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	<title>Topic:uranium enrichment &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Harsa Kakar]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 02 Feb 2026 13:00:44 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32239</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The year 2026 arrives with looming threats of nuclear weapon employment more than ever, as the world is faced with eroding arms control agreements and the global environment seems increasingly fragile. With several key treaties set to expire in 2026 and countries rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenals in response to growing international conflict 2026 will [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/">The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The year 2026 arrives with looming threats of nuclear weapon employment more than ever, as the world is faced with eroding arms control agreements and the global environment seems increasingly fragile. With several key treaties set to expire in 2026 and countries rapidly expanding their nuclear arsenals in response to growing international conflict 2026 will be a defining moment, particularly as countries like Japan and Saudi Arabia contemplate nuclear weapon development. As diplomats of non-proliferation continue to call for disarmament, reality dictates that such talk is fantasy rather than a clear roadmap forward, underscoring a need for a realistic assessment of the challenges that lie ahead.</p>
<p>Most the world’s approximately <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">12,100</a> nuclear weapons are held by just a handful of major world powers. The U.S. and Russia hold nearly <a href="https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/">87</a> percent of the world’s nuclear weapons, with Russia possessing approximately <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">5,500</a> and the US holding approximately <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">5,177,</a> declared  weapons, many of which remain in a state of high alert. China possesses an estimated <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/nuclear-weapons-who-has-what-glance">600</a> operational nuclear weapons, with the number having grown by over 100 in recent years. France is estimated to have 290 warheads; the UK, 225; India, 180; and Pakistan, 170. These countries have all maintained stable stockpiles through modernization efforts. However, North Korea maintains an estimated <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea">50</a> nuclear weapons, but is aggressively developing its nuclear delivery capabilities, including the development of solid-fueled ICBMs and nuclear-capable submarines with Russian backing.</p>
<p>These developments present the growth in nuclear arsenals and nuclear technology, rather than a reduction. The growth includes the qualitative development of nuclear delivery technology, such as hypersonic vehicles and Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs), which has undermined the existing balance in the arms race established because of the Cold War.</p>
<p>The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New Start), which remains the last bilateral US-Russian nuclear weapons agreement, is scheduled to expire on February 5, 2026, without any proposed replacements because of disagreement on the treaty’s terms. In 2023, Russia withdrew from the inspection and data sharing provisions in relation to Ukraine, but the two countries have openly stated to voluntarily meet their respective limit requirements under the treaty since then. If the treaty is allowed to lapse, it is anticipated that each side could begin to increase their nuclear weapons arsenal, which could prompt other nuclear-capable states, including China, to do likewise.</p>
<p>Additionally, the upcoming review conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to occur in New York in April 2026, presents additional challenges. Past NPT review conferences have been unable to reach a consensus primarily because of the anger expressed by non-nuclear states toward nuclear-armed states for failing to meet their obligations under Article VI of the treaty to pursue disarmament. As a result of this failure, several treaties relating to the regulation of nuclear weapons, including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) have been signed but not ratified by key signatory states and therefore lack the needed verification mechanisms.</p>
<p>Iran may also be motivated to obtain nuclear weapons for the purpose of providing a deterrent against Israel&#8217;s expanding conventional and nuclear capabilities. Iran&#8217;s nuclear weapons program is one of the most pressing issues confronting the United States and Israel today. Iran is now stockpiling uranium-enriched to 60% levels that are close to the level of enrichment required to produce nuclear weapons. It is also developing new centrifuges at its underground facility, known as Fordow, and is shortening the time it takes to produce a nuclear weapon despite continuing economic sanctions and airstrikes against its military assets.</p>
<p>Further, North Korea indicated that 2025 would be a &#8220;<a href="https://www.apln.network/analysis/the-korea-times-column/2026-signals-critical-moment-to-preserve-nuclear-order">crucial year</a>&#8221; for its nuclear weapons development program and announced that it successfully tested its Hwasong-20 Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and has increased the size of its nuclear facility at Yongbyon; it intends to complete construction of missile factories by 2026. Regional conflicts on the Korean Peninsula and in the Middle East, especially those involving Iran and Israel continue to pose a substantial risk of unintended escalation in the increasingly complex and multi-polar world we live in today.</p>
<p>Disarmament is nothing more than a relic of a bygone era. Nuclear-armed states are engaging in modernization efforts and the language used by these states appears to lower the threshold for using these weapons, seen from Russia’s nuclear threats regarding Ukraine to the lowering of nuclear alert status. Verification is touted by some as much as possible through the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); however, the nuclear powers are unwilling to provide the level of transparency needed to verify compliance with any proposed disarmament treaty. Furthermore, although non-proliferation efforts have successfully limited the number of new nuclear weapons being developed, until nuclear-armed states reduce their own arsenals, non-proliferation efforts will remain a hollow pillar.</p>
<p>In 2026, nuclear arsenals among the great powers are expected to continue expanding. At the same time, the expiration of New START is likely to lead to the failure of the NPT Review Conference, further weakening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime. These challenges will be compounded by the emergence of modern technologies, including artificial-intelligence–enabled command systems and hypersonic delivery vehicles, which increasingly blur the line between conventional and nuclear capabilities. When combined with the proliferation activities of states such as Iran and North Korea, these developments will place unprecedented strain on diplomatic efforts to prevent conflict and miscalculation. This risk is heightened further by escalating tensions among the world’s major powers.</p>
<p><em>Ms. Harsa Kakar is working as an Assistant Research Fellow at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS, Quetta, Pakistan. She is an MS International Relations Scholar at BUITEMS, Quetta, and a distinguished graduate of International Relations from the University of Balochistan. She specializes in AI, Global Politics, Diplomacy, Soft Power, and Conflict Resolution. Views expressed in this article are her own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/The-Dawn-of-2026-Challenges-to-Non-proliferation.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-dawn-of-2026-and-challenges-to-non-proliferation/">The Dawn of 2026 and Challenges to Non-Proliferation</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan Heath]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 07 Oct 2025 12:05:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31642</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On June 22, the United States struck multiple Iranian nuclear sites, marking a tipping point in its deterrence of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions. It was no longer enough to institute unilateral or multilateral sanctions against the regime, carry out strikes against its proxies, or support Israel’s own military action; direct American military power was [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/">Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On June 22, the United States <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/live/2025/06/21/world/iran-israel-trump">struck</a> multiple Iranian nuclear sites, marking a tipping point in its deterrence of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear ambitions. It was no longer enough to institute unilateral or multilateral sanctions against the regime, carry out strikes against its proxies, or support Israel’s own military action; direct American military power was needed against Iran itself. After all, Iran was <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/mossad-says-iran-15-days-from-bomb-us-agencies-still-say-up-to-a-year-report/">dangerously close</a> to producing a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>The near completion of Iran’s nuclear weapon brings to mind another rogue state’s activities. In 2006, after years of global efforts aimed at preventing the Kim regime from obtaining nuclear weapons, North Korea (DPRK) conducted its first nuclear test. Today, the DPRK has an <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-north-korea">estimated</a> 50 nuclear weapons and fissile material for 6 or 7 more.</p>
<p>An in-depth comparison of US engagement with Iran and the DPRK’s nuclear programs requires a much longer paper. However, a brief comparative analysis of American deterrence of these adversaries is possible. Applying national interests, objectives, and activities, a methodology employed by decision analysis experts yields interesting results.</p>
<p>Globally, the United States has an enduring interest in safeguarding its national security and sovereignty. Underneath this enduring interest, it has a core objective of defending allies and partners, including through credible deterrence (e.g., preventing conventional and/or nuclear attacks on allies and partners by the DPRK, China, Russia, and Iran). Other <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/us-policy-middle-east-second-quarter-2025-report-card">major American objectives</a> include <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-five-keys-of-donald-trumps-grand-strategy">safeguarding</a> the free flow of commerce, countering <a href="https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2025-Unclassified-Report.pdf">transnational threats</a>, preventing <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/indopacom_posture_statement_2025.pdf">regional domination or aggression</a>, and <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/08/trump-wants-to-stop-nuclear-proliferation-stratcom-could-play-a-major-role/">advancing nonproliferation</a>.</p>
<p>The United States advances deterrence through a range of activities, including the presence of its own military assets and security cooperation with allies and partners. In the Indo-Pacific, this includes mutual defense treaties with Australia, the Philippines; South Korea, and Japan (the latter two of which are explicitly covered by the US nuclear umbrella); <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2025/05/31/2003837800#:~:text=The%20US%20plans%20to%20ramp%20up%20weapons%20sales,two%20US%20officials%20said%20on%20condition%20of%20anonymity.">arms</a> sales to Taiwan; and <a href="https://www.army.mil/article/286395/exercise_talisman_sabre_2025_to_showcase_us_australia_alliance">military exercises</a> with allies.</p>
<p>More recently, the Trump administration emphasized <a href="https://uscnpm.org/2025/06/24/the-trump-administrations-indo-pacific-strategy/">increased allied defense spending</a> to support “burden-sharing.” Given the limitations of the American industrial base, this is necessary even as the US <a href="https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/foreignaffairs/20250131/hegseth-reaffirms-strong-alliance-with-s-korea-during-1st-phone-talks-with-seouls-defense-chief">maintains</a> efforts to prevent Chinese and North Korean aggression.</p>
<p>Deterrence against North Korea is successful insofar as it keeps the North from invading the South or launching nuclear strikes on US Indo-Pacific allies. However, this deterrence is increasingly complicated by Chinese and Russian <a href="https://www.fpri.org/article/2025/03/russia-china-north-korea-relations-obstacles-to-a-trilateral-axis/">protection</a> of the DPRK through mutual defense treaties.</p>
<p>This lends greater urgency to the American call for allies to increase defense spending, as there is a real risk of <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/the-united-states-and-its-allies-must-be-ready-to-deter-a-two-front-war-and-nuclear-attacks-in-east-asia/">simultaneous conflict</a> with China and North Korea, a scenario requiring substantial military assets in the region. Fulfilling the objective of regional deterrence also requires containing aggression from adversaries and bolstering security cooperation with allies and partners.</p>
<p>The United States supports deterrence in the Middle East by deploying its military forces and cooperating with allies and partners. However, regional deterrence, which <a href="https://cgsr.llnl.gov/sites/cgsr/files/2025-05/Extended%20Deterrence%20in%20a%20Multipolar-Nuclear-World-Workshop-Summary.pdf">does not</a> formally extend the US nuclear umbrella to regional allies and partners (including Israel), often manifests as kinetic operations against adversaries, whether through security assistance or direct attacks. Thus, in the Middle East, deterrence also means advancing the goals of counter proliferation and degrading terror groups who threaten allies.</p>
<p>Unlike in the Indo-Pacific, where the United States <a href="https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4202504/hegseth-outlines-us-vision-for-indo-pacific-addresses-china-threat/">prefers</a> to contain aggression and expansion from nuclear-armed adversaries without firing a shot, in the Middle East, it will <a href="https://instituteofgeoeconomics.org/en/research/2025040904/">employ</a> kinetic means to fulfill its objectives. For decades, the United States deterred Iran through sanctions, negotiations, and the threat of military action. It was when President Trump believed Iran’s uranium enrichment program was “<a href="https://www.politifact.com/article/2025/jun/23/Tulsi-Gabbard-Iran-nuclear-weapon-Donald-Trump/">at its highest levels and…unprecedented for a state without nuclear weapons</a>” that the US conducted kinetic attack.</p>
<p>The deep rifts in Middle East politics complicates the activities needed to maintain deterrence in the region. Prospects for security cooperation between Israel and the Gulf states, for example, are <a href="https://theconversation.com/israeli-strike-in-doha-crosses-a-new-line-from-which-relations-with-gulf-may-not-recover-264954">challenging</a> given the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict, including Israel’s recent strike against Hamas in Qatar.</p>
<p>Deterrence must also account for energy security concerns, given that US attempts to contain a nuclear-armed Iran may lead the regime to weaponize its <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/four-questions-and-expert-answers-about-irans-threats-to-close-the-strait-of-hormuz/">control</a> over the Straits of Hormuz. It is also <a href="https://www.cfr.org/article/assessing-effect-us-strikes-iran">unclear</a> how far back American strikes set Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran’s proxy network <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/06/28/iran-is-severely-weakened-but-remains-a-regional-threat/">persists</a>, they can also commit further violence against the United States, its allies, and partners through attacks on military, commercial, and civilian targets.</p>
<p>None of these challenges are simple. In the coming years American deterrence guarantees to allies and partners may look very different as the nation <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/policy_briefs/2025/02/14/stark-strategic-realities-hegseth-tells-nato-u-s-must-prioritize-pacific-deterrence/">shifts focus</a> to the homeland and the Indo-Pacific. It remains to be seen how this imperative is realized in the forthcoming <em>National Defense Strategy</em>. Some critics <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/analysts-await-forthcoming-nds-to-clear-up-defense-policy-contradictions/">note</a> that, in practice, the United States remains heavily focused on the Middle East and Europe. Much of the ability to deter Iran and North Korea will be determined by these larger strategic shifts.</p>
<p>As American decision-makers face questions about effectively deploying American power across the globe, analyzing national interests, objectives, and activities can provide a helpful framework. Assessing the requirements needed to advance larger regional goals brings trade-offs into focus, better preparing the American warfighter for multiple threat scenarios. In short, this approach can yield meaningful results for those in the decision-making chair at critical moments when faced with complex problems, including maintaining credible deterrence.</p>
<p><em>Nathan Heath is an analyst at NSI. Views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><em><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Extended-Deterrence-of-North-Korea-and-Iran-Interests-Objectives-Analysis-Framework.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-of-north-korea-and-iran-interests-objectives-analysis-framework/">Deterrence of North Korea and Iran: Interests-Objectives-Analysis Framework</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Nuclear Diplomacy or Regime Survival? Rethinking the Iran Deal</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/who-truly-benefits-from-a-us-iran-new-nukes-deal/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Loqman Radpey]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 24 Apr 2025 12:15:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30597</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In response to President Donald Trump’s letter to Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, proposing a new nuclear deal, Khamenei’s stance was unequivocal: rejection, dismissing it as “deception of public opinion.” Yet, within the Iranian government, conflicting signals emerged, with some officials suggesting the offer was under consideration. This strategic ambiguity is not new. Khamenei employed [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/who-truly-benefits-from-a-us-iran-new-nukes-deal/">Nuclear Diplomacy or Regime Survival? Rethinking the Iran Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In response to President Donald Trump’s <a href="https://www.axios.com/2025/03/19/trump-letter-iran-nuclear-deal">letter</a> to Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, proposing a new nuclear deal, Khamenei’s stance was unequivocal: rejection, <a href="https://nypost.com/2025/03/19/us-news/trumps-letter-to-iran-demanded-new-nuclear-deal-very-soon-wh/">dismissing</a> it as “deception of public opinion.” Yet, within the Iranian government, conflicting signals emerged, with some <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/world/5124276-iran-behind-trump%E2%80%99s-threat-opportunity">officials</a> suggesting the offer was under <a href="https://x.com/Iran_UN/status/1898746038074155491">consideration</a>. This strategic ambiguity is not new. Khamenei employed the same tactic during negotiations for the collapsed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), allowing him to distance himself from any fallout should the deal collapse. Ultimately, however, history has shown that under pressure, the regime will capitulate—what Iran’s leaders call “drinking the poisoned chalice.” But assuming a new deal materializes, what would it mean for the people of Iran?</p>
<p>In 2018, President Donald Trump <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-ending-united-states-participation-unacceptable-iran-deal/">withdrew</a> from the JCPOA, the nuclear agreement brokered by President Barack Obama in 2015, as it “failed to protect America’s national security interests.” Trump justified his withdrawal by arguing that the agreement, as “a windfall of cash”, did not curbed Iran’s malign activities. Instead, he contended, it provided financial resources that “enriched the Iranian regime and enabled its malign behavior.”</p>
<p>For Iran’s non-Persian national and ethnic groups, the failure of the JCPOA was also due to its <a href="https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2020/05/08/jcpoa-not-improved-irans-human-rights-record/">disregard</a> for human rights and domestic oppression. Western negotiators prioritized nuclear and missiles restrictions and regional security while sidelining the people’s suffering under an authoritarian regime. The economic relief from the deal landed in the hands of regime elites, particularly the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and their affiliates. Ordinary peoples saw little benefit. Instead, the regime doubled down on its crackdown against marginalized groups, including Kurds, Baloch, and Arabs. With reduced external pressure, Tehran felt emboldened to impose its Persian-Shia ideological <a href="https://www.meforum.org/mef-observer/persia-or-iran-why-it-matters">hegemony</a> even more aggressively.</p>
<p>Now, with <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-04/iran-putin-to-help-trump-broker-nuclear-talks-with-tehran">talks</a> of a renewed deal <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=acvu2LBumGo">resurfacing</a>, one must ask: will this agreement, like its predecessor, serve only the regime’s interests? Trump’s letter outlined <a href="https://x.com/abdulkhaleq_uae/status/1902772134432403958?s=46">conditions</a> for sanctions relief, including an end to Iran’s nuclear weapons program, cessation of uranium enrichment, ceasing financial support to Hezbollah and halting arms transfers to the Houthis, and dismantling its militias in Iraq. However, these terms, like before, fail to address the human rights abuses within Iran. If a future deal ignores these realities, it will once again be the oppressed groups who pay the price.</p>
<p>The absence of human rights considerations in Western negotiations with Iran is not incidental—it is a <a href="https://webarchive.archive.unhcr.org/20230530075957/https:/www.refworld.org/docid/55e6bf714.html">consistent</a> pattern. Historically, the West has often prioritized short-term strategic gains over the long-term aspirations of the people in Iran. The result has been a cycle of diplomatic engagements that empower the ruling elite while leaving everyday people in a deepening state of economic hardship and political repression. Sanctions relief, while theoretically aimed at improving the people’s economy, has instead served as a financial injection for the regime’s military-industrial complex, allowing it to tighten its grip on power.</p>
<p>For Iran’s diverse population—comprising Baluchis, Kurds, Armenians, Qashqais, Azeris, Arabs, Turkmens, Gilakis, Tabaris, Talyshis, and religious groups including Jews and Bahais—a nuclear deal that fails to address their plight could be devastating. The regime’s persecution of non-Persian groups has been marked by disproportionate <a href="https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc5862-situation-human-rights-islamic-republic-iran-report-special">executions</a> of Kurds and Baluchis, arbitrary detentions, and systematic cultural suppression. Economic marginalization has left these groups disproportionately affected by unemployment, poverty, and lack of access to basic services. A deal that does not explicitly condition sanctions relief on improvements in human rights will serve as yet another tool for the government to sustain its policies of repression and forced assimilation. Moreover, the suppression of dissent extends to students, journalists, and activists who have faced severe crackdowns for expressing opposition to the regime’s policies.</p>
<p>This regime operates outside conventional norms, yet Western commentators in mainstream media, instead of acknowledging the ideological and religious motives of Iran’s Shi’ite rulers, continue to search for rational justifications that overlook the regime’s true nature. If the past is any indication, a nuclear deal without guarantees for the people of Iran will reinforce the status quo: economic benefits funneled to regime elites, intensified repression of national and ethnic minorities, and continued expansion of Iran’s regional influence at the expense of its citizens. A more “comprehensive” approach to diplomacy with Iran must incorporate human rights as a core negotiating principle. Strict oversight and accountability measures must be implemented to prevent state-controlled entities, such as the judiciary, from imposing verdicts on the people, and the IRGC from monopolizing financial resources and oppressing dissidents. Furthermore, human rights organizations and genuine opposition figures should have a voice in shaping the terms of any agreement.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the goal of any nuclear deal should also aim to create conditions that empower its people to pursue democratic aspirations. A policy that prioritizes human rights alongside the security of Israel and the US would be strategically effective in fostering long-term stability in the region.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Nuclear-Diplomacy-or-Regime-Survival-Rethinking-the-Iran-Deal.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29601" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="Download here." width="274" height="76" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 274px) 100vw, 274px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/who-truly-benefits-from-a-us-iran-new-nukes-deal/">Nuclear Diplomacy or Regime Survival? Rethinking the Iran Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-global-instability-fuels-the-nuclear-arms-race/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Usama Khalid]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Mar 2025 12:05:23 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30228</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The world is in an uncertain place today and is perhaps experiencing the most uncertainty since World War II. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the world has faced an active threat of nuclear escalation. Fortunately, Russian President Vladimir Putin has not crossed the nuclear threshold. Still, the threat [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-global-instability-fuels-the-nuclear-arms-race/">How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The world is in an uncertain place today and is perhaps experiencing the most uncertainty since World War II. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the world has faced an active threat of nuclear escalation. Fortunately, Russian President Vladimir Putin has not crossed the nuclear threshold. Still, the threat cannot be discounted.</p>
<p>Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.</p>
<p>The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.</p>
<p>In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.</p>
<p>The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.</p>
<p>Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.</p>
<p>On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.</p>
<p>Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.</p>
<p>Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.</p>
<p>Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.</p>
<p>The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for <a href="https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280401fbb">security assurances</a>—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.</p>
<p>At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.</p>
<p>Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Erosion-of-Trust.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="Download this article. " width="281" height="78" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 281px) 100vw, 281px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-global-instability-fuels-the-nuclear-arms-race/">How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jan 2025 13:38:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29859</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The Middle East experienced significant geopolitical shifts over the past year. In October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, resulting in approximately 1,200 Israeli deaths. Israel’s subsequent military response led to an estimated 40,000 Palestinian casualties, predominantly in Gaza. The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The Middle East experienced significant geopolitical shifts over the past year. In October 2023, Hamas launched a surprise attack on Israel, resulting in <a href="https://www.state.gov/anniversary-of-october-7th-attack/#:~:text=Today%2C%20we%20mark%20a%20devastating,of%20Jews%20since%20the%20Holocaust.">approximately</a> 1,200 Israeli deaths. Israel’s subsequent military response led to an <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/12/1158206">estimated</a> 40,000 Palestinian casualties, predominantly in Gaza.</p>
<p>The conflict caused widespread destruction and displacement, exacerbating the long-standing humanitarian crisis in the region. It then extended into Lebanon, where Iran-backed Hezbollah engaged in hostilities against Israel. On November 27, 2024, following months of intense confrontations, the US brokered a 60-day ceasefire, allowing thousands of displaced individuals to return to southern Lebanon. However, the ceasefire’s durability remains <a href="https://apnews.com/article/lebanon-hezbollah-israel-war-ceasefire-tyre-ae002af23c7ec9e19a0cea08fecc9f62">uncertain</a>, with speculation concerning potential violations and the broader implications for regional stability.</p>
<p>In Syria, rebels led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) capitalized on regional unrest to seize control of key areas, including Aleppo, Idlib, and Hama. The Assad regime’s traditional allies—Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia—were preoccupied with their own conflicts, allowing the Assad regime’s overthrow. HTS, which is presumably anti-Iran, is making Syria more difficult for Iran to influence. Iranian influence allowed the regime to transit armaments to Hezbollah in Lebanon.</p>
<p>Over the past year, Israel intensified its military operations to degrade Iran’s proxy forces across the Middle East, employing a combination of airstrikes, special operations, and strategic assassinations. On October 26, 2024, Israel <a href="https://news.sky.com/story/operation-days-of-repentance-how-israels-strike-on-iran-unfolded-13243562">launched</a> Operation Days of Repentance, targeting over 20 locations in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. This operation significantly damaged Iran’s capabilities for missile production and utilization of its air defense systems.</p>
<p>This also included the destruction of long-range surface-to-air missile batteries and detection radars. Israeli operations employed targeted assassinations to eliminate key figures within Iran’s proxy networks, including Hassan Nasrallah, who was eliminated in an airstrike in Beirut on September 27, 2024, along with other senior officials. Previously, on July 31, 2024, in an operation attributed to Israel, another notable assassination in Tehran, Iran, eliminated Ismail Haniyeh, the political leader of Hamas.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Israeli special forces conducted covert special operations and missions to disrupt Iran’s proxy activities. For instance, in September 2024, Israeli commandos <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/09/13/world/middleeast/israel-raid-syria-hezbollah.html">raided</a> an underground facility near Masyaf, Syria, known for its weapons development and potential use by Iran and Hezbollah to produce precision-guided missiles. Israeli forces also <a href="https://www.ynetnews.com/article/bjynx00hb1g">captured</a> Ali Soleiman al-Assi in southern Syria in November, accusing him of aiding Iranian intelligence efforts.</p>
<p>Despite the systematic degradation of Iran’s proxy forces in the region, Iran <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-nuclear-iaea-mideast-wars-israel-7450481f9e42ea5b786c5d672ec382a1">continues</a> to advance its nuclear program, posing a significant threat to the region. The head of France’s foreign intelligence agency <a href="https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2024-11-29/iran-nuclear-proliferation-critical-threat-in-coming-months-french-spy-chief-says">stated</a> that Iran’s nuclear proliferation poses a serious threat in the coming months, and both France and the United Kingdom are developing strategies to counter this threat.</p>
<p>However, the current geopolitical and military dynamics may present a unique opportunity for Israel to strike Iran, with a focus on neutralizing its nuclear and regional threats. A combination of factors, particularly the expectation of a West-backed Israeli military action to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, can underpin the reasoning.</p>
<p><strong>Degraded Proxy Capabilities</strong></p>
<p>In the past few months, Israel has effectively degraded the operational strength of Iranian-affiliated groups such as Hezbollah, Hamas, and Shia militias in Syria and Iraq. Moreover, the precise eliminations of various leadership divisions within Hezbollah and Hamas significantly undermine the command frameworks of Iran’s affiliates and their capacity to orchestrate operations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, Israeli precision strikes and covert operations effectively dismantled essential facilities supporting these groups, thereby diminishing their capacity for swift counteractions. With its proxies weakened, Iran is likely encountering difficulties in coordinating a robust regional strategy.</p>
<p>Israeli operations significantly <a href="https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-showed-power-of-f-35s-iran-strikes-uk-admiral-2024-12">degraded</a> Iran’s air defense systems, including their Russian <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ipJ80yH2BfI">S-300</a>s and other advanced defense platforms. This leaves critical facilities, including nuclear sites like Natanz and Fordow, more exposed to precision strikes aimed at eliminating Iran’s nuclear threat. Some Western experts believe that a successful strike now could potentially delay Iran’s nuclear ambitions for many years.</p>
<p>Domestically, Iran is also facing severe economic challenges, including unemployment, inflation, and widespread dissatisfaction among its population, which was further fuelled by protests over the past two years as a result of the dire <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202411173173">economic</a> situation of the country as well as the increasing <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/03/1147681">repression</a> by the regime. Ongoing protests and internal dissent are already straining the regime’s resources. Analysts believe that Iran’s leadership is significantly preoccupied with maintaining internal stability rather than launching a significant retaliatory campaign.</p>
<p>Overall, reports indicate that Iran’s national funds are nearly depleted, along with most of its financial resources being drained by its support to military and proxy activities. In addition, <a href="https://manaramagazine.org/2024/11/the-challenges-of-gas-and-electricity-imbalance-in-iran/#:~:text=However%2C%20the%20country%20grapples%20with,energy%20deficit%20by%20next%20summer.">energy</a> shortages, including electricity and gas, have fueled Iran’s economic crisis, thus, severely impacting its citizens and therefore further increasing civil unrest towards the regime.</p>
<p>That said, there is already a growing gap between the government and the public. This gap spans economic, political, and social aspects along with the increasing dissatisfaction over the government’s inability to address internal civil needs in parallel to the increasing repression by the regime.</p>
<p>Iran’s nuclear program is progressing at a rapid pace, with the emergence of reports indicating the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/11/29/iran-plans-to-install-6000-centrifuges-to-enrich-uranium-iaea-says">installation</a> of advanced centrifuges and uranium enrichment nearing the weapons-grade levels. Israel and the West may be seeing this as a narrowing window of opportunity to act decisively before Iran develops a nuclear weapon or possesses weapons-grade uranium. The possibility of delaying a firm action could allow Iran to fortify its facilities further or even achieve a nuclear breakout.</p>
<p>Iran’s foreign minister recently <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/28/iran-says-it-could-end-ban-on-possessing-nuclear-weapons-if-sanctions-reimposed">stated</a> that if the West proceeds with the threat of reimposing all United Nations sanctions, Iran is likely to move toward possessing its own nuclear weapons. This statement raises concerns about the effectiveness of the sanctions against Iran over the past years in advancing its nuclear objectives.</p>
<p>The ceasefire with Hezbollah and reduced clashes with Hamas is expected to establish a brief respite in regional conflicts. However, the US and European allies are growing increasingly exasperated with Iran’s unwillingness to engage on its nuclear program, which could render decisive action more acceptable on the diplomatic front. Arab nations, while cautious, share concerns about Iran’s regional influence and the progress in the development of its nuclear capabilities.</p>
<p>Although Iran held a new round of nuclear talks with France, Germany, and the United Kingdom on November 29, 2024, talks resulted in <a href="https://www.iranintl.com/en/202411296711">minimal</a> progress and no immediate course of action. This underscores the fact that diplomatic discussions with Iran yielded nothing in recent years, except for Iran’s continued advancement in its nuclear aspirations.</p>
<p>Furthermore, this will likely increase Europe’s shift towards adopting a hard-line position regarding engagement with Iran on nuclear issues. In this respect, it was reported that US President-elect Donald Trump is weighing <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/trump-iran-plan-nuclear-weapons-def26f1d">options</a> in countering Iran’s nuclear developments, including the option for a preventive airstrike.</p>
<p>Recent Israeli successes against Iran and its proxies created strategic momentum. Waiting too long could allow Iran to rebuild its defenses and recover its regional proxies to actively engage in attrition warfare with American and Israeli forces in the Middle East. This could occur while potentially working covertly in strengthening its own nuclear program. In this respect, some security analysts may argue that a Western-supported Israeli strike would leverage the latter’s current military and intelligence superiority in countering Iran’s regional proxies.</p>
<p>While highlighting these opportunities, it is also important to anticipate the possible risks, including the regional escalation involving Hezbollah, Yemen’s Houthis, Iraqi militias, and Syria. The risk of fully strained international relations with Iran also exists, especially if a strike triggers widespread civilian casualties or destabilizes global oil markets. Furthermore, a military action could arguably accelerate Iran’s nuclear ambitions clandestinely.</p>
<p>Those advocating for prompt action are likely to contend that the dangers of failing to act against Iran surpass the dangers of launching a pre-emptive strike before it is too late, putting Iran in a position to acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear-grade enriched uranium. It can be argued that the current moment is a fleeting alignment of weakened Iranian proxies, vulnerable defenses, and growing nuclear threats, making it a strategically opportune time to act decisively in pressuring Iran to refrain from pursuing its nuclear program. Finally, with President’s Trump return, it can be assumed that the new US administration may not have the immediate intention to pursue diplomacy with Iran, instead it would be more likely that a “maximum pressure” campaign would be adopted.</p>
<p><em>Mohamed ELDoh, PhD, is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Is-This-the-Right-Moment-to-Act-Against-Iran-on-All-Fronts.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/is-this-the-right-moment-to-act-against-iran-on-all-fronts/">Is This the Right Moment to Act Against Iran on All Fronts?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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