Washington’s Return to Central Asia

 For the past two decades, Central Asia—comprising Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan—has largely remained on the margins of U.S. foreign policy. After the withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington viewed the region not as a battlefield, but as a quiet buffer zone separating Russia, China, and Iran. That perception, however, is changing. The war in Ukraine, the growing convergence between Moscow and Beijing, and the reemergence of ‘bloc politics’ have convinced U.S. strategists that the stability of this region will shape not only Eurasia’s future, but also the architecture of the emerging world order.

This renewed engagement can be seen as a redefinition of the C5+1 initiative that began under the Biden administration but is now being pursued under Trump with a distinctly economic and commercial tone. The difference lies in emphasis: rather than promoting liberal values, Washington’s new approach prioritizes industrial cooperation, transit corridors, and competition over critical mineral resources.

Washington no longer relies on hard containment. Instead, it is adopting what American policy circles call ‘smart containment’: a strategy of weaving economic, technological, and logistical interdependence that constrains Russian and Chinese influence without a military presence. Central Asia can become a strategic lever for Washington by positioning itself against Russia through reducing export routes dependent on Moscow and reshaping energy transport networks. For China, Central Asia can compete in the extraction and processing of vital minerals, which are the backbone of batteries, clean energy, and advanced technologies.

 Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: Washington’s two Strategic Anchors

The United States engages Central Asia through two key partners: Kazakhstan, the region’s largest economy and the world’s main uranium producer, has become increasingly attractive to the Trump administration, and Uzbekistan, with its central location and sizable population. Investments by major U.S. companies like GE, Wabtec, and Microsoft represent more than industrial partnerships. They are part of Washington’s broader efforts to build non-Chinese supply chains, integrating the region into networks that bypass Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

However, unlike in the 1990s and early 2000s, the Central Asian republics are now seeking to act independently. Kazakhstan, for instance, blocked the deployment of Wagner Group forces near its borders in 2023 and declined to deepen its participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. Uzbekistan, for its part, has introduced new foreign investment reforms designed to limit its dependence on China. The region’s leaders have now learned that diversification, not dependence, is the true safeguard of sovereignty and survival in an increasingly competitive Eurasian landscape.

Trump’s recent summit with Central Asian leaders carried significant political weight.  Kazakhstan’s willingness to join the Abraham Accords marks the first formal linkage between the Middle East and the Eurasian security architectures. Further, Kazakhstan recently signed a $4.2 billion deal with U.S. Company Wabtec Corporation to supply 300 locomotives over the next decade. Central Asia holds vast reserves of strategic minerals such as lithium, copper, and uranium that the U.S. can capitalize on.

Washington at a Crossroads: Containment or Partnership

Central Asia’s renewed importance for the United States stems from its position at the intersection of three major global trends: competition for vital resources, the restructuring of supply chains, and the emergence of a multipolar world order. This realization has prompted Washington to return to the heart of Eurasia after two decades of relative disengagement. Still, Washington will have to decide on a long-term strategy for diplomacy in Central Asia.

Today, Washington faces a choice between two approaches in Central Asia. The first is a containment-oriented strategy, viewing Central Asia primarily as a tool to counter China and Russia. The second is a partnership-oriented approach, focusing on infrastructure, technology, and sustainable development, which could help transform Central Asia into a genuine partner in the emerging global order.

Kazakhstan’s multi-alignment strategy, Turkmenistan’s neutrality, and Uzbekistan’s pragmatic approach signal efforts to navigate between competing powers. If these dynamics are guided by a cooperative mindset, Central Asia could transform from a backyard of disparate states to a bridge between major powers. However, if the competition continues under a zero-sum logic, the history of Cold War competition risks repeating itself in a new guise.

By embracing a cooperative strategy that recognizes the region’s strategic autonomy and prioritizes economic diversification and technological cooperation, Washington could move beyond the traditional containment mindset. In doing so, it could play a constructive role in shaping a new Eurasian order grounded in soft power, connectivity, and multilateral cooperation.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Why Central Asia Matters to the United States Again was originally published on Global Security Review.

The challenge with all such posts is that they never tell the whole story. Yes, Russia and China are refusing to enter arms control negotiations with the United States and Russia is believed to be conducting hydronuclear tests that produce a nuclear yield, but the President’s post does not mean what you may think.

Contrary to the wailing and gnashing of teeth of arms control advocates after Trump’s post, he is not calling for a return to detonating nuclear warheads under the Nevada desert. He is calling for something much different, which is why his post included, “…on an equal basis.” This point is important and was seemingly lost on many.

What many Americans may not know is that the United States last tested a nuclear weapon in 1992 and has, since at least 1996, interpreted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to mean that nuclear testing cannot produce a nuclear yield. Thus, the United States, has voluntarily followed the CTBT and produced “zero yield” in the many tests it has conducted over the past three decades. American scientists were able to verify the continued safety, security, and effectiveness of the nation’s nuclear arsenal without producing an explosive yield.

President Trump is simply enabling American scientists to conduct hydronuclear tests that can provide higher fidelity results as the nation modernizes its existing nuclear warheads and begins building the first new nuclear warhead in more than a generation. This is a very important distinction.

The President, who often speaks in generalities, can be faulted for not offering a level of detail that explained his post more clearly, but articles claiming he does not understand nuclear testing may be less accurate than the President’s critics believe. The relationship between the Department of War and the Department of Energy, when it comes to nuclear weapons, is symbiotic. The Department of Energy designs and builds the weapons at its federally funded and privately operated labs, under the management of the National Nuclear Security Agency, but the Department of War drives the demand for capabilities. Thus, criticizing the President for saying the Department of War will do the testing is a bit of a hollow victory.

With Russia unwilling to extend New START and China’s continuing unwillingness to join multilateral arms control negotiations, President Trump’s statement was an attempt at demonstrating American resolve in the face of America’s declining nuclear position. The reality is that Russia understands its strength is in its nuclear forces, not its conventional capabilities.

If President Trump deserves criticism for anything, it is incorrectly suggesting that the American nuclear arsenal is superior to that of Russia; it is not. Russia’s arsenal is both newer and larger than that of the United States.

Russia may also breakout of New START limits upon the treaty’s expiration, which is a worrying prospect for the United States. Russia’s abrogation the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 2023, in retaliation for Western support of Ukraine, is also concerning. It is, however, unsurprising. Before, Russia at least tried to ensure any violations of the “zero yield” understanding was hidden from the global public. That may cease if the Ukraine war continues. Although, President Trump’s announcement may have contained Russian ambitions.

Russia may have announced “reciprocal measures” if the United States begins testing, but Vladimir Putin knows the US is looking to conduct tests at the same level as Russia’s existing tests. China called on the US to uphold the moratorium on nuclear testing, but China may have also violated the “zero yield” threshold in its effort to build advanced nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, neither the Chinese nor Russian programs is particularly visible to Western monitoring efforts.

The prospects for Russo-American cooperation are low, but this should come as no surprise considering nuclear weapons are Russia’s trump card, no pun intended, when it comes to limiting Western support to Ukraine. Putin cannot afford to lose in Ukraine. His head, quite literally, is on the line.

Chinese nuclear forces are still inferior to American nuclear forces, but not for long. Thus, joining multilateral negotiations are not in China’s core interests as the Chinese Communist Party builds a nuclear arsenal fit for deterring American intervention with Chinese plans to seize Taiwan and perhaps other disputed territories. Of course China responded to President Trump’s post by calling it “unreasonable and unrealistic.” Hypocrisy on nuclear issues will not, however, stop Chinese communists from expanding their arsenal.

President Trump’s post is understandable given the world in which he finds himself. The President must try to deter continued Chinese and Russian aggression. If resuming nuclear testing helps, it is well worth the effort. What the President’s words will not do is start an arms race. That would require the United States to be a participant, and the Chinese and Russians left the starting blocks long ago.

Adam Lowther is the Co-founder and VP for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.  Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Understanding President Trump’s Truth Social Post on Nuclear Testing? was originally published on Global Security Review.

In fact, months ago, the president asked North Atlantic Treaty Council Organization (NATO) countries for a proposal by each state for putting peacekeeping troops in Ukraine. The Europeans dithered and then expressed consternation that Trump was keeping them out of the negotiations with Putin.

More pertinently, the president suggested that NATO countries increase their defense expenditure to five percent of gross domestic product (GDP). This is a far more realistic assessment of the decline in European capabilities than that which calls for a growth of defense expenditure to three percent of GDP.

The British, French, and Germans all expressed varying degrees of outrage at Trump’s actions including the suggestion by some that he is creating a “Munich”-like outcome in his negotiations with Putin by conceding too much even before the discussions began. The fact is that Trump is playing his cards knowing full well that the Europeans have no plan.

Why Five Percent Is Impossible

When one looks at NATO’s defense expenditure, countries like Canada, Italy, and Spain are below the two percent threshold while France, Germany, and the Netherlands barely cross it.  Yes, countries like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are above the two percent threshold, but they are small nations with populations less than that of Chicago. Estonia has a mere 1.6 million people.

To get to three percent, let alone five, would require NATO countries to add tens of billions to their defense budgets and require cutting the social services that their citizens expect and value. As Politico pointed out, for France, which is one of the voluble proponents of European rearmament, to go from two to three percent of GDP would require Paris to add about 30 billion euros to its defense budget.

Given the country’s budgetary problems that is unlikely to happen. Five percent is a bridge too far. Britain, which is also facing economic headwinds, cannot afford such an increase. In Germany, despite the 100 billion euros committed to modernization, which largely went to refurbish existing equipment that was mothballed, Berlin made it clear it is a long way from substantially increasing its defense budget. Countries like Italy and Spain, given their own economic compulsions, will also find five percent impossible.

The Europeans raise the issue that even if they went to five percent their defense industries are not able to crank up production to meet the demand for new weaponry. That is not the primary problem for these countries. Instead, it is an issue of manpower. Europe is aging and lacks the population for expanded militaries. Worse, as part of the peace dividend, conscription was removed in most countries in the 1990s. This left Gen X, the millennials, and now Gen Z, without any memory of military service.

Reinstating conscription, as seen from the figures below, would be the way to give teeth to European militaries. Compulsory military service, however, is hugely unpopular among the younger generation and a push to draft people would lead to an electoral backlash that few politicians in Europe want to face.

As Table I shows, the major European militaries drastically downsized after the Cold War:

Source: The Military Balance [IISS: London], 1972, 2017, 2023, 2024 editions.

The above figures clearly show that remilitarization would require a major intake of manpower that the European countries would be unable to achieve because of the factors discussed above. Yet, this does not stop them from making bold pronouncements about future militarization efforts. Reality is something else.

The Kiel Institute for the World Economy states the German case of weakness quite bluntly:

The decline in German numbers over the past 20 years is particularly striking: in 2004 Germany had thousands of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles and even almost one thousand howitzers. By 2021, these numbers had come down to the hundreds, as Germany only had 339 tanks and 121 howitzers. The German numbers for 1992 must be interpreted carefully, as they include weapons and equipment from the newly incorporated East German army. Still, when considering the available Leopard tanks, i.e., the West German tanks, Germany had around 4200. The German decline in military stock is thus massive.

Despite all the optimistic talk emanating from Berlin, German rearmament is a myth.  The country’s industrial capability, which is in the doldrums, will not allow it to rapidly militarize. And young people will not join the military in droves as Olaf Scholz and Ursula van der Lyon fondly believe. There is a reason Ukraine has not dipped into its pool of 18–21-year-olds for the current war. It would probably lead to mass flight from the country by younger Ukrainians.

If Europe cannot remilitarize easily and lacks the manpower to build Cold War–level forces, what can it do? The answer is simple. Write checks.

Ukraine requires reconstruction. The World Bank estimated that it would cost around $486 billion, while Zelensky put the number closer to $700 billion. It is a year since the World Bank made its estimate so one can safely assume that in the intense conflict of 2024 the damage to infrastructure may have added another $50 billion to $100 billion to the bill. The Europeans can make a $25 billion a year commitment to Ukraine for the next twenty years to aid reconstruction. This would lead to the rapid build-up of Ukraine’s economy and stop the population from fleeing the war-torn nation.

As things stand, Ukraine’s population is set to decline to around 30 million by 2050 and it will largely be a country of old people thanks to a decline in fertility. If Kyiv stands a chance, it needs a sustained dose of financial aid with no strings attached. A side benefit would be that China would not be the major post-war economic player in Ukraine.

From the European perspective, Brussels can go to Trump and say that yes, we engaged in burden sharing and it would be a lot less expensive than five percent of GDP and far less socially divisive than the imposition of conscription.

Xi Jin Ping suggested Chinese and Indian peacekeepers be inserted in Ukraine. This would change the future security architecture of the region. Russia will be far more comfortable with such a peacekeeping force rather than a crypto-NATO force posing as peacekeepers. It will be interesting to watch how this plays out.

Perhaps most interesting is the fact that Trump called Europe’s bluff. If London, Paris, and Berlin want to be relevant, it is time to write a big check. At least for now, Americans are no longer willing to subsidize Europe’s welfare states.

Amit Gupta is a Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views in this article are personal.

The European Dilemma: Five Percent and Manpower was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s Strategic Mistakes and Their Consequences

Russia’s decision to attack Ukraine in 2022 was clearly a strategic blunder. Russian President Vladimir Putin believed he could seize control of Ukraine with a swift military strike, install a government aligned with Russian interests, and prevent the admission of Ukraine into the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). However, the invasion stalled and is now widely seen as a disaster for Russia.

Now, two years after the start of the war, Russia has neither installed a government aligned with its interests in Ukraine nor succeeded in increasing its own security. On the contrary, the war led to economic sanctions, severed Russia’s relationship with the West, and diminished Russia’s military reputation, which was once formidable to its rivals.                                           Putin also underestimated the probability that he would require assistance from China, Iran, and North Korea to maintain the fight, and, incorrectly, assumed that NATO member-states would fail to act in effective coordination and support Ukrainian independence. Russia is now trapped in a prolonged war, Russia is beholden to its junior partners, and the Russian military is now proven to be largely ineffective. NATO is now working more closely together than it has since the Soviet Union collapsed and two new countries (Finland and Sweden) are now members of the alliance. Entering the war in Ukraine was a strategic mistake for Russia, which has exposed the country as an aggressor that is driving defensive preparation in Europe.

The West has imposed more than 11,000 sanctions on Russia, about 3,500 Western companies left the country, and nearly 1,000 Russian elites left their country. Russia’s relations with the West have deteriorated significantly, leading to political and economic isolation from the free world.

These strategic mistakes not only weakened Russia’s competitive position but also revealed its wider vulnerabilities. Russia is now caught in a prolonged war from which it is difficult to exit with dignity. Recognizing this opportunity, the United States and its allies are unlikely to allow Russia to easily escape this crisis. As a result, Russia is being forced to move closer to China and regional powers such as Iran and North Korea. Although this proximity is necessary for Russia economically and strategically, it primarily benefits China and increases China’s influence in global competition. Therefore, in this geopolitical game, Russia has not only failed to achieve its goals, but has also significantly fallen behind its competitors, diminishing its prospects of emerging as a great power in the international system.

America’s Strategic Mistakes and Their Consequences

The war in Ukraine is not in the United States’ best interest because it distracts from America’s larger effort to deter Chinese aggression against Taiwan and elsewhere in Asia. This distraction is allowing China to expand their influence globally, especially in areas where American influence is waning.

Early in the war, the United States tried to weaken Russia through extensive economic sanctions. Although these sanctions damaged the Russian economy temporarily, they did not achieve American objectives in the long run as Russia found new outlets for its energy products. Unexpectedly, Western pressure brought China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia closer together, strengthening China’s position vis-à-vis Russia—making China the senior partner.

The increasing economic and military cooperation between these countries helped China expand its influence directly and indirectly. Because the United States was deterred by Russian nuclear threats from providing Ukraine war-winning military tools, the war has dragged on—all to the benefit of China.

America’s distraction by Ukraine, the conflict in Israel, the presidential election, and other issues is leading the United States to neglect long-term strategic threats. As a result, while China, avoiding direct military conflicts, is increasing its economic and technological power globally. The disastrous American withdrawal from Afghanistan is attributed by some analysts as an important reason why Vladimir Putin thought he could get away with an invasion of Ukraine—the perception of American weakness.

The sum of these strategic mistakes puts America in a position where Russia and the United States are weakened by the war. When America is seen as weak, anti-American groups in different parts of the world see an opportunity. The same is true of all of America’s enemies.

China’s Opportunity in Global Competition and Its Benefits

Unlike Russia and America, China gained a significant advantage in global competition by choosing a strategy of self-restraint and prioritizing economic growth and technological advancement since the war began. Despite predictions that China would invade Taiwan because the United States is focused on Ukraine—and Israel—China’s lack of military action is a sign of this country’s smart and accurate calculations about any such invasion. By pursuing an economic oriented approach, China is focusing on addressing its own internal economic issues while trying to outpace the United States. By focusing at the operational level, avoiding military conflicts, China is using this time to petter position itself for a war that it too sees as likely.

China’s strategic partnerships and economic engagement, especially with developing countries, are gradually changing the balance of global power. This change is evidenced by the increase in the number of countries that are willing to interact with China on its terms and see it as a balancer against Western influence. By capitalizing on the strategic mistakes of other great powers and presenting itself as a champion of global peace and economic development, China is positioning itself as a leader in the new world order.

The Future Perspective of Global Competition

However, America still remains the greatest of great powers because it still carries the most influence in world affairs. Chinese power has, however, increased, leading Chinese leaders to be more sensitive to the expression position in the international system. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the war in Ukraine does not benefit the United States. It benefits China.

China continues to strengthen its position and turned the game in its favor by taking advantage of the strategy of restraint and economic growth. The United States has inadvertently helped strengthen China’s position by focusing too much on Russia and the Ukraine war. Russia is clearly falling behind its great power peers.

If China continues with its current policies, it should avoid conflict and continue to grow economically and in its influence over other nations. There are still opportunities to change China’s trajectory.

America should adjust its approach by focusing on its vital interests and associated threats—China—instead of focusing on lesser interests. Additionally, preventing the increase of China’s influence in various regions of the world, especially in Asia and Africa, should be the priority of American foreign policy. It is not too late, but the time to act is now.

Dawood Tanin is a professor of political science at a private university in Afghanistan. The views expressed are his own.

The Ukraine War: Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

Now, Moscow is coming to understand what life is like outside the tent. Its new military connections with Iran and North Korea, and its political-economic alliance with China, are reason for concern in the West and more than enough reason to see if there is a way to bring Russia back inside the tent.

Background

Russia as a member of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) has, unlike China, worked to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology. Where China transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan, the Russians were careful in their transfers of items that could be used to proliferate. Thus, when it sold nuclear reactors to India the agreement was that the spent fuel would be reprocessed in Russia (then the Soviet Union), removing any concerns about the spent fuel being diverted for building nuclear weapons.

The Indians have also received two Russian submarines on lease, but both vessels were returned to Russia before the leases ended. When the Russians signed an agreement to build the supersonic Brahmos missile, they insisted that the missile’s range be within the limits imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Similarly, despite the long-standing ties between Moscow and Pyongyang, there were no serious transfers of nuclear capabilities to the Hermit Kingdom—although there are questions about how the technology in the SS-18 missile made it to Pyongyang. The missile was manufactured in a cash-strapped factory in Ukraine and William Broad and David Sanger argue that this possibly led to a sale by rogue actors within Ukraine; the government of Peter Poroshenko denied any knowledge of the transfer. In contrast, the Chinese provided nuclear weapons technology to Pakistan, particularly the bomb design from their second nuclear test.

While Russia stuck with the international community’s goals to prevent nuclear proliferation, the war in Ukraine and the ensuing Western sanctions changed Russia’s strategic calculus and potentially its hesitation to supply technologies to other states.

Faced with sanctions, the Russians cut deals with both Iran and North Korea for the supply of weaponry—ranging from artillery shells and drones to ballistic missiles. It is not clear what will be given in return.  Most observers believe that North Korea may receive “direct military assistance from Russia to include fighter aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, armored vehicles and ballistic missile production equipment or materials, as well as other advanced technology.”

It is the advanced technology part of the agreement that is worrying since the North Koreans may well seek technologies that increase the lethality of their strategic weaponry. This could include nuclear submarines and the technological capability to launch submarine-launched cruise missiles. It could also lead the Russians to transfer technology needed to increase the accuracy of North Korean intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and warheads. Such transfers can take place by giving the actual technology or providing the scientific manpower to make Pyongyang’s weapons more lethal.

In the case of Iran, Tehran filled an immediate need of Moscow by providing drones in large numbers to help the Russians better deal with the changed nature of warfare in the Ukraine conflict. Like Western nations, Russia allowed its munitions stockpiles to run low. Russia is now building up to 6,000 drones annually in a new factory near the Urals. Tehran also supplied close-range ballistic missiles to further beef up Moscow’s arsenal and, in return, Moscow is reportedly upping its supply of weapons to Iran.

Russia is considering the sale of the Su-35 fighter and the S-400 anti-missile system, but the biggest contribution by Moscow could be to help improve domestically manufactured Iranian weaponry. Again, giving advanced technology to the Iranians would increase the lethality of its missile force.

The Strategic Realm

It is in the nuclear realm that the removal of restraints by Moscow would be the most damaging. Russia has abided by the provisions of the NPT and the MTCR, but if the war continues, with increasing Western provision of weaponry to Ukraine and growing sanctions on Moscow, the Russians may decide to abandon the international treaties they helped create and enforce and, instead, start to become major proliferators.

This would create a global flow of weaponry and technology that will not only build up the capabilities of hostile nations but also severely complicate regional security settings and make American intervention more costly. The worst-case scenario would be the Russians basing nuclear weapons in one of these countries—creating a new level of global insecurity. This is not as far fetched as it seems since this was done by the former Soviet Union in Cuba. That move was seen as an existential threat by the US. It is not clear what the reaction would be to a Russian nuclear fait accompli in Iran or North Korea.

Options

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the West was confident that its technological superiority, economic strength, and unified resolve would lead the Russians to back down. Instead, the Russian economy is growing, the West spent close to $300 billion in arming Ukraine, and Kyiv now faces an economic and demographic disaster. It is wishful thinking to suggest that this war may end with a favorable outcome for Ukraine. Bringing the Russians back into the tent may prove difficult.

In four months, the United States will have a new administration, giving the next president some leeway for pursuing a different policy towards Moscow. Carrots, rather than just sticks, may be the best approach. Included, however, in whatever cease-fire plan is created should be a commitment from the Russians that they will continue to abide with the provisions of the NPT and MTCR and ensure that Moscow will try to prevent the flow of Russian scientific labor to North Korea and Iran, specifically.

This will require a rethink in Washington and Brussels on how to end the war and what constitutes an equitable outcome rather than a maximalist view, as suggested by some in the West. Not doing so could lead to a new set of security problems in other parts of the world that are just as crucial for the United States.

Amit Gupta, PhD, is a senior fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

You Think the Ukraine War Was Bad? Imagine a Rogue Russia was originally published on Global Security Review.

Those European intelligence agencies tasked with countering malicious cyber actors are simply unprepared for the fight they face. Disinformation campaigns waged by the Chinese, North Koreans, and Russians are also plaguing Europe. When Russia first began such efforts to shape election outcomes about a decade ago, their rather low-cost efforts were successful enough to encourage further disinformation efforts.

French efforts to sound the alarm about disinformation in Europe and Africa were largely unheeded and is now bearing fruit for China and Russia as several African nations are turning against the West and toward these autocracies. The cyber four of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, through their security institutions, targeted the UK and French institutions, financial markets, and security infrastructure at home and their prestige abroad.

In response to the exponential growth of cyberattacks, in April 2023, new regulations were passed in France to secure the computer networks of state institutions. The French government also recognized the importance of international security cooperation in combating cyber terrorism.

When the French rail network was vandalized in July 2024 the French Interior Minister warned of the possible involvement of foreign cyber warriors. Saboteurs had already carried out attacks against fiber-optic cables and other infrastructure. For months, French intelligence was on its heels as consecutive attacks on the country’s critical infrastructure occurred. Russian and other European nationals were arrested for varying destabilization attacks. French intelligence and police also launched an operation to find cyber sleeper cells.

The Olympics began as thousands of police and military personnel were operating across the country in an effort to prevent future terror attacks of any kind. If the cyberattacks on France prior to the Olympics are an indicator of a looming threat, France has its work cut out for it.

Cyber threats are more than just hackers exploiting the internet. On July 26, 2024, terrorists damaged lineside communication cables on three of the most important ligne a vitesse radiating from Paris. These attacks disabled signal technology at key junctions including in LGV Nord at Croisilles—connecting Paris with Lille. Eurostar rail networks were also disrupted ahead of the Olympics. Thus, damage to communication networks can take a physical form.

China is now engaged in open hybrid warfare against the West—more broadly. Policymakers, parliamentarians, and intelligence officials in the UK and France sometimes advocate for reforms to address these challenges, but little happens. The lack of cyber expertise within European intelligence agencies leads to numerous domestic security challenges. The French government, for example, was exasperated with the sabotage campaign that took place.

France accused Russia of cyberattacks during the election earlier this year—all to disrupt the country’s democracy. Authorities asserted that the Russian Federal Security Service was behind sustained attempts against the French institutions.

The UK took measures in response to cyber threats from China, demonstrating a proactive stance, but British efforts are not widely understood and accepted. Recent cyberattacks on the UK’s National Health Service and the Ministry of Defense highlight significant challenges faced by the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) in countering hybrid warfare tactics from state actors like China and Russia.

These attacks illustrated vulnerabilities in the UK’s cybersecurity infrastructure and raised concerns about the effectiveness of GCHQ’s strategies in mitigating threats posed by advanced persistent threat (APT) groups.

In July 2024, cyberattacks on the NHS disrupted critical healthcare services, compromised patient data, and operational capabilities. Attacks on Ministry of Defense infrastructure jeopardized national security by leaking sensitive information and undermined military readiness.

The presence of foreign spies within UK state institutions suggests these networks have successfully penetrated high-security environments, posing substantial risks to national security. The presence of a strong Russian security and intelligence infrastructure in Eastern Europe, and its reluctance to accept Western security-sector reforms is a threat to internal and external security for the region.

In Eastern Europe, reshaping intelligence and police services is part of the consolidation of democracy. In the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, intelligence agencies are experiencing a cultural hangover from a bygone era. In these countries, the process of bringing intelligence services into a Western way of operating is progressing slowly.

The war in Ukraine is also leaving a deep impact. European intelligence service strategies, operations, and collection processes in and outside their sphere of influence. They never realized how to introduce the reforms required to prevent Russian success. The Danish, for example, produced the PET Report, which uncovered espionage networks in Denmark. The PET Report has noted several cases that illustrated how a number of foreign states were actively carrying out intelligence activities against Denmark using cyber and other means.

In short, Europe is facing a challenging future when it comes to the malicious cyber activities of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. European intelligence services are unprepared for the adversary they face. The challenge is growing. The time is now for Europe to respond.

Musa Khan Jalalzai is an author, journalist, and member of Research Institute for European and American Studies, Director of Law Enforcement and Intelligence Analysis Centre London, and Fellow of Islamic Theology of Counter Terrorism. The views expressed are his own.

The European Union’s Cyber War Challenge was originally published on Global Security Review.

Over 4,300 miles of Russia’s Siberian Plateau are undergoing renovation—including a floating nuclear power plant—to support new civilian settlements and 17 full-service Northern Sea Route (NSR) ports, tightening control over regional petroleum supplies and commerce through increased Russian military presence.

Oil and gas exports top Russia’s priorities, representing 60 percent of total revenue and 30 percent of the Russian government’s overall budget. Rising ocean temperatures are providing new access to minerals on land and sea. Multi-billion-dollar contracts with Gazprom, Rosneft, and Novatek will develop the Vostok oil field and Yamal Liquid Natural Gas plant. Once complete, these facilities could rival the Nord Stream Pipeline and increase Putin’s influence.

Russia possesses the largest icebreaking fleet—40 ships compared to the United States’ two—escorting the most maritime traffic through the NSR. Warming seas will likely increase demand for shippers seeking shorter transit times between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, while new ports will serve increased maritime traffic. Putin is also considering a Trans-Siberian Railway between seaports and an Arctic road that expedites cargo across Russia’s interior.

The Northern Fleet projects growth to 50 icebreaker vessels as part of its full-spectrum operations to “phase NATO out of the Arctic.” One year into the Ukraine war, Russian global positioning satellite (GPS) jamming incidents affecting foreign sea vessels in the NSR nearly doubled.

In 2022, Norway reported Russian intelligence gathering drones over its Svalbard archipelago and energy-processing facilities. Russia thinly veils this activity as responses to action against it in Ukraine and correlates operations between the two theaters.

The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) decrees Arctic Circle nations possess up to 200 nautical miles of contiguous seabed, extendable with supporting scientific data. In 2007, a Russian submarine planted a flag on the seabed beyond its border, claiming the Lomonosov Ridge and 1.2 million additional square kilometers of seabed, drawing Canada and Denmark into a legal battle over economic exclusion area infringement.

On December 5, 2022, Putin updated the “Rules of Navigation on the Water Area of the Northern Sea Route.” The revision now prohibits foreign military vessels in internal waters unless heading to port, re-designates the NSR straits as internal waters (instead of international routes), requires military vessels receive permission 90 days before passage, and allows only one warship at a time. Russia enforces its perceived territorial gains with bomber overflights of the NSR, citing security, but obfuscates where security ends and militarization begins.

Seven Arctic military locations anchor Russia’s Arctic military monopoly and are or have received upgrades to military capabilities. First, the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago is where Russia conducts nuclear testing. Intelligence suggests upgrades to facilities could mean atmospheric testing may resume. Second, the Nagurskoye Air Base is seeing a runway expansion, air defense missiles added, and a new meteorological facility completed. Third, Rogachevo Air Base is getting upgrades to radars, air defense missiles, electronic warfare capabilities, and signals intelligence assets. Third, Sredniy Air Base is receiving a runway expansion. Fourth, Northern Clover Base is receiving observation, air defense missile, and equipment-testing upgrades. Fifth, Wrangel Island’s deepwater port, radar station, air defense missiles, and signals intelligence collection, used to monitor American bases in Alaska, were all upgraded. Sixth, air defense missiles were emplaced at Cape Schmidt.

These Arctic military upgrades show Russia’s intent to monopolize Arctic commerce and create a new avenue of attack against NATO. Wrangel Island can house submarines and surface ships, establishing Arctic entry control between Russia and Alaska. Bases at Nagurskoye and Rogachevo establish similar control on the opposite end of the Arctic Ocean, creating guarded entry points supported by the new military installations along Russia’s Arctic coast.

Canada’s Arctic region directly across from Russia is mostly uninhabited but contains two Cold War–era early warning radar sites supporting NATO. In 2022, then Canadian Chief of Defense Staff Wayne Eyre called the Arctic “a key area of concern,” warning North America’s Arctic coast may be vulnerable and prompting joint exercises focused on northern nuclear attacks. Exercises Joint Viking and Joint Warrior included new members Sweden and Finland but do not match Russia’s increased regional presence.

America’s early warning facility at Thule, Greenland, is crumbling from under-investment and melting permafrost, while the Danish government monitors over 400 Russian infrastructure projects. China envisions itself a near-Arctic country under its Belt and Road Initiative and acquired a decommissioned Russian military facility. Rather than pursue a large footprint, China bankrolls many of the ongoing Russian projects. The Danes warn Chinese ownership of Arctic facilities can create safe havens for Russian forces and bring both adversaries to NATO’s polar doorstep.

The once-isolated Arctic Ocean is bustling with Russian activity as former Russian Premiere Mikhail Gorbachev’s proclaimed “zone of peace” becomes militarily contested. Russia continues its brand of strong-arm diplomacy using military force as an enabler for commercial expansion and financial gain.

NATO must prepare for what a Russian Arctic Ocean monopoly could mean for international commerce and security. Simply admiring the problem is no longer an option. Deterring Russian aggression means the United States and its NATO allies must expand their own capability to levels that dissuade Russian action.

Dan Wasserman is a contributor to Global Security Review. The views expressed are his own.

Russia’s Arctic Ocean Monopoly was originally published on Global Security Review.