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		<title>The African Union Disarmament Architecture: Balancing Autonomy and Proliferation Risks </title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-african-union-disarmament-architecture-balancing-autonomy-and-proliferation-risks/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Lanssina TO]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Nov 2026 13:12:58 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence & Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AFCONE]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[African Union]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[civilian nuclear energy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber resilience]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disarmament architecture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Egypt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[El Dabaa nuclear power plant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[energy autonomy]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Great Power Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hybrid threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[industrial control systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear fuel cycle]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Sahel]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Treaty of Pelindaba]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=33185</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published:  November 9, 2026 Africa is navigating a pivotal postcolonial transition driven by a deliberate pursuit of strategic and energy autonomy to sustain its rapid demographic and industrial expansion. A critical tension has emerged between international nonproliferation frameworks, namely the Treaty of Pelindaba and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), and the sovereign right [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-african-union-disarmament-architecture-balancing-autonomy-and-proliferation-risks/">The African Union Disarmament Architecture: Balancing Autonomy and Proliferation Risks </a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}">  November 9, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Africa is navigating a pivotal postcolonial transition driven by a deliberate pursuit of strategic and energy autonomy to sustain its rapid demographic and industrial expansion. A critical tension has emerged between international nonproliferation frameworks, namely the </span><a href="https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pelindaba"><span data-contrast="none">Treaty of Pelindaba</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> and the </span><a href="https://www.afcone.org/"><span data-contrast="none">African Commission on Nuclear Energy</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> (AFCONE), and the sovereign right of African states to develop civilian nuclear energy. In an era defined by Great Power Competition, this tension is accelerating a geopolitical shift in Egypt and the nations along the Sahelo-Saharan strip, the narrow belt between the Sahara and the Sub-Saharan savannas, stretching from the Atlantic to the Red Sea. This is happening as they are increasingly bypassing traditional Western channels to sign nuclear memoranda with global alternatives such as Russia’s Rosatom. The structural limitations of the current African Union disarmament architecture are being tested by sovereign imperatives. To reduce proliferation vulnerabilities and external interference, the continental framework must evolve from a passive monitoring mechanism into a dynamic legal shield across Africa&#8217;s developing nuclear landscape.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Introduction</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Africa is currently undergoing a pivotal phase in its post-colonial history, characterized by an explicit shift toward comprehensive sovereignty. This dynamic manifests as a dual transition: strategic autonomy aimed at securing the continent through regional means, and energy autonomy essential to sustain the industrial development of a rapidly expanding demographic base. However, this quest for technological advancement, specifically through civilian nuclear energy, clashes with an increasingly polarized global security environment. Now, a central conceptual and practical tension arises. How can the </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/African_Union"><i><span data-contrast="none">African Union</span></i></a><span data-contrast="auto">&#8216;s (AU) disarmament architecture oversee this transition without local nations perceiving it as an external technological constraint or a vector of vulnerability mitigation vis-à-vis global nuclear powers?</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">The Pelindaba Framework Confronting New Geopolitical Imperatives</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The continent’s disarmament architecture historically rests upon the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, which established Africa as a zone free of nuclear weapons while promoting the peaceful use of the atom. While this legal framework and its executive body, the AFCONE, have successfully prevented military proliferation, their structural limitations are becoming apparent under the new paradigm of absolute sovereignty. Conceived within a post-Cold War logic, this architecture is increasingly critiqued by African scholars as a passive monitoring structure heavily influenced by the Western </span><a href="https://www.google.com/goto?url=CAESiAEB6zswFd5EnGsXL_A09Pan7gXEcdvioEQKBt8067dkguhsly48XDeHDr4Lh9ra36P4rsGeaL99gmnWspbR6kMQThciqWB3zSBFqRs3ND3f5L0zu78NGoa7mKij-OweIPTAnAjuzm2hbHRvWkqV7cVkGFMv0NOddnEUnhiXndJN5xwwVpD5dkI0"><span data-contrast="none">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> requirements, inadvertently restricting the transfer of dual-use technologies to the Global South.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Conversely, AFCONE, headquartered in South Africa, represents an historic institutional success. By championing a modern, pragmatic vision, AFCONE actively promotes the peaceful application of nuclear technologies in vital sectors such as medicine, agriculture, and power generation. This strategy demonstrates that targeted, sovereign institutional management can transform budgetary limitations into opportunities, ensuring technical efficiency and non-proliferation compliance without compromising regional autonomy.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Great Power Competition and the &#8220;State-Led Strategic Vision&#8221;</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Africa&#8217;s transition toward energy autonomy extends beyond technical parameters. It represents a calculated act of geopolitical repositioning driven by state-led strategic visions. In an international order regulating civilian nuclear technologies under strict non-proliferation banners, African states are actively asserting their right to development through decisive executive leadership. This top-down political willpower challenges the traditional monopoly of Western regulatory frameworks by treating energy access as a fundamental national security imperative.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">This disruptive paradigm is reshaping regional alliances and redrawing maps of strategic dependency. Egypt’s </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/El_Dabaa"><span data-contrast="none">El Dabaa</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, nuclear power plant megaproject and the strategic shift of Sahelian heads of state signing new nuclear memoranda with Russia’s state-owned corporation, Rosatom, reflect a top-down executive momentum. The &#8220;State-led strategic vision&#8221; has become the primary arbiter between international collective security demands and the immediate requirement of national industrialization. This shift introduces a complex variable into global deterrence tracking, as local leaders increasingly bypass traditional Western commercial and political channels. By leveraging foreign partnerships that do not impose conditional governance clauses, African states are redefining the geopolitical balance of technology transfers in the Global South.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Resource Securitization and the Sahelian Laboratory</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">While political leadership drives policy, access to raw materials stems from geography. The abundance of uranium, particularly in the Sahelo-Saharan strip, imposes a severe security responsibility upon regional leaders. Long exploited under frameworks that yielded minimal tangible benefits for local populations, these strategic reserves are now the focus of intense sovereign reclamation. Securing the front-end of the nuclear fuel cycle has evolved from a commercial negotiation into a matter of state survival.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">In an environment marked by volatile asymmetric threats and state fragility, proving that African states can secure their own strategic resources is essential to prevent foreign military interference and secure global supply chains. Consequently, the Sahel has become a contemporary laboratory where the imperatives of local scientific capacity building and sovereign resource control are actively tested against global non-proliferation norms. The critical vulnerability no longer lies solely in the physical diversion of material, but at the intersection of physical infrastructure security and tactical hybrid threats. Unmanned aerial systems, border penetration by non-state actors, and specialized cyber-attacks targeting industrial control devices represent a new spectrum of risks that the African Union&#8217;s legacy framework is ill-equipped to counter.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><b><span data-contrast="auto">Conclusion</span></b><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Ultimately, the African Union&#8217;s disarmament architecture must evolve from a passive doctrine of non-proliferation into a dynamic legal and political shield that protects African states&#8217; right to technological emancipation. This evolution requires converting AFCONE into an active operations intelligence hub that coordinates real-time security threats across newcomer nuclear states. For global strategic analysts, understanding this shift is critical. The Sahel&#8217;s technological transition cannot be ignored or suppressed through restrictive regimes. Instead, it must be matched by a rigorous, collaborative culture of physical nuclear security, international safeguards verification, and cyber resilience to reduce proliferation risks while accommodating Africa&#8217;s inevitable and legitimate energy transition.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Lanssina TO, PMP, holds a DESS in Management (Ing.) and serves as an international climate negotiator. He is a Vertic Hub Africa Member, GSTE/NDV of Vertic Member, Founder of NewComer Global, and Founder of IGNIS-University for NewComers in Nuclear (Virtual). He currently serves as the Director of Publicity for the African Nuclear Society, conducting strategic research on nuclear education, newcomer state integration, environmental diplomacy, and regional security architectures across the African continent. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335551550&quot;:6,&quot;335551620&quot;:6,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-african-union-disarmament-architecture-balancing-autonomy-and-proliferation-risks/">The African Union Disarmament Architecture: Balancing Autonomy and Proliferation Risks </a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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