One thing is clear: Pakistan’s nuclear capability is solely focused on India. Claims to the contrary misrepresent Pakistan’s doctrinal posture while creating unfounded geostrategic fears.

Unlike North Korea or Russia, Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is India-focused and regionally confined. Even when it became a nuclear power, it was not the first country to introduce nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan’s missile inventory includes the Shaheen, Ghauri, Ababeel, and other series of missiles. They are all short- or medium-range missile systems to counter Indian nuclear capabilities. Even Pakistan’s multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV)–capable medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM), the Ababeel, has a range of 2,200 km and is a response to India’s ballistic missile defense system.

Moreover, Pakistan’s Shaheen III land-based MRBM has a range of 2,750 to cover Indian far-off strategic bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These missile ranges are not even close to the ICBM threshold of at least 5,500 km.

Unlike nuclear weapon states that have ICBMs, Pakistan does not possess the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability, terrestrial or space-based, needed to accurately launch nuclear weapons half-way across the planet. India, not Pakistan, is working on not just ICBMs, but also the global ISR infrastructure to effectively employ such weapons. India has not only tested the Agni-V, which has a range of 8,000+ km but is also developing the Agni-VI with a 12,000 km range. The K-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), with intercontinental strike capability, is also in development.

It is alarming to note that the deployment of K-5 SLBMs on expansive ocean patrols can enable India to target Europe, Russia, Israel, and American Pacific territories. Such Indian military and nuclear buildup are not consistent with India’s policy of credible minimum deterrence (CMD).

Currently, India is accelerating the deployment of 52 military satellites for ISR. These satellites will support ICBM employment and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons capabilities.

Indian naval nuclear projection also indicates that it will develop military bases abroad in accord with its ambitions to be a blue-water navy. India is developing overseas military facilities across the Indian Ocean region, including in the Seychelles, Tajikistan, Oman, the Maldives, and Mauritius. India also has signed logistic support agreements (LSAs) with states for mutual logistic support at ports and bases. These agreements also include ISR agreements with Australia, France, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the US, and Vietnam.

Pakistan’s strategic culture and historic interests reflect a deep concern with losing a conflict against India. This is because Pakistan does not have the geography that allows for a defense in depth against an attacking Indian Army. Thus, both conventional and nuclear forces are designed to deter and defeat that specific threat.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine is defined by the logic of CMD. Its full-spectrum deterrence (FSD) posture also falls under CMD at all levels of threat, including tactical, operational, and strategic. The development of an ICBM is inconsistent with every aspect of Pakistani military thinking and action.

Pakistan already fields the capabilities needed to strike any target in India. Pakistan has no ambitions regarding global power projection. From a Pakistani perspective, building nuclear weapons for the sake of coercing or striking the United States only makes the relationship with the United States worse and invites American intervention in Pakistan.

When Vipin Narang and Pranay Vaddi, Indian Americans, published an article in Foreign Affairs in which they suggested Pakistan is building an ICBM whose target is the United States, they engaged in blatant information warfare. Their assertion is unfounded.

India’s shift from deterrence-by-denial to a more aggressive nuclear posture, including deterrence by compellence and punishment, certainly has Pakistan concerned. This change is tolerated by the United States because India is seen as a counterweight to China in Asia.

It is important for Americans to learn a critical lesson from the 2020 China-India crisis; India is unlikely to fight with the US against China if a war comes. China is the second-largest trade partner of India after the US with total trade reaching $127.7 billion in 2024–2025. There is ample reason for India to do what it has always done, play both sides.

Admittedly, Pakistan has a problem with terrorism and a difficult time effectively controlling terrorists operating from the Afghan border region, which grew worse when Pakistan partnered with the US to fight the War on Terror. Pakistan is now the second most negatively affected country when it comes to terrorism.

Over recent years, Islamabad alone lost 80,000 civilian and security personnel to the menace of terrorism. India has also been involved in terror activities in Pakistan, irrefutable evidence of Indian involvement was provided to UN Secretary-General.

Keep in mind, the vast majority of Pakistanis want to live in a country that looks like the United States, not one that looks like Afghanistan or China—when it comes to democracy, economic prosperity, freedom, and stability. Pakistanis want increased economic trade and development with the United States, not nuclear war.

As India expands its capabilities, Pakistan is likely to follow India’s lead. This is, however, done for the purpose of ensuring India cannot launch a disarming strike against Pakistan. Platforms like SSBNs may be necessary as Pakistan is compelled to diversify, not globalize, its range of nuclear weapons.

If the US is sincere in its desire to create stability in South Asia, encouraging India to cease building nuclear weapons that are a direct threat to Pakistan would be helpful. The US can also invest in arms control dialogue and crisis communication in South Asia. President Trump played a key role in ending the most recent conflict. He also ended the Twelve Day War between Iran and Israel. Given his concern for preventing war, President Trump can play a critical role in South Asia.

Pakistan has partnered with the United States since its independence from India. It was a partner during the Cold War when India was not and worked closely with the United States for two decades during the conflict in Afghanistan. Admittedly, Pakistan faces some internal challenges, but educated Pakistanis want nothing more than a good relationship with the United States.

Anum A. Khan is an Associate Director at the Centre for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, a Youth Leader Fund (YLF) Mentor with the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), and Project Associate of The Third Nuclear Age Project.

Pakistan Is Not Building an ICBM to Attack America was originally published on Global Security Review.

The latest round of sanctions showed the Biden administration’s disregard for Pakistan’s long history of cooperation with Washington. Islamabad always sought to engage diplomatically with the White House in a constructive manner—aspiring to nurture its relationship with the United States. However, the sanctions imposed on Pakistan’s missile program by the US, grounded in doubts and assumptions, do not bode well for the overall stability of the relationship.

When Pakistan became an ally of the United States in the 1950s and supported American strategy in the region, especially during the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan took significant risk both domestically and with often unfriendly neighbors. Pakistan valued the relationship and made significant strides in fostering a partnership. However, it still struggles to preserve peace and stability in the region after a hasty American withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The recent spate of American allegations against Pakistan not only increase mistrust between the two states but also undermine the credibility of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Current sanctions tend to create an imbalance in the strategic calculus of South Asia, shifting the balance of power towards Pakistan’s adversary, India. New Delhi’s military and nuclear modernization is already destabilizing South Asia.

            Washington’s favoring of New Delhi furthers the augment that there is an increasing gap between India and Pakistan, which could reignite an arms race. Historically, the US played a constructive third-party role in easing tensions between Pakistan and India. However, growing mistrust between Pakistan and the US could limit its leverage to act as neutral mediator in any future crisis. Such a trust deficit between the US and Pakistan could undermine regional stability in South Asia.

With New Delhi’s evolving missile capabilities, Pakistan considers its strategic capabilities crucial for deterrence. This ensures that the country does not face an existential threat from across its border. Islamabad maintains that its missile and nuclear program are intended to counterbalance India’s growing conventional and nuclear superiority.

According to the former US Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, Jon Finer, Pakistan has pursued “increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors.” If that continues, Finer said, “Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States.” He further said that the advancement in Pakistan’s ballistic missile systems could pose a direct threat to global security, enabling Pakistan to target countries far beyond its immediate neighborhood.

In response Pakistan’s Foreign Office (MOFA) commented on Finer’s statement and said that the perception of an alleged threat was “unfortunate.” These sanctions which are imposed under Executive Order 13382, are based on mere doubts and suspicions devoid of any substantial evidence. In its statement, the MOFA said that “Pakistan has also made it abundantly clear that our strategic program and allied capabilities are solely meant to deter and thwart a clear and visible existential threat from our neighborhood and should not be perceived as a threat to any other country.” With such clarity in Pakistan’s strategic approach, the American sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missile program are nothing more than misplaced concerns.

The US is turning a blind eye towards Indian nuclear expansion and is strengthening its strategic partnership so that it can serve as a counterweight to China. Because of this strategic cooperation, the US aids India with the transfer of high-end defense technologies. Agreements such as the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) and the Communications Capability and Security Agreement (COMCASA) are critical to Indian development. Under the framework of the Defense Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET), India also benefits.

In 2008, the United States pampered India with a waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) restrictions, exempting it from obligations that apply to nuclear export controls for states outside the scope of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).This mutual defense cooperation between the US and India augments Indian military capabilities, accentuating military asymmetries in South Asia.

While maintaining silence on India’s intercontinental ballistic missile program, with a manifest range of above 5,000 kilometers, American officials raised misleading concerns regarding Pakistan’s capabilities. In reality, the longest-range ballistic missile of Pakistan, the Shaheen III, demonstrated a range of 2,750 kilometers, explicitly designed to deter only India. The country’s ballistic missile program has no intention of endangering the sovereignty of any other state, including allies of its long-standing partner, the United States.

To overcome this trust deficit, Pakistan and the US must take the initiative and forge a comprehensive security dialogue that aligns their strategic interests. This security dialogue would provide an avenue to discuss common security objectives, including regional stability, counterterrorism efforts, and transnational threats. Furthermore, mutual collaboration in intelligence-sharing will augment the effectiveness of both nations’ security apparatus. Constructive communication between Pakistan and the US is crucial to building a more stable and cooperative future, which would not only strengthen their bilateral ties but also contribute to peace and security in South Asia and beyond.

While the Biden administration expressed concerns about Pakistan’s missile capabilities, Islamabad maintained, then and now, that these measures are purely defensive in nature. They are designed to safeguard national security amidst evolving regional tensions. It would be fruitful for both nations for President Donald Trump to correct the mistake of the Biden administration, acknowledging Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns and engaging with a willing ally. Collaboration rather than coercion is necessary for Pakistan and the US to address shared challenges.

Nawal Nawaz is a research assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

American Sanctions and Pakistan’s Strategic Realities was originally published on Global Security Review.

President Trump’s foreign policy will primarily focus outside South Asia and engage countries with a lens toward their relationship with China. Drawing on his known foreign policy orientation, Trump 2.0 is poised to keep India on a high strategic pedestal in the broader framework of Indo-Pacific strategy.

Pakistan is unlikely to play a major foreign policy role for the Trump administration. Thus, it is pertinent for the Pakistani diplomatic community to find areas of convergence with the Trump administration. Policy options must be exercised in a way to constructively approach strategic divergencies between the two states.

America’s engagement with the Global South is likely going to decline as an “America First” approach calls for reducing international engagement towards all but a handful of countries. Critics may characterize President Trump’s foreign policy approach as short term and transactional, but this sells the president short. A policy of “minilateralism” is not shortsighted but may allow him to focus on more pressing domestic issues in the United States. This redirection of focus is, however, bad news for global agendas like climate change and multilateral cooperation.

There is a broader consensus in the Trump team, based on a strategic imperative to counter China in the Asia-Pacific, that leaves less room for lower priorities. Thus, the trade and tariff wars between China and the US may have second-order effects for countries like Pakistan.

President Trump’s advisers are likely to approach China as an adversary and will view Pakistan with some caution, perceiving it as an ally of Beijing. The Trump administration may seek to intensify the competition with China and up the ante for countries who are onboard with Chinese infrastructure and development projects, such as Pakistan, which could be a potential victim of a new Great Game.

An era of conditional trade agreements between Pakistan and the United States appears imminent and is characterized by a departure from preferential trade practices. Instead, the US is likely to prioritize market-driven agreements, emphasizing economic pragmatism over diplomatic goodwill. To enhance bilateral trade relations, Pakistan could strategically leverage its geopolitical significance and pursue a proactive approach to addressing American concerns, without compromising its national strategic interests.

This would necessitate credible efforts to combat terrorism and contribute to stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. Such measures could foster greater mutual confidence and pave the way for more constructive economic engagement between the two nations.

American attempts to make India its strategic surrogate in the Asia-Pacific will embolden Indian hegemonic ambitions. Intense security collaboration between the US and India at bilateral and multilateral defense groups like the Quad could disrupt the regional strategic stability calculus in South Asia.

Pakistan’s economic woes may not allow it to sustain the brunt of a growing Indian strategic modernization in the long run. This will impact strategic stability in the region.
Retrospective analysis of the first Trump administration suggests that American cooperation with Pakistan, in the realms of climate change and clean energy, will be relegated as more pressing geostrategic issues take precedence. Moreover, the dwindling economy of Pakistan may find the Trump administration far less sympathetic as far as economic aid and loan packages are concerned. The first Trump administration was less sensitive to Pakistan’s core interest, like Kashmir, and more demanding of Pakistan in its Afghanistan conundrum.
The US State Department under Trump will likely pursue a limited set of priorities, especially in the security and counterterrorism realms. US-Pakistan relations are traditionally marked by events in Afghanistan. This was true from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the war on terror. With the reduction of American engagement in Afghanistan, Pakistan finds itself entangled in an increasingly intricate security matrix amid deteriorating relations with the Taliban and increasing terrorism in Pakistan.

Shifting the onus onto Pakistan for an American policy debacle was a convenient strategy of the Biden administration. Pakistan may find the new administration more aggressive in its demands for stabilizing Afghanistan. The “do more” mantra will not go over well with Pakistan anymore and will require a more practical approach on the part of the US.
On the flip side, President Trump’s personality-centered diplomatic overtures, rather than institutionalized mechanisms, are not good for Pakistan. President Trump engaged with Imran Khan constructively, but he is no longer in office. Criticism could come from Trump’s team regarding the crackdown on Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) movement. State Department and Pentagon engagement with Pakistan’s diplomatic corps and security establishment will depend on the whims of Trump rather than an ongoing policy framework. The absence of mutual interests between the US and Pakistan remains a hurdle.

These are interesting times for the diplomats of Pakistan. On the one hand, they will try to resist President Trump’s pressure-based strategy toward Pakistan. On the other hand, they will try to convince State Department officials to pursue more practical approaches to the US-Pakistan relationship. How hard this proves is yet to be determined.
Either way, Pakistan will face a more conditional and transactional relationship with the US. It will hinge on security concerns rather than economic issues. Being close to China diplomatically and strategically opens a unique window of opportunity for Pakistan. It can play the role of a bridge between China and the US, as it has done historically, should the Trump administration seek it out.

Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Future of US-Pakistan Relations was originally published on Global Security Review.