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	<title>Topic:Tunisia &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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	<title>Topic:Tunisia &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>The Return of the Arab Spring</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/return-of-the-arab-spring/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ibrahim Taha]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Jul 2019 13:11:11 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Government & Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[African Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Algeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Morocco]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sudan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tunisia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=12433</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The ouster of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir on April 11 failed to satisfy the demands of millions of Sudanese protestors, who sought a timely transition to a democratic, civilian-led government. The Transitional Military Council’s (TMC) intervention failed to achieve the goal of democratic rule and revealed the firm grip of Al-Bashir’s loyalists in the country’s [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/return-of-the-arab-spring/">The Return of the Arab Spring</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The ouster of Sudanese President <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/happening-sudan-unrest-190603091106565.html">Omar al-Bashir</a> on April 11 failed to satisfy the demands of millions of Sudanese protestors, who sought a timely transition to a democratic, civilian-led government. The Transitional Military Council’s (TMC) intervention failed to achieve the goal of democratic rule and revealed the firm grip of Al-Bashir’s loyalists in the country’s security services and military, who sought to preserve the old regime. Despite the repressive tactics of authorities, thousands continued to demonstrate for <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/march-sudanese-renew-protests-demand-civilian-rule-190630122106508.html">democratic governance</a> in Sudan, amidst growing dissent in several North African and Arab countries including Algeria, have prompted analysts to anticipate a <a href="https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/commentary/second-arab-spring-not-quite">second Arab Spring</a>.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>While the uprisings of the 2011 Arab Spring brought about renewed optimism in the MENA (the Middle East and North Africa) region, it ended in catastrophic failure. Over 180,000 individuals were killed, and <a href="https://www.worldbulletin.net/middle-east/180000-killed-6-million-displaced-in-arab-spring-h125344.html">over six million</a> were displaced—a solemn reminder to demonstrators and activists today. While the defiance of demonstrators is laudable, lives were lost as the <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/05/sudan-death-toll-rises-to-60-after-khartoum-pro-democracy-sit-in">death toll increased</a> to seemingly little avail as negotiations between the military government and opposition in Sudan seemed destined for failure, until talks brokered by the African Union yielded a breakthrough agreement.</p>
<p>The United States dispatched an <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/exclusive-us-sudan-envoy-calls-for-return-to-talks-and-end-to-violence-1.881132">envoy</a> to facilitate ongoing talks in Sudan, and the African Union <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jun/06/sudan-african-union-suspension-military-rulers">suspended the country&#8217;s membership</a>. While the situation in Sudan appears to have stabilized to a degree, the unrest in Sudan and Algeria has spread to other North African states, in a reverberating echo of the 2011 Tahrir Square demonstrations in Cairo, Egypt. As economic discontent spreads throughout the Middle East, political unrest is growing.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>In Morocco, a <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48771758">BBC survey</a> has revealed that more than half of respondents in the country seek immediate political change. Whether mass protests will erupt in Morocco is unknown; however, grievances are palpable, signaling a possible rerun of the unrest experienced in the Arab Spring protests. Eight years after the failure of the mass protests of 2011 to affect meaningful reform, lessons must be learned to avoid similar outcomes—or worse.</p>
<p>With the removal of the Mubarak dictatorship, came the election of Egypt’s first democratically-elected president, <a href="https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/morsi-wasn-t-perfect-but-he-was-egypt-s-best-bet-against-tyranny-27582">Mohamed Morsi</a>. Just as Morsi’s election symbolized the dawn of a new era for many, his demise by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s military coup and recent unexpected death was emblematic of democracy’s often brutal fate in the Middle East and North Africa—a statement which does not imply support for the Muslim Brotherhood or deflect from the short-lived hopes for a chaotic presidency, but rather highlights its reverse effect: the emboldening of military dictatorships. Except for Tunisia, many states in the region have seen the implementation of <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-second-arab-spring-go-way-first-53357">greater autocratic control</a> or have spiraled into anarchy since the Arab Spring.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>The convoluted role of the United States in the Arab Spring, whereby President Obama sanctioned <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/21/barack-obama-arab-spring-cairo-speech">regime change in Libya</a> while supporting the military-backed coup in Egypt, arises from the contention between abiding by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/21/barack-obama-arab-spring-cairo-speech">America’s foreign policy and national security interests</a> and aligning with local democratic movements.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>One conspicuous feature of the United States’ approach to recent unrest is <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/world/africa/sudan-revolution-protest-saudi-arabia-gulf.html">resounding silence</a>. This could reflect the Trump’s antipathy to foreign intervention or precautionary measures after the inefficacy of U.S. involvement in 2011. Nonetheless, the protests in Sudan and Algeria are organic movements of ordinary citizens, many of whom are young people—the nemesis of autocratic dictatorships. The large-scale involvement of youths was illustrated in the successful attempt to block 82-year-old Algerian <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/10/algeria-youth-rise-up-against-ageing-leaders">President Bouteflika</a> from running for a fifth term.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Almost seventy percent of Algeria’s population is <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/on-algerian-streets-hope-for-revolutionary-change-but-history-haunts-the-protesters/2019/06/26/35448878-92c1-11e9-956a-88c291ab5c38_story.html?noredirect=on&amp;utm_term=.9cbd7f3e8760">under the age of 30</a>, resembling the demographic profile of the Arab Spring protests, aided by social media and propelled by <a href="https://egyptianstreets.com/2019/06/30/sudanese-protests-march-a-one-million-man-march-demanding-the-fall-of-tmc/">economic hardships</a> seeking to topple military-backed regimes. These similarities present similar obstacles with a <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-second-arab-spring-go-way-first-53357">decentralized opposition</a> being unsustainable in the long-term. Meanwhile, the presence of social media as a weapon for democracy remains a concern for Arab governments, evidenced by the <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/06/iamthesudanrevolution-support-sudan-internet-blackout-190607053612349.html">internet blackout</a> in Sudan, which only served to further fuel public grievances.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>A case study of Egypt reveals that deposing the front-facing leadership is merely a smokescreen to the power structure that remains—mainly bureaucrats, members of the security and military establishments, and oligarchs loyal to the old regime. While delaying elections in Algeria <a href="https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/06/04/the-cancellation-of-algerias-elections-is-an-opportunity-for-democratization/">favors protestors</a> in buying time to prevent <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/02/world/africa/algeria-elections-canceled.html">Army Chief Gaid Salah’s</a> preferred candidate taking office—a remnant of Bouteflika’s regime—the action highlights how a lack of organization amongst the opposition impedes progress. The militaries in both Sudan and Algeria are the repositories of power. Salah’s description of protestors who opposed the army as being “<a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/on-algerian-streets-hope-for-revolutionary-change-but-history-haunts-the-protesters/2019/06/26/35448878-92c1-11e9-956a-88c291ab5c38_story.html?noredirect=on&amp;utm_term=.9cbd7f3e8760">enemies of Algeria</a>,” reinforces the brevity of hope instilled by the protests, before being silenced by the military.<span class="Apple-converted-space"> </span></p>
<p>Revolutions enthuse the masses with optimism, however, the experiences of the 2011 protests reveal an illusory and temporal effect in the face of a powerful military and security establishment. The Sudanese and Algerian cases highlight growing dissent in the Middle East and North Africa. Without an organized opposition with overwhelming international support, political unrest in the MENA region is likely to bear an uncanny resemblance to the events of the first Arab Spring, potentially resulting in anarchy, civil war, or the imposition of stronger autocratic rule.</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/return-of-the-arab-spring/">The Return of the Arab Spring</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<item>
		<title>The Resilience of Jihadi Extremist Groups in North Africa</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/resilience-extremist-groups-north-africa/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Paolo Zucconi]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Apr 2019 18:37:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al Qaeda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Algeria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[European Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Lybia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Morocco]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tunisia]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=11101</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Eight years after Qaddafi&#8217;s fall, Libya remains in a state of chaos due to the fragmentation of power and contrast between West and East Libya (Tripoli and Tobruk)—as well as tribal conflicts (especially in the Fezzan). This affects both the rebuilding of active state institutions and the process of national reconciliation. While the Libyan conflict has [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/resilience-extremist-groups-north-africa/">The Resilience of Jihadi Extremist Groups in North Africa</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Eight years after Qaddafi&#8217;s fall, Libya remains in a state of chaos due to the fragmentation of power and contrast between West and East Libya (Tripoli and Tobruk)—as well as tribal conflicts (especially in the Fezzan). This affects both the rebuilding of active state institutions and the process of national reconciliation. While the Libyan conflict has been primarily characterized by short-term alliances among local actors (such as militias and tribes), the resilience of Libyan jihadi extremist groups and their networks cannot be underestimated.</p>
<p>Extremist propaganda has spread beyond Libya to reach Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt. While this isn&#8217;t a new phenomenon, North African states continue to suffer from substantial terrorist attacks. Recently, the Tripoli-based Libyan <a href="https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/isis-claims-libyan-oil-headquarters-attack-1.769334">National Oil Company</a> and the <a href="https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/libya/43893/statement-attack-libyan-high-national-electoral-commission-hnec-tripoli_en">High National Electoral Commission</a> were attacked by militants seemingly linked to ISIS (<em>Daesh</em>). Extremist movements are increasing their propaganda output and continue to pose a severe threat to internal and regional security.</p>
<p>Tunisia is engulfed in a deep economic crisis. As such, international financial institutions are demanding significant economic structural reforms, which have triggered protests and prompted an increase in propaganda originating from networks in Libya to exploit socio-economic issues to attract disaffected young people to their ranks.</p>
<p>On October 28<sup>th</sup>, 2018 a woman with no previously-known militant background (according to <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2018/10/29/middleeast/tunis-female-suicide-bomber-intl/index.html">Tunisian authorities</a>) blew herself up. The attack occurred just as the country&#8217;s vital tourism industry started to recover more than three years after two deadly terror attacks. More recently, on March 7<sup>th</sup>, 2019, a post office in Tunis intercepted <a href="http://northafricapost.com/28518-tunisia-interception-of-letters-containing-toxic-substances-addressed-to-public-figures.html">19 letters</a> containing potentially deadly toxins addressed to notable journalists, politicians, and trade unionists. Local authorities revealed that the substances were produced in a Tunisian laboratory. This is a critical security issue that needs to be addressed—both domestically and regionally, and possibly in cooperation with the European Union. Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt are strategic partners for Europe—ensuring their stability is essential to avoid further crises in the region.</p>
<p>On March 10<sup>th</sup>, 2019, Al-Qaeda in the Maghreb&#8217;s (AQIM) al-Andalus media foundation released an <a href="https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2019/03/aqim-official-calls-for-sharia-governance-in-algeria.php">audio clip</a> of a speech given by AQIM official Abu Obeida Yusuf al-Annabi. The address championed the Algerian protests against current Algerian president Abdelaziz Bouteflika and encouraged protesters to demand Sharia-based governance. Despite Algeria having recently initiated a massive counter-terrorism operation to prevent the infiltration of terrorists through the country&#8217;s borders with Tunisia, Libya, and Mali, extremist propaganda still represents a serious issue.</p>
<p>Algier&#8217;s counter-terrorism efforts are increasingly complicated by illegal migration and human trafficking along Algeria&#8217;s southern border. Terrorism and criminality are increasingly interconnected, and the need to break the nexus between the two has increased following the social unrest that led to the ouster of the 82-year old Bouteflika. Stability in Algeria is critical—for the security of Algerians, and the broader region. The country&#8217;s next leader will face a challenging economic situation, persistent threats from terrorist networks in Mali and Libya, and increasing extremist propaganda targeted to influence the country&#8217;s younger generations.</p>
<p>According to the British government&#8217;s <a href="https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/morocco/terrorism">Foreign Travel Advice</a>, &#8220;terrorists are likely to try to carry out attacks in Morocco. You should be vigilant at all times.&#8221;  Two Scandinavian tourists were brutally killed in Morocco in December of 2018. While local authorities <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/12/261356/scandinavian-tourists-murder-isis/">reported</a> the attackers were not affiliated with ISIS, the attack—coupled with ISIS&#8217; territorial defeat in Syria and Iraq—has lead to growing scrutiny over the group&#8217;s increasingly asymmetric dimension.</p>
<p>One component of the Moroccan counter-terrorism strategy is <i>moussalaha—</i>a reconciliation program. Launched in 2018, it is a de-radicalization program to combat violent extremism. According to the General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration, human rights and anti-radicalization experts provide psychological support and rehabilitation of charged and jailed people for terror crimes. On March 10<sup>th </sup>of 2019, Moroccan authorities announced a repatriation program to allow militants of Moroccan origin to return in safety. The returnees were subject to judicial investigations for their alleged involvement in terror-related activities. The Head of Morocco’s Central Bureau of Judicial Investigation estimated <a href="https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/03/267647/authorities-repatriate-8-moroccans-terrorism-syria/">1.668 Moroccans</a> joined ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya.</p>
<p>In Egypt, several cells affiliated with <i>Wilaya Sinai (</i>Islamic State in the Sinai) remain operational and continue to threaten security and stability in the Sinai. Egypt continues to suffer from ongoing attacks against Christians and other religious minorities. The elimination of the territorial holdings of ISIS in Syria and Iraq could force militants to flow into Egypt.</p>
<p>Furthermore, despite the group&#8217;s territorial defeat, ISIS-affiliated propaganda and the group&#8217;s shift to an asymmetric entity from a territorially-based entity will continue to threaten North African security. ISIS, in addition to smaller, localized groups, are capable of radicalizing young people in a complex regional context, one deeply affected by economic crises. Extremist propaganda represents an illusory—but convincing—opportunity for young people to turn from losers to winners<i>. </i>Breaking the nexus between terrorism and criminality (especially smuggling) is essential to promote regional stability and security.</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/resilience-extremist-groups-north-africa/">The Resilience of Jihadi Extremist Groups in North Africa</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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