This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President Trump described during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”

“Peace through strength” refers to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”

The ripening entente between Russia and China, alongside the alarming rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals, is further complicated by an expanding North Korean nuclear capability. A collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These malcontent states seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.

Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing $1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization, designed to meet the previous decade’s threat, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.

First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia did in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent history of treaty violations, China’s violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and recent revelations Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.

Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining 2,000 retired warheads. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a B61-13, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.

Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with three warheads per missile—as recently advised by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly 800 warheads demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure allies whose populations contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.

Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.

Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial detect-decide-direct command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.

Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s report emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.

Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s four Ohio-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that retired from service around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.

Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. Once removed from the constraints of New START, the Ohio-class submarines could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be retained rather than retired and reconfigured for nuclear operations to meet nuclear and conventional demands on an overburdened bomber force.

With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “go faster”––unless it becomes a national priority.

A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.

Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies.

Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors.

“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 2010, Congress and the Obama administration reached an agreement that saw the Senate ratify the New START treaty in return for the administration’s support of nuclear modernization. This left advocates of nuclear disarmament dismayed.

Recent news that infrastructure costs for the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) is increasing appears to be generating efforts to once again kill the land-based leg of the nuclear triad. Such efforts are a mistake but are unlikely to end.

Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) told a SASC nuclear and space hearing on February 29, 2024, that the Sentinel ICBM has no reasonable acquisition program plan and previous Government Accountability Office warnings about the program costs were ignored. Reportedly, the senator’s previous efforts to kill Sentinel in the Senate Armed Services Committee received only one vote—hers.

As for the House of Representatives, one recent push to kill ICBMs was made in September 2021 when Representative John Garamendi (D-CA) proposed that the US block funding for the new ICBM and discard the new Sentinel missile altogether. His amendment failed in Committee 13–46 and on the House floor 118–299.

The new anti-ICBM campaign’s arguments have not changed, with one exception. The cost of ICBM infrastructure has increased. The 450 silos that need replacement exist with widely varied soil conditions. There is necessarily no uniformity of work required because the condition of each sixty-year-old silo varies considerably.

On the other hand, missile program costs are steady. While infrastructure costs increased, the cost of the new missile stayed steady. The motor technology was validated, and the new missile shroud was successfully tested.

Outside the new cost estimates, arguments against the Sentinel missile remain in the fiction category. These arguments are: (1) the nuclear modernization overall program costs are $2 trillion, which is too much; (2) the 50-year-old Minuteman III missile, if needed, can go through an inexpensive service life extension program (SLEP); (3) ICBM missiles are on a hair trigger alert and could accidentally start a nuclear war; (4) the missile force is only a sponge for Russian warheads; (5) there is no reasonable use of the missile except as a first-strike weapon against Russia; and (6) there is no reason to keep ICBMs through 2080 as the Air Force proposes, as this artificially inflates costs, and these old ICBMs can effectively be traded away in a new arms deal. Let’s examine these fairy tales in order.

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) increased cost estimates for “modernization” by including both costs for modernization and sustainment. By also including all conventional bombers and all costs calculated over 30 years, with an average annual cost increase of 3 percent, the CBO cleverly reached the $1 trillion mark in what it described as only “modernization” costs. All nuclear forces cost $52 billion in fiscal year 2024. Modernization costs, however, which include Sentinel, Columbia, Trident D-5 missile, long-range standoff missile (LRSO), B21 Raider, and nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) are only $19 billion of the total—36 percent of total nuclear spending.

As for a Minuteman III life extension, it is no longer technically feasible without actually building a new missile. Additionally, it also requires rebuilding the infrastructure which is increasingly costly in annual sustainment costs. In short, sustainment costs of the legacy Minuteman III system would increase even should all ICBM modernization programs be cut.

Even if a life extension on Minuteman III were possible, it must also be replaced with a new missile after a relatively short period of time. Keeping the legacy force, which is rising in cost each year, also runs the risk of what nuclear expert Clark Murdock called “rusting to obsolescence,” especially after 62 years on alert. Over time the remaining Minuteman IIIs would be worthless as a bargaining chip to trade away during arms negotiations with the Russians.

Arguments about “hair trigger alert,” sponges, and the uselessness of ICBMs for deterrence are all connected and easily dismissed altogether, as Representative Doug Lamborn, chair of the House Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, does in a recent essay.

First, the president would never authorize the launch of an ICBM without confirming the launch of an enemy attack on the US or allies—or detonation of an enemy warhead on American soil. No smart Russian leader would launch 900 warheads at the United States to destroy 450 missile silos and launch control centers, assuming the attack will not see a response from American submarines and/or bombers.

Since no massive enemy nuclear strike will occur, although a limited “escalate to win” strike is possible, American ICBMs are available for counter strikes and ongoing deterrence missions. The difficulty for any adversary that is planning to successfully destroy all of the United States’ ICBMs is not an invitation for an irrational attack. It complicates enemy plans to make such an attack operationally possible.

As to why original US Air Force comparative cost estimates used 2080 as a point through which the ICBM force would remain on alert, the answer is simple. Sentinel is being designed for a 50-year operational life cycle. Coincidentally, it is also the time period the Columbia-class submarine will remain in the US arsenal.

There was no conspiracy to artificially deflate the costs of alternative ICBM options. Since the disarmament community tries to stop most proposed nuclear modernization efforts, there is no reason to worry why the US is keeping its ICBM force until 2080. Remember, Minuteman III is 62 years old.

Finally, even at the new price, Sentinel’s price tag comes to $2.8 billion a year for the lifetime of the missile and, as General Anthony Cotton, Commander of US Strategic Command explained, it is foundational to American nuclear deterrence. The ICBM will remain in the force from 2031–2080 and in line with General Mattis’ words telling Congress that with respect to the cost of nuclear modernization, “the United States can afford survival.”

Peter Huessy is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

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Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Fairy Tales was originally published on Global Security Review.