President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized U.S. European allies for their alleged failure to assume a larger share of the responsibility for NATO deterrence and defense. Although most U.S. angst about European burden sharing concerns preparedness for a larger conventional war on the continent, the sharing of risk with respect to nuclear escalation has received less attention. Past practice suggested that the American nuclear umbrella would suffice to deter Russian threats of nuclear escalation. On the other hand, Europe’s indigenous nuclear forces may have the potential to serve as a sufficient deterrent against Russian nuclear first use.

French “Forwardism”

In March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a doctrine of “forward deterrence” regarding the future of French nuclear declaratory and employment policy. His statements amounted to the most important shift in French nuclear posture in decades. The more important components of this policy change are as follows: First, France will increase the size of its nuclear deterrent force (force de dissuasion) for the first time since 1992. The assumption behind this move is that the current nuclear force is too small to deter aggression beyond France’s borders. Second, France would permit the temporary deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft to allied countries. However, France will not delegate nuclear employment authority to other countries. Stationing nuclear forces outside France will reinforce France’s commitment to its European partners. Third, France would work more closely with allies to develop shared understandings of the nature of the Russian threat and to coordinate on the management of escalation control in the context of a conventional war. The first stage of this collaboration will include visits to strategic sites and/or joint exercises with Germany, the UK, and other NATO countries.

Trump’s Frustrations

The decision taken by Macron reflects a perceived need for upgrading the proficiency of France’s nuclear deterrent. It also represents a political statement about his doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to NATO. Despite improvements in European defense readiness and preparedness, President Trump has continued to disparage NATO as weak and “free riding” on the backs of the U.S. military. Trump has announced that he plans to remove 5,000 American troops from Germany and has suggested that the U.S. should leave the alliance despite being prohibited by Congress from unilaterally doing so.

There are several prompts for this continuing cold shoulder from Washington to Brussels. First, Trump is frustrated by Putin and Zelensky and their inability to negotiate a cease-fire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Second, the U.S. President launched a pre-emptive combat operation against Iran on February 28, 2026, without either consulting or informing NATO allies before the fact. Understandably, in this regard, European leaders have been hesitant to provide military support, and some have refused to grant access to American bases or airspace for Operation Epic Fury, further frustrating President Trump. Third, the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global supply chains and driven up the prices of fossil fuels and fertilizer worldwide.

European and U.S. Support for Ukraine

Despite distractions, NATO members remain committed to supporting Ukraine as long as needed. An agreement allows U.S. allies in Europe to buy weapons from the U.S. and pass them to Ukraine. The U.S. continues to upgrade its nuclear deterrent, especially the strategic nuclear triad, with a $71.4 billion FY27 plan for next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers with new Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missiles, and improved nuclear command and control.

It is doubtful that France’s nuclear force, which includes several hundred warheads with delivery systems such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and both land- and sea-based aircraft, can replace the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent – nor was it meant to. Instead, France’s independent nuclear deterrence, designed to defend its own interests and sovereignty, along with the United Kingdom’s small ballistic missile submarine force, offers a minimal deterrent against nuclear threats from Russia at a level below strategic nuclear weapons.

Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded international audiences that Russia, under certain conditions of adversity in conventional war, might resort to nuclear first use of non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons, having shorter ranges and lower yields than strategic weapons, can be launched from land, sea, and airborne platforms and could number as many as 2,000 in Russia’s available inventory. In comparison, the U.S. deploys some 200 available NSNWs at several NATO bases.

U.S. Nuclear War Planning and NATO

This disparity in the number of NSNWs is not as alarming as it might seem because the nature of U.S. nuclear war planning has changed since the Cold War. Current U.S. operational plans include the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities within one comprehensive plan. U.S. nuclear forces are expected to provide options for graduated escalation and flexible response. Toward that end, U.S. bomber deployments and military exercises provide additional support to U.S. European Command, bolstering NATO deterrence. In addition to the increased bomber presence, the Trump administration wants to add the flexibility of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) for the deployment of weapons with variable yields. The purpose of SLCM-N is to deter limited nuclear use by adversaries and to provide reassurance to U.S. European and Asian allies.

France recognizes that deterrence is not only about the size of military forces, including nuclear arms, despite Macron’s plan to increase the number of French nuclear weapons. It also depends on perceived resolve among allies and potential adversaries. In Macron’s view, Russia should not expect that democratic Europe can be intimidated by threats of limited nuclear war because (in Russia’s mind) that threat is more realistic compared to strategic nuclear war. Nor should Russia expect that French support for NATO excludes the possibility of deploying French nuclear-capable launchers outside French national territory. French training exercises with NATO countries closer to Russia’s border will help send that message.

Conclusion

A more forward-leaning French military doctrine does not mean abandoning France’s commitment to European security. Nor does it replace the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Macron recognizes that, in defense matters, truth counts more than words: the United States cannot completely detach itself from NATO, nor can NATO sever its ties with America. NATO without the U.S. invites nuclear coercion upon Western Europe, while the U.S. without NATO risks political and military isolation instead of credible deterrence. The American and European pillars of NATO, as the French might say, are “condemned to succeed” together.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up-Can France Lead the Way was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) overran at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and failure to reinforce troops under attack points to deep organizational failure.

Events like the February 2026 Kwara massacre, in which jihadists killed over 200 people as well as the December 2025 U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile strikes on Nigerian soil and the deployment of American troops amount to the clearest sign yet that Africa’s most populous nation can no longer secure itself.

The Mosul Parallel

Iraq, before the fall of Mosul in 2014, offers the closest comparison. When 1,500 ISIS fighters routed 60,000 Iraqi soldiers, the collapse came not from lack of firepower but from corruption. The Iraqi military had roughly 50,000 ghost soldiers on its payroll, troops who existed only on paper so commanders could pocket their salaries. Nigeria faces the same problem. Leaked UK diplomatic cables found that of the 20,000 troops Nigeria claims to deploy in the northeast, the real number is significantly lower, with thousands of ghost soldiers generating salaries collected by officers. The corruption is not incidental; it is systemic. Transparency International gave Nigeria’s defense sector an ‘E’ rating for “very high” corruption risk.

The human cost falls on ordinary soldiers. A Nigerian private earns $31 to $38 per month. Soldiers spend three to five years deployed without rotation, creating conditions for mass desertion. Iraq’s military eventually reformed after Mosul through fingerprint-based troop verification and coalition mentoring, but that reform only happened because Mosul was a shock too large to ignore. Nigeria faces a harder problem, a slow bleed rather than a single catastrophe, which gives political leaders room to delay action indefinitely.

ISWAP’s Tactical Evolution and the Sahel Corridor

ISWAP’s 2025 “Camp Holocaust” campaign has been the most successful in the group’s history. ISWAP systematically destroyed forward operating bases across the Lake Chad Basin using drones, night-vision gear, and coordinated swarm attacks. The capture and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba in November 2025 was not simply a battlefield loss. It revealed that ISWAP now operates with better intelligence than the forces it fights. ISWAP intercepted his communications and tracked his position after his convoy was ambushed 88 kilometers from regional military headquarters in Maiduguri. A force with 230,000 troops and a multibillion-dollar budget could not locate its own brigade commander.

The broader Sahel security framework has collapsed around Nigeria, and the timing could not be worse. Niger’s withdrawal from the Multinational Joint Task Force in March 2025 ended joint border patrols along a vast open frontier. Into this gap has moved Lakurawa, an Islamic State Sahel Province subgroup operating across Sokoto and Kebbi states with surveillance drones. Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM launched its first recorded attack on Nigerian soil in 2025.

The Air Power Deficit

The Nigerian Air Force shows what happens when procurement runs ahead of maintenance capacity. Three JF-17 fighters from Pakistan were delivered in 2021. By May 2023, only one could still fly. The result is an air force that cannot protect civilians or support ground troops. SBM Intelligence estimates over 400 Nigerian civilians killed in erroneous military airstrikes between 2017 and 2025. The February 2026 Woro massacre showed what this means in practice. A military aircraft appeared overhead during a ten-hour attack that killed at least 162 civilians but did not engage.

External Partners and the Limits of Assistance

The United States launched 16 Tomahawk cruise missiles against Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State on Christmas Day 2025 and deployed troops to Bauchi Airfield. CSIS assessed that one-off strikes are unlikely to reduce the terrorist threat significantly. The pattern is familiar: outside firepower treats the symptoms while the underlying disease, institutional corruption, goes unaddressed. Nigeria’s own Defense Minister Christopher Musa has acknowledged that military action addresses only 30 percent of the conflict. The International Crisis Group’s 2016 reform blueprint called for fingerprint-based troop verification and open defense spending records. It remains unimplemented a decade later.

The Coup Question and the Criminal-Terror Nexus

Recent history across the Sahel makes this risk real. In Burkina Faso and Mali, troops who felt abandoned by civilian leaders seized power. Nigeria shows each of these warning signs. Soldiers earn $31 a month while generals oversee billions in unchecked spending. The Nigerian Armed Forces mostly ruled the country between 1966 and 1999, and the memory of military government has not faded.

A second risk deepens the picture. ISWAP brings in an estimated $191 million per year by taxing trade across the Lake Chad Basin, ten times what the Borno State government collects. Furthermore northwest bandit networks took in an estimated $1.42 billion in ransom in a single year.

Every overrun  base sends vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ISWAP and other groups, fortifying their governance with economic and military assets. This is the critical danger: the longer reform is delayed, the more these groups entrench themselves as alternative governments with independent revenue. Once that happens, as Sudan’s civil war has shown, the window for reversing the trend narrows sharply.

Outlook

The 2026 Nigerian defense budget includes 5.41 trillion naira ($3.9 billion). However, 62 percent goes to personnel costs and the naira’s collapse has cut real spending power by two-thirds since 2023. Nigerian President Tinubu’s security emergency declaration has not changed the picture. At least 316 civilians were killed across 15 states in the 71 days that followed.

Three patterns deserve attention: the self-arming cycle, where weapons from overrun bases fuel the next attack; the intelligence gap, where ISWAP knows more about the military than the military knows about ISWAP; and the governing contest, where ISWAP’s services undercut public trust in the state. Until the corruption at the heart of Nigeria’s military is confronted, no amount of outside help will change the course. The question facing Abuja is whether reform comes through deliberate action or through the kind of devastating loss that forced Iraq’s hand after Mosul.

Arman Sidhu is an American geopolitical analyst and writer. He regularly covers the commodities market, international trade, and foreign investment. He is a regular contributor to Geopolitical Monitor and his work has previously appeared in The Diplomat, Eurasia Review, Economic & Political Weekly, and RealClearWorld, among several other outlets. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Hollow Ranks & Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria’s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse was originally published on Global Security Review.

The US does not seek a full-scale nuclear exchange. Yet it is critically important that the civilian and military leadership consider all possible scenarios. It is imperative to impress upon warfighters and their political leaders that, while unwanted, nuclear exchange may be a reality the United States faces.

The expanding arsenals of China and Russia deploy advanced and varied delivery vehicles and warheads and are a direct challenge to the American-led international order. The move from a bi-polar to a tri-polar world is driving instability and creating new challenges that the US military is not prepared to face.

If military commanders fail to understand the critical role of nuclear weapons or lack a willingness to use them, when necessary, national security objectives will not be met. China and Russia see their nuclear weapons as an extension of their warfighting capabilities and are prepared to use them.

American leaders cannot wish away events unfolding around them. The Congressional Research Service’s (CRS) report on the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) identified the contradiction in direction and understanding of American warfighters. According to the report, “The NPR reiterates a January 2022 statement by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdon and the United States stipulating that ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,’ and that ‘nuclear weapons should serve defensive purposes, deter aggression, and prevent war.’”

Later the report explains, “The NPR lists three roles for nuclear weapons: deter strategic attacks, assure allies and partners, and achieve US objectives if deterrence fails.” This is indeed the cornerstone of national policy and ensures the United States effectively operates under a non-first-strike policy.

However, the military seems to interpret this message to mean that the United States will never fight a nuclear conflict and does not need to plan to fight one. A clear example of this is the fact that no American president has participated in a US Strategic Command national nuclear exercise since President George W. Bush. Warfighters and planners from Air Force Global Strike Command and US Strategic Command who do, in fact, plan and think about possible nuclear options every day, may disagree because they do think about nuclear conflict. Unfortunately, these issues are rarely discussed or examined by leaders within the major commands or combatant commands that are primarily tasked with a conventional mission.

The focus on conventional warfare pushes aside any discussion of conventional-nuclear integration in a future fight. Too often, a response becomes focused on a comparable conventional response instead of all available options for the president to choose from. This becomes self-limiting even after nuclear attacks on the United States or its forces abroad. Limiting the response to adversary’s nuclear attack to conventional options very likely has the opposite of the desired effect.

It is time to refocus attention on how to fight and win a conflict where nuclear weapons are employed and teach warfighters that deterrence holds when Russia and China understand the United States can and will fight and win a nuclear conflict. The military, unfortunately, has experienced a precipitous decline in nuclear expertise and strategic thought.

The future focus should be to increase the level of understanding across all levels within the total force. This is critical as the nation presses into uncharted waters in a new nuclear world. Recent developments and growth among the Russian, Chinese, and even North Korean nuclear arsenals create serious concern because none of these adversaries are only building strategic nuclear weapons for the sole purpose of strategic deterrence. They are building low-yield, shorter range, tactical nuclear weapons that serve no purpose other than battlefield use.

Time for a New Deterrence Theory?

 Three significant deterrence thinkers play an outsized role in shaping theory and policy. Thomas Schelling, Herman Kahn, and, in the post–Cold War era, Keith Payne were, and remain, influential in driving national policy. Deterrence theory served the nation for many years and ensured that the Soviet Union understood the ultimate risk of nuclear conflict with the United States.

The tri-polar world emerging may change the probability for limited nuclear exchange—increasing the threat by emboldening Russia and China to challenge the United States. The smaller nuclear-armed states, when added to the mix, create additional volatility. Understanding that an adversary may believe they can overcome an overmatch of their conventional forces with the use of low-yield weapons is a new factor in the deterrence equation. While keeping any fight conventional is clearly the United States’ preference, Russia and China are demonstrating that they intend to use nuclear weapons to backstop conventional forces.

It is worth keeping in mind that any fight between the United States and Russia or China will take place in their backyard. This means the asymmetry of interests at stake may leave either adversary to see nuclear weapons as a logical option to ensure victory.

This change should drive new thought and deeper understanding of nuclear strategy and deterrence. Political and military leaders will have to rethink the time-tested deterrence methods of the past and see how they may or may not apply with this new and challenging nuclear world. Increasing nuclear expertise and strategic exploration will open new and varied thoughts on how to apply an updated and possibly more flexible nuclear strategy.

Conclusion

Political and military leaders must understand the dynamics discussed and ensure warfighters understand the battlefield on which they may fight. They must articulate the difference between nuclear deterrence and nuclear warfighting and mentor leaders on its critical importance.

Warfighters need to organize, train, and equip to fight and win in conflicts that include nuclear weapons use. Future leaders cannot fear nuclear weapons and must understand how to fight after their employment by either side. This may very well be the difference between American victory or defeat.

Raymundo M. Vann Jr. is a 2024 Department of the Air Force Fellow and author of The Joint Force’s Unwinnable War? The views expressed are his alone.

The US Military’s Unwinnable War was originally published on Global Security Review.