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		<title>Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Shahzad Akram]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 12:12:47 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32727</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 1, 2026 As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “nuclear-AI nexus” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/">Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: June 1, 2026</em></p>
<p>As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “<a href="http://www.nuclear-abolition.com/language/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-decision-making/">nuclear-AI nexus</a>” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect of the NPT’s three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, as experts recently cautioned at the “<a href="https://wise-materials.org/external/from-algorithms-to-atoms-machine-learning-meets-materials-science-2-2-3/">Atoms for Algorithms</a>” webinar, we need to cut through the speculative “AI hype” to ensure this technology remains a means for peace, not an avenue for unintentional escalation.</p>
<p>To regulate the nuclear-AI connection, we first need to understand the technology. As a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research researcher, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MuwZJ48cic">Dr. Yasmina Fina</a> suggests, AI is not a monolithic entity, but a “construct” and a “system of systems,” made up of code, software, data, hardware, and sensors. It is a system used to fulfill certain functions, not a threat capable of usurping human decision-making. The risk is the “<a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">speed and scale</a>” of AI, which can have myriad implications for performance and strategy. Moreover, Fina warns that comparing <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6MuwZJ48cic">nuclear governance to AI governance</a> is unhelpful because the technologies are not the same; nuclear materials are limited and tangible, whereas AI is ubiquitous and digital.</p>
<p>In the context of non-proliferation, AI is touted as a game-changing <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">verification tool</a>. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could potentially use “AI agents,” semi-autonomous machines capable of processing large <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">data streams and satellite images </a>to verify the accuracy of declarations by states at a pace humans cannot match. However, <a href="https://medium.com/@ian-j-stewart/generative-ai-and-weapons-of-mass-destruction-will-ai-lead-to-proliferation-c4476580bbc6">Dr. Ian Stewart</a>, Executive Director of the CNS Washington, states that AI will not help states develop nuclear weapons they could not otherwise build, for two physical reasons: AI cannot “magic up” <a href="http://www.nuclear-abolition.com/language/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-decision-making/">fissile material</a>, and there is no evidence that large language models can transfer the “tacit knowledge” necessary for weaponization.</p>
<p>When it comes to AI and nuclear weapons, political concerns are high. States have been reluctant to allow the IAEA to use open-source data or “black box” algorithms. Should an AI detect an event, the absence of “explainability” or how the machine arrived at its decision could lead to a crisis of <a href="https://medium.com/@ian-j-stewart/generative-ai-and-weapons-of-mass-destruction-will-ai-lead-to-proliferation-c4476580bbc6">political legitimacy</a> for the safeguards system.</p>
<p>The most fraught part of the nexus is disarmament. We are now seeing a “<a href="https://www.sipri.org/publications/2025/sipri-insights-peace-and-security/advancing-governance-nexus-artificial-intelligence-and-nuclear-weapons">race to adopt</a>” AI in military strategies due to the perceived speed advantage it offers. AI can speed up threat identification and data integration, potentially freeing up more time for decision-making (or, on the other hand, reducing decision-making cycles to the point that humans are simply rubber-stamping decisions).</p>
<p>Aliche Sultini, senior research lead at the Rhode Island School of Design, explains that AI systems create new <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">levels of uncertainty</a>. If a state cannot grasp how an adversary’s AI operates in its decision-making, it might fall into worst-case scenarios, reinforcing alert postures that prevent disarmament. To <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2025/12/lessons-from-the-uns-first-resolution-on-ai-in-nuclear-command-and-control/">support disarmament</a>, AI must be used to enhance technical verification and confidence, not to shorten the path to war. Possibly the most disruptive aspect of this interaction is the NPT’s third pillar: peaceful nuclear energy applications. According to <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/INF/7">Mr. Shota Kamishima</a> of the IAEA, an “affinity” is emerging between nuclear power and AI. We are now moving into a world where energy-hungry AI data centers need the clean, scalable, and reliable power offered by nuclear power, and where nuclear generation and maintenance are improved through AI.</p>
<p>This alliance is especially important for the rollout of <a href="https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/INF/7">Small Modular Reactors</a> (SMRs), for which AI-optimized construction schedules and supply chains are critical. By enhancing predictability and avoiding cost overruns, a major issue for nuclear construction, AI could make nuclear projects more “bankable” and thus more attractive for the global shift towards clean energy. Despite technological progress, the experts agree: human responsibility is essential. Whether it is a safeguards inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or a human commander in a nuclear-armed nation, humans are the “<a href="https://docs.un.org/en/NPT/CONF.2026/PC.II/INF/7">last line of defence</a>”.</p>
<p>“Black box” systems are incompatible with a strong safety culture. <a href="https://unidir.org/event/the-nuclear-ai-nexus-implications-for-the-three-pillars-of-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/">Governance policies</a> must ensure that AI is implemented with transparency, traceability, and “explainability”. We must also be alert to the potential for AI to be employed by “agents” to monitor sites, which could result in disinformation and the distortion of threat perception through “<a href="https://unidir.org/event/the-nuclear-ai-nexus-implications-for-the-three-pillars-of-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/">anomaly detections</a>.” As the 2026 Review Conference draws near, policymakers’ mission should be to “denoise.” <a href="https://unidir.org/event/the-nuclear-ai-nexus-implications-for-the-three-pillars-of-the-non-proliferation-treaty-review-conference/">Nuclear policy decisions</a> must not be based on science fiction or fear of competition. Rather, we should prioritize “lower stakes” opportunities where AI can help us now, such as employing AI agents to navigate the overwhelming output of the NPT process — making it searchable and highlighting inconsistencies in delegation positions.</p>
<p>The relationship between nuclear and AI is not a bug to be fixed with more software, but a circumstance to be managed by the international community. By prioritizing evidence-based policy and law, human-in-the-loop systems, and the common ground of the peaceful <a href="http://www.nuclear-abolition.com/language/the-impact-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-decision-making/">“Atoms for Algorithms”</a> alliance, we can ensure that the digital revolution supports, rather than undermines, the global nuclear order. In the end, the fate of the NPT will not be determined by algorithms, but by human intelligence.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), and Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Navigating-the-AI-and-Nuclear-Nexus.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="216" height="60" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 216px) 100vw, 216px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-ai-and-nuclear-nexus/">Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
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		<title>Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Arman Sidhu]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 11 May 2026 12:15:09 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32674</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 11, 2026 Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) overran at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/">Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 11, 2026</em></p>
<p>Nigeria’s worsening security crisis is, at its core, a story of military breakdown. The Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) <a href="https://issafrica.org/iss-today/lake-chad-basin-s-military-bases-in-iswap-s-crosshairs">overran</a> at least 15 military bases in 2025, captured and executed a brigadier general, and deployed armed drones that outmatched the defending units. The pattern of base overruns, mass desertions, and failure to reinforce troops under attack points to deep organizational failure.</p>
<p>Events like the February 2026 Kwara massacre, in which jihadists killed over 200 people as well as the December 2025 <a href="https://www.africom.mil/pressrelease/36158/us-africa-command-conducts-strike-against-isis-in-nigeria">U.S. Tomahawk cruise missile strikes</a> on Nigerian soil and the <a href="https://www.africanews.com/2026/03/22/us-troops-in-nigeria-using-drones-to-detect-and-disrupt-terrorist-activity/">deployment</a> of American troops amount to the clearest sign yet that Africa’s most populous nation can no longer secure itself.</p>
<p><strong>The Mosul Parallel</strong></p>
<p>Iraq, before the fall of Mosul in 2014, offers the closest comparison. When 1,500 ISIS fighters routed 60,000 Iraqi soldiers, the collapse came not from lack of firepower but from corruption. The Iraqi military had roughly <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/12/11/how-iraqs-ghost-soldiers-helped-isil">50,000 ghost soldiers</a> on its payroll, troops who existed only on paper so commanders could pocket their salaries. Nigeria faces the same problem. <a href="https://www.declassifieduk.org/ghost-soldiers-britains-shadow-war-in-west-africa/">Leaked</a> UK diplomatic cables found that of the 20,000 troops Nigeria claims to deploy in the northeast, the real number is significantly lower, with thousands of ghost soldiers generating salaries collected by officers. The corruption is not incidental; it is systemic. <a href="https://ti-defence.org/gdi/">Transparency International</a> gave Nigeria’s defense sector an ‘E’ rating for “very high” corruption risk.</p>
<p>The human cost falls on ordinary soldiers. A Nigerian private earns $31 to $38 per month. Soldiers spend three to five years <a href="https://www.genocidewatch.com/single-post/documentary-reveals-low-morale-in-nigerian-army">deployed</a> without rotation, creating conditions for mass desertion. Iraq’s military eventually reformed after Mosul through fingerprint-based troop verification and coalition mentoring, but that reform only happened because Mosul was a shock too large to ignore. Nigeria faces a harder problem, a slow bleed rather than a single catastrophe, which gives political leaders room to delay action indefinitely.</p>
<p><strong>ISWAP’s Tactical Evolution and the Sahel Corridor</strong></p>
<p>ISWAP’s 2025 “Camp Holocaust” campaign has been the most successful in the group’s history. ISWAP systematically <a href="https://adf-magazine.com/2025/08/iswap-assaults-target-military-bases-in-lake-chad-region/">destroyed</a> forward operating bases across the Lake Chad Basin using drones, night-vision gear, and coordinated swarm attacks. The capture and execution of Brigadier General Musa Uba in November 2025 was not simply a battlefield loss. It revealed that ISWAP now operates with better intelligence than the forces it fights. ISWAP <a href="https://saharareporters.com/2025/11/17/nigerian-army-commander-brig-gen-uba-killed-iswap-after-terrorists-intercepted-his">intercepted</a> his communications and tracked his position after his convoy was ambushed 88 kilometers from regional military headquarters in Maiduguri. A force with 230,000 troops and a multibillion-dollar budget could not locate its own brigade commander.</p>
<p>The broader Sahel security framework has collapsed around Nigeria, and the timing could not be worse. Niger’s <a href="https://www.military.africa/2025/03/niger-withdraws-from-mnjtf-counter-terror-coalition/">withdrawal</a> from the Multinational Joint Task Force in March 2025 ended joint border patrols along a vast open frontier. Into this gap has moved <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2026-february-6/">Lakurawa</a>, an Islamic State Sahel Province subgroup operating across Sokoto and Kebbi states with surveillance drones. Al-Qaeda affiliate JNIM launched its first recorded <a href="https://www.counterextremism.com/blog/sahel-monitoring-may-2025">attack</a> on Nigerian soil in 2025.</p>
<p><strong>The Air Power Deficit</strong></p>
<p>The Nigerian Air Force shows what happens when procurement runs ahead of maintenance capacity. Three JF-17 fighters from Pakistan were delivered in 2021. By May 2023, only one could still fly. The result is an air force that cannot protect civilians or support ground troops. SBM Intelligence estimates over 400 Nigerian civilians <a href="https://impactpolicies.org/news/483/zamfara-airstrike-tragedy-understanding-civilian-casualties-and-security-challenges-in-nigeria">killed</a> in erroneous military airstrikes between 2017 and 2025. The <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/anb/africa/nigeria/massacre-kwara-state-heightens-nigerias-security-challenges">February 2026 Woro massacre</a> showed what this means in practice. A military aircraft appeared overhead during a ten-hour attack that killed at least 162 civilians but did not engage.</p>
<p><strong>External Partners and the Limits of Assistance</strong></p>
<p>The United States launched <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2025/12/25/politics/us-strikes-isis-nigeria">16 Tomahawk cruise missiles</a> against Lakurawa camps in Sokoto State on Christmas Day 2025 and deployed troops to Bauchi Airfield. <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/why-did-united-states-conduct-strikes-nigeria">CSIS assessed</a> that one-off strikes are unlikely to reduce the terrorist threat significantly. The pattern is familiar: outside firepower treats the symptoms while the underlying disease, institutional corruption, goes unaddressed. Nigeria’s own Defense Minister Christopher Musa has acknowledged that military action addresses only 30 percent of the conflict. The <a href="https://reliefweb.int/report/nigeria/africa-report-n-237-nigeria-challenge-military-reform">International Crisis Group’s 2016 reform blueprint</a> called for fingerprint-based troop verification and open defense spending records. It remains unimplemented a decade later.</p>
<p><strong>The Coup Question and the Criminal-Terror Nexus</strong></p>
<p>Recent history across the Sahel makes this risk real. In Burkina Faso and Mali, troops who felt abandoned by civilian leaders seized power. Nigeria shows each of these warning signs. Soldiers earn $31 a month while generals oversee billions in unchecked spending. The Nigerian Armed Forces mostly ruled the country between 1966 and 1999, and the memory of military government has not faded.</p>
<p>A second risk deepens the picture. ISWAP brings in an <a href="https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2025/07/24/when-rebels-rule-iswap-formula-winning-support-nigeria-northeast-tax-control">estimated</a> $191 million per year by taxing trade across the Lake Chad Basin, ten times what the Borno State government collects. Furthermore northwest bandit networks took in an estimated <a href="https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-2025-november-25/">$1.42 billion in ransom</a> in a single year.</p>
<p>Every overrun  base sends vehicles, weapons, and ammunition to ISWAP and other groups, fortifying their governance with economic and military assets. This is the critical danger: the longer reform is delayed, the more these groups entrench themselves as alternative governments with independent revenue. Once that happens, as Sudan’s civil war has shown, the window for reversing the trend narrows sharply.</p>
<p><strong>Outlook</strong></p>
<p>The 2026 Nigerian defense budget includes <a href="https://statehouse.gov.ng/president-tinubu-presents-%E2%82%A658-18-trillion-2026-appropriation-bill-vows-stronger-discipline-in-budget-execution/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CThese%20outcomes%20are%20not%20accidental,revenue%20of%20%E2%82%A634.33%20trillion.">5.41 trillion naira ($3.9 billion)</a>. However, 62 percent goes to personnel costs and the naira’s collapse has cut real spending power by two-thirds since 2023. Nigerian President Tinubu’s security emergency declaration has not changed the picture. At least 316 civilians were killed across 15 states in the 71 days that followed.</p>
<p>Three patterns deserve attention: the self-arming cycle, where weapons from overrun bases fuel the next attack; the intelligence gap, where ISWAP knows more about the military than the military knows about ISWAP; and the governing contest, where ISWAP’s services undercut public trust in the state. Until the corruption at the heart of Nigeria’s military is confronted, no amount of outside help will change the course. The question facing Abuja is whether reform comes through deliberate action or through the kind of devastating loss that forced Iraq’s hand after Mosul.</p>
<p><em>Arman Sidhu is an American geopolitical analyst and writer. He regularly covers the commodities market, international trade, and foreign investment. He is a regular contributor to Geopolitical Monitor and his work has previously appeared in The Diplomat, Eurasia Review, Economic &amp; Political Weekly, and RealClearWorld, among several other outlets. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Hollow-RanksGhost-Soldiers-Nigerias-Corruption-Fueled-Security-Collapse-.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="202" height="56" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 202px) 100vw, 202px" /></a></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hollow-ranks-ghost-soldiers-nigerias-corruption-fueled-security-collapse/">Hollow Ranks &#038; Ghost Soldiers: Nigeria&#8217;s Corruption-Fueled Security Collapse</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-new-start-prospects-for-u-s-russian-nuclear-arms-control/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 14 Apr 2026 12:19:34 +0000</pubDate>
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		<category><![CDATA[working through the calculations for this response in more detail.New START]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32579</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: April 14, 2026 For more than half a century, U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control has served as a central mechanism for managing strategic competition. Beginning with the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I), successive agreements institutionalized transparency, predictability, and mutual restraint. New START, which entered into force in 2011, represents the culmination of this [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-new-start-prospects-for-u-s-russian-nuclear-arms-control/">Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: April 14, 2026</em></p>
<p>For more than half a century, U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control has served as a central mechanism for managing strategic competition. Beginning with the <a href="https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/salt">1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)</a>, successive agreements institutionalized transparency, predictability, and mutual restraint. <a href="https://www.state.gov/new-start-treaty">New START</a>, which entered into force in 2011, represents the culmination of this bilateral architecture. Its limits on deployed strategic warheads and delivery systems, combined with an intrusive verification regime, helped sustain stability even as geopolitical relations deteriorated.</p>
<p>However, Russia’s suspension of participation in 2023 and the treaty’s expiration in 2026 mark a significant turning point. The breakdown of the broader arms control framework—evident in the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty in 2002, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, and the Open Skies Treaty in 2020—suggests a structural shift in the valuation of negotiated restraint. Assessing the prospects for post–New START arms control, it is important to consider these developments within both the historical context of bilateral relations and the shifting dynamics of current great power competition.</p>
<p>Academic debates on arms control offer a helpful context for understanding the current impasse. Traditional arms‑control theory, rooted in rationalist models, views treaty agreements as tools for reducing uncertainty, preventing arms races, and stabilizing deterrence. From this perspective, verification mechanisms and numerical limits mitigate the security dilemma by reducing incentives for worst‑case planning. While other scholars emphasize the role of domestic politics, bureaucratic interests, and leadership perceptions. Arms control agreements often reflect internal political coalitions, institutional preferences, and the ideological orientation of decision makers. The current U.S.-Russian environment, which is characterized by mutual suspicion and nationalist rhetoric complicates the formation of pro-arms control coalitions. Moreover, constructivist analyses highlight the normative dimension of arms control, arguing that treaties shape expectations, legitimize restraint, and embed cooperative practices. The erosion of these norms over the past decade has contributed to a broader delegitimization of negotiated limits.</p>
<p>These theoretical perspectives underscore that the challenges facing post–New START arms control are not merely technical but deeply embedded in political and normative contexts. The war in Ukraine has fundamentally reshaped U.S.-Russian relations. Moscow’s framing of the conflict as a confrontation with the West, combined with U.S. and allied NATO support for Ukraine, has created a political environment in which formal negotiations are viewed as strategically risky or politically unacceptable.</p>
<p>The U.S. seeks to address Russia’s large arsenal of <a href="https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2025/01/24/recent_developments_in_russian_nuclear_capabilities_1086894.html">non‑strategic nuclear weapons</a> and its development of novel systems such as nuclear-powered cruise missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles. Russia, in turn, prioritizes constraints on U.S. missile defenses and long-range conventional strike capabilities. These asymmetries complicate the search for mutually acceptable trade-offs. Furthermore, verification has long been a cornerstone of bilateral arms control. Russia’s suspension of inspections and data exchanges under New START has undermined transparency and raised questions about the feasibility of future verification regimes. Designing agreements that satisfy both sides’ security concerns will be a central challenge.</p>
<p>The U.S. increasingly argues that future arms control must account for <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/parading-chinas-nuclear-arsenal-out-shadows">China’s expanding nuclear arsenal</a>. Russia rejects trilateral frameworks, viewing them as attempts to dilute U.S.–Russian parity. Thus far, China shows little interest in formal arms control negotiations. This triangular dynamic introduces new complexities absent from earlier bilateral negotiations.</p>
<p>Despite the hostile political environment, arms control still matters. The strategic reasons for arms control include specific factors that deserve attention from states. Agreements reduce incentives for preemption and miscalculation, which can increase crisis stability. Data exchanges and inspections improve transparency by reducing uncertainty and reliance on worst-case assumptions. Arms races can impose significant economic burdens, even for the U.S.’ trillion-dollar defense budget and Russia’s constrained economy. Finally, U.S.–Russian cooperation reinforces the legitimacy of the global nonproliferation regime. These lasting incentives suggest that both states have structural reasons to pursue at least minimal engagement.</p>
<p>So, what are the pathways for Post–New START arms control? Political commitments to maintain New START limits, even without a formal treaty, could involve both sides making parallel political statements to uphold New START’s numerical limits. While these have no legal force, such commitments could help prevent rapid nuclear arsenal expansion and maintain stability and predictability.</p>
<p>Other paths could include more Issue‑Specific or Modular Agreements. Rather than pursuing a new comprehensive treaty, negotiators could focus on discrete issues, such as notifications of major strategic exercises, transparency measures for new strategic systems, and agreements to avoid dangerous military incidents. These modular arrangements could serve as building blocks for more ambitious frameworks. Next, revitalizing crisis‑management mechanisms by reestablishing military-to-military communication channels could reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation. Such mechanisms do not require treaty-level negotiations and can function even amid broader political tensions. Finally, promote multilateral and norm-building initiatives such as broader dialogues involving China, NATO allies, and other nuclear-armed states to help shape norms around transparency and risk reduction. Multilateral workshops, data exchange initiatives, or voluntary reporting mechanisms may be more practical than formal treaties.</p>
<p>The expiration of New START marks a critical turning point in the history of U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control. The structural, political, and technological challenges facing a successor agreement are formidable, and a new comprehensive treaty is unlikely in the near term. Yet the logic of arms control, rooted in the need to manage existential risks, remains important. Incremental, issue-specific, and politically binding measures offer a pragmatic path forward, preserving essential elements of strategic stability until conditions allow for more ambitious negotiations. The future of arms control will depend not only on geopolitical developments but also on policymakers&#8217; ability to adapt traditional frameworks to a more complex, multipolar nuclear landscape. Without some form of negotiated restraint, the world risks entering an era of unconstrained nuclear competition for the first time in over half a century.</p>
<p><em>Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Beyond-New-START-Prospects-for-U.S.–Russian-Nuclear-Arms-Control.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="202" height="56" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 202px) 100vw, 202px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-new-start-prospects-for-u-s-russian-nuclear-arms-control/">Beyond New START: Prospects for U.S.–Russian Nuclear Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-washington-has-turned-to-pakistan-and-what-it-means-for-india/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ziaulhaq Tanin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 16 Mar 2026 12:42:25 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32438</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: March 16, 2026 In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-washington-has-turned-to-pakistan-and-what-it-means-for-india/">Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: March 16, 2026</em></p>
<p>In the summer and fall of 2025, Washington’s decision-makers faced an urgent question: which partners could act immediately and deliver tangible results? This focus on short-term capability, rather than potential or size, has brought Pakistan back into the spotlight of U.S. foreign policy. Its importance today is tied not to historical ties, but to what it is prepared to deliver. <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/6/19/trumps-pakistan-embrace-tactical-romance-or-a-new-inner-circle?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Recent</a> high-level meetings and agreements provide evidence of this shift, signaling a new calculus in Washington’s regional approach.</p>
<p><strong>The Main Reason Behind Trump’s Foreign Policy Shift</strong></p>
<p>The main reason for the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward Pakistan is neither ideology nor historic friendship, but Pakistan’s current capacity to deliver on Washington’s key objectives—security, resources, and political flexibility. This “capacity to deliver” consists of three dimensions on which Washington is counting today.</p>
<p>The first is the operational-security dimension, involving intelligence and operational cooperation that yields measurable results, such as counterterrorism cooperation and mediation in Afghanistan. The second is strategic and economic resources, referring to access to energy, minerals, or contracts supporting U.S. industrial and defense initiatives, including mineral promises and economic or crypto agreements. The third is diplomatic and tactical flexibility, characterized by Pakistan’s <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/us-official-says-differences-with-india-cannot-be-resolved-overnight-deal-2025-08-01/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">readiness</a> to make quick deals, assume regional roles, and engage in de-escalation aligned with Washington’s interests—something India is less willing to do.</p>
<p>In short, Washington seeks a “measurable partner,” not merely an “ideal strategic ally,” and Pakistan is offering that measurable partnership.</p>
<p><strong>Why Didn’t India Become Dependable?</strong></p>
<p>To understand why the U.S. is stepping back from India, it is essential to distinguish between two types of capability: long-term capacity—such as market size, population, and economic strength—and immediate ability to cooperate, meaning willingness to align with U.S. interests. While India’s long-term potential is undeniable, several factors have eroded Washington’s trust in its short-term reliability.</p>
<p>New Delhi’s independent economic and energy behavior, including <a href="https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russia-india-oil-ties-us-trade-deal-targets-crude-imports-2026-02-03/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">continued</a> purchases of discounted Russian oil and increasingly protectionist trade policies, has been interpreted in Washington as undermining U.S. economic interests, prompting tariff responses and weakening strategic trust. In addition, tactical asynchrony on regional and international issues has made India reluctant to reach quick agreements with Washington or bear domestic political costs of alignment.</p>
<p>As a result, India’s behavior has become, in Washington’s view, “predictably resistant.” When a partner’s cooperation becomes constrained, the U.S. tends to look elsewhere—even if the alternative is smaller or less prominent globally.</p>
<p><strong>How Did Pakistan Build a “Deliverable” Status?</strong></p>
<p>Pakistan actively crafted a “delivery package” <a href="https://apnews.com/article/pakistan-washington-trade-deal-oil-reserves-development-b891d26a9047cba4c13f098be7e068d1">combining</a> tangible security cooperation, fresh economic offers, and regional coordination—the formula Washington sought.</p>
<p>On the security front, <a href="https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/joint-statement-of-pakistan-us-counterterrorism-dialogue?utm_source=chatgpt.com">reports</a> point to growing counterterrorism cooperation and structured dialogue between the U.S. and Pakistan, signaling that Islamabad can play an immediate operational and intelligence role. Economically, Pakistan has presented <a href="https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/1342174-pakistan-inks-mous-with-us-firms-on-minerals-500m-pledged?utm_source=chatgpt.com">proposals</a> tied to vital minerals, energy projects, and partnerships involving firms linked to Washington’s business circles. These offers, coupled with access to strategic resources and investment contracts, have added significant political value.</p>
<p>Regionally, Pakistan&#8217;s role in Afghanistan and participation in recent arrangements—such as the <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/pakistan-saudi-arabia-partnership-what-are-both-sides-seeking/">defense pact</a> with Saudi Arabia—have further positioned Islamabad as a pragmatic actor in Washington’s calculus.</p>
<p><strong>The Role of Leadership Style in Washington: Trump’s Transnationalism</strong></p>
<p>The trajectory of U.S. foreign policy is closely tied to leadership style. The Trump administration embodies a distinctly transactional approach—offering rewards for cooperation and swift punishment for actions undermining American interests.</p>
<p>This style has reshaped Washington’s behavior in three ways. First, speed has become paramount: quick deals and visible short-term results matter more than long-term strategies. Second, deliverability is the new standard: Washington prioritizes what a partner can provide immediately rather than who might remain loyal in the future. Third, domestic politics and business networks, including figures linked to Trump’s inner circle, have made decision-making more interest-driven and risk-prone. <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2026/02/01/trump-uae-crypto-world-liberty-financial/?utm_source=chatgpt.com">Reports</a> of business ties close to the White House have reinforced this perception.</p>
<p><strong>The Costs and Risks of This Shift</strong></p>
<p>Washington’s tilt toward Pakistan may follow the logic of “deliverability,” but it carries risks that should not be overlooked. Partnering with a nuclear-armed state facing internal instability exacerbates security vulnerabilities, especially amid discussions of Saudi-Pakistan defense arrangements. India is unlikely to remain neutral; it could lean further toward China or reinforce strategic autonomy, both weakening U.S. influence in Asia. Moreover, privileging Islamabad risks alienating regional and Middle Eastern allies, opening the door to new bloc formations complicating U.S. strategy.</p>
<p>These risks are structural. For Pakistan, the gamble is also dangerous: entanglement in U.S.-China rivalry may deepen domestic fragility rather than strengthen its position.</p>
<p><strong>The Messages of the Shift for Key Players </strong></p>
<p>Washington’s pivot sends clear signals to New Delhi and Islamabad. For India, the first is the need to make foreign policy more operational—demonstrating tangible results in areas Washington prioritizes, from technology supply chains to selective security cooperation. The second is using multilateral channels to reduce risks while carefully addressing costs of diverging from Washington.</p>
<p>For Pakistan, two messages stand out: if it seeks to move from being merely “deliverable” to becoming a “responsible partner,” transparency on nuclear issues and guarantees of internal political stability are essential. Pakistan must also channel its leverage into structural investments—through institutional building and resource legislation—to reduce dependence on transactional deals.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion: A Warning and an Opportunity </strong></p>
<p>Washington’s pivot to Pakistan reflects a key principle in contemporary geopolitics: in fluid, high-pressure environments, actors able to deliver short-term results gain advantage—but this edge is not lasting without transparency, accountability, and risk management. For observers, the story is clear: today, the U.S. seeks tangible results; Pakistan provides them; if India cannot—or chooses not to—adapt to “practical deliverability,” it must be prepared to bear strategic costs. Washington’s choice signals that in the current era, those who can act immediately hold significance.</p>
<p>If India fails to show greater flexibility in trade, energy, and geopolitical alignment, years of diplomatic investment in its relationship with the U.S. could be seriously undermined.</p>
<p><em>Ziaulhaq Tanin is a university lecturer and researcher specializing in international security, regionalism, and foreign policy. As a freelance writer, he contributes to national and international publications, including Modern Diplomacy, Global Security Review, RealClearDefense, and Afghan outlets such as Hasht-e-Subh and Madanyat Media, and has published articles in academic journals of Afghan universities, providing analysis on Afghanistan, South Asia, and broader global affairs. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><em> <a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Why-Washington-Has-Turned-to-Pakistan.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="241" height="67" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 241px) 100vw, 241px" /></a></em></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-washington-has-turned-to-pakistan-and-what-it-means-for-india/">Why Washington Has Turned to Pakistan—and What It Means for India</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/no-treaty-no-panic-deterrence-and-stability-after-new-start/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Feb 2026 13:51:02 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32266</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The expiration of the New START Treaty on February 5, 2026 has fueled concerns that, absent formal limits, uncertainty surrounding U.S. and Russian nuclear forces could generate instability and elevate the risk of arms racing or the threat of nuclear conflict. Although arms control agreements have historically been promoted as acts of transparency and predictability, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/no-treaty-no-panic-deterrence-and-stability-after-new-start/">No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The expiration of the New START Treaty on February 5, 2026 has fueled concerns that, absent formal limits, uncertainty surrounding U.S. and Russian nuclear forces could generate instability and elevate the risk of arms racing or the threat of nuclear conflict. Although arms control agreements have historically been promoted as acts of transparency and predictability, New START has not been a preeminent example. The end of New START does not threaten global security or stability. A world without the treaty will remain safe and stable because strategic deterrence remains effective!</p>
<p>The New START treaty, signed by the United States and Russia in 2010 and effective in 2011, limited each country to 1,550 deployed strategic nuclear warheads, and 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers, with a total launcher cap of 800. It includes verification measures like inspections and data exchanges to enhance transparency and predictability in their nuclear relationship. Russia <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R41219/R41219.83.pdf">declared itself compliant</a> with the treaty in 2018, completing the required nuclear weapons reductions after seven years.</p>
<p>In January 2021, Presidents Biden and Putin impulsively extended New START for five years, until 2026, as permitted under Article 14 of the treaty. The Biden administration <a href="https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/2479274/statement-by-john-kirby-pentagon-press-secretary-on-new-start/">emphasized</a> that the United States could not afford to lose the treaty’s intrusive inspection and notification mechanisms. Officials argued that failure to extend the agreement would significantly reduce U.S. insight into Russia’s long-range nuclear forces, even though on-site inspections had already <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2022-New-START-Implementation-Report.pdf">been paused</a> since the spring of 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. President Biden had hoped to buy time to negotiate a new treaty that might further reduce the U.S. arsenal, while President Putin, having already <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2021/february/forging-21st-century-strategic-deterrence">completed over 70 percent</a> of his nuclear modernization, could continue to decelerate U.S. nuclear modernization efforts. In 2023, Putin suspended Russia’s participation in the New START treaty, citing U.S. <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/2022-New-START-Implementation-Report.pdf">“inequality”</a> in <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/3/last-us-russia-nuclear-treaty-is-expiring-does-it-really-matter#:~:text=Then%2C%20in%202023%2C%20Russian%20President%20Putin%20suspended%20Moscow%E2%80%99s,data%20but%20was%20still%20party%20to%20the%20treaty.">support of Ukraine</a>.</p>
<p>New START’s termination may sound like losing guardrails—but there are solid reasons why its expiration is not only manageable and instead arguably acceptable in today’s environment. First, strategic stability—removing incentives to launch a nuclear first strike—among nuclear powers is primarily sustained by strategic deterrence and the intolerable threat of nuclear retaliation rather than by treaty constraints. Both the United States and Russia possess secure second-strike capabilities through diversified and survivable nuclear forces. As long as neither state can expect to eliminate the other’s nuclear arsenal in a first strike, the incentive to initiate nuclear war remains low. This deterrence logic has persisted for decades, including periods when no formal arms-control agreements were in place, and even when such agreements are arbitrarily suspended, demonstrating that stability is rooted in structural realities rather than in legal instruments alone.</p>
<p>Second, the absence of New START does not create strong incentives for rapid or destabilizing arms buildups. The arms constrained under New START are the most predictable and thus the most stable. It is Putin’s novel weapon systems, developed after New START, which are the most destabilizing. Several advanced Russian nuclear delivery systems fall outside New START’s counting rules, highlighting the treaty’s limitations and Putin’s intention to violate the spirit of arms control writ large. The Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo, an underwater drone rather than a ballistic missile, can travel thousands of miles and deliver a massive nuclear payload without being subject to treaty limits. The Burevestnik/Skyfall nuclear-powered, ground-launched cruise missile similarly avoids New START restrictions, which apply only to air-launched cruise missiles carried by treaty-defined heavy bombers. Likewise, the Kinzhal air-launched ballistic missile is carried by aircraft not classified as heavy bombers under the treaty, meaning its nuclear warheads do not count toward the 1,550 deployed warhead cap. Moreover, the treaty was enacted without thought to the advent of Avangard Hypersonic Glide Vehicles or the heavy Sarmat ICBM with its <a href="https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/rs-28-sarmat/">10-16 multiple</a> warheads, all meant to compress warning and decision time and avoid missile defenses—the essence of destabilizing capability.</p>
<p>Ironically, the U.S. nuclear modernization program was launched as a central condition for the Senate’s consent to ratify New START in 2010. The Obama administration committed to a long-term, fully funded modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, as well as the supporting nuclear weapons infrastructure, deeming modernization essential to maintain a safe, secure, and credible deterrent over time.</p>
<p>The U.S. <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF10519">nuclear triad modernization program</a> is primarily focused on replacing aging systems with more reliable and secure platforms, rather than introducing new capabilities or expanding nuclear capacity. The Department of War has no plans to deploy any additional Sentinel ICBMs beyond the 400 Minuteman IIIs already deployed. Additionally, the 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, each with 20 SLBMs, will be replaced by 12 Columbia-class SSBNs, each with 16 SLBM tubes. This represents a 15 percent reduction in “boomers” and a 20 percent reduction in SLBM capacity. Although the final number of nuclear-capable B-21 Raider bombers remains publicly uncertain, the pressure to maintain a greater number of conventional-only bombers will be politically immense. If this behavior signals an arms race, the U.S. is running in third place.</p>
<p>Third, although New START provided valuable transparency through inspections and data exchanges, its expiration does not eliminate visibility into Russian nuclear forces. The key to New START’s verification was the introduction of a <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2020/05/the-new-start-verification-regime-how-good-is-it/">physical inspection method</a> in which inspectors could verify and count missile front ends by examining reentry vehicles on-site. They were able to tally objects on missile fronts by inspecting opened covers that hid technical details. Because on-site inspections have not been conducted in six years, this innovative verification process has been replaced by advanced national technical means (NTM), such as satellite imagery, missile-test detection, and intelligence monitoring. While imperfect, NTM can offer insights into adversary capabilities and deployments without requiring a treaty or on-site access and would continue beyond the treaty’s expiration. The Biden administration’s <a href="https://2021-2025.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/UNCLASS_NST-Implementation-Report_2024-FINAL-Updated-Accessible-01.17.2025.pdf">final compliance report</a> concluded that the United States could not determine whether Russia remained in compliance during 2024 with its obligation to limit deployed warheads on New START–accountable delivery vehicles. Thus, on-site inspections, the secret sauce of New START, have been effectively nullified for 40 percent of the treaty’s existence.</p>
<p>Finally, contemporary strategic stability is influenced by a wider set of factors than those regulated by New START. Missile defense, cyber operations, offensive space systems, drones, artificial intelligence, and precision conventional weapons are now impacting strategic stability, but they remain outside the scope of the treaty. Furthermore, China’s breathtaking expansion of its nuclear arsenal since 2020 has completely altered the geostrategic landscape with the goal <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF">of “strategic counterbalance—including nuclear deterrence—to sufficiently deter or restrain U.S. military involvement”</a> in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s historic nuclear buildup—unconstrained by the New START—has made the U.S. homeland increasingly vulnerable to a direct and catastrophic nuclear attack. New START’s limitations, had the treaty continued through 2035, would have effectively relegated U.S. nuclear deterrence capacity to either Russia or China, but not both simultaneously.</p>
<p>Perhaps the greatest tragedy of New START is its omission of a class of nuclear weapons not defined as “strategic.” This has enabled Russia to amass a dominant capacity of smaller, shorter-range nuclear weapons with which to coerce its neighbors and enable its malevolent behavior within its near abroad. While often touted as a 10-to-1 advantage, <a href="https://nipp.org/information_series/mark-b-schneider-the-2024-edition-of-the-federation-of-american-scientists-report-on-russian-nuclear-weapons-flaws-and-fallacies-no-587-may-20-2024/">some experts estimate</a> the real Russian advantage in tactical nuclear weapons at 50-to-1. The Congressional Research Service noted an estimate of Russian nonstrategic nuclear warheads at <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/RL32572?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22nonstrategic%22%7D&amp;s=7&amp;r=13">1,000 to 5,000,</a> a range so expansive as to undermine meaningful threat assessment—an uncertainty enabled by the New START treaty’s failure to include any accounting mechanisms for these weapons.</p>
<p>Many credit the 2010 New START Treaty with enhancing predictability and confidence between the U.S. and Russia. Negotiated for a markedly different geopolitical era, the treaty ultimately facilitated Russian nuclear coercion and novel force expansion while providing political justification for U.S. self-restraint. Yet the termination of New START does not render the world unsafe or unstable. In practical terms, the international system has already “survived” nearly six years without a fully functional treaty. Enduring deterrence relationships, ongoing—even if limited—transparency through national technical means, and evolving concepts of strategic stability, including <a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Dynamic-Parity-Report.pdf">parity approaches</a>, all suggest that global security can and will extend beyond New START. Rather than a cause for alarm, the treaty’s demise may warrant cautious celebration: The United States is finally liberated from constraints on both nuclear capability and capacity. If Western democracies are to credibly uphold peace through strength, a robust and flexible nuclear deterrent is essential. With the end of New START, the United States is no longer shackled by an agreement ill-suited to today’s strategic realities.</p>
<p><em>Col. Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/No-Treaty-No-Panic-Deterrence-and-Stability-After-New-START.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="256" height="71" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 256px) 100vw, 256px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/no-treaty-no-panic-deterrence-and-stability-after-new-start/">No Treaty, No Panic: Deterrence and Stability After New START</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Beyond the Next Administration: Building Enduring Tech–Government Alliances for National Power</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-next-administration-building-enduring-tech-government-alliances-for-national-power/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-next-administration-building-enduring-tech-government-alliances-for-national-power/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Sharpe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 15 Dec 2025 13:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>The tech industry can increase the nation’s trust in government by becoming a reliable and visibly accountable partner for securing America’s technological edge. Specifically, the tech industry can help Congress codify critical capabilities in law and funding provisions that outlast political cycles. Doing so successfully will require long-term relationships with legislators, bipartisan support, and clear [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-next-administration-building-enduring-tech-government-alliances-for-national-power/">Beyond the Next Administration: Building Enduring Tech–Government Alliances for National Power</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The tech industry can increase the nation’s trust in government by becoming a reliable and visibly accountable partner for securing America’s technological edge. Specifically, the tech industry can help Congress codify critical capabilities in law and funding provisions that outlast political cycles. Doing so successfully will require long-term relationships with legislators, bipartisan support, and clear safeguards that reassure the public that powerful technologies are used in the best interest of the nation.<a href="https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer">[1</a>]​</p>
<p><strong>Why Trust and Continuity Matter</strong></p>
<p>Recent trust surveys show that public confidence in both government and business has declined, with many people believing institutional leaders are not honest with them. The 2025 Edelman Trust Barometer, for example, highlights a “crisis of grievance,” in which large segments of the population feel left behind and are more inclined to distrust complex policy and technology initiatives.<a href="https://cooleypubco.com/2025/02/11/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-grievance/">[2</a>]​</p>
<p>This erosion of trust is particularly dangerous at a time when artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and advanced biotechnologies are central to economic and military competition. A report submitted to Congress by U.S.–China policy experts emphasizes that both countries now treat these technologies as strategic industries, tying them directly to national power and long-term security.[<u>4]</u>​</p>
<p><strong>Building Durable Relationships with Legislators</strong></p>
<p>For technology companies, increasing national trust starts with treating Congress as a long‑term strategic partner, not simply as an annual budget gatekeeper.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf">[4]</a>​</p>
<ul>
<li>Institutionalize bipartisan technology engagement: Firms can create recurring, nonpartisan briefings and workshops with relevant committees to explain how artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, cyber, and bio tools affect national resilience, economic competitiveness, and workforce opportunity. By engaging members and staff from both parties, companies reduce the perception that emerging technologies are aligned with a single political faction.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf">[5]</a>​</li>
<li>Lead with ethics, safety, and security: Research on public attitudes toward AI suggests people are more supportive when they see clear safeguards, transparency, and accountability mechanisms within the tech industry. Companies can build trust by proactively presenting their AI safety frameworks, data-protection policies, and supply‑chain security measures, aligning them with federal guidance and international norms on responsible technology use.<a href="https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2025-01/Global%20Top%2010%202025%20Trust%20Barometer.pdf">[6]</a>​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Securing Sustained Funding for Critical Technology</strong></p>
<p>Trust is reinforced when technology programs are clearly tied to enduring strategic missions and supported through stable, multi‑year funding rather than fragile pilots.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf">[5]</a>​</p>
<ul>
<li>Connect capabilities to mission portfolios: Instead of scattered line items, technology programs can be organized into mission‑driven portfolios—such as quantum‑resilient communications, AI‑enabled national preparedness, or biosecurity infrastructure—that span research, prototyping, and deployment over several years. Multi‑year authorizations and appropriations make it harder for any single administration to abruptly cancel essential capabilities.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3--U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf">[4]</a>​</li>
<li>Use innovation tools that protect both government and industry: Policy analyses highlight the value of mechanisms like Other Transaction Authority and structured public‑private partnerships to bring nontraditional vendors into national security and infrastructure work more quickly. By pairing these tools with clearer intellectual property protections and streamlined oversight, legislators can encourage top-tier tech firms to stay engaged in sensitive missions over the long term.<a href="https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1558121/download-documents?artifactId=z4DLuAiI8FBq5qxTCRlq-VPk-yx0lU4p_Mou2oSkOWL2OdIfZr8DAG4">[8]</a>​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Embedding Technology in Law, Not Just Budgets</strong></p>
<p>To prevent critical technologies from being swapped out with each political shift, their roles must be written into statute and tied to democratic oversight.<a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/white-house-releases-2025-national-7517228/">[9]</a>​</p>
<ul>
<li>Statutory roles for key technologies: Laws governing defense planning, critical infrastructure, and economic security should explicitly call for the use of AI, secure digital infrastructure, and advanced analytics in defined mission areas, such as threat detection, disaster response, and supply‑chain monitoring. Once these roles are codified, dismantling them requires visible legislative action rather than quiet executive changes.<a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/white-house-releases-2025-national-7517228/">[9]</a>​</li>
<li>Multi-stakeholder governance in legislation: Legislated advisory councils and oversight boards that include government, industry, academia, and civil society should supervise high-impact technologies and publish regular reports. This structure signals that powerful tools are subject to ongoing, pluralistic scrutiny rather than being controlled solely by political appointees or corporate executives.<a href="https://www.biotech.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/NSCEB-Full-Report-%E2%80%93-Digital-%E2%80%934.28.pdf">[10]</a>​</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Quantum Networking Testbed Infrastructure</strong></p>
<p>The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) put forth by Congress each year does not typically use a single, generic phrase like “quantum networking testbeds” in isolation; instead, it authorizes and directs specific programs and experiments that collectively constitute quantum networking testbed infrastructure. Several provisions and related authoritative documents are especially relevant to the future of quantum technology growth.</p>
<p>A Senate Armed Services Committee fact sheet on the fiscal year 2024 NDAA highlights language that “authorizes increased funding for a distributed quantum networking testbed” and the development of a next-generation ion‑trap quantum computer at the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). While the fact sheet summarizes rather than reproduces the statutory text, it makes clear that Congress explicitly authorized a distributed quantum networking testbed as part of the defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&amp;E) portfolio.<a href="https://defensescoop.com/2024/01/08/ndaa-2024-quantum-provisions/">[12]</a>​</p>
<p>Within the fiscal year 2025 NDAA, Congress, “authorizes funding to create a ‘quantum communications corridor’ as part of Navy research, development, test, and evaluation.” This is an explicit description of support for a testbed or network to advance quantum communication research so the Navy and the Department of Defense (DoD) can securely transmit information resistant to quantum computer decryption.<a href="https://www.emergingtechnologiesinstitute.org/publications/insights/fy2025ndaa">[15]</a>​</p>
<p>Other recent NDAA cycles also include broader direction that reinforces these testbed authorizations, such as requirements for DoD to establish pilot programs for promising quantum computing capabilities and to identify near‑term use cases that can be fielded within two years. These provisions do not always use the word “testbed” in the operative clause, but they direct the department to stand up experimental infrastructure and pilots that, in practice, operate as quantum networking and computing testbeds for defense applications.<a href="https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2024/12/fy2025-ndaa-angles-enhance-dods-ai-and-quantum-sciences-capabilities/401545/">[16]</a>​</p>
<p>In parallel, the National Quantum Initiative framework and associated Department of Energy (DOE) efforts describe quantum networking testbeds as shared infrastructure for entanglement distribution and quantum communications, and Congressional action has repeatedly referenced these federal testbeds and network efforts as part of the broader quantum information science ecosystem that the DoD can leverage.<a href="https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/NQIA2018-NDAA2022-CHIPS2022.pdf">[13]</a>​</p>
<p>Ensuring key technologies not only protect the nation but are also provided with substantial investment and economic promise is a necessity for companies to further their developmental efforts. Demonstrating that quantum technologies are viable for multiple applications—within internal defense and external partnerships—is one possible solution as tech companies become increasingly concerned with the long-term payoff of their test bed programs. For now, defense authorization bills appear to be the most forward leaning avenue supported by government, but the long-term stability of this method has yet to be validated.</p>
<p><strong>How This Approach Builds Public Trust</strong></p>
<p>When the tech industry engages both parties and chambers in Congress, supports multi-year statutory programs, and accepts meaningful oversight, it demonstrates that emerging technologies are being developed within a framework of law, ethics, and long-term national interest. In such a system, citizens can see that AI, quantum computing, and other advanced capabilities are not partisan experiments or purely profit-driven ventures, but part of a durable national strategy subject to democratic control.<a href="https://www.edelman.com/news-awards/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-high-level-grievance">[2]</a>​</p>
<p>The tech sector can both strengthen U.S. strategic competitiveness and contribute tangibly to rebuilding public trust in government by positioning itself as a co-steward of national resilience, helping design governance mechanisms, committing to transparency, and working with legislators to hard‑wire critical technologies into law and funding.<a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3--U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf">[5]</a>​</p>
<p>Sources:</p>
<ol>
<li><a href="https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer">https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer</a></li>
<li><a href="https://cooleypubco.com/2025/02/11/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-grievance/">https://cooleypubco.com/2025/02/11/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-grievance/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.edelman.com/news-awards/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-high-level-grievance">https://www.edelman.com/news-awards/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-high-level-grievance</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3--U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf">https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3&#8211;U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf">https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2025-01/Global%20Top%2010%202025%20Trust%20Barometer.pdf">https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2025-01/Global%20Top%2010%202025%20Trust%20Barometer.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.nationalsecurity.ai/chapter/executive-summary">https://www.nationalsecurity.ai/chapter/executive-summary</a></li>
<li><a href="https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1558121/download-documents?artifactId=z4DLuAiI8FBq5qxTCRlq-VPk-yx0lU4p_Mou2oSkOWL2OdIfZr8DAG4">https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1558121/download-documents?artifactId=z4DLuAiI8FBq5qxTCRlq-VPk-yx0lU4p_Mou2oSkOWL2OdIfZr8DAG4</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/white-house-releases-2025-national-7517228/">https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/white-house-releases-2025-national-7517228/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.biotech.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/NSCEB-Full-Report-%E2%80%93-Digital-%E2%80%934.28.pdf">https://www.biotech.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/NSCEB-Full-Report-%E2%80%93-Digital-%E2%80%934.28.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.imd.org/ibyimd/audio-articles/restoring-faith-in-leadership-in-the-age-of-grievance/">https://www.imd.org/ibyimd/audio-articles/restoring-faith-in-leadership-in-the-age-of-grievance/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://defensescoop.com/2024/01/08/ndaa-2024-quantum-provisions/">https://defensescoop.com/2024/01/08/ndaa-2024-quantum-provisions/</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/NQIA2018-NDAA2022-CHIPS2022.pdf">https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/NQIA2018-NDAA2022-CHIPS2022.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/NQI-Annual-Report-FY2025.pdf">https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/NQI-Annual-Report-FY2025.pdf</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.emergingtechnologiesinstitute.org/publications/insights/fy2025ndaa">https://www.emergingtechnologiesinstitute.org/publications/insights/fy2025ndaa</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2024/12/fy2025-ndaa-angles-enhance-dods-ai-and-quantum-sciences-capabilities/401545/">https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2024/12/fy2025-ndaa-angles-enhance-dods-ai-and-quantum-sciences-capabilities/401545/</a></li>
</ol>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Beyond-the-Next-Administration-Building-Enduring-TechGovernment-Alliances-for-National-Power.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="256" height="71" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 256px) 100vw, 256px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/beyond-the-next-administration-building-enduring-tech-government-alliances-for-national-power/">Beyond the Next Administration: Building Enduring Tech–Government Alliances for National Power</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Vaibhav Chhimpa]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Oct 2025 12:14:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31719</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>When India’s AI-powered missile defense system intercepted a simulated hypersonic threat in 2023, American analysts were surprised by the ethical framework guiding its development. In South Asia, rapid AI adoption intensifies deterrence challenges as India and Pakistan field autonomous strike capabilities. Existing arms control regimes fail to account for the region’s rivalries, asymmetric force balances, and non-aligned traditions.</p>
<p>That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.</p>
<p><strong>India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI</strong></p>
<p>India’s governance model integrates<a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/sites/default/files/2021-02/Responsible-AI-22022021.pdf"> civilian oversight</a> with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its <a href="https://www.niti.gov.in/national-strategy-for-ai"><em>National Strategy for AI</em></a> mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.</p>
<p>The<a href="https://visionias.in/current-affairs/"> Evaluating Trustworthy AI</a> (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.</p>
<p>India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular<a href="https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10493592"> red-team exercises</a> involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.</p>
<p><strong>Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation</strong></p>
<p>US-India collaboration on <a href="https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/06/17/joint-fact-sheet-the-united-states-and-india-continue-to-chart-an-ambitious-course-for-the-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology/">AI verification</a> can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The <a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/international-center-excellence-in-technology">iCET fact sheet</a> outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.</p>
<p>A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.</p>
<p>The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the <a href="https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Lalwani%20-%20U.S.-India%20Divergence%20and%20Convergence%20.pdf">Quad framework,</a> pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.</p>
<p><strong>Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control</strong></p>
<p>A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The<a href="https://unidir.org/publication/artificial-intelligence-in-the-military-domain-and-its-implications-for-international-peace-and-security-an-evidence-based-road-map-for-future-policy-action/"> UNIDIR report</a> calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.</p>
<p>The UN General Assembly has established an <a href="https://dig.watch/updates/fourth-revision-of-draft-unga-resolution-for-scientific-panel-on-ai-and-dialogue-on-ai-governance">Independent AI Scientific Panel</a> and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.</p>
<p><strong>Regional Applications and Future Prospects</strong></p>
<p>India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2024/mapping-the-prospect-of-arms-control-in-south-asia/">joint research on AI safety</a>, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.</p>
<p>Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5bSpONUdcms">Mach 8</a> and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.</p>
<p>Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.</p>
<p>By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.</p>
<p><em>Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science &amp; Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/AI-Arms-Race-South-Asia.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="241" height="67" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 241px) 100vw, 241px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-artificial-intelligence-ai-arms-race-in-south-asia/">The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Shahzad Akram]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2025 12:15:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30898</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Global arms control regimes are built on the pillars of trust, dialogue, transparency, mutual respect, restraint, verification, and, most critically, consensus among great powers. However, leadership in this domain risks deterioration at a time when the world urgently needs a renewed commitment to peace and stability. As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/">How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Global arms control regimes are built on the pillars of trust, dialogue, transparency, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2023.2292812">mutual respect</a>, restraint, verification, and, most critically, consensus among great powers. However, leadership in this domain risks deterioration at a time when the world urgently needs a renewed commitment to peace and stability.</p>
<p>As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the spillover effects threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit essential for effective arms control. These <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship">economic conflicts</a> erode bilateral relationships, making it even more challenging to negotiate future agreements on critical and emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space.</p>
<p>Tariffs can disrupt trade, increase prices, stifle innovation, and agitate the <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/ending-the-china-paradox/">supply chain</a>. Moreover, it can weaken American <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship">global leadership</a> as long-term allies face an American president unwilling to accept high tariffs on American exports while guaranteeing low tariffs on imports. American efforts to counter China are disrupted by tariff disputes as well, as allies and foes coordinate their strategies for countering President Trump’s effort to reduce tariffs on American exports. The president’s actions erode the confidence of allies in extended nuclear deterrence because allies begin to question whether the United States will continue to subsidize security, if they are demanding an end to protective tariffs.</p>
<p>The tariff dispute between China and the US, two large trading partners, severely affects arms control and <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trade-war.asp">strategic stability</a>. It exacerbates crisis, heightens mistrust, undermines confidence-building measures, and curtails the possibility of a constructive arms control framework. It is, however, not unexpected. The United States long tolerated protective tariffs and poor intellectual property protections by the Chinese. Thus, rebalancing should not come as any surprise, even if it is disconcerting.</p>
<p>American <a href="https://behorizon.org/china-u-s-tech-war-new-hegemony/">technological superiority</a>, innovation, cutting-edge military and civilian technology, and significant soft-power influence are the key components of its hegemonic status. Central to this dominance is access to rare earth minerals, which are critical for producing advanced weaponry, including missiles, drones, artificial intelligence (AI)–driven systems, and cutting-edge civilian technologies. However, the US faces a growing vulnerability in this domain, as China currently controls approximately <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1drqeev36qo#:~:text=A%20US%20Geological%20report%20notes,%2C%20radar%2C%20and%20permanent%20magnets.">70 percent of the global supply</a> of rare earth elements. This strategic dependency seriously challenges American innovation and military effectiveness.</p>
<p>However, the American military is already in <a href="https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/americas-incredible-shrinking-navy/">decline</a> according to a report from the US Army Science Board, which reveals the limitations of the American industrial base. The report warned that the US may be “incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.”</p>
<p>The conflict in Ukraine underscores this concern, as the US struggles to maintain adequate production levels of artillery shells, drones, rockets, and missiles primarily due to insufficient stockpiles of critical components. Furthermore, structural deficiencies are increasingly evident within the US Navy. As of 2023, less than 68 percent of surface fleet ships were rated “mission-capable,” with only 63 percent of attack submarines meeting the same standard. Compounding these challenges, American shipyards are currently unable to produce more than <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/03/21/osd-comptroller-says-u-s-shipyards-cant-build-3-destroyers-a-year">three destroyers annually</a>. By contrast, <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/threat-chinas-shipbuilding-empire#:~:text=Today%2C%20Jiangnan%20Shipyard%20alone%20has,support%20China's%20military%20industrial%20complex.">China</a> possesses 13 shipyards capable of constructing large and deep-draft vessels one of which reportedly surpasses the entire US shipbuilding capacity.</p>
<p>The ongoing US-China tariff dispute reflects a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/08/us/politics/jd-vance-peasants-china.html">zero-sum</a> strategic mindset, intensifying hostilities and reducing incentives for restraint or cooperation. This economic confrontation has already narrowed the space for meaningful arms control dialogue. The imposition of sanctions on each other’s officials and entities alongside increasingly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20zd4k6d36o">provocative rhetoric</a> from senior officials risks further erosions of the fragile trust necessary for future diplomatic engagement, particularly in arms control and emerging domains such as AI, cyber warfare, and outer space.</p>
<p>Traditionally, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/why-china-not-trust-america-nuclear-weapons-talks-1926809">China rejects</a> arms control as the US had far more weapons than China. Tarriff disputes reinforce the narrative that the US is using economic means to contain China’s rise, making China less likely to engage in future arms control discussions. Moreover, diplomatic relations and multilateralism will weaken and increase mistrust—leaving no room for constructive future arms control talks.</p>
<p>Arms control forums are increasingly fragile as mutual trust and respect for arms control and disarmament among the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424348">great powers</a> declines. Tariff disputes create mistrust, which complicates the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424348">verification process</a>, and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424348">supply chain</a> supporting the global cooperative arms control verification limits the ability to enforce or verify compliance with arms control agreements.</p>
<p>Trade disputes deepen mistrust and normalize confrontation over cooperation, secrecy over transparency, and arms racing over arms control. This leads to proliferation while making accountability less relative and paves the way for a fragmented world order with little or no hope for future arms control.</p>
<p>Moreover, it increases the chances future administrations face a backlash for rolling back policies that demand equitable treatment of American trade goods, fearing internal backlash for being soft on China. This will permanently lock both states into an adversarial stance, reducing any flexibility in arms control. Moreover, if the US wants to reconsider any future arms control discussion, political costs may prove too high, leaving fewer options to prevent an arms race.</p>
<p>In 2019, President Donald Trump <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-withdraw-united-states-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty/">withdrew</a> the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, after Russian cheating became too hard to ignore.  Meanwhile, the future of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-01/features/life-after-new-start-navigating-new-period-nuclear-arms-control">New START</a> remains uncertain and fragile.</p>
<p>At such a critical juncture, President Trump’s demand that American exports sent to foreign markets receive equal treatment to those foreign imports entering the United States, penalizing both allies and adversaries who enact punitive tariffs, may be unsettling for recipients of increased tariffs, but it should come as no surprise that an American president elected to stop the outflow of American wealth would seek equal treatment for American exports.</p>
<p>Many Americans are willing to see the subsidies to foreign nations—that are brought about by high tariffs on American exports and American extended deterrence—come to an end. This may lead to an erosion of confidence in American benevolence by some states.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-korea-s-quest-for-nuclear-weapons">South Korea</a>, for example, was shocked that the United States took offense to the very protectionist policies that allowed South Korea to become the third largest auto producer in the United States, all while effectively preventing American automobile sales in South Korea. Thus, South Korea is reconsidering their non-nuclear status and exploring an independent nuclear deterrent. As President Trump seeks to level the playing field by forcing down the tariffs of trade partners, under the threat of higher tariffs on imported goods, allies should come to understand that the United States is increasingly unwilling to subsidize others. While this may be a jarring fact, it is not a purposeful effort to destabilize arms control.</p>
<p>Thus, trade disputes may cause allies and adversaries to reconsider American willingness to accept unequal trade and disproportionate burden sharing. In the long run, equilibrium will return. It is just a matter of what that equilibrium may look like.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Shahzad Akram </em><em>is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu Kashmir. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/How-Trade-war-Threatens-the-Future-of-Arms-Control.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/">How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 05 May 2025 12:09:30 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AGM-183 ARRW]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ambiguity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Avangard]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[coercive tool]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[confidence-building measures]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional payloads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional prompt strike]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[DF-17]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[first-strike role]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FOBs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fractional orbital bombardment system]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[glide phase interceptor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global balance of power]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hypersonic cruise missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hypersonic glide vehicles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hypersonic Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[interceptor systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international norms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[long-range hypersonic weapon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mach 5]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military doctrines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[miscalculations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear payloads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[radar detection]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regulations]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[SS-19]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[strategic security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[warning times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zircon]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30673</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The advent of hypersonic weapons, with their unparalleled speed and maneuverability, ignited a global debate about the future of strategic security. Some argue these weapons unwittingly ushered in an era where traditional defenses are rendered obsolete, leaving nations exposed to swift and devastating attacks. The emergence of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/">Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The advent of hypersonic weapons, with their unparalleled speed and maneuverability, ignited a global debate about the future of strategic security. Some argue these weapons unwittingly ushered in an era where traditional defenses are rendered obsolete, leaving nations exposed to swift and devastating attacks. The emergence of hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) and hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) prompts a fundamental reassessment of assumptions about deterrence and defense.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons, capable of exceeding Mach 5 with unpredictable flight paths, <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjDyqS03ISMAxXdSDABHdn2BmUQ-NANegQIShAG&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.csis.org%2Fanalysis%2Fcomplex-air-defense-countering-hypersonic-missile-threat-0%23%3A~%3Atext%3DI%2520think%2520it%27s%2520a%2520number%2Cto%2520adequately%2520address%2520the%2520threat.&amp;usg=AOvVaw3XVxaqX_L8zs0rOiDfXyxI&amp;opi=89978449">shatter the bedrock principles</a> of conventional missile defense. Their ability to glide and maneuver within the atmosphere allows them to evade radar detection and interceptor systems, compressing warning times to mere minutes. This drastic reduction in reaction time amplifies the risk of miscalculations and accidental escalation, particularly in moments of crisis.</p>
<p>The global balance of power is being fundamentally altered, not merely adjusted, by the aggressive pursuit of maneuverable hypersonic weapon capabilities. China’s DF-17 hypersonic missile, coupled with its reported testing of a fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) with a hypersonic payload, demonstrates a clear intent to achieve <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjZvb7O3ISMAxVQM9AFHQYhEjgQFnoECCMQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fmedia.defense.gov%2F2023%2FOct%2F19%2F2003323409%2F-1%2F-1%2F1%2F2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF&amp;usg=AOvVaw071h0Fy5906vIE-xj7tnoR&amp;opi=89978449">global strike capabilities with minimal warning</a>. Russia’s deployment of the Avangard HGV on its SS-19 intercontinental ballistic missiles and the operational status of the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwimx7rg3ISMAxX3JNAFHdOhCP4QFnoECBYQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fjamestown.org%2Fprogram%2Fthe-role-of-hypersonic-weapons-in-russian-military-strategy%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw3n36uTFyvfkRCtN8vA3S-g&amp;opi=89978449">Zircon hypersonic</a> anti-ship missile further highlight the growing proliferation of these advanced weapons. North Korea’s claim of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjQ2_zs3ISMAxVm8MkDHV_GL5YQFnoECCAQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fthediplomat.com%2Ftag%2Fnorth-korea-hypersonic-missile%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw20bRg4HsjuR_uIgDgG7ptn&amp;opi=89978449">successful hypersonic missile tests</a>, while requiring verification, signal a potential integration of these weapons into its theater nuclear strategy, adding another layer of complexity to regional security.</p>
<p>The inherent capacity of maneuverable hypersonic weapons to render existing missile defense systems obsolete signifies not just a technological leap, but a deliberate dismantling of established strategic certainties. The unpredictability of their flight paths and the compression of warning times do not just complicate defense planning; they erode the very foundation of strategic stability, where deterrence relies on the certainty of retaliation. The potential for these weapons to carry both conventional and nuclear payloads does not just increase their versatility; it blurs the lines between conventional and nuclear conflict, creating a perilous ambiguity that heightens the risk of miscalculation.</p>
<p>The ability to strike targets with minimal warning does not just enhance offensive capabilities; it creates a coercive tool, enabling states to exert pressure and achieve strategic objectives without resorting to large-scale conventional warfare. The potential for hypersonic weapons to be deployed in a first-strike role does not just raise concerns about escalation; it fundamentally alters the calculus of deterrence, where the threat of retaliation may no longer be sufficient to prevent aggression.</p>
<p>To counter this burgeoning vulnerability, the United States must not merely react, but fundamentally redefine its strategic posture, acknowledging that piecemeal technological solutions are insufficient to address the profound shift hypersonic weapons impose on the security landscape. The rapid development of the glide phase interceptor (GPI) and space-based tracking systems is not just about enhancing missile defense; it is about restoring a sense of strategic stability, reassuring allies and deterring potential adversaries. The expansion of conventional hypersonic programs, such as the AGM-183 ARRW, conventional prompt strike, and the long-range hypersonic weapon, is not just about developing counterforce capabilities; it is about demonstrating a commitment to <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiMkcr93ISMAxXy78kDHb_0AS0QFnoECCIQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.gao.gov%2Fproducts%2Fgao-24-106792&amp;usg=AOvVaw2jIDDvLxHHcvNklw37Y8Mg&amp;opi=89978449">maintaining a credible deterrent</a>, signaling to potential adversaries that aggression will be met with a swift and decisive response. The integration of hypersonic weapons into existing military doctrines does not just require tactical adjustments; it demands a fundamental reevaluation of strategic thinking, adapting to a new era of high-speed warfare.</p>
<p>The international community’s response to hypersonic weapons must not be limited to national defense initiatives; it must include a concerted effort to promote arms control and transparency. The absence of clear <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwigzbuP3YSMAxWsRTABHY1wDBgQ-NANegQIKxAC&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Funidir.org%2Fpublication%2Fthe-implications-of-hypersonic-weapons-for-international-stability-and-arms-control-report-on-a-unidir-unoda-turn-based-exercise%2F%23%3A~%3Atext%3DView%2520or%2520Download%26text%3DIn%2520September%25202019%252C%2520a%2520one%2C%252C%2520UNIDIR%252C%2520Geneva%252C%2520Switzerland.&amp;usg=AOvVaw0Dza55Gx-PQxOYY8KilYUi&amp;opi=89978449">international norms and regulations regarding hypersonic weapons</a> does not just create uncertainty; it fosters a climate of strategic competition, where states are incentivized to develop and deploy these weapons without restraint. The development of transparency and confidence-building measures is not just about reducing the risk of miscalculation; it is about building a foundation for strategic stability, where states can engage in dialogue and cooperation to mitigate the risks posed by these advanced weapons.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons represent a paradigm shift in military technology, fundamentally questioning if the world is entering a new era of vulnerability, undermining the foundations of traditional missile defense and reshaping the strategic landscape. Addressing this challenge requires a comprehensive approach that combines technological innovation, strategic adaptation, and international cooperation. Only through a concerted effort can the international community hope to mitigate the risks posed by hypersonic weapons and ensure a more stable and secure future.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Hypersonic-Weapons_-Are-We-Entering-a-New-Era-of-Vulnerability.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="234" height="65" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 234px) 100vw, 234px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-weapons-are-we-entering-a-new-era-of-vulnerability/">Hypersonic Weapons: Are We Entering a New Era of Vulnerability?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>A South Asian Blueprint for Nuclear Risk Reduction</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-south-asian-blueprint-for-nuclear-risk-reduction/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-south-asian-blueprint-for-nuclear-risk-reduction/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Sana Ahmed]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 03 Apr 2025 12:02:28 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Additional Protocol I ​]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bhabha Atomic Nuclear Plant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bilateral accord]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chernobyl]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conflict zones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber-attacks]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disruptive technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone attack]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Geneva Conventions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global emergency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IAEA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international framework]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kahuta Nuclear Research Laboratories]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear facilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear power plant]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear restraint]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear risk reduction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[P-5 states]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[radioactive contamination]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Smiling Buddha]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Asian model]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30442</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The recent drone attack on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant reignited the critical debate about the security of nuclear infrastructure in active conflict zones. It also underscored the need for a robust international framework to safeguard nuclear facilities. Such targeting of nuclear facilities, deliberate or inadvertent, poses a significant risk and sets a precarious precedent [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-south-asian-blueprint-for-nuclear-risk-reduction/">A South Asian Blueprint for Nuclear Risk Reduction</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The recent <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2025/02/1160141">drone</a><u> attack</u> on the Chernobyl nuclear power plant reignited the critical debate about the security of nuclear infrastructure in active conflict zones. It also underscored the need for a robust international framework to safeguard nuclear facilities. Such targeting of nuclear facilities, deliberate or inadvertent, poses a significant risk and sets a precarious precedent for rival states to follow.</p>
<p>Nuclear incidents could lead to catastrophic radioactive contamination and a global emergency. In this regard, the South Asian model for the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement is a milestone achievement in nuclear risk reduction. It was a breakthrough agreement that prevented two arch-rivals from attacking each other’s nuclear sites despite several intense standoffs. It played a crucial role in ensuring nuclear facilities remain off-limits by preventing catastrophic escalations and reinforcing stability.</p>
<p>Contemporary conflicts are increasingly defined by disruptive and cutting-edge technologies, such as drone and cyber attacks that introduce a new dimension to conflict and exposed nuclear infrastructure to unprecedented vulnerabilities. It is thus time for P-5 states and the IAEA to formulate an international non-attack agreement to ensure nuclear restraint. The world cannot afford another nuclear disaster due to the negligence of the international community and the absence of a proper enforcement mechanism.</p>
<p>After the nuclearization of South Asia in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, Smiling Buddha. Pakistan sensed a pre-emptive strike against its nuclear research labs. The rivalry got more intense when India hedged against blowing up Pakistan’s <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1195904">Kahuta</a><a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1195904"> Nuclear Research Laboratories</a><a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1195904">.</a> In return, Pakistan assured India that any attack on Kahuta would evoke a retaliatory strike on its <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/889781/threat-to-destroy-indian-n-plant-stopped-attack-on-kahuta#:~:text=ISLAMABAD%20Pakistan%20had%20warned%20India%20in%20the,evoke%20a%20retaliatory%20strike%20on%20its%20Bhabha">Bhabha Atomic Nuclear Plant</a>.</p>
<p>To avert such future scenarios, both states agreed to sign the bilateral accord. Since doing so, and despite several conflicts like the <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03071840208446752">Kargil conflict </a>(1999), the 2001–2002 <a href="https://issi.org.pk/nuclear-signalling-and-escalation-risk-in-the-india-pakistan-context-a-critical-overview-of-the-2001-02-standoff/#:~:text=A%20terrorist%20attack%20on%20the,speeches%2C%20statements%20and%20press%20briefings.">military standoff,</a> and the <a href="https://www.stimson.org/2024/reflections-on-pulwama-balakot-at-five-years/">Pulwama-Balakot crisis</a> (2019), neither state has targeted the other’s nuclear facilities. Therefore, the <a href="https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/india_pakistan_non_attack_agreement.pdf">India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement’s</a> successful implementation in a highly volatile region, where nuclear-armed neighbors are eyeball-to-eyeball, sets a precedent that serves as a model for other states to follow.</p>
<p>The provisions of the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement, require that both states refrain from “undertaking, encouraging, or participating in any action aimed at causing the destruction or damage to any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.” This is a model for a global nuclear security non-attack commitment. The agreement clearly defines nuclear installations to include research reactors, uranium enrichment plants, reprocessing facilities, and storage sites for radioactive material.</p>
<p>The second provision of the agreement is the Classification of Protected Sites. The Annual Exchange of Nuclear Facility List is the most important clause. Under this clause India and Pakistan exchange lists of their nuclear facilities every January 1, ensuring transparency, avoiding miscalculations, and implementing risk mitigation. This agreement sets the ground rules that even hostile states can uphold nuclear restraint, and the international community must take a lesson from this model to formulate an international nuclear non-attack agreement.</p>
<p>Moreover, the <a href="https://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/chernobyl.html">Chernobyl disaster of 1986 </a>is a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of nuclear incidents, with radiation leaks contaminating large areas and causing long-term ecological and health crises. While commenting on an attack, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that a drone hit the concrete shelter, sparking a fire that caused <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/14/europe/russia-ukraine-drones-chernobyl-intl-hnk/index.html">significant</a> damage, but radiation remained under control. Both Ukrainian and Russian officials released their respective statements, denying the responsibility for the drone strike.</p>
<p>The pertinent question here is not who is responsible, but rather the safety and security of nuclear facilities during conflict and the need for militaries to exercise restraint. The war might end one day, but the hazards of nuclear radiation persist far longer. Meanwhile, existing international laws provide some protections for nuclear sites, but they lack enforceable mechanisms to deter attacks. The <u>Geneva Conventions</u><a href="https://www.icrc.org/en/document/additional-protocols-geneva-conventions-1949-factsheet"> and Additional Protocol I (1977)</a> classify nuclear power plants as civilian objects that should not be targeted. However, these clauses are not binding under all circumstances, leaving loopholes for states to exploit during wartime.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard protocols primarily focus on nonproliferation and the safety of nuclear materials, rather than averting military strikes on nuclear sites. Here the absence of clear, legally binding enforcement mechanisms in international law means that states can act with impunity while targeting nuclear sites in conflict zones. Hence, the Chernobyl drone attack demonstrates the urgency for a comprehensive and enforceable global agreement.</p>
<p>The new international nuclear non-attack agreement should essentially address the weaknesses in existing laws. The P5 (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) and the IAEA must spearhead a legally binding comprehensive treaty prohibiting any form of attack on nuclear infrastructure. This new agreement should explicitly include these several nuclear restraints. Starting from the military restrictions that should prohibit all military operations in the vicinity of designated nuclear sites. This includes ground forces, aerial strikes, reconnaissance missions, and drone activities near nuclear installations.</p>
<p>Further states must ensure annual transparency measures to prevent miscalculations. Each party must be required to exchange lists of their nuclear facilities annually, similar to the India-Pakistan model.</p>
<p>Most importantly, there must be severe consequences if any state violates the agreement by conducting a strike, covert operation, or cyberattack on nuclear facilities. Such a state must face severe economic sanctions, diplomatic consequences, and potential designation as a rogue state. Finally, there must be a prohibition on cyber and non-kinetic attacks.</p>
<p>The UN Security Council and leading nuclear powers, the P5 states, should take the responsibility of drafting and enforcing the agreement. These nations must set aside geopolitical rivalries and recognize that the threat of nuclear facility attacks endanger global stability. Additionally, the IAEA must play a more proactive role in integrating nuclear facility protection into global conflict prevention strategies.</p>
<p>The Chernobyl drone strike and the volatile situation in Zaporizhzhia is a wake-up call, a warning that nuclear security cannot be taken for granted in modern warfare. As conflicts become increasingly complex, nuclear sites will remain vulnerable unless strong, enforceable international agreements are put in place. The world cannot afford to wait for another disaster before taking decisive action.</p>
<p><em>Sana Ahmed is an </em><em>MS scholar at the Center for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), NUST, and a researcher at the Islamabad-based independent think tank Strategic Vision Institute (SVI).</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/Pakistans-Nuclear-Non-Attack-Agreement_-a-Lesson-for-all.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="310" height="86" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 310px) 100vw, 310px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-south-asian-blueprint-for-nuclear-risk-reduction/">A South Asian Blueprint for Nuclear Risk Reduction</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Justin Miller]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 25 Feb 2025 13:15:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30150</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In modern politics, decisions often seem driven more by narrow interests than by a genuine concern for the public good. A prime example of this is the evolving stance on TikTok in American political discourse. In 2020, President Donald Trump led a campaign to ban TikTok, citing national security risks stemming from its Chinese ownership [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/">TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In modern politics, decisions often seem driven more by narrow interests than by a genuine concern for the public good. A prime example of this is the evolving stance on TikTok in American political discourse.</p>
<p>In 2020, President Donald Trump led a <a href="https://www.npr.org/2020/08/06/900019185/trump-signs-executive-order-that-will-effectively-ban-use-of-tiktok-in-the-u-s">campaign to ban</a> TikTok, citing national security risks stemming from its Chinese ownership and compromise of private data by the Chinese government. Four years later, Trump <a href="https://www.reuters.com/technology/tiktok-goes-dark-us-users-trump-says-save-tiktok-2025-01-19/">delayed the removal</a> of TikTok from the American market as he looks to find an American buyer for the popular app. This apparent reversal raises the question, is this change motivated by legitimate considerations or political advantage?</p>
<p><strong>The 2020 Ban: National Security or Politics?</strong></p>
<p>During his first term, President Trump pushed to ban TikTok. This effort was framed as a national security measure. Concerns were raised that the app’s parent company, ByteDance, was sharing user data with the Chinese government, posing a threat to American citizens and government operations.</p>
<p>While these concerns were legitimate, critics argued the move was also a political maneuver. It allowed Trump to position himself as tough on China, appealing to his base and broader nationalistic sentiments during an election year. Few analysts considered that both can be true. Politics, particularly those surrounding a beloved video app, were too divisive.</p>
<p><strong>2024: The Return of TikTok?</strong></p>
<p>Fast forward to 2024, and the reported pivot to support TikTok’s return appears incongruous. The core issues cited in 2020—national security and data privacy—have not fundamentally changed. In fact, Americans better understand what it means to have sensitive personal data captured and potentially used for nefarious purposes by an adversary state. Highly contentious congressional testimony by the leaders of social media companies in 2024 only shined a further spotlight on how such firms do not work for the good of users.</p>
<p>Why then would President Trump seek to save the platform? One possible explanation is the platform’s immense popularity, particularly among younger demographics—a voting bloc Trump struggled to capture. Saving TikTok from the US Supreme Court’s <a href="https://www.vox.com/scotus/395462/supreme-court-tik-tok-garland-first-amendment-china">ruling</a> and ensuring its sale to an American firm could signal an attempt to appeal to these voters, making the move less about the app’s merits and more about electoral politics.</p>
<p><strong>Is It about the Public Good?</strong></p>
<p>President Trump’s changing perspective on TikTok may reveal a broader trend in modern politics—the prioritization of optics over substance. Leaders often take contradictory stances to align with prevailing public opinion or to cater to specific constituencies. In the case of TikTok, the narrative seems less about resolving genuine concerns and more about capitalizing on its cultural ubiquity. If national security was a pressing concern in 2020, the question remains why it would be any less urgent today.</p>
<p>Ironically, users fleeing from TikTok prior to its designated cutoff date did not flock to American social media platforms as some might expect, but other Chinese platforms similar to TikTok. It seems Americans are angrier and more concerned that Facebook, Instagram, and Snapchat are manipulating them than anything the Chinese Communist Party may do. Whether this is the wisest choice is yet to be determined.</p>
<p><strong>Political Rhetoric or Pragmatism?</strong></p>
<p>Ultimately, the fluctuating stance on TikTok underscores the blurred line between political rhetoric and pragmatic governance. Decisions on complex issues like technology and national security require consistency and transparency, yet they are often reduced to tools for political gain. This is a bipartisan issue that was not invented by President Trump. It has a long tradition dating back to the early days of the Republic. In fact, it is endemic to democratic systems.</p>
<p>Whether Trump’s recent position reflects a genuine change of heart or strategic posturing, it highlights the broader issue of political inconsistency. Leaders across the political spectrum often adjust their positions based on electoral strategy rather than principle, yet accountability for these shifts is rare. For example, former Vice President Kamala Harris initially endorsed “Medicare for All” during the 2020 Democrat primary, only to later soften her stance to appeal to moderate voters. These shifts demonstrate how political beliefs are easily adjusted to maximize votes. Whether on healthcare, national security, or technology policy, such reversals can erode public trust if not clearly explained to the electorate.</p>
<p>The ultimate resolution of TikTok’s future will depend on whether the app is sold to an American firm, as President Trump has stipulated, or whether it continues operating without a sale. Given the heightened concerns over data security and foreign influence, a lack of clarity on this issue could further weaken public confidence. While political reversals are common, abrupt shifts without clear explanations can make leadership appear inconsistent or opportunistic. Greater transparency from President Trump regarding his rationale would not only provide insight into the decision-making process but could also help mitigate skepticism about his motivations. At a time when trust in government is already fragile, reinforcing accountability and open communication is critical to maintaining public confidence.</p>
<p>The TikTok saga serves as a reminder that political decisions, especially those framed as national security concerns, are often entangled with strategic interests. In an era where public trust in government is fragile, transparency and consistency are essential. Without them, shifting narratives risk further eroding confidence in leadership—not just on TikTok, but on the larger issues that shape democracy itself.</p>
<p>Offering further explanation into President Trump’s plan and thinking would give the American people a better understanding of the variables under consideration and could potentially assuage some of the speculation into his motivation. Democracies require open communication between the citizenry and their representatives. TikTok is an example of just that.</p>
<p><em>Justin Miller is Associate Professor of Practice in the School of Cyber Studies at the </em><a href="https://cybersecurityonline.utulsa.edu/"><em>University of Tulsa</em></a><em>.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/TikTok_-Security-Threat-or-Political-Pawn_-Regardless-America-deserves-better.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="367" height="102" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 367px) 100vw, 367px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/tiktok-security-threat-or-political-pawn/">TikTok: Security Threat or Political Pawn</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Navigating the New Frontier: Agentic AI’s Promise and Challenges</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-new-frontier-agentic-ais-promise-and-challenges/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-new-frontier-agentic-ais-promise-and-challenges/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Sharpe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 04 Feb 2025 13:05:37 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[AI & Deterrence]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[Bonus Reads]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[adaptability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[agentic AI]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[autonomy]]></category>
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		<category><![CDATA[personalized customer experiences.]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29971</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is entering a new era with the rise of agentic AI, a groundbreaking innovation redefining how machines interact with the world and perform tasks. Unlike traditional AI systems that operate within the bounds of human-defined algorithms and instructions, agentic AI stands apart because it can act autonomously, adapt to changing environments, and [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-new-frontier-agentic-ais-promise-and-challenges/">Navigating the New Frontier: Agentic AI’s Promise and Challenges</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Artificial intelligence (AI) is entering a new era with the rise of <a href="https://www.investors.com/news/technology/servicenow-stock-now-stock-mcdermott-interview-artificial-intelligence/">agentic AI</a>, a groundbreaking innovation redefining how machines interact with the world and perform tasks. Unlike traditional AI systems that operate within the bounds of human-defined algorithms and instructions, agentic AI stands apart because it can act autonomously, adapt to changing environments, and make decisions independently to achieve specific objectives. This evolution marks a paradigm shift, moving AI from a tool to an active agent capable of strategic reasoning and complex problem-solving.</p>
<p>Agentic AI quickly became a buzzword in the technology industry, drawing the attention of innovators, corporations, and policymakers alike. By combining machine learning, natural language processing, and real-time analytics, agentic AI systems can interpret nuanced data and execute multi-step tasks previously thought to require human intervention. This capability unlocks immense potential across industries, from healthcare and finance to manufacturing and customer service.</p>
<p>However, the rise of this transformative technology is accompanied by profound challenges. The potential for significant job displacement is actual and imminent. Roles that involve repetitive or analytical tasks could be rendered obsolete, leaving swathes of the workforce vulnerable. This shift is sparking resistance from employees and unions concerned about job security and the ethical implications of AI in the workplace.</p>
<p>In the workplace, agentic AI is already making waves. Businesses leverage these systems to automate complex workflows, enhance productivity, and reduce operational costs. For instance, AI agents are being deployed to streamline supply chains, personalize customer interactions, and even assist in groundbreaking research, such as drug discovery and financial forecasting. As organizations increasingly adopt this technology, the workplace transforms, promising greater efficiency and innovation.</p>
<p>However, the rise of agentic AI is not without challenges. Concerns about job displacement, ethical considerations, and security risks have fueled resistance from employees, unions, and policymakers. Trust in AI decision-making and transparency in its operations remain critical issues that must be addressed for widespread acceptance. Moreover, questions about accountability and regulatory oversight are at the forefront of discussions as the line between human and machine decision-making becomes increasingly blurred.</p>
<p>As this trend continues to gain momentum, agentic AI promises to become a cornerstone of the future economy. Its ability to think, learn, and act autonomously offers unprecedented opportunities to reshape industries and redefine the relationship between humans and technology. With careful implementation and robust ethical guidelines, agentic AI could usher in a new era of collaboration between intelligent systems and human ingenuity, setting the stage for innovations yet to be imagined.<strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Basics of Agentic AI</strong></p>
<p>Agentic AI represents a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, characterized by its autonomy in decision-making and action execution without direct human intervention. Unlike traditional AI systems that rely on predefined rules, agentic AI adapts to dynamic environments, processes vast data, and formulates strategies to achieve specific objectives. This autonomy enables agentic AI to handle complex, multi-step problems across various <a href="https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-are-companies-using-ai-agents-heres-a-look-at-five-early-users-of-the-bots-26f87845">industries</a>.</p>
<p>Integrating agentic AI into the workplace transforms business operations by automating intricate tasks and enhancing efficiency. Companies like ServiceNow are embedding agentic AI into their enterprise software to act as control towers for AI-driven business transformations, facilitating seamless system cooperation. Additionally, organizations such as Johnson &amp; Johnson and Moody’s are deploying AI agents for tasks ranging from drug discovery to financial analysis, demonstrating the versatility and impact of Agentic AI in various sectors.</p>
<p><strong>Potential Benefits</strong></p>
<p>Autonomy and adaptability are critical as agentic AI systems operate independently, making decisions and adapting to changing inputs to achieve specific goals without human oversight. Enhanced productivity is vital because agentic AI automates complex tasks, allowing employees to focus on strategic initiatives, thereby increasing overall productivity.</p>
<p>Agentic AI aids industry applications when it is utilized across various industries, including healthcare, manufacturing, and retail, to optimize processes and improve efficiency.</p>
<p><strong>Emerging Concerns</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>While promising enhanced productivity and operational efficiency, the integration of agentic AI in the workplace faces significant resistance from various groups due to various concerns. These objections stem from ethical, economic, and cultural implications. Worker advocacy organizations and unions express concern about the potential for large-scale job displacement.</p>
<p>Agentic AI, with its capacity to perform complex, multi-step tasks autonomously, threatens roles that rely on repetitive or analytical tasks, such as data analysis, customer service, and logistics coordination. These groups argue that businesses may prioritize short-term cost savings over employee welfare, exacerbating unemployment and wage stagnation.</p>
<p>Employees in affected industries, such as manufacturing, finance, and retail, fear job insecurity and skill redundancy. Their resistance stems from the perception that companies are deploying AI solutions without clear plans for retraining or upskilling displaced workers. Furthermore, employees often express discomfort working alongside autonomous systems due to a lack of trust and transparency in AI decision-making.</p>
<p>Civil rights groups and ethics committees raise alarm bells over the potential misuse of Agentic AI in surveillance, decision-making, and predictive analytics. Concerns center on the lack of accountability for autonomous decisions, biases in AI algorithms, and the possibility of violating individual privacy rights. These groups argue that deploying AI without clear ethical guidelines undermines trust and could harm marginalized communities disproportionately.</p>
<p>Many managers view agentic AI as threatening their authority and decision-making roles. With AI systems taking on responsibilities like resource allocation and strategic planning, resistance arises from concerns about <a href="https://scet.berkeley.edu/the-next-next-big-thing-agentic-ais-opportunities-and-risks/">diminished relevance</a> and influence in organizational hierarchies.</p>
<p><strong>C-Suite Leadership and Industry Best Practices</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>Executives, particularly C-suite leadership, often resist large-scale AI adoption due to high implementation costs, cybersecurity risks, and the challenges of integrating AI into legacy systems. They also face pressure to ensure ethical compliance, which slows decision-making processes and creates resistance to adopting agentic AI systems.</p>
<p>As agentic AI reshapes the corporate landscape, C-suite leaders face a dual imperative: embracing this <a href="https://www.exitcertified.com/blog/understanding-agentic-ai">transformative technology</a>, driving innovation, and remaining attractive to top talent while supporting existing employees. Forward-thinking executives recognize that successfully navigating this shift requires technical adoption and a strategic focus on building a resilient and inclusive workplace culture.</p>
<p>C-suite leaders emphasize reskilling and upskilling programs to keep <a href="https://venturebeat.com/programming-development/agentic-ai-can-help-you-to-get-a-new-software-engineering-job-in-2025/">talent coming</a>. By investing in continuous learning initiatives, leaders can empower employees to thrive alongside agentic AI, positioning their companies as industry leaders prioritizing professional growth. Additionally, fostering partnerships with academic institutions and specialized training providers enables businesses to cultivate a pipeline of skilled professionals eager to work with cutting-edge technologies.</p>
<p>Equally important is addressing employee concerns about job security and ethical AI deployment. Transparent communication about how agentic AI is integrated and its benefits to the organization and <a href="https://techbullion.com/copy-of-understanding-the-role-of-intentionality-in-agentic-ai/">workforce</a> helps build trust.</p>
<p>C-suite leaders should also protect their organizations by establishing best practices for ethical AI use, including governance frameworks, data privacy safeguards, and inclusive decision-making processes. These measures mitigate risks and position companies as responsible innovators, enhancing their reputation among employees, customers, and investors.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Ethics and Governance</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong>In the broader policy perspective, regulatory authorities resist rapid adoption due to insufficient legislation governing AI ethics, accountability, and security. Policymakers advocate for stricter oversight and clearer governance frameworks to mitigate autonomy and data security risks.</p>
<p>While this innovation has much to be praised, consumer resistance stems from a lack of understanding and <a href="https://www.knime.com/blog/what-is-agentic-ai">trust in</a> agentic AI systems. Concerns about transparency in AI-driven decisions—such as pricing models, recommendations, or dispute resolutions—lead to skepticism about businesses that fully rely on such systems.</p>
<p><strong> </strong><strong>Tech Companies Eye Financial Windfall from Agentic AI</strong></p>
<p><strong> </strong><a href="https://www.investors.com/news/technology/servicenow-stock-now-stock-mcdermott-interview-artificial-intelligence/">Tech giants</a> are racing to position themselves at the forefront of the agentic AI revolution, recognizing its immense potential to drive financial growth. Companies like Google, Microsoft, and Amazon invest heavily in research and development to create advanced AI agents capable of autonomous decision-making. These firms view agentic AI as a transformative technology that can enhance their existing platforms, open new revenue streams, and cement their dominance in the AI landscape. For instance, <a href="https://venturebeat.com/ai/nvidia-launches-agentic-ai-blueprints-to-automate-work-for-enterprises/">enterprise solutions powered</a> by agentic AI are being marketed as tools to revolutionize industries by automating complex tasks, optimizing workflows, and delivering unprecedented efficiency.</p>
<p>Start-ups and established firms compete to attract venture capital funding, focusing on niche applications such as healthcare diagnostics, financial analytics, and personalized customer experiences. These targeted deployments promise significant cost savings for businesses, making them attractive investments. Additionally, tech companies are integrating agentic AI into cloud computing services, offering businesses scalable, AI-powered solutions that can be tailored to diverse needs.</p>
<p>In short, Agentic AI is coming. It will shape industry, government, and the military, and preparing for that future is critical.</p>
<p>Mr. Greg Sharpe is a Fellow and the director of Communications and Marketing for the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the Managing Design Editor for the Global Security Review. He has 25+ years in marketing and communications with a focus on digital communications, organizational and institutional change, and analysis.  Greg has over 35 years of military, federal civilian, and defense contractor experience in the fields of database development, digital marketing &amp; analytics, and organizational outreach and engagement, technology use case exploration and assessment.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/The-Rise-of-Agentic-AI.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/navigating-the-new-frontier-agentic-ais-promise-and-challenges/">Navigating the New Frontier: Agentic AI’s Promise and Challenges</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Volatility of Cryptocurrency: Barrier or Enabler of Nuclear Escalation?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-volatility-of-cryptocurrency-barrier-or-enabler-of-nuclear-escalation/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-volatility-of-cryptocurrency-barrier-or-enabler-of-nuclear-escalation/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Greg Sharpe]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 12 Dec 2024 13:14:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29578</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The volatility of cryptocurrency markets has been a major topic of discussion since the inception of digital assets like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Its impact extends beyond financial speculation and the promise of decentralized finance. Cryptocurrency’s creation is creating distinct ripples through the global economy, even reaching security and geopolitical affairs. Among the more intriguing dimensions [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-volatility-of-cryptocurrency-barrier-or-enabler-of-nuclear-escalation/">The Volatility of Cryptocurrency: Barrier or Enabler of Nuclear Escalation?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The volatility of cryptocurrency markets has been a major topic of discussion since the inception of digital assets like Bitcoin and Ethereum. Its impact extends beyond financial speculation and the promise of decentralized finance. Cryptocurrency’s creation is creating distinct ripples through the global economy, even reaching security and geopolitical affairs. Among the more intriguing dimensions of this impact is the interplay between <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/digital-assets/2024/03/09/more-dangerous-than-nukes-china-and-russia-revealed-to-be-suddenly-abandoning-the-us-dollar-for-a-bitcoin-ethereum-and-xrp-inspired-rival-amid-crypto-price-pump/">cryptocurrency volatility and nuclear deterrence</a>.</p>
<p>Too few Americans contemplate the role of digital currency volatility in acting as a barrier or an <a href="https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1369&amp;context=jlia">enabler to nuclear deterrence</a>. The reality is that there are opportunities and risks that volatile cryptocurrency plays in the strategic calculus of nuclear states.</p>
<p><strong>Cryptocurrency and Geopolitical Shifts</strong></p>
<p>Cryptocurrencies are decentralized and borderless, challenging traditional financial systems and reshaping how states interact economically. Their volatility stems from market immaturity, speculative trading, regulatory uncertainties, and evolution of these ever-changing technologies. Essentially created to prevent intermediaries, like banks and financial institutions, cryptocurrencies lay the foundation for trustless transactions for illicit activities.</p>
<p>This volatile mix of person-to-person transactions and zero oversight introduces both unpredictability and opportunity, raising questions about their implications for nuclear deterrence, which now must deal with a domain that includes ungoverned access to financial streams that can be used by state and non-state actors to engage in elicit behavior that undermines deterrence stability.</p>
<p>Nuclear deterrence relies on a delicate balance of power, with states maintaining assured second-strike capabilities to dissuade adversaries from initiating conflict. This balance hinges on credibility and capability. Cryptocurrencies, with their volatile swings in value, could serve to undermine stability within a country or enable elicit actors to engage in a range of nonnuclear actions that undermine strategic stability.</p>
<p><strong>The Risks of Cryptocurrency Volatility as a Barrier</strong></p>
<p>Cryptocurrency volatility can act as a barrier to nuclear deterrence by creating financial instability and undermining a state’s ability to project economic power. Traditional nuclear powers depend on stable economies to maintain robust defense capabilities, fund deterrence strategies, and support diplomatic efforts. Sharp and unpredictable fluctuations in digital assets can <a href="https://www.trendmicro.com/en_us/research/24/g/crypto-crime-2024-report-part-ii.html">undermine financial stability</a>, weakening a state’s capacity to fund critical defense initiatives.</p>
<p>For the United States, crypto is not a major issue currently. But, for North Korea, who funds its nuclear program through elicit activities, crypto is important. Proliferators also use crypto to conduct activity. Instability in crypto makes illicit activity even more high stakes and unpredictable.</p>
<p>Instability creates advantages for state and non-state actors to exploit cryptocurrency markets for nefarious purposes, such as evading sanctions, financing proliferation, and bypassing traditional financial controls. The decentralized nature of cryptocurrencies complicates efforts to monitor, track, and regulate illicit activities, potentially undermining efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons or restrict financing for state and non-state actors pursuing destabilizing weapons programs.</p>
<p>Cryptocurrency instability also presents a challenge to strategic stability through <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1057521924003715">cyber threats</a>. If critical financial systems or exchanges are disrupted, or if adversaries manipulate markets to harm a nation’s economy, it could create economic shocks severe enough to destabilize deterrence relationships, increase miscalculation risks, or fuel insecurity-driven arms build-ups.</p>
<p><strong>The Darknet and Conflict Escalation</strong></p>
<p>Darknet cryptocurrency markets empower bad actors by offering anonymity and decentralized financial tools, enabling a wide range of conflict-escalating activities. These markets facilitate the purchase of illegal arms, military-grade technology, and hacking tools, often used to destabilize regions and target critical infrastructure (command-and-control systems) through cyberattacks.</p>
<p>Terror organizations leverage cryptocurrencies for anonymous funding, allowing them to finance operations, recruit globally, and expand their influence. Sanctioned entities exploit these markets to bypass <a href="https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S240584402309477X">international restrictions</a> and acquire resources that fuel aggressive actions.</p>
<p>The ability to transact anonymously with cryptocurrencies also shields organized crime, including narcotics and human trafficking, whose revenues often fund conflict zones and insurgent groups. Covert exchanges on the darknet can increase espionage, destabilize international relations, and provoke hostilities to serve a radically motivated agenda.</p>
<p>In parallel, extremist groups utilize these platforms to spread propaganda, incite violence, and radicalize populations, further destabilizing fragile regions. The combination of anonymity, decentralized systems, and hidden economies presents a formidable challenge for global security efforts aimed at <a href="https://www.occrp.org/en/news/us-seizes-crypto-mixer-linked-to-north-korean-regime">conflict prevention and stability</a>.</p>
<p><strong>Cryptocurrency as an Enabler of Nuclear Deterrence</strong></p>
<p>On the other hand, cryptocurrency volatility also opens new avenues for strengthening nuclear deterrence through financial resilience and innovation. The decentralized nature of digital assets can enable states to diversify their financial resources and reduce dependency on traditional systems that might be vulnerable to adversarial influence or geopolitical tensions. In times of economic crisis or sanctions, cryptocurrencies <a href="https://www.coinbase.com/blog/national-security-in-the-age-of-digital-innovation-the-critical-role-of-crypto">can provide states with alternative means</a> to maintain fiscal stability, thus supporting their deterrent capabilities. Countering bad activities with good can be as challenging as the reliance on traditional financial stability for positive security assurance.</p>
<p>Furthermore, blockchain technology, which underpins cryptocurrencies, offers potential for transparency, accountability, and verification mechanisms in arms control agreements. By leveraging <a href="https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_national_security/publications/aba-standing-committee-on-law-and-national-security-60-th-anniversary-an-anthology/what-do-blockchain-and-cryptocurrency-have-to-do-with-national-security/">blockchain</a>, states can create tamper-proof records for tracking nuclear materials, enhancing verification regimes, and building trust between adversaries. The volatility of digital assets may fuel innovation and drive investment into these applications, ultimately strengthening nuclear stability and deterrence structures.</p>
<p><strong>Balancing the Risks and Opportunities</strong></p>
<p>While the volatility of cryptocurrencies poses undeniable risks, it is essential to approach them with a nuanced perspective to find the right balance between risk and reward. <a href="https://itif.org/publications/2019/04/30/policymakers-guide-blockchain/">Policymakers</a> must strike a balance between leveraging the opportunities that digital assets present and mitigating their risks to global security. Collaborative efforts to regulate and stabilize cryptocurrency markets can reduce the likelihood of financial instability while harnessing the potential of decentralized systems.</p>
<p>In addition, enhanced cybersecurity measures must accompany any state or multilateral effort to integrate cryptocurrency into the financial systems that underpin deterrence capabilities. <a href="https://www.chainalysis.com/blog/white-house-crypto-framework/">Protecting digital infrastructure</a> against malicious actors will ensure that the advantages of decentralized assets are not overshadowed by their exploitation for destabilizing purposes.</p>
<p><strong>A New Strategic Frontier</strong></p>
<p>The volatility of cryptocurrency markets is both a challenge and a frontier for instability of nuclear deterrence. While it poses risks through financial instability, illicit use, and cyber threats, it also offers opportunities for financial resilience, innovation, and transparency. In today’s evolving digital environment, nations must adapt to this dual-edged sword, developing strategies that incorporate the volatility of digital assets into a <a href="https://arxiv.org/html/2409.10031v1">comprehensive approach to deterrence</a>.</p>
<p>Ultimately, whether cryptocurrencies become a barrier or enabler of nuclear deterrence depends on how nations, regions, and regulators in the broader international community respond to this evolving challenge. By advocating cooperation, innovation, and regulation, cryptocurrencies can strengthen global security architectures and contribute to a stable nuclear order—turning volatility into a force for strategic stability and peace.</p>
<p><em>Greg Sharpe is the Marketing and Communications Director at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/The-Volatility-of-Cryptocurrency-on-Conflict-Escalation-1.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-volatility-of-cryptocurrency-barrier-or-enabler-of-nuclear-escalation/">The Volatility of Cryptocurrency: Barrier or Enabler of Nuclear Escalation?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Proposing Maritime Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/proposing-maritime-confidence-building-measures-between-india-and-pakistan/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/proposing-maritime-confidence-building-measures-between-india-and-pakistan/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Rizwana Abbasi&nbsp;&&nbsp;Maryyum Masood]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Nov 2024 13:05:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29393</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>There are escalating tensions between India and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), which underscores the need for maritime confidence-building measures (CBM) and risk-reduction strategies to avoid any probability of future conflict. Power projection by the United States, China, and India is visible in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) as they seek to assert [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/proposing-maritime-confidence-building-measures-between-india-and-pakistan/">Proposing Maritime Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are escalating tensions between India and Pakistan in the Indian Ocean region (IOR), which underscores the need for maritime confidence-building measures (CBM) and risk-reduction strategies to avoid any probability of future conflict. Power projection by the United States, China, and India is visible in the Indian Ocean region (IOR) as they seek to assert control over sea lines of communications (SLOC), navigate vital trade routes, and regulate energy transportation networks and natural resources, including fisheries, oil, and gas.</p>
<p>These states are modernizing their naval deterrence capabilities, thus weaponizing the waters of the IOR. The growing competition between US-led alliances, China and India, as well as India and Pakistan intensified, particularly with US support for India to counter China’s influence in the IOR.</p>
<p>Pakistan views these developments as a security threat, as they challenge its maritime mobility and increase the risk of entanglement between Indian and Pakistani forces at sea. The escalating tensions between India and Pakistan underscore the need for maritime confidence-building measures (CBM) and risk-reduction strategies to avoid conflict. What are the evolving dynamics between India and Pakistan in the IOR and how can maritime CBMs be realized and institutionalized to prevent prospects for any dangers?</p>
<p><strong>Maritime Entanglement in the IOR</strong></p>
<p>Maritime entanglement refers to the complex and potentially dangerous situations where naval forces from different states, often adversaries, come into proximity or engage in activities that can lead to unintended confrontations, miscalculations, or escalations. The IOR is a center point for states’ contestation where forces of India and Pakistan can interface anytime.</p>
<p>India is modernizing its naval capabilities to assert its regional dominance through advanced technologies such as <a href="https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/commissioning-of-indias-second-nuclear-submarine-ins-arighat/article68579761.ece"><em>Arihant</em>-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines</a>, aircraft carriers, uncrewed systems, and sensors, thereby expanding its naval presence.</p>
<p>India has also approved the purchase of MQ-9B high-altitude, long-endurance drones, which will enhance the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities of its armed forces in the IOR.</p>
<p>India is also inclined to procure high endurance unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) to further enhance its ISR, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and <a href="https://forceindia.net/feature-report/mean-machines/">mine-counter measures (MCM)</a>. India is using China’s looming threat as leverage to procure <a href="https://www.ussc.edu.au/engaging-with-reality-in-the-indian-ocean">26 Rafale-M fighters to serve as the new carrier, Vikrant’s, air wing, and three additional Kalvari-class submarines</a>.</p>
<p>Pakistan, in turn, is also improving its deterrence survivability. Pakistan’s capability is mainly based on conventional platforms with heavy reliance on cruise missiles. Its sea-based force consists of nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, deployed on <em>Agosta</em>-class submarines or on-surface ships.</p>
<p>India’s acquisition of autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV) adds new complexities to Indian Ocean security. These stealthy, autonomous systems enhance India’s naval capabilities in surveillance and anti-submarine warfare and increase the risk of unintended encounters with other countries’ forces, especially Pakistan, as the autonomous nature of AUVs makes them less predictable and harder to monitor.</p>
<p>Furthermore, a cyberattack on surveillance or intelligence systems can create monitoring “blind spots,” leading to potential misinterpretations of naval activities. If one country’s radar is disabled, it might incorrectly assess the other’s movements, prompting a more aggressive stance. This risk escalates if command and control communications are also affected, as either side could misinterpret a blackout as a threat, potentially deploying additional naval assets and leading to unintended confrontations.</p>
<p>The presence of a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine near another state’s naval assets might be perceived as a prelude to an act of aggression, especially during times of heightened tensions. A stark example of this occurred during the <a href="https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/post-balakot-navy-on-the-prowl-722932.html">2019 Pulwama-Balakot</a> crisis between India and Pakistan. In the milieu of the Pulwama crisis, the Indian Navy declared that its carrier battle group, including the Indian nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, the INS Arihant, was on a deterrence patrol, which was “<a href="https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/asiajapan/4/0/4_55/_pdf">swiftly shifted from exercise to operational disposition</a>” amid the crisis.</p>
<p>After the crisis, Pakistan reportedly detected an Indian submarine, suspected of being armed with nuclear weapons, within its maritime zone. The lack of transparency surrounding nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine movements makes it difficult for states to distinguish between routine operations and potential threats, increasing the risk of miscalculation.</p>
<p>This is particularly noteworthy in the IOR where numerous states assert their interests in strategically significant areas as well as crucial chokepoints for trade routes, namely the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca. Thus, misinterpretation of naval maneuvers, especially involving nuclear-armed submarines, heightens the risk of maritime entanglement between India and Pakistan, which will create challenges for all the players involved and disrupt the SLOCs and transportation. These developments demand the opening of effective CBMs between India and Pakistan to prevent any risks in the maritime domain.<strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Proposed Confidence-Building Measures </strong></p>
<p>In the context of India and Pakistan, several CBMs are applicable. First, establishing a mutual notification and data-sharing mechanism on cybersecurity threats between India and Pakistan is essential, given the growing reliance on digital systems for naval and maritime operations. This mechanism would help reduce misunderstandings and prevent the misattribution of cyber incidents to state actors.</p>
<p>Second, an agreement on prior notifications of naval activities such as naval exercises or critical movements of submarines is needed. This will enhance transparency and trust by ensuring that routine movements, such as those involving nuclear submarines, are not misinterpreted as hostile actions.</p>
<p>Third, an agreement on managing incidents at sea can also be formalized by setting up clear protocols for their behavior during unintended or unexpected encounters at sea. This would help both countries to turn dangerous eventualities into normal situations. The two states can create standardized rules of engagement for naval forces operating nearby and develop crisis-management protocols to handle maritime incidents.</p>
<p>Fourth, another risk-reduction initiative could be a submarine rescue agreement, enabling cooperation in case of climate-prone or any natural crisis-led accidents involving rescuing crew and sunk submarines, and sheltering the survivors on board.</p>
<p>Fifth, the ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) deployment notification and safety protocol CBM proposes that India notify Pakistan, via a neutral third party or direct hotline, about routine SSBN deployments near Pakistan’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in the Arabian Sea. It includes communication protocols to prevent accidental encounters from escalating, with India providing limited, non-sensitive information on SSBN timing and location near shared maritime boundaries.</p>
<p>Sixth, an agreement on the non-deployment of AUVs between India and Pakistan is essential to mitigate risks associated with autonomous systems in sensitive maritime areas. Establishing no-deployment zones, particularly near nuclear sites, disputed areas, and key naval bases, would reduce the chances of misinterpretation and accidental confrontations, offering a safety buffer in shared waters.</p>
<p>Seventh, India and Pakistan could establish a code of conduct (CoC) for the Arabian Sea to manage maritime interactions, reduce confrontation risks, and promote peaceful sea use amid regional tensions. Modeled after the South China Sea CoC. This CBM would provide a framework of rules for behavior in contested areas, particularly near disputed zones like Sir Creek and along shared maritime boundaries.</p>
<p>Eighth, direct bilateral maritime cooperation and conflict resolution between India and Pakistan would ideally be the most effective approach. Given the current state of relations between the two countries, this option remains politically challenging.</p>
<p>Therefore, a more feasible path to promote bilateral trust would come through multilateral forums. For example, the Indian Ocean Rim Association can be a valuable avenue to which both nations are already members. This forum provides a platform for indirect cooperation on shared maritime issues such as security, trade, and disaster-related risk management.</p>
<p>Expanding their collaboration within this multilateral forum, particularly on non-sensitive issues like anti-piracy efforts and environmental protection, could help build trust between them. As multilateral engagement deepens, it could serve as a steppingstone toward more focused and issue-specific dialogues between India and Pakistan at a bilateral level.</p>
<p>Implementation of the above agreements would provide a structured approach to promote a more secure and stable maritime environment in the IOR preventing miscommunication or misunderstandings and ensuring safety during maritime operations, contributing to greater stability in the IOR.</p>
<p><em>Rizwana Abbasi is an associate professor of security studies at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, a non-resident fellow of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, and a visiting fellow at the Central European University of Austria.  </em></p>
<p><em>Maryyum Masood is a Research Officer and Associate Editor at CISS and an M. Phil Scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, Islamabad.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Maritime-CBMs-between-India-Pakistan.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/proposing-maritime-confidence-building-measures-between-india-and-pakistan/">Proposing Maritime Confidence-Building Measures between India and Pakistan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Thibert]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 Nov 2024 13:29:06 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29302</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The development of hypersonic technology is poised to redefine the landscape of military airpower. Hypersonic vehicles, capable of reaching speeds greater than Mach 5, offer unprecedented speed and agility, making them a game-changer in modern warfare. This article delves into the advancements, challenges, and strategic implications of hypersonic technology, highlighting how it is set to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/">Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The development of hypersonic technology is poised to redefine the landscape of military airpower. Hypersonic vehicles, capable of reaching speeds greater than Mach 5, offer unprecedented speed and agility, making them a <a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/how-hypersonic-weapons-are-redefining-warfare">game-changer</a> in modern warfare. This article delves into the advancements, challenges, and strategic implications of hypersonic technology, highlighting how it is set to transform air superiority in the twenty-first century.</p>
<p>Hypersonic technology encompasses both aircraft and missiles that travel at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound. These vehicles leverage advanced propulsion systems, such as scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets), to achieve and sustain such high velocities. The potential applications of hypersonic technology are vast, ranging from rapid global strike capabilities to enhanced missile defense systems.</p>
<p>However, interest in hypersonic technology is not new. Scientific research began during the Cold War, but only in recent years have significant breakthroughs been made towards advancing hypersonic technology from theory to practicality. The primary drivers of this renewed focus include advancements in materials science, computational fluid dynamics, and propulsion technology. Nations such as the United States, <a href="https://wmdcenter.ndu.edu/Publications/Publication-View/Article/2484178/chinas-hypersonic-weapons/">China</a>, and Russia are at the forefront of hypersonic research, each vying for technological supremacy, with China and Russia attempting to challenge the status quo.</p>
<p>The strategic advantages of hypersonic technology are multifaceted. One of the most significant benefits is the ability to deliver payloads at unprecedented speeds, drastically reducing the time available for adversaries to detect, track, and intercept these threats. This capability enhances both offensive and defensive operations.</p>
<p>Hypersonic vehicles can reach their targets much faster than conventional missiles or aircraft. This rapid response capability is crucial in scenarios requiring immediate action, such as neutralizing high-value targets or responding to emerging threats. The ability to strike quickly and precisely could deter adversaries from initiating conflict, knowing that retaliation would be swift and devastating.</p>
<p>The high speed and maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles make them difficult to detect and intercept. Traditional air defense systems, designed to counter slower, more predictable threats, may struggle to adapt to the dynamic flight paths of hypersonic weapons. This enhanced survivability increases the likelihood of mission success, particularly in contested environments.</p>
<p>Hypersonic vehicles can cover vast distances in a short amount of time, providing global reach without the need for forward-deployed bases.</p>
<p>This capability is especially valuable for nations looking to project power and influence across the globe. It also reduces the logistical burden associated with maintaining overseas bases and allows for more flexible deployment strategies.</p>
<p>Despite their potential, hypersonic technologies face significant technological challenges. Overcoming these obstacles is essential for the successful development and deployment of hypersonic systems.</p>
<p>One of the primary challenges is managing the extreme heat generated during hypersonic flight. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, air friction can cause the surface temperature of a vehicle to reach several thousand degrees Celsius. Developing materials and cooling systems capable of withstanding and dissipating this heat is crucial to maintaining the structural integrity and performance of hypersonic vehicles.</p>
<p>The materials used in hypersonic vehicles must endure not only high temperatures but also extreme pressures and aerodynamic forces. Advanced composites, ceramics, and metal alloys are being developed to meet these demanding requirements. Researchers are also exploring innovative manufacturing techniques, such as additive manufacturing, to create components with enhanced durability and performance.</p>
<p>Maintaining control and accuracy at hypersonic speeds is another significant challenge. Hypersonic vehicles must navigate through rapidly changing atmospheric conditions, requiring sophisticated guidance and control systems. These systems must be able to make real-time adjustments to the vehicle’s trajectory, ensuring that it stays on course and reaches its intended target.</p>
<p>Developing reliable propulsion systems capable of sustained hypersonic flight is a major technological hurdle. Scramjets, which operate efficiently at hypersonic speeds, are still in the experimental stage. Achieving a balance between thrust, fuel efficiency, and structural integrity is critical for the success of these systems.</p>
<p>The deployment of hypersonic technology has profound strategic implications for global security. As nations race to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, the balance of power could shift, necessitating new defense strategies and international regulations.</p>
<p>The development of hypersonic technology has the potential to trigger an arms race among major powers. Nations may feel compelled to develop their own hypersonic capabilities or invest in advanced defense systems to counter these threats. This escalation could lead to increased military spending and heightened tensions on the global stage.</p>
<p>Hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence by providing a credible and rapid response option. However, their deployment also raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons could shorten decision-making windows, increasing the likelihood of accidental or preemptive strikes. That said, the opportunity to discuss potential <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2023-03/news/us-faces-wins-losses-hypersonic-weapons">gains and losses</a> for both development and implementation of hypersonic weapons is an opportunity to help drive future strategy development.</p>
<p>Developing effective countermeasures against hypersonic threats is a priority for many nations. Advanced radar systems, directed-energy weapons, and missile defense systems are being explored as potential solutions. Integrating these technologies into existing defense frameworks is essential for maintaining a robust defense posture.</p>
<p>The <a href="https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-hypersonic-weapons/">proliferation</a> of hypersonic technology underscores the need for international regulations and agreements. Establishing norms and guidelines for the development, testing, and deployment of hypersonic weapons could help mitigate the risks associated with their use. Diplomatic efforts to promote transparency and confidence-building measures are crucial for maintaining global stability.</p>
<p>Regardless of the <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2024/03/hypersonic-weapons-are-mediocre-its-time-to-stop-wasting-money-on-them/">naysayers</a>, hypersonic technology represents the next frontier in military airpower, offering unparalleled speed, agility, and reach. While the strategic advantages are significant, the technological challenges and strategic implications cannot be overlooked. As nations continue to invest in hypersonic research and development, the race for air superiority will intensify, shaping the future of global security. Balancing the benefits and risks of hypersonic technology will be essential for ensuring a stable and secure international environment.</p>
<p><em>Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the</em> <a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/"><em>National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</em></a> <em>with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Hypersonic-Horizons-The-Next-Generation-of-Air-Superiority.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/hypersonic-horizons-the-next-generation-of-air-superiority/">Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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