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		<title>China&#8217;s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Holden Johansen]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 12:10:48 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32858</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: July 2, 2026 China&#8217;s dominance of the rare-earth mineral supply chain gives Beijing a powerful tool of economic coercion against rival states. Vital rare-earth minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, and graphite are crucial inputs for products used in daily life and in national defense. These include electric vehicles, solar panels, military aircraft, and semiconductors. Ensuring control over [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/">China&#8217;s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{}"> July 2, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">China&#8217;s dominance of the rare-earth mineral supply chain gives Beijing a powerful tool of economic coercion against rival states. Vital rare-earth minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, and graphite are crucial </span><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-africa-critical-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none">inputs for products</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> used in daily life and in national defense. These include electric vehicles, solar panels, military aircraft, and semiconductors. Ensuring control over the supply chains of these critical minerals is becoming a key aspect of geopolitical rivalry.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Much of this competition is focused on Africa, which holds about </span><a href="https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/our-work-africa"><span data-contrast="none">30 percent</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the world’s mineral reserves. China has already secured dominant positions in essential parts of these supply chains, recognizing the strategic importance of controlling access to these critical resources.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">China produces nearly</span><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-africa-critical-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none"> 70 percent of the world&#8217;s rare earth minerals</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and has reinforced this position through deliberate efforts to </span><a href="https://rareearthexchanges.com/news/chinas-critical-minerals-footprint-in-africa-projects-strategy-and-impacts/"><span data-contrast="none">control every stage</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the critical mineral supply chain. This process begins long before extraction, with Chinese banks and engineering firms securing involvement. Beijing then extends that control to the project&#8217;s end, pairing ownership of mines with ownership of the railways, roads, and ports through which these materials move. The result is a supply system in which China extracts, refines, and exports minerals from Africa which ensures that, in many cases, raw materials move on Chinese terms.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">China’s dominance in the rare earth mineral trade stems from its strategic approach to mineral supply chains, not just profit. This allows Beijing to maintain long-term control of mines during economic downturns. This is a luxury that profit-driven Western competitors do not have. Chinese firms enter the market fully prepared and offers financing, workforce, equipment, and logistics that often gain significant control over project execution from the start. This strategy has helped Beijing achieve “</span><a href="https://rareearthexchanges.com/news/chinas-critical-minerals-footprint-in-africa-projects-strategy-and-impacts/"><span data-contrast="none">processing dominance</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">,” meaning control over the refining system to the point that winning a mining contract in Africa does not ensure independence from Chinese supply chains. Although </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-executive-order-ties-us-critical-minerals-security-global-partnerships"><span data-contrast="none">China produces only about 10 percent of the world&#8217;s lithium, cobalt, and copper, it controls roughly 40-90 percent</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the refining capacity for these materials. Therefore, a Western company extracting ore in sub-Saharan Africa has not truly succeeded if the ore must be processed through a Chinese refinery. For the United States, this distinction has far-reaching consequences beyond market competition.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The U.S. is highly exposed to supply chain disruption risks because critical minerals have uses that extend far beyond consumer products. They are key components of systems essential to national defense, including</span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions"><span data-contrast="none"> </span></a><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions"><span data-contrast="none">F-35 fighter jets, Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator unmanned aerial vehicles</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and more. The U.S. maintains </span><a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/us-critical-minerals-dilemma-what-know"><span data-contrast="none">only one domestic rare earth mine, possesses minimal refining infrastructure</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and </span><a href="https://energycommerce.house.gov/posts/chairman-griffith-delivers-opening-statement-at-subcommittee-on-environment-hearing-on-the-beneficial-use-of-coal-ash-1"><span data-contrast="none">relies on China for 70% of rare earth imports</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. Expanding domestic mining and refining capacity </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/trade-critical-supply-chains"><span data-contrast="none">requires significant capital investment and highly specialized expertise</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, limiting the speed at which domestic production can realistically offset exposure risks. The result is a situation in which the U.S. defense industrial base is significantly dependent on a strategic adversary for materials it cannot easily replace, and which are essential to the production and sustainment of advanced military capabilities.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The risks of relying on a strategic adversary like China for materials vital to American national security are clearly shown by the China–Japan Rare Earths </span><a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/10/japan-rare-earth-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none">dispute of 2010</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard ships in the East China Sea, leading to the arrest and detention of the boat’s captain. In reaction, the Chinese government stopped exporting critical minerals to Japan. Tokyo, which depended on Beijing for nearly 90 percent of its rare earth mineral imports, saw prices for these goods rise nearly 10-fold in the year after the incident. Although the United States and Japan are in different positions within global supply chains, Japan&#8217;s experience demonstrates the broader strategic dangers that arise when a country becomes heavily dependent on a geopolitical rival for key resources.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The coercive value of rare earth dominance lies not only in China&#8217;s ability to deny access but also in the threat of disruption. Even the possibility of export restrictions can drive price volatility, delay industrial production, complicate defense procurement, and undermine long-term investment planning. Japan’s response to the 2010 dispute reveals that dependency on rare earth elements is not unavoidable. Japan’s proactive approach included investing in recycling technologies, developing alternative materials, diversifying supply chains through overseas mining projects in Australia and other countries, and building stockpiles to secure reserves. As a result, Tokyo reduced its reliance on Chinese rare earths by </span><a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/10/japan-rare-earth-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none">about 30 percent</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, demonstrating that policy actions can yield tangible results. More broadly, Japan’s experience underscores a key truth of modern strategic competition: dependence on an adversary for vital materials can create vulnerabilities that go beyond economics. Washington and its partners should take notice.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Holden Johansen is an independent researcher focused on geopolitical security risks. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Miami University and completed coursework in European Politics and Security at the Danish Institute for Study Abroad in Copenhagen. The views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Chinas-Critical-Mineral-Strategy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/">China&#8217;s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-new-economics-of-war-cheap-drones-asymmetric-threats-and-the-democratization-of-destruction/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-new-economics-of-war-cheap-drones-asymmetric-threats-and-the-democratization-of-destruction/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Andrey Koval]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 12:14:45 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32721</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 28, 2026 In the past three years, the war in Ukraine has marked a decisive turning point in global security. Low-cost, mass-produced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become the decisive factor on the battlefield, fundamentally altering the economics of modern warfare. Expensive, low-volume traditional weapon systems are increasingly being neutralized by drones priced [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-new-economics-of-war-cheap-drones-asymmetric-threats-and-the-democratization-of-destruction/">The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 28, 2026</em></p>
<p>In the past three years, the war in Ukraine has marked a decisive turning point in global security. Low-cost, mass-produced unmanned aerial vehicles (<a href="https://www.wwno.org/2026-04-22/small-inexpensive-drones-are-changing-the-battlefield-the-pentagon-is-playing-catchup">UAVs</a>) have become the decisive factor on the battlefield, fundamentally altering the economics of modern warfare. Expensive, low-volume traditional weapon systems are increasingly being neutralized by drones priced at just a few thousand dollars. This inversion has established a new guiding principle of defense: countering low-cost threats with low-cost means. This shift extends beyond state-on-state conflict. Affordable drone technology is expanding the military potential of small and medium-sized nations. At the same time, it multiplies the operational capacity of non-state actors, terrorist organizations, extremist groups, insurgent movements, and criminal networks that are turning what was once an expensive domain into an accessible tool of asymmetric warfare.</p>
<p><strong>The Economic Inversion of Warfare</strong></p>
<p>Traditional defense procurement has long relied on high unit costs and limited production runs. A single main battle tank or advanced air-defense missile can cost tens of millions of dollars. Yet, inexpensive drones costing as little as $500 have repeatedly destroyed or disabled assets worth <a href="https://www.epc.eu/publication/the-new-economics-of-warfare/">millions</a>. A commercially modified quadcopter or loitering munition can achieve effects once reserved for precision-guided munitions costing orders of magnitude more. The result is a dramatically altered cost-exchange ratio that favors the attacker. This forces even well-funded militaries to reconsider force structures and procurement chains. For smaller nations with constrained budgets, affordable and scalable drone systems offer a way to build credible denial capabilities without disproportionate spending.</p>
<p><strong>Ukrainian Technology Transfer</strong></p>
<p>A recent example of technology diffusion is the strategic investment <a href="https://terra-drone.net/global/2026/03/31/terra-drone-announces-strategic-investment-in-amazing-drones-a-ukraine-based-interceptor-drone-company-and-the-launch-of-new-interceptor-drone-terra-a1/">announced</a> on March 31, 2026, by Japan’s Terra Drone Corporation in Ukraine’s Amazing Drones LLC through its subsidiary Terra Inspectioneering. The partnership includes the launch of the Terra A1 interceptor drone: an electrically propelled system with a 32 km range, maximum speed of 300 km/h, 15-minute flight time, low noise and heat signature, and the ability to perform airspace surveillance, target detection, and neutralization in a single sortie.</p>
<p><strong>Empowering Non-State Actors and Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region</strong></p>
<p>The most destabilizing aspect is the accessibility of these systems to non-state actors. Terrorist and extremist organizations no longer require state sponsors or complex supply chains. Commercial components, open-source software, and simple assembly have lowered the barrier to entry, allowing insurgent groups, criminal syndicates, and ideological extremists to field effective aerial capabilities.In the Asia-Pacific, where vast maritime spaces, porous borders, and multiple gray-zone disputes already exist, the proliferation of cheap drones carries specific risks. Small terrorist cells or insurgent movements could use first-person view (FPV) drones or loitering munitions to disrupt shipping lanes, attack critical infrastructure, or conduct targeted operations with minimal logistical needs. The same technology that enables smaller states to deter larger neighbors also equips criminal networks and extremist groups to challenge law-enforcement or rival factions in remote areas. The combination of low cost, commercial availability, and rapid adaptability means that non-state actors in the region can now sustain prolonged asymmetric campaigns. Reports from other conflict zones show terrorist and insurgent groups already employing commercial UAVs for resupply and precision strikes, and similar patterns are emerging in <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/03/david-vs-goliath-cost-asymmetry-in-warfare.html">Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands</a>.</p>
<p>In Southeast Asia, the risks are particularly acute. The Philippines’ ongoing insurgencies in Mindanao and the porous maritime borders of the Sulu Sea already see small extremist cells experimenting with commercial drones for reconnaissance and occasional strikes. Similar patterns are visible in Myanmar’s borderlands, where insurgent groups have modified off-the-shelf UAVs for logistics and targeted operations. In the Malacca Strait and South China Sea gray zones, low-cost drone swarms could disrupt vital shipping lanes or harass naval patrols with minimal investment. These developments lower the threshold for violence: a terrorist or criminal network with a few thousand dollars can now field persistent aerial surveillance or precision munitions that once required state-level resources. The combination of vast ungoverned maritime spaces and readily available commercial technology creates ideal conditions for prolonged asymmetric campaigns by non-state actors across the region.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>The convergence of economic inversion, widespread accessibility, and rapid technology transfer has created a more volatile global security environment. In the Asia-Pacific—a region defined by strategic chokepoints, unresolved territorial disputes, and active non-state threats, the democratization of lethal drone capabilities lowers the threshold for conflict and expands the operational reach of terrorist, extremist, insurgent, and criminal organizations. Policymakers can no longer rely solely on high-end systems. The principle of “countering cheap threats with cheap means” has become the new baseline for credible defense. Without scalable, affordable countermeasures and domestic production ecosystems, states risk ceding initiatives not only to peer competitors but also to far smaller and resource‑constrained actors operating in the region’s gray zones. The economics of war have changed, and the Asia-Pacific region is one where the consequences of the new economics will play out.</p>
<p><em>Andrey Koval is a defense planner working on issues of military effectiveness and long-duration conflict. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/The-New-Economics-of-War-Cheap-Drones-Asymmetric-Threats-and-the-Democratization-of-Destruction.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-new-economics-of-war-cheap-drones-asymmetric-threats-and-the-democratization-of-destruction/">The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>AI Defense Start-ups</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-defense-start-ups/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Raphael Chiswick]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 17 Mar 2025 12:13:27 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>As the recent war in Ukraine makes abundantly clear, unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, are firmly established as a key tool of modern warfare. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both sides have made massive technological advances in their drone capabilities in what is essentially a drone production arms race. The Ukrainian government, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-defense-start-ups/">AI Defense Start-ups</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>As the recent war in Ukraine makes abundantly clear, unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, are firmly established as a key tool of modern warfare. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, both sides have made massive technological advances in their drone capabilities in what is essentially a drone production arms race. The Ukrainian government, however, started to take an alternative route in the development and advancement of their tech by forging mutually beneficial relationships with small artificial intelligence (AI)-focused defense companies across Europe.</p>
<p>As it stands, Ukraine cannot rely entirely on aid packages from Europe and especially not the US who, under Trump, is taking a much more careful role in European conflict. So far, support for Ukraine from the international community is limited, costly, and dependent on repayment either in natural resources or as the United Kingdom said, “the extraordinary profits on immobilized Russian sovereign assets.”</p>
<p>There are certain things which, due to their higher cost, Ukraine must receive from aid deals with foreign governments, such as missile systems and larger manned vehicles. These more expensive items must be produced by larger defense contractors as they have greater access to raw materials and a larger production budget. UAVs, however, can be produced as effectively by smaller companies which are able and willing to provide the Ukrainian government a better deal financially. Over the past few years, a German AI company, Helsing, has filled an important role in providing affordable drone systems to the Ukrainian military. Four thousand reconnaissance drones, designed and manufactured by Helsing, are already operational in Ukraine, and a recent deal was struck to provide 6,000 of their new HX-2 attack drones.</p>
<p>The HX-2 attack drones are similar in design to the Russian Lancet drone, produced by Russian aerospace giant ZALA, but come with a few key advantages and innovations. The HX-2 is technologically advanced and able to avoid signal disruption, a feature which can transform drone capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield. The engagement range is also far higher, at 100 kilometers (km) compared to the Lancet’s 40–60 km. Helsing is the developer of an AI software which allows the drones to travel on missions in a swarm, where many are piloted by one individual, allowing for incredibly destructive capabilities.</p>
<p>The key advantage of a company like Helsing, over a larger aerospace company with a wider range of products, such as ZALA, is the significantly lower production cost, which Helsing offers. Helsing has plans to increase output, building “resilience factories” across Europe, which allow for countries to carry out domestic production.</p>
<p>The Ukrainian government clearly spotted some of the advantages in giving smaller defense companies the opportunity to develop new and innovative products. Brave1 is an initiative run by the Ukrainian government, where investors, engineers, defense companies, and military experts are able to meet to address some of the gaps and issues that Ukraine faces on the battlefield. The idea is to fix issues and fill gaps as fast as possible, and so far, it has been successful. The Ukrainian government incentivizes both smaller and larger technology companies to innovate by offering them a shot at a lucrative government contract.</p>
<p>Another similar program aimed at kickstarting innovation in the European defense industry is the Darkstar Coalition. Listed as one of the partners of Brave1, Darkstar is a team of European tech start-up owners and investors who joined forces to boost European defense. Darkstar hosted two boot camps, where small tech start-ups demonstrate their creations and compete for the winning prize: cash to expand their operations. A third boot camp will take place in Spring of 2025, with a total of €1.5 million awarded to the two most successful companies. Even companies which do not win the funding will benefit from attending, as they are given the opportunity to carry out field testing, network with other companies, gain technical advice, and potentially receive funding externally from other interested attendees. The success of the boot camps demonstrates the previously underutilized talent and innovative ability in Europe in sectors such as engineering, robotics, AI, and cybersecurity. When incentivized and supported, these smaller start-ups can have a real impact on the war in Ukraine and European security more broadly.</p>
<p>It is not just defense manufacturing companies that are stepping up to meet the changing requirements of the Ukrainian government, but also AI programming companies such as Swarmer are also innovating. Swarmer is a company that creates drone swarm programs with huge capabilities in modern warfare. It is also a company which is consistently present at Brave1 tech summits, meeting with investors and Ukrainian military officials.</p>
<p>As the war enters a new phase, with reduced support from the US and the prospect of limited support from Europe, stretching the Ukrainian defense budget as far is it will go will become even more of a priority. This is where these smaller defense and tech start-ups will thrive. Whilst giants such as Lockheed Martin, BAE, or Airbus typically fill a majority of the orders during long-term conflicts, Ukraine recognized the power in allowing smaller, newer, more nimble defense technology companies to innovate.</p>
<p><em>Raphael Chiswick is an independent author. Views expressed are his own.  </em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/ai-defense-start-ups/">AI Defense Start-ups</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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