreakers when it comes to providing security guarantees to allies and partners in the crosshairs. Consider post–World War II Germany. After a period of disarmament and occupation, the country’s western half was rearmed and invited into NATO as a full member, despite massive Soviet bloc armies ringing West Berlin and despite West Germany facing an overwhelming military disadvantage across a heavily armed border.

In fact, the US did not formally recognize the post–World War II territorial-political settlement in Germany or across Europe until 1975. The people of West Germany never abandoned their hopes for German reunification. Those hopes were not realized until 1990.

Next, consider post–World War II Japan. The Red Army seized Japanese islands at the end of the war. To this day, Tokyo does not recognize Russian control over those islands. Despite this territorial dispute, the United States guaranteed Japan’s security in 1951 and entered into a full-fledged mutual-defense treaty in 1960. That treaty is still in force today.

Last, consider the Korean Peninsula. Despite territorial disagreements; despite the absence of a peace treaty; and despite, or perhaps because of, the threat posed by a massive hostile army north of the 38th Parallel, the US provided open-ended security guarantees to South Korea in the autumn of 1953. Those security guarantees are still in force. The people of South Korea still look forward to unification of the two Koreas under the banner of freedom. South Korea even has a cabinet-level government ministry focused on unification.

Predator

In none of these examples did the US or its allies agree to the permanent ceding of territory. Rather, they recognized the difficulty of liberating occupied territory and they envisioned the future prospect of the return of that territory. That is how Ukraine and its partners should view the imperfect peace that will emerge in the coming months—a peace that will leave some of Ukraine’s territory under Putin’s control.

It is also worth emphasizing that a European-led, US-supported peacekeeping force in Ukraine is necessary given Putin’s policies and plans: Moscow occupies swaths of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; threatens Poland; is conducting a campaign of sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint; has moved nuclear weapons into Belarus; is firing off intermediate-range missiles; and is diverting 35 percent of government spending into its war machine. As French President Emmanuel Macron concluded, Putin is “a predator…at our doorstep.” Putin will not stop until he is stopped. Securing Ukraine—while continuing the build-up of deterrent forces on NATO’s eastern flank—is key to stopping Putin.

Alan W. Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

Trump’s Path to an Imperfect Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

This issue is not new. In his 1957 book Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Henry Kissinger made a controversial, yet analytically compelling, argument for the possible utility of tactical nuclear weapons in limited wars. He warned that massive retaliation was neither credible nor effective for deterring limited aggression and that a rigid dichotomy between conventional and strategic nuclear responses risked inviting coercion at the lower rungs of the escalation ladder. For Kissinger, introducing the possibility of limited nuclear use was not a call to war, but a recognition of strategic reality; the ability to escalate with restraint could deter adversaries from escalating first.

Fast forward to the 2030 scenarios modeled in Guardian Tiger I and II, and Kissinger’s insights remain disturbingly relevant. In the exercise, North Korea carried out a low-yield nuclear strike targeting South Korean naval vessels. American decision-makers, faced with the risk of horizontal escalation with China and the lack of consensus among allies, struggled to identify a proportional yet credible response. The idea of a retaliatory tactical nuclear strike was floated, but the simulated American leadership hesitated, reflecting both doctrinal ambiguity and an operational gap in American nuclear capabilities.

The risks of such hesitation are manifold. First, American restraint may be misinterpreted as indecision or weakness, particularly by allies like South Korea and Japan, who are directly exposed to North Korean and Chinese threats. Second, it creates an opening for adversaries to believe they can escalate to the nuclear level without inviting proportional retaliation. Third, it undermines the entire architecture of extended deterrence that underpins regional security.

Critics will rightly point out the perils of normalizing nuclear use. Introducing tactical nuclear weapons into a conflict zone invites moral hazards, increases the risk of miscalculation, and breaks long-standing nuclear taboos. It also challenges existing declaratory policies, such as the 2022 P5 Joint Statement affirming that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”

But these arguments, while valid in principle, must be weighed against the operational reality that a low-yield nuclear strike by an adversary may not be deterred by threats of massive retaliation. As the Atlantic Council report noted, North Korea’s nuclear doctrine increasingly incorporates elements of pre-delegated authority, tactical nuclear use, and efforts toward a more survivable second-strike posture. If the United States signals that it will not respond proportionally to a limited nuclear attack, North Korea may calculate that it can use nuclear weapons to coerce the South or constrain American action without triggering regime-ending consequences.

Moreover, the credibility problem is not confined to North Korea. China, observing Washington’s reluctance to respond in kind, may also be emboldened to engage in horizontal escalation, confident that the United States’s nuclear threshold is politically—and perhaps operationally—immobile. This perception could unravel the strategic coherence of integrated deterrence.

To address these challenges, US Forces Korea (USFK) and Indo-Pacific Command should adopt a more robust approach across multiple dimensions. First, the United States should consider forward-deploying platforms capable of delivering low-yield nuclear weapons. This could include the reintroduction of dual-capable aircraft or sea-based assets positioned in or near the Korean Peninsula. Such deployments must be both survivable and possess the ability to clearly signal an adversary of will, while being fully integrated into bilateral operational planning with the Republic of Korea (ROK).

Second, escalation options must be clarified through updates to American declaratory policy. This does not mean issuing public ultimatums or fixed thresholds but rather ensuring that adversaries understand the United States is willing to conduct proportional nuclear responses if deterrence fails. Strategic ambiguity must not become strategic paralysis.

Third, while the US and South Korea launched the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) in 2023 to enhance extended deterrence coordination, further institutionalization is needed. A structure modeled more closely on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group would help deepen transparency, signal unity of purpose, and reduce the risk of fragmented responses during crises.

Fourth, both US and ROK forces must be equipped and trained to operate in the aftermath of a limited nuclear strike. This includes rehearsals and exercises focused on base survivability, radiological detection and decontamination, logistics continuity, and the resilience of command-and-control (C2) systems.

Fifth, strategic communication must be strengthened. Clear and consistent messaging to both adversaries and allies is critical. Deterrence depends not only on military capabilities, but also on the perceived credibility of those capabilities and the intentions behind them.

Ultimately, the goal of these measures is not to normalize the use of nuclear weapons, but to reinforce the threshold against their use by making deterrence more credible and responsive.

If that threshold is ever crossed and the United States fails to respond proportionately, the credibility of its extended deterrence architecture could unravel. The Guardian Tiger exercises highlight this grim possibility and should serve as a clarion call to action for policy and defense leaders alike.

As Kissinger warned in 1957, the danger of total war arises not so much from a deliberate decision to embark on it as from a series of actions which, though rational in themselves, cumulatively lead to disaster. The United States must ensure that its rational desire to avoid nuclear escalation does not lead to an irrational loss of deterrence. Tactical nuclear flexibility, responsibly exercised and credibly signaled, may be the painful but necessary insurance policy to uphold peace in East Asia.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

The Case for US Low-Yield Nuclear Options in Korea was originally published on Global Security Review.

Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK), as key American allies, should strengthen their conventional military capabilities, both offensive and defensive, to reinforce regional deterrence. Two critical steps are needed. First, Japan and South Korea must expand their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s missile launchers. Second, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System to create an integrated deterrence framework.

So far, to address concerns over potential nuclear decoupling, the US, Japan, and South Korea have explored multiple options. In addition to Washington’s repeated assurances that its nuclear extended deterrence remains intact, discussions have included modernizing American nuclear weapons, expanding nuclear-sharing agreements, redeploying tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea, and even the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear arsenal.

However, South Korea acquiring nuclear weapons remains highly improbable due to its significant political costs. From the 1960s to the 1980s, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states feared the US might hesitate to retaliate with nuclear weapons if the Soviet Union launched a nuclear strike on Europe. While NATO pursued multiple strategies—most notably the dual-key system and the deployment of Pershing II missiles—these measures never fully resolved nuclear decoupling concerns.

Ultimately, NATO never confronted the full extent of this dilemma as the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991. Since the issue lies not in the US’s ability to retaliate but in its willingness to do so under specific conditions, the most practical approach is to adopt deterrence measures that North Korea perceives as credible.

First, Japan and South Korea should prioritize expanding their capabilities to neutralize North Korea’s nuclear missile launchers. A key advantage for the US, Japan, and South Korea—compared to NATO during the Cold War—is that North Korea is estimated to have around 50 nuclear warheads, far fewer than the tens of thousands in the Soviet arsenal.

In this context, Japan’s planned acquisition of enemy base strike capabilities should focus not only on expanding the number of available strike assets but also on improving their precision and destructive power to ensure maximum effectiveness against North Korean launch sites. At the same time, South Korea’s kill chain should further enhance its deep-strike capabilities by increasing assets like the Hyunmoo-4 missile, which is designed to penetrate deeply buried facilities.

Additionally, South Korea’s Drone Operations Command, established in 2023, should undergo a major expansion in drone assets capable of effectively detecting, tracking, and striking North Korean missile launchers. By integrating high-precision missiles and unmanned systems, both Japan and South Korea can significantly reduce North Korea’s ability to deliver nuclear strikes, thereby reinforcing deterrence.

Second, as Japan and South Korea expand their strike capabilities, Japan’s defense architecture should be aligned with South Korea’s Three-Axis System. This integration would allow both countries to allocate their finite military assets more effectively when targeting North Korea’s nuclear-related ground units. For example, given the geographic distance, Japan could focus on striking fixed targets such as command centers and underground missile storage sites while South Korea concentrates on eliminating mobile launchers that require rapid response and precision strikes.

Additionally, harmonizing Japan and South Korea’s missile defense structures would improve the likelihood of intercepting North Korean missiles. While Japan has developed its missile defense in close coordination with the United States, South Korea has opted to develop its own independent missile defense system, instead of fully integrating into the American-led ballistic missile defense framework.

However, aligning the two countries’ missile defense systems would significantly enhance regional interception capabilities. A fully integrated defense network would not only establish a more layered interception system against incoming North Korean missiles but also enable earlier response times—as Japan and South Korea deepen their real-time missile-tracking cooperation—South Korea’s response times could improve further. By improving both offensive and defensive coordination, Japan and South Korea can maximize deterrence and reduce North Korea’s nuclear strike effectiveness.

By implementing these measures, North Korea would be left with only a limited number of launchers capable of delivering nuclear weapons. While it is possible that some missiles could still be launched from the remaining launchers and a few might evade American missile defenses, North Korea would have to consider allocating few nuclear warheads against Japan, South Korea, and the United States. This would be necessary both to achieve its long-term political objectives and to deter US-ROK combined forces and US Forces Japan (USFJ) from retaliating in the short term.

Moreover, North Korean leadership would face significant uncertainty about whether its remaining nuclear missiles could successfully penetrate American missile defenses. In essence, by increasing their conventional strike capabilities and aligning their military strategies, Japan and South Korea could ensure that a substantial number of North Korean launchers are neutralized. This would force Pyongyang to operate with significantly reduced military options, making its attempt to create nuclear decoupling less credible.

However, this strategy is only viable as long as North Korea’s nuclear arsenal remains limited. If Pyongyang dramatically expands its warhead stockpile and launch platforms, conventional deterrence alone will no longer be sufficient, and the risk of nuclear decoupling will escalate beyond control. The US, Japan, and South Korea must act decisively—before the balance of power shifts irreversibly in North Korea’s favor. Time is running out.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, CEO of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

Strengthening Nuclear Deterrence in the Far East was originally published on Global Security Review.

India and the Philippines are set to sign a $200 million missile deal in 2025, that will include Akash missiles, which is a short-range surface-to-air ballistic missile and has a range of 25 kilometers (km). This is the second defense venture between Manila and New Delhi, the first being the acquisition of missile systems in 2022 worth $375 million from India. This new development shows India’s rise in the international defense market.

To enhance its defense capabilities, India robustly tests missile systems. In March 2024, India successfully tested the nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) Agni-5 missile, which has a range of 5,000 km. This missile is capable of carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) and has elevated India’s status as it enters the group of states that can fire multiple warheads from a single ICBM. In November 2024, India tested a long-range hypersonic missile successfully that can mark targets 1,500 km away. This missile is indigenously developed and puts India in the league of just a few countries that have developed this advanced technology.

In its Defence Day parade in January 2025, India publicized the mass production of quasi-ballistic Pralay missiles, which have a range of 150 to 500 km, can carry a payload of 500 to 1,000 kilograms (kg), and can maneuver while keeping a low trajectory. This is a short-range surface-to-surface tactical missile and is expected to be deployed near the Chinese and Pakistani borders. Moreover, there are media reports that Armenia is interested in buying these missiles from India.

According to media reports, India issued a notice to airmen (NATOM) in early 2025 for potential missile tests in the Bay of Bengal. It is anticipated that this NATOM was  conducting tests of the Agni-5MII. If tested successfully the Agni-5MII will modernize the Indian military, advance the Indian missile program, give India an edge over regional competitors, and will enhance India’s status in shaping the global security dynamics.

Along with the modernization of its missile program, the MTCR’s membership grants India greater boosted defense ties with various states, as previously mentioned. The MTCR focuses on missiles alone, but Indian defense exports are beyond just missiles. They include a broader range of equipment and services. Indian defense exports are estimated to increase to over $4 billion by 2025.

Moreover, India is actively pursuing partnerships with France, Israel, Russia, and the US. All of these partnerships focus on joint development and production of defense equipment, joint productions, transfer of technology, and military exercises.

Growing Indian missile capabilities pose a challenge to regional competition, putting Pakistan in a position where it needs to maintain the balance of power in the region via upgrading its defense capabilities. Indo-Philippine defense ties can be translated as a shift in the alliance in the Pak-Philippines equation. This was a traditionally warm relationship. It can force Pakistan to look out for developing closer ties with other states to counter this emerging alliance.

The technological advancement India achieved via the Akash missile can push Pakistan to invest in developing the same capabilities to counter any future Indian threat. The selling of Akash missile technology to the Philippines can be viewed in the light of India’s attempt to expand its strategic footprint at the regional and global level.

Pakistan then needs to reassess its own strategic alliances and defense posture. Growing Indian missile and defense ambitions will have repercussions on peace and stability both at the regional and global level. India’s growing missile ranges, in the case of ICBMs, will be perceived by China as an emerging threat, which can escalate tensions between these two states. The mutual perception of threat by China and Pakistan has the possibility of driving these two nations closer together. This is certainly not something the United States desires.

Dr. Anum Riaz is the Associate Director of Research for the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

India’s Missile Program: A Threat to Regional and Global Peace and Stability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Vance addressed the continents’ hostile stance on freedom of opinion. He suggested Europe is becoming the enemy they opposed during the Cold War, and with elections coming, challenged Europeans to step up and take charge of their own defense. Vance also argued that the most urgent issue shared by all nations at the conference was mass migration.

Europe is Not Unified

 Incidentally, in late 2024, Global Security Review (GSR) published an updated independent assessment of European political uncertainties. It shows that JD Vance’s statements made in February 2025 were factual and fully grounded, even if inconvenient.

The governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom are fractured and dysfunctional. Another late 2024 GSR independent assessment of an endgame in Ukraine suggested an uncomfortable realpolitik-driven negotiated settlement, even before the Trump administration offered its plan after the Munich Security Conference.

That suggests two observations. First, the complete terms will never be made public but are already known to powerbrokers. Present neutrality of Russian forces in Transnistria and a lack of attacks on Ukrainian leadership suggests some form of agreed limitation of the conflict. Recently both Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio remarked on Zelensky’s duplicitousness. Apparently, he would agree to terms in meetings and then lie to the media about them. The ostentatious way Zelensky ended up confronting both President Donald Trump and Vice President Vance in the Oval Office, despite the rather realistic and transactional path to settlement, only reinforces this assessment.

The indignation and moral outrage over the conflict is mostly performative for the media and the public. It gives governments cover to prolong the conflict by providing aid, winning elections, and increasing the size of their bureaucratic apparatus, along with the corrupt mechanisms endemic to Ukraine. What online outrage does not do is enable a negotiated settlement of hostilities.

After the White House debacle, President Macron arranged an emergency meeting. While President Macron again pushed for “strategic autonomy” for Europe, the emergency meeting again showed that other European countries are not getting on the France bandwagon just yet. Together with the UK, France is the most likely to send troops to Ukraine, an idea that both Germany and Poland loathe. Italy is attempting a pragmatic balancing act between Europe and the US. Regrettably, the Baltic and Nordic countries, who are the frontline against Russia and invest the most in their defense, were not represented in a meaningful way.

Second, the claims of America “abandoning” Kyiv are hyperbolic, counterfactual, and premature. This is an ongoing negotiation. The facts are clear. The US provided 0.6 percent of its 2021 GDP to Ukraine and more than $160,000,000,000 in financial assistance and munitions, just about half of all assistance Ukraine has received. This aid, unlike European aid, has no strings attached and no expectation of repayment. The US also secured billions in loans from various banks for the benefit of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, the US is strategically overextended and incapable of matching the more immediate threat (China). The Trump administration understands this. Many Americans know this, too, which is why 72 percent of registered voters want a negotiated settlement. That does not mean President Trump is surrendering to Putin or “abandoning” Europe. Nor does it make him a tool of Putin.

The West is in a bad strategic and operational position. Even after three years of supporting the Ukrainian war effort, weapons production across all North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states cannot meet demand, let alone stockpile in case of war in the Pacific. While many speculate that Russia is in bad shape and is showing indicators of economic decline, they are stronger than Ukraine and its immediate neighbors.

For the West there are only two alternatives to a brokered peace: a dramatic escalation led by American conventional forces and resources or continuing to feed the war of attrition. Neither is a good scenario for the Ukrainian people who are dying by the thousands. President Trump understands this fact.

The Future of NATO

How Europe responds to the US remains to be seen. There are deeper fractures within and between the UK, France, and Germany than mainstream observers realize. The only ones significantly expanding their militaries and cooperating with the US are Poland, the Baltic states, and the Nordic countries.

As for the United States’ participation in NATO, it should be scaled back over time and be contingent on shared values with partner nations, especially when it comes to freedom of conscience and speech. Countries like Denmark, who believe Russia will invade Europe in 5 years, should expand their militaries and demonstrate not only commitment to liberal values but self-defense. The United States cannot fund its welfare state and those of Europe. Americans are not that wealthy.

American involvement in NATO should be primarily limited to (1) logistics (air and sea transport to Europe); (2) support in the form of weaponry, materiel, and war support materiel; (3) maintaining freedom of the seas; and 4) developing missile defense systems that can serve American and, when purchased, NATO. The United States also has unmatched space capabilities.

There should be no expectation of American boots on the ground simply because Europe neglected its security obligations for nearly 30 years. While there is still immense value in joint training and cooperation, the US should be seen as a rear guard and a last resort force. American taxpayers should not be the primary funder and provider of military forces and capability for Europe.

It is difficult to expect any long-term peace to be possible so long as NATO serves primarily as an anti-Russia platform funded by the United States. Europeans need to solve their own problems without vilifying the United States for solving American problems first. This means Eastern Europe needs to secure the buy-in of countries like Italy and Spain, who do not feel the Russian threat. As Vice President Vance suggested in Munich, Europeans must reflect on what they are defending and not just what they are against.

Europe is their continent and their home. It is their responsibility and duty to be the primary protectors of their individual nations and European society. Unfortunately, Europe does not appear to be ready to make a unified effort. Nonetheless, the proposal by the newly elected German chancellor, which calls for France and the United Kingdom to share their nuclear deterrent, might be a first concrete step in the right direction.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the authors’ own.

The US and Europe: A Reality Check was originally published on Global Security Review.

The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government forces within just a few days. The regime change, and the resultant uncertainty in Syria, invite regional powers to intervene for political and strategic spoils. Israel also conducted numerous air strikes to dismantle Syrian military and strategic capabilities.

The Asad regime posed a significant challenge for the US, which led the US to support rebel factions. The loss of the regime is a major setback to Iran’s axis of resistance and also puts Russian strategic interests in jeopardy. In the aftermath of the current development either the model of Libya or Iraq can be the possible trajectories for Syria.

Middle Eastern Ba’athist regimes emerged, in the second half of the century, as Arab nationalist leaders, championed the ideologies of Pan-Arabism, socialism, secularism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Despite their lofty ideals, these regimes, exemplified by Assad’s rule in Syria, devolved into deeply authoritarian systems characterized by the centralization of power, political repression, and a departure from their original revolutionary aspirations.

Political oppression by the Assad regime created numerous ethnic and sectarian fault lines that were later exploited by the regional and extra-regional powers. The alleged Iranian support and Russin aerial cover seem to have kept the Assad regime in power even after the so called Arab Spring removed numerous autocratic regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.

Syria exemplifies the emerging threat of rebel movements to dysfunctional polities and how they gain national legitimacy. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is a Salafi-Jihadist organization and a splinter group of al-Qaeda. The avowed pronouncements of HTS allude to independence from al-Qaeda’s influence, thus forsaking any territorial claim in the name of the caliphate beyond Syria.

Assad’s Syria had also long been an irritant for US and Israeli interests by being a crucial component of Iranian perfidy in the region. HTS, however, is a United Nations designated terrorist organization and is also considered one by the European Union and the US. Irrespective of this fact, America and its partners expressed jubilance over the HTS takeover, which creates room for speculation that the US and others covertly supported HTS regime change in Syria.

Millions of Syrian refugees and the ongoing Kurdish desire for independence prompted Turkish involvement in the Syrian quagmire. Ankara makes little secret of its desire to neutralize the ambitions of Kurdish leaders demanding autonomy in the North of Syria. President Donald Trump described Turkey as the most important player on the Syrian chessboard after the fall of Damascus.

Having much at stake in the future of Syria, Turkish involvement and material support cannot be ruled out in the overthrow of the Syrian government under Assad. Kurds control 25 percent of Syrian territory, including much of the oil-rich area, while being less than 10 percent of the total population. Kurdish administration of North and East Syria is also a strong bulwark against the ISIS threat, and it was supported by the US in the past. HTS’s pronouncements regarding the formation of a secular and inclusive government will be tested in the crucible of time considering Kurd-Turkish animosity.

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Assad regime stood the test of numerous crises in the Middle East. The so called Shia Cresent, along with the Houthis, provided a sense of strategic depth to Iran vis-à-vis military threats in the Middle East. With the axis of resistance being torn apart, Iran finds itself deprived of deterrence capabilities, in the backdrop of the fall of Damascus. Hence it must explore other strategic options to achieve its aims and objectives.

Russia has long used its strategic partnership with Damascus to project power across the MENA region through military and naval assets. Russian airstrikes were crucial instruments of subversion of the political dissent and armed struggle against the Syrian despot. The fall of Assad does not mean the strategic retreat for Russia. As Mohammad Al Jolani, the leader of HTS, stated, “We don’t want Russia to leave.”

This statement underscores the strategic importance of Russia in Syrian geopolitical calculus. It seems that Russia will stay in the region despite many analysts predicting a possible diminishing Russian presence in Syria.

China has emerged as a credible mediator on the Middle Eastern political horizon after the Saudi-Iran deal. China could potentially help resolve the differences among the warring factions within Syria. It could potentially transform the zero-sum strategic contestation in Syria. The importance of Syrian conflict for China could be discerned by its use of the veto eight times,  on related issues, during the past decade at the United Nations Security Council.

Syrians made history with their success in toppling the Assad regime, but their greatest challenge lies ahead, building a positive future. Syria is exactly at the point of its national history where Iraq and Libya were after the fall of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.

Both nations followed a contrasting trajectory with Libya continuing its struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions while Iraq had a series of elections since 2005, which helped to develop mechanisms for political bargaining, particularly between Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. Syria faces similar challenges including the sectarian fault lines and Kurd minority.

The consociationalism model for governance practiced in Iraq may best fit the social and political imperatives in Syria. Although foreign aid and rescinding the sanctions could help build the Syrian state and society, internal reconciliation and power-sharing mechanisms could only satiate the concerns of stakeholders for lasting peace. The idiosyncratic socio-political climate of Syria requires the restraint and political acumen on the part of the victorious group to avoid another civil war.

HTS’s leadership has announced that it may take at least four years before Syria will have a general election. Confidence in the state’s institutions must be restored and strengthened to create a viable state. Lifting sanctions and technical and humanitarian assistance can help build the Syrian state and society. But it will ultimately require the peaceful resolution of difference for any form of liberal government to succeed in Syria.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.

The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways was originally published on Global Security Review.

Semiconductors: The Backbone of Cyber Power

Semiconductors enable the computing power that drives everything from commercial applications to military operations. Advanced chips are critical for AI, autonomous systems, and national security infrastructure. As nations race to secure technological dominance, control over semiconductor production becomes a central element of cyber deterrence.

The production of semiconductors is extraordinarily complex and relies on a global supply chain. No single country is self-sufficient in this domain. Manufacturing processes demand rare metals, precision tools, and expertise spanning Japan, the Netherlands, South Korea, Taiwan, and the United States. Companies like TSMC (Taiwan), Intel (United States), and Samsung (South Korea) dominate the field, with TSMC leading in advanced chip production. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography (ASML), a Dutch company, monopolizes the production of extreme ultraviolet (EUV) lithography machines, critical for fabricating cutting-edge chips.

The Strategic Importance of Semiconductors

Semiconductors are more than just a commercial product—they are a strategic resource that nations leverage to project power in cyberspace. The United States has long recognized the importance of staying ahead in chip technology, aiming to maintain at least a two-generation lead over adversaries like China. This lead is not just about technological superiority but is also about cyber deterrence.

Cyber deterrence relies on the ability to defend, retaliate, or disrupt an adversary’s cyber capabilities. Advanced semiconductors provide the computational power necessary for AI-driven cybersecurity systems, intelligence gathering, and offensive cyber operations. For example, autonomous systems in modern warfare require sophisticated chips to function effectively. If a nation lacks access to such technology, its cyber capabilities are significantly weakened.

China’s Vulnerability and Response

China, despite being the second-largest economy and a global manufacturing powerhouse, has a surprising weakness in the semiconductor supply chain. It spends more on importing chips than oil and relies heavily on foreign suppliers, including its geopolitical rivals. This dependency creates a critical vulnerability in its cyber and AI ambitions.

Recognizing this weakness, China launched massive initiatives to achieve self-sufficiency in semiconductor production. However, the barriers to entry are steep. Manufacturing cutting-edge chips requires material purity at a level of 99.99999 percent, and even a minor defect can render a chip unusable. The complexity of the global supply chain further complicates China’s efforts. For instance, ASML’s EUV lithography machines, essential for advanced chip production, are legally restricted from being sold to China under export control agreements led by the United States.

China’s strategy focuses on targeting chokepoints in the supply chain while ramping up domestic production of less advanced chips. Success in this endeavor would significantly alter the balance of power in cyberspace, enabling China to compete more effectively in AI and cyber operations. However, for now, its reliance on foreign technology remains a significant deterrent.

US Strategy: Strengthening Deterrence Through Dominance

The United States took proactive steps to secure its dominance in semiconductor technology as part of its cyber deterrence strategy. Legislation like the 2022 CHIPS and Science Act provides billions in subsidies to bolster domestic chip production. The US also works to integrate government, industry, and academia to address challenges in manpower, education, and research and development.

The American approach to cyber deterrence is twofold. First, it seeks to maintain its technological edge by investing in leading-edge chips while ensuring a robust supply of legacy nodes for essential systems. Second, it actively restricts access to critical technologies for adversaries. For instance, since 2018, the export of EUV lithography machines to China has been prohibited, a move aimed at stalling China’s progress in advanced semiconductor manufacturing.

This strategy aligns with the broader geopolitical framework, where supply chain control becomes a tool for exerting influence. By leveraging its dominance in semiconductors, the US can deny adversaries the tools they need to compete in AI-driven cyber capabilities, thereby strengthening its cyber deterrence posture.

The Role of AI and Advanced Chips in Cyber Deterrence

AI is a cornerstone of cyber operations, from defensive systems that identify and mitigate threats to offensive tools that exploit vulnerabilities in adversarial networks. The power of AI is directly tied to the availability of advanced chips, which enable greater computational efficiency and data processing.

In the AI arms race, semiconductors are the critical enabler. Nations with access to advanced chips can train larger models, process more data, and deploy more sophisticated algorithms. Conversely, those lacking access are at a significant disadvantage. This dynamic emphasizes the importance of securing semiconductor supply chains as part of national cyber deterrence strategies.

Geopolitics and the Future of Cyber Deterrence

The geopolitical implications of semiconductor dominance extend beyond cyber operations. Control over the chip supply chain influences alliances, trade policies, and even the balance of power in global governance. Governments increasingly push nations and companies to choose sides, creating a polarized landscape.

The US and its allies currently hold a strong position, but the race is far from over. As China invests heavily in self-sufficiency, the stakes in the semiconductor arms race continue to rise. The future of cyber deterrence will depend on the ability of nations to secure their supply chains, innovate in chip technology, and adapt to the rapidly evolving landscape of AI and cybersecurity.

Conclusion

Semiconductors are not just a technological marvel—they are a strategic weapon in the cyber domain. As nations compete for supremacy, control over chip production and supply chains will play a pivotal role in shaping cyber deterrence strategies. The US, with its technological edge and integrated approach, aims to maintain its dominance, while China’s efforts to overcome its vulnerabilities will redefine the global order. In this high-stakes competition, the invisible hand of the market is guided by the visible hand of governments, ensuring that semiconductors remain at the heart of cyber power.

Adam Harris, PhD, is a career cyber professional who both practices the profession and teaches at the university level. The views expressed are his own.    

Cyber Deterrence in the Age of Semiconductors was originally published on Global Security Review.

Data source: https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data

Deficit spending is a long-standing tradition in the US, with a budget surplus occurring in only four of the past 50 years. Debates about the size and importance of the federal debt raged for decades. With interest rates at historically low levels prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, debt financing came at a relatively small price soothing many concerns about deficit spending. Over the 2010s, net interest to finance the debt averaged only 6.8 percent of government spending and just 1.4 percent of GDP. Low interest rates led some to argue that “[t]he economics of deficits have changed,” and that reducing the debt and deficit spending should be a low priority compared to continued government investments in security, infrastructure, and well-being.

Two fundamental factors emerged to accelerate debt accumulation during the COVID-19 pandemic and aftermath. First, federal deficit spending limited the negative economic consequences of federal, state, and local responses to COVID-19. Second, the Federal Reserve sought to control inflation, a result of the Federal Reserve’s practice of “quantitative easing,” by increasing interest rates following the end of the pandemic—increasing government borrowing costs. The overall result was that net interest on government debt more than doubled between 2019 and 2024 in actual dollars. More funds spent to finance the debt leaves a smaller fraction of outlays available for discretionary spending, including national defense.

Data source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data

As the above chart illustrates, the percentage of GDP allocated to debt repayment surpassed defense spending in 2024. Future CBO projections appear in dashed lines. Major wars in Korea, Vietnam, and the height of the Cold War increased defense spending in the short term, but the overall trend was downward. Future defense spending is increasingly constrained by spending growth in both debt and nondiscretionary programs. With debt repayment exceeding defense spending, the American people should see this as a warning that must be redressed. Given great-power competition with China and several active hotspots around the world, decreasing American defense funding as a fraction of GDP is a significant concern. However, defense spending remains at a relative high point when examined in constant-year dollars.

Data source: https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/historical-tables/
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/59710#data.

The size of defense budgets, accounting for inflation, provides a more optimistic view. The solid line presents historic defense spending in constant 2024 dollars and the dashed line, again, represents CBO projections. From 1950–2000, US defense spending increased significantly during major conflicts and at the height of the Cold War. Over those fifty years, peaks in defense spending remained below $750 billion in fiscal year 2024 dollars. Post–September 11, 2001, operations resulted in much higher levels of spending, approaching $940 billion at its peak. Even with reductions over the 2010s, spending over the next decade projects to be 15 percent higher annually than at the peak of the Cold War.

Even with high levels of spending, the current US force structure is in desperate need of modernization due to a laser-sharp focus on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in prior decades. Since the year 2000, operations and maintenance (O&M) spending has taken an increasing share of the national security budget. This means the United States is using its assets in combat and on deployment. Over the past 24 years, O&M averaged 39 percent of the national security budget. In the 35 years prior to 2000, this number was only 30 percent.

The growing fraction of O&M costs left a smaller fraction of the budget available for system acquisition. What funds remained were heavily focused on winning the Global War on Terrorism, meaning that investments in technologically advanced systems to counter threats posed by China and Russia often took a back seat. A second effect of the lack of procurement is that today’s military is simply smaller. For example, the US Air Force will soon have a fleet of less than 5,000 aircraft for the first time in its history and the US Navy will sail only half the ships it did 40 years ago. The outcome of these decisions, according to leading researchers, is that the “US defense strategy and posture have become insolvent.”

What does this situation mean for the security of the US and its allies? While American involvement in a major conflict would certainly result in increased defense spending, there is precious little room for the peacetime defense budget to grow without large tax increases or significantly reduced spending on entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare. The most likely outcome is that new investments will need to come at the expense of other platforms or spending inside the defense budget.

Closing the gap between strategic goals and the means needed to achieve those goals during this dangerous time of strategic competition requires a thorough examination of solutions beyond increasing defense spending. The defense strategy needs rightsizing and a focus on the most stressing threats to the nation’s security. New concepts for imposing costs on competitors need to be developed. Methods to deter conventional and nuclear conflict should also be prioritized with special attention paid toward developing methods to prevent a conventional conflict from escalating across the nuclear threshold.

Carl Rhodes, PhD, is a Senior Fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the founder of Canberra-based Robust Policy.

The US Must Handle Its Fiscal Challenges was originally published on Global Security Review.

While the military supplement package is undoubtedly beneficial, it falls short of grappling with the deeper strategic complexities of the conflict. The war in Ukraine is not merely a matter of tactical engagements. It is a multifaceted struggle that demands a comprehensive approach.

The cyclical nature of military aid inadvertently creates vulnerabilities. As obstacles arise—whether due to domestic political debates, bureaucracy, or logistic challenges—a new gap in Ukraine’s defense could emerge. With each step forward, Russian forces entrench themselves deeper into Ukrainian territory, making subsequent efforts to reclaim lost ground more resource-intensive and costly in terms of human lives. Russia has already switched to an exhaustion strategy that is too costly for Ukraine.

While the current rate of military aid may bolster Ukraine’s defense, it is unlikely to afford Ukrainian forces the opportunity for a counteroffensive or strategic initiative that can secure victory. As the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Washington looms, the prevailing stance in the US and Europe is to persist in providing life support for Ukraine, yet refrain from confronting Russia, the root cause of Ukraine’s tragedy. This approach affords the Kremlin increased confidence and time to adapt its war economy.

By choosing political passivity and refraining from adopting a counter-offensive stance against Russia, Western democracies are gradually ceding their global influence. The strategic choice—or, more accurately, the strategic indecisiveness—to remain in a passive-defensive mode against Russia extends beyond the relationship between Western democracies and Russia. The war in Ukraine is but a single theater in a much larger conflict—a third world war, to be blunt—where the free world is pitted against authoritarian regimes. China, Iran, and North Korea already emerged as major supporting actors on Russia’s side, fully cognizant that their fight is not against Ukraine, but an indirect war with Western democracies.

For China, the war in Ukraine holds paramount importance. By supplying military components and dual-use technologies to Russia, and purchasing Russian oil and gas, China can gauge not only the effectiveness of economic sanctions on a large authoritarian state, but also the seriousness of the US and European countries in implementing full-scale isolation of the aggressor. This could be a pivotal factor in the future, particularly when assessing the impact of potential economic isolation from Western democracies towards China, for instance, in a scenario involving an assault on or blockade of Taiwan.

As one report indicates, China is already the largest single exporter of key military goods to Russia. This clearly reveals Beijing’s strategic posture on the war. Chinese communist leaders aim to defeat Western powers in Ukraine by exposing democracies as unable to compete with the authoritarian axis in terms of political will, efficient strategic decisions, and even by depleting the military reserves of NATO countries and the readiness of democratic societies to fight for democratic values.

Despite these challenges, the Biden administration persists in seeking dialogue with China, even with the knowledge that China attempts to “influence and arguably interfere” with the upcoming election in the United States. However, Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s recent visit to China demonstrated that Beijing does not seem inclined towards meaningful conversations with Washington. It appears that Chinese leaders already assessed the Ukraine-Russia war in terms of Western resolve to fight back. These conclusions bolster Beijing’s confidence that the US and NATO allies are too timid, too slow, and too preoccupied with domestic political issues to assert themselves against Russia.

The war in Ukraine is likely the initial phase of a much longer and more complex war between the US and China, as leaders of diametrically opposed blocs in the current global landscape. This initial phase could culminate in a victory for China if Western democracies fail to adopt a robust stance and enter a counter-offensive mode against Russia.

NATO must dissuade Russia that it fears the dubious escalation risk, a narrative heavily promoted by the Kremlin’s propaganda, to prevent genuine NATO membership accession talks with Ukraine. This would send an unequivocal signal that Russia is incapable of conquering Ukraine, regardless of the duration of their attempts. And Ukrainians, armed with military supplies from NATO, will do everything in their power to liberate the occupied territories from Russian control. This is the path forward for Western democracies to re-assert their global role and uphold democratic values.

Tomas Janeliūnas is a visiting fellow at the Hudson Institute, Washington, DC, and a professor of international relations at Vilnius University, Lithuania. At X: @TomasJaneliunas The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Strategic Contest in Ukraine: A Pivotal War Foreshadowing a Major US-China Conflict was originally published on Global Security Review.

Encouraging competition and redirecting investments away from major defense contractors such as Raytheon, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Northrop Grumman, towards emerging companies (Space X, Looking Glass, Kodiak) with innovative approaches and cost-effective capabilities, can enhance national security. This shift has the potential to lower defense procurement costs, provide technological advantages, and reduce the monopolistic control and price gouging these major contractors have over government defense contracts.

Shipyards

Naval shipyards are the backbone of maritime defense, yet their capacity and efficiency were challenged in recent years. Currently, the top military shipbuilding corporations are General Dynamics, Huntington Ingles, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon. The nation cannot continue to rely on these companies to produce cost-effective, on-time results for the Navy. The simple truth is almost every contract awarded to these companies ends up over budget and delayed years.

By fostering competition among up-and-coming companies we can revitalize our shipbuilding industry, introducing new technologies and innovative approaches that improve cost-effectiveness and speed of construction. Paramount to the issue, the US needs to invest in developing additional shipyards to combat the growing Chinese capabilities as a new maritime superpower. This will not only strengthen the US naval fleet, but also allow the Navy to counter the rising threat and reverse the nation’s downward trajectory, creating jobs and stimulating economic growth.

ICBM Manufacturing

Enhancing ICBM manufacturing capabilities is essential for maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent. Currently, Boeing is responsible for producing key components for US and UK Trident II (D5) missiles and US Minuteman III ICBMs, while General Dynamics manufactures key components for US and UK Trident II (D5) missiles. Lockheed Martin plays a role in upgrading Trident II (D5) missiles for the US and UK, as well as Minuteman III, and also manages a UK nuclear weapons laboratory along with several US nuclear weapons facilities.

Northrop Grumman is involved in similar activities, including Trident II (D5) missile upgrades for the US and UK, Minuteman III, and management of some US nuclear weapons facilities. Additionally, in 2020, Northrop Grumman was awarded a sole-source $13.3 billion contract for engineering and manufacturing Sentinel missiles to replace the current arsenal of 400 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs. They have also acquired Orbital ATK, which has similar involvements.

Unfortunately, every nuclear modernization project went over budget and was delayed despite tens of billions of dollars pledged towards the modernization goal. Ultimately, increasing competition in this sector can spur innovation, resulting in more dependable and advanced missile systems at a more cost-effective price. Encouraging companies like SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic to invest in defense manufacturing of rocket technology, possibly through government contracts, could drive progress. Furthermore, diversifying the manufacturing base can mitigate the risk of supply-chain disruptions, ensuring a consistent supply of these critical weapons. 

Nuclear Weapons Facilities

Nuclear weapons design and manufacturing facilities are another area where competition can yield significant benefits. Currently, the Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas, is the only nuclear weapons assembly and disassembly facility. The nation needs more than a single facility for this task. This is a national security concern. Any issue with this facility, and assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons is hampered. By encouraging competition, the nation can modernize the nuclear arsenal, ensuring it remains safe, secure, and effective. Moreover, competition in the assembly and disassembly process can lead to cost savings, which enables the nation to allocate resources to other pressing defense needs.

Aircraft Manufacturing 

The need for a robust aircraft manufacturing capability is paramount. Navy Adm. John C. Aquilino, the head of US Indo-Pacific Command said, in recent congressional testimony, that China has the world’s largest navy and is soon to be the world’s largest air force. With potential adversaries investing heavily in advanced aircraft, America must maintain a competitive edge. With the looming prospect of having to fight and fund a three-front war (Ukraine-Russia, Israel-Iran, and China-Taiwan), the US needs to maintain its ability to obtain and provide air superiority in whatever conflicts it enters.

By fostering competition, we can spur innovation in aircraft design and production, ensuring air superiority in future conflicts. Investing in cost-effective drone swarms and continued advancements of our 5th- and 6th-generation fighters is essential. Furthermore, the US must increase the number of strategic stealth bombers in its arsenal from 20 to 200 to 300. Development and purchase of 100 B-21 Raiders is a good start, but there needs to be more competition or manufacturing supply-chain issues will continue to plague this modernization process. 

Fallout Shelter Investments 

Investing in a more robust fallout shelter system is crucial for ensuring the safety and protection of the American population in the event of a nuclear attack or other catastrophic event. While government efforts have historically been the primary driver of fallout shelter development, there is also a role for private entities to play in this important endeavor.

During the Cold War, the United States undertook a massive effort to build fallout shelters in anticipation of a potential nuclear conflict with the Soviet Union. The government constructed thousands of public fallout shelters in buildings such as schools, government offices, and subway stations. Private individuals and organizations also built their own shelters to protect against nuclear fallout.

The government entities involved with fallout shelters are the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Defense (DoD). FEMA is responsible for coordinating federal government efforts in disaster response and recovery, including the development and maintenance of fallout shelters. The DoD is involved in the construction and maintenance of fallout shelters, particularly those designed to protect military personnel and assets such as the Cheyenne Mountain Complex.

The primary private entities involved in developing and manufacturing fallout shelters are Atlas Survival Shelters, Rising S Company, and Hardened Structures. Atlas Survival Shelters specializes in the design and construction of underground shelters for protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats. Rising S offers a range of underground bunkers and shelters for protection against various threats, including nuclear fallout. Similarly, Hardened Structures provides custom-designed shelters and bunkers for protection against nuclear, biological, and chemical threats.

While the number of public fallout shelters declined since the end of the Cold War, there are still thousands of designated shelters across the country, although most are unknown, rundown, and primarily used for storage. They should be refurbished and updated to properly address the sheer number of citizens that would be required to shield from not only the initial blast, but any possible fallout.

Ultimately, it is essential that efforts to develop and maintain fallout shelters continue, as the threat of nuclear conflict remains a major concern in today’s world. By fostering competition in this sector, the nation can drive innovation and ensure that every American has access to adequate protection in the event of a nuclear attack or other catastrophic event. 

Conclusion

The United States must prioritize investments in fostering competition and innovation across key areas of the defense industry to strengthen national security. By redirecting investments from major defense contractors towards emerging companies with cost-effective military capabilities, the nation can enhance its military edge, reduce costs, and mitigate the near-monopolistic control of government defense contracts.

Revitalizing naval shipyards, enhancing ICBM manufacturing capabilities, modernizing nuclear weapons facilities, advancing aircraft manufacturing, and investing in a robust fallout shelter system are critical steps in safeguarding our nation against emerging threats.

By encouraging competition and diversifying the manufacturing base, the nation can drive innovation, ensure a continuous supply of critical weapons, and maintain a technological edge over adversaries. It is imperative that the nation act now to secure the future of our national security.

Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the authors own.

Investing in National Security: The Case for Fostering Competition in the Defense Industry was originally published on Global Security Review.