Ideology matters, as I learned from surviving 18 years under the Chavista regime in Venezuela. The United States pretended otherwise for three decades, clinging to the “end of history” and similar dreams. Today, with ideologically driven conflicts simmering around the world, it is time for America to integrate deterrence, defense, and a theory of victory across the so-called gray zone of geopolitics. Doing so will require policymakers to start listening to what America’s enemies have been saying for years about their ideological designs.

In 2004, when questioned about whether a Venezuela-Cuba alliance was exporting communist revolution throughout the Western Hemisphere, the Venezuelan ambassador to the United States averred: “It is a thing outdated in time and it is not understanding the relationships that exist between the countries.” That was a backhanded ‘yes,’ if there ever was one. The message was meant to assuage the busy, post-9/11 national security community, diverting attention away from the problems brewing south of the U.S. border. More than two decades later, the annual warnings of USSOUTHCOM Combatant Commanders before Congress have finally been heeded by the White House.

Ideology has been slapping America in the face since the late 1990s. For this era of refocusing on state-based threats, it comes in these forms and many others: Beijing’s obsession with employing “united front” organizations to silence dissidents overseas; Moscow’s obsession with Ukraine, kicking off a murky war in 2014 that is now sustained conventionally; Tehran’s obsession with aiding and abetting proxy martyrs of the Islamic Revolution; Havana’s and Caracas’ shared obsession with waging “asymmetric war” on Western powers (which included flooding the American homeland with illicit narcotics); and Pyongyang’s obsession with subverting Seoul’s political processes and civic life. All these gray-zone efforts have an ideology at the heart. Their ideologies, variously rooted in Marxism, religion, and revanchism, drive the leaders of these states to employ irregular warfare tactics without any remorse and at any cost to civilians in the West or anywhere else. You will not find high degrees of intellectual coherence between these constructs; shared hatreds and collectivist doctrines and dogmas are cohesive enough for what now amounts to an anti-Western coalition.

Anti-Western adversaries became sneakier when strategizing and aligning with those espousing similar worldviews. They also became more convinced of their moral superiority. The U.S. national security community makes arbitrary distinctions between geopolitics and ideology. These distinctions obfuscate reality, which is already tough to comprehend, and lead to poor policymaking. Nowhere is this weakness more prominent than in the domain of irregular warfare. How did ISIS carve out its domain between Iraq and Syria, for instance, if not through the aid of its ideology?

Discussing rival-state ideology in the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security seems to generate discomfort despite some strides to understand strategic cultures. It started with the spectacular triumphs of 1991. After Saddam Hussein’s defeat in the First Gulf War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, international relations’ ideological variables have been marginalized in the Federal Government. The American bureaucrat could finally put ‘Sovietology’ to rest, and, with it, anything to do with alternatives to liberal internationalism. The term ‘Great-Power Competition’ continues the delusion; ‘strategic-ideological struggle’ captures reality much better.

Disclaimer: Ideologies are messy. Their study requires incredible levels of nuance, subtlety, cultural awareness, philosophical skill, and extensive interpretive room. It is not a field of expertise attuned nor prone to engineering solutions or linear responses, making it politically dangerous to confront ideological challengers. Bringing up ideology always risks alienating a group and hurting its feelings. Hence, American political leaders and senior officials have scarcely breathed a word about state-centric ideological conflict since the demise of the USSR.

This problematic approach is a vestige of America’s long-gone “unipolar moment.” Through mirror imaging, it takes our attention away from elements that the Western world’s rivals thrive on. Several foes of the West have developed highly complex irregular warfare doctrines, intelligently focusing on the types of operations that some of these actors can excel in, and backing off from the type of war that they know they cannot win. Because illegality is the common denominator to all irregular warfare activities coming from any type of challenger, ideological zeal and fervor are absolute strategic imperatives to the leaders of these revanchist entities. Indeed, during the Global War on Terror, we recognized it as an essential enemy warfighting capability. Ideology is the glue that authoritarians, totalitarians, and other extremists apply to bind together the domestic constituencies that they rely on for control and aggression. In ideology, those leaders find the corpus of thought and the narratives required to morally justify atrocities committed in pursuit of greed, territorial expansion, or a simple clinging to power.

Acknowledgement is growing that defeating mere symptoms of its rivals’ irregular warfare campaigns cannot bring American strategic victory or even achieve deterrence in the “gray zone.” Looking back at the U.S.-led quagmires of Afghanistan and Iraq, more observers have called for defeating root ideologies, rather than just crushing the fighters who currently espouse a certain ideology’s flavor-of-the-moment (e.g., Taliban, al-Qaeda, ISIS, Hezbollah, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, FARC, ELN, etc.).

Defeating our enemies must include defeating their ideologies. This no longer demands global wars in the traditional (conventional) military sense. To defeat regime ideologies, whole-of-government efforts require dusting off forgotten or atrophied competencies that America used to cultivate, including the ‘dark arts’ of U.S. foreign policy. Washington needs to articulate once again what it believes in, beyond vague notions of stability, and bring like-minded allies to our side.

David Guenni is completing his doctorate with Missouri State University’s Graduate School of Defense & Strategic Studies. His research focuses on nation-states’ employment of narcotrafficking as an irregular warfare modality. He is a Venezuelan political asylum seeker in the United States, having spent many years in the struggle against the Chavista regime in Caracas. His opinions are his own and no one else’s.

Why Ideology Matters in Irregular Warfare was originally published on Global Security Review.

In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. Recent high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.

The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift

The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.

The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s readiness to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.

In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.

Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?

To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.

New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including continued purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.

As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.

How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?

Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” combining tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.

On the security front, reports point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented proposals tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.

Regionally, Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the defense pact with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.

The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism

The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.

This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. Reports of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.

The Costs and Risks of This Shift

Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.

These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.

The Messages of the Shift for Key Players

Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.

For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.

Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity

Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.

If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.

Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India was originally published on Global Security Review.

ICBM EAR Report Nov 5, 2024 was originally published on Global Security Review.