Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

In Washington policy and political circles, the former President’s comments are met with both shock and disdain. The familiar tropes about the indispensability of the Western alliance and the civilizational connection with Europe are trotted out to defend NATO. In the Pentagon, there is even an optimistic belief that Europe is the security partner of future expeditionary missions around the world.

While Trump may talk like a shock jock, what he says about NATO and Europe hold true. Unless some tough love is imposed on the Europeans, American taxpayers will foot Europe’s security bill indefinitely. What Europe needs to understand is that America is changing, and with it Europe’s free pass is getting rescinded.

The Demographic Transition

One reason the Trans-Atlantic political and military alliance will change is the demographic transition in both the United States and Europe. In the US, by about 2045, citizens not of European extraction become a slim majority. Surveys of the next generation show that the affinity for Europe and with traditional American foreign policy imperatives is shrinking. The younger generation’s position on the Palestine-Israel conflict is a case in point. Latinos, Asians, and black Americans do not have emotional ties to Europe. They are, therefore, less inclined to tolerate and support the subsidizing of European defense efforts.

Instead, much like Trump, they will call on Europe to pay its bills. Europe, however, cannot pay those bills since it is an aging society with a large welfare state. As Table 1 shows, major European societies are rapidly aging. Not only that, but their median age is also going to rise to the extent that they will have a hard time fielding women and men of a fighting age.

 Table 1

Source:  Data retrieved from UN Population Revision 2019. (These numbers do not account for the recent population transfer from Ukraine to Russia or to the millions of Ukrainian refugees now in other parts of Europe who are unlikely to return.)

These numbers paint a bleak future. The nations listed above have the largest and most capable armed forces among NATO. In short, they all have greying populations and, by 2030, except for Turkey, will have a median age that is greater than 40. Italy, for example, is in serious demographic trouble with a median age of 50.8. Spain and Greece also have a median age of nearly 50. Worse, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Spain are all going to see a major decline in their populations. The priority of these countries is focused on meeting the social needs of their populations—something which is very expensive and can only come at the cost of reduced defense expenditure.

The other big problem for the Europeans is finding people who are willing to join the armed forces. After the Cold War, most European countries eliminated conscription. Reintroducing it would be political suicide for even the most conservative politician. Thus, while German Prime Minister Olof Schulz has committed 100 billion euros to defense modernization, he cannot realistically bring about force expansion without bringing back conscription. Further, 100 billion euros are not primarily going to buy more weapons but, instead, refurbish and modernize the existing force, much of which is mothballed.

The fact that the European nations lack manpower and the fact that rebuilding the forces will be expensive leads to the modest size of the militaries of the major NATO countries (as shown in Table 2). The question then arises, how many troops and weapons can these nations realistically field in modern combat? The answer is very few as these countries are likely to be casualty averse given their shrinking and aging demographics.

Table 2: Cuts in Force Levels of Major European Nations

Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, and 2023 editions.

The Two Percent Myth

The other myth that Europe must stop hyping is that of how these countries are going to reach 2 percent of GDP in their defense spending. A remilitarization of Europe would require the Germans to cross the 2 percent threshold, but, by the end of 2022, the German government was admitting that it is unlikely to raise defense expenditure to 2 percent of GDP.

Table 3: NATO Defense Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP, 2023

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

            The news is not all bad. Those NATO member-states who most fear Russia, or, in the cases of Greece and Turkey, are spending the required 2 percent of GDP on defense. However, except for the United Kingdom, the further geographically from Russia a NATO member-state gets, the less the country spends on defense.

Table 4: NATO Nations Spending Two Percent of GDP on Defense

Source: Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2023), NATO Communique, July 7, 2023.

With only a third of NATO member-states contributing 2 percent of GDP, it begs the question to what end? Estonia, for example, has a population is 1.3 million. Is 2 percent of Estonia’s small GDP a meaningful contribution to the Continent’s collective defense? Latvia, similarly, has 1.9 million citizens. Lithuania has 2.79 million citizens. In practical terms, this means that for credible militarization the rich and populous states of Europe need to reach a similar level of defense expenditures.

Most NATO nations intend to raise their defense expenditure to 2 percent by 2026. Italy and Spain expect to reach it by 2028 and 2029, respectively. This is, however, a medium-term projection which does not consider the state of the economy. Neither does it explain where funding will come from. The social democracies of Europe are unlikely to agree to a transfer of resources from social welfare programs to defense expenditures. In fact, with rapidly aging populations the cost of elderly care will grow.

The other alternative, raising taxes, is unpopular in European societies, which already carry a heavy individual tax burden. Further, in some countries, notably Britain, the prevailing mood is to cut taxes, making it unfeasible to ask the citizenry to agree to a tax increase to fund defense expenditures. The question arises, therefore, where will the money come from to pay for new weapons, the development of a defense infrastructure, and the intake of more troops to boost larger military formations?

A European Nuclear Deterrent

 One way out is for Europe to field a Euro-centric nuclear umbrella. Talk is already ongoing as some suggest the French nuclear force transform into one requiring joint authority to permit employment. The British nuclear force, since 1962, has been committed to the protection of NATO members.

One way to achieve this integration painlessly would be to state which missions fell under the purview of the French or British nuclear authority and which would be covered by the joint command. Thus, a French decision to use a tactical nuclear weapon in response to a 9/11-style terror attack, for example, would be the country’s sovereign right while a Russian assault would fall under the category of a jointly authorized strike. NATO member states would contribute to the cost of maintaining and fielding the force—perhaps increasing its size and capability.

One can also speculate on whether other NATO states may decide to cross the nuclear Rubicon given the changed security environment on the continent. Sweden and Poland would certainly fall into this category given their fears of Russian expansionism. If this happens, it is well within the scope of nonproliferation laws since countries are allowed to leave the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty if their core security interests are threatened (The problem for the US, however, is how to prevent non-Western states from taking a similar step).

While this may compensate for the inability to field adequate forces it would certainly meet with considerable opposition from the peace groups in Europe and the general population which is wary of nuclearization.   Which then brings the issue back to the need for conventional militarization.

Fielding capable militaries that can defend Europe and project power in alliance with the United States requires NATO member-states to make hard choices about spending and compulsory military service. For the reasons cited above that is unlikely. For the United States, therefore, the best course of action is to redefine its commitment to Europe and let the continent make the diplomatic and political compromises needed to bring about regional stability.

For those in the Pentagon who think Europe is a partner to help maintain global security, it is time to look for new security alliances. The evidence is clear. Europe has neither the funds nor the manpower to be a partner of the United States.

Amit Gupta was on the faculty of the USAF Air War College and is now a Senior Advisor on Peace and Conflict Resolution to the Forum of Federations, Ottawa. The views in this piece are his. He may be contacted at agupta1856@gmail.com.

Is Trump Right About Europe? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission’s report suggests that Russia and China’s large-scale nuclear programs pose “qualitatively new threats of opportunistic aggression” and raise the risk of future “cooperative two-theater aggression.” In their report and testimony, commission members clarify that written Russian strategy and doctrine envision limited first use of theater nuclear weapons to deter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), coerce war termination on favorable terms, and suggest larger-scale employment of theater nuclear weapons to defeat NATO in war, if a loss is likely.

And yet Russian emphasis on new nuclear weapons hardly ends here. Russia’s walkout from the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) reopens possibilities for it to test nuclear weapons. Indeed Putin warned that he is prepared to resume nuclear testing.

Stationing nuclear weapons in Belarus likewise adds to the threat of nuclear war in Europe. Russia also seeks to build nuclear power plants in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These could become a basis for nuclear material exports back to Russia or other countries.

Chinese imports of nuclear materials from Russia hit a record high in 2022, stimulating widespread fears that Moscow is making it easier for China to produce weapons-grade uranium for its missiles. Moscow has also backtracked on its 2013 insistence that China must take part in any future arms control negotiations because China still refuses to do so. As Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Rybakov said in 2013, “We cannot endlessly negotiate with the United States the reduction and limitation of nuclear arms while some other countries are strengthening their nuclear and missile capabilities…. Making nuclear disarmament a multilateral process is becoming a necessity.”

However, Russia evidently cannot now insist on Chinese participation despite the Chinese nuclear threat to Russia. Thus, Rybakov now reiterates the official view that Chinese nuclear weapons do not threaten Russia even though several independent analysts argue to the contrary. Similarly, Russia’s newfound amity with North Korea is stimulating anxiety that Pyongynag’s natural demand for a quid pro quo for the one million artillery shells it gave Russia will lead Putin to support North Korea’s missile, nuclear, and space programs. It is already known that Moscow promised to help Pyongyang build satellites and followed through on that pledge recently—regarding its most recent launch. Other observers maintain that it would not be excessively difficult for Russia to provide North Korea with nuclear assistance.

Here again, there is a parallel precedent. Recently, Putin, in conversation with General Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, stated that building on existing plans, Putin advocated closer cooperation in space with China, “including high-orbit assets, and new prospective types of weapons that will ensure strategic stability (i.e. likely nuclear weapons) of both Russia and the People’s Republic of China.”

Beyond these actions undermining nonproliferation, in general, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in particular, Russo-Iranian military cooperation is reportedly unprecedented, growing in scope, and comprises ballistic missile cooperation. There is also little doubt that Iran is coming closer to actually possessing a nuclear weapon.  

Indeed, Russia told the United Nations (UN) that it no longer needs to obey UN restrictions on giving Iran missile technology since Resolution 2231 (2015) recently expired.  And, at the same time, Iran is actively soliciting Russian help with its nuclear program.  Providing such help would, like all of the aforementioned activities, either break the spirit or even the letter of the NPT. In invading Ukraine, Moscow actually violated the NPT, which openly commits signatories not to invade non-nuclear states.

All of these Russian moves undermine nonproliferation and the NPT. And this list does not include the almost nightly wild nuclear threats to be heard daily on Russian TV and even among supposed experts. Certainly, experience repeatedly shows that the UN is unlikely to do more than inform and provide reports on the process.

Moscow and her friends are dismantling the structures of nuclear security. China, Iran, and North Korea are apparently intent on destroying the “guardrails” of international security, in general, and against nuclear use, in particular—all to obtain a free hand in realizing their imperial and aggressive dreams. This trend not only puts smaller states at increased risk, but it obligates the US and its nuclear allies to invest more in new and improved nuclear weapons. This is needed to restore deterrence that only justifies these aggressors’ paranoia, which drives them to nuclear weapons in the first place.

As the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States recommended, the US needs to update and renovate its nuclear arsenal to make it more fit for service in regard to today’s and tomorrow’s threats. This means technological renovation, more precision, greater flexibility, and very likely additional nuclear weapons. Yet at the same time America and her allies, in both Europe, Asia, and the Middle East need a conventional buildup as well to preserve deterrence at lower levels in both Europe and Asia so neither Russia nor China can start a conventional war in the expectation that it can use nuclear blackmail, as in the Ukraine, to deter NATO from defending vital interests.

Likewise, the United States and her allies abroad must also update and modernize conventional forces to deter either by punishment or deny lower-level threats that could also escalate—the Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping—in the belief that the organizers of these threats could control escalation and that the US is afraid to widen existing conflicts. Thus, as noted above, in the nuclear sphere too many states lost their reason and are tempting fate. Consequently, judgment in nuclear and other security areas is left to states who, as the record shows, are all too willing to behave as brutish beasts. Therefore, they must be stopped sooner than later.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Consultant at the American Foreign Policy Council and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Proliferation’s Rising Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.