The conclusion of the scenario is that terrorists could easily do the same, and that the American security apparatus needs to take action to prevent a possible wave of bioterrorism before it is too late. But given the knowledge starting point of the scientists, and ease of more proven violent methods, is this a really legitimate concern?

The simulated test was overseen by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and saw the players involved, two Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) graduate students, successfully place orders for DNA fragments of the virus from 36 of 38 providers, despite obvious red flags, like the organization not being one that does lab experiments or the address for delivery not being a laboratory facility. According to MIT Professor Kevin Esvelt, who oversaw the students, they then were able to employ “standard biochemical techniques” to create the deadly virus.

That these graduate students were able to successfully complete such a purchase 36 out of 38 times is alarming, but consider how these MIT students compare to an aspiring terrorist; is there perhaps a knowledge and capability gap? MIT is among the top-ranked schools in the world and, according to EduRank, number 1 in biomedical engineering. Hardly a representation of the average knowledge base. Even knowing how to go about purchasing viral DNA fragments is highly specialized knowledge, let alone having the expertise to successfully engineer those fragments to a level needed for weaponization.

According to research out of the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN) attacks are seldom in the wheelhouse of terrorist groups. In fact, the use of weapons in this category has been in an overall downward trend since 2000. Terrorists “generally lack significant chemical or biological skills or experience.”

However, there is a first time for everything, which is why such red-team events occur. While many believed the idea of al-Qaeda using hijacked planes as missiles after the September 11, 2001, attacks to be anathema, it was presented as a possibility in a red-team event after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing—following a series of terrorist hijackings in 1994 and 1995, indicating a growing trend.

What are current trends in terrorism showing? Another START report focused on terrorism and targeted violence between January 2, 2023–September 26, 2024. The report analyzed 1,509 reported incidents in the US. Filtering out categories such as hate crimes and school and workplace violence, and focusing on just terrorism, there were 366 domestic incidents.

The START data offers further filters by weapon type, showing 196 firearm incidents, 80 incendiary device attacks, 60 explosives used, 16 sharp objects used, 10 chemical attacks, eight melee attacks, six vehicles, three sabotage efforts, and two blunt objects used. There were also 15 noted under “other” and “unknown” weapon types. Zero radiological incidents were found during the time period.

While no biological category exists, looking at chemical incidents could offer an example comparable to a biological terror attack. The events break down into one pepper spray incident, an unknown noxious aerosol attack, a novelty stink spray use, an attempted ricin poisoning, and six fentanyl-laced letter attacks.

The multiple fentanyl-laced letters could possibly indicate a terrorism trend related to scientific know-how. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reports the majority of domestic fentanyl is “manufactured in foreign clandestine labs and smuggled into the United States through Mexico, [and] is being distributed across the country and sold on the illegal drug market.”

While a clandestine lab could certainly hire itself out to a terrorist organization, no arrests were made for such incidents. It is impossible to know if the fentanyl was purchased domestically in illegal drug transactions, purchased directly from a lab, or manufactured by the perpetrators themselves.

Reporting from Reuters confirms that fentanyl is actually relatively simple for scientists to manufacture, and virtually all fentanyl in the US is produced in Mexican labs, many affiliated with Mexican drug cartels, which were recently designated as terrorist groups by President Donald Trump. These labs are able to skirt chemical regulations by switching from one method to another using different ingredients to produce the same result. The cartels have financial motivations, rather than ideological ones, as with terror groups.

The manipulation of regulations by these labs in Mexico is eerily similar to the MIT red-team concerns—a security gap worth addressing. It is still too limited to call it a trend in terrorism attack types. Historic outliers (such as the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo) are just that, outliers.

Over 90 percent of START’s analyzed terrorist incidents use firearms, incendiary devices, or bombs. Only 2.7 percent are chemical in nature (with 1.6 percent fentanyl). It is clear where counterterror resources should be directed. Concerns over technological or scientifically advanced terrorist attacks are closer to fear mongering than reality.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. The views expressed are his own.

Is Bioterrorism Really on the Horizon? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since June 2023, there is increasing attention on space security, with a particular focus on collaboration with private-sector space businesses. In situations like the Ukraine conflict, private companies’ satellite imagery and satellite communication services are utilized. It is therefore crucial for the Japanese government to leverage the technology and innovation of private companies, and for the private sector to integrate space security into their business. Close collaboration between the two, advancing public-private partnerships, is a key factor.

The event opened and closed with Kenji Minami, Director, Business Planning Division 2 of the Defense Department, Air Staff Office, at the Japanese Ministry of Defense. The first keynote session, “The Forefront of Public-Private Collaboration in the Security Domain: The Case of the United States,” was delivered by Yasuhito Fukushima, Senior Researcher at the Global Security Laboratory of the Policy Research Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. The session reviewed the current American model of space development. It took a close look at several programs (SpaceWERX), US efforts at connecting industries with government, and expanding the industrial base of space innovation, along the motto: “Exploit What We Have, Buy What We Can, and Build Only What We Must.” Kenji Minami moderated the ensuing panel discussion, “Expectations for Private Companies to Strengthen Space Security,” which gathered participants from the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, and Keio University, at senior researcher, director, and professor level, respectively.

Masayasu Ishida, CEO of SPACETIDE, moderated the second part of the event, with a session called, “Opportunities and Challenges in Space Security from the Perspective of private companies.” It featured the C-Suite representatives of three Japanese space Businesses: Shunji Izutsu, Vice President of Astroscale Co., Ltd., Akiko Kitahara, Executive Vice President and CFO of Warp Space Co., Ltd., and Yoshihiro Ota, Executive Officer and CSO of Axel Space Holdings Co., Ltd. Astroscale is dedicated to on-orbit servicing, such as active debris removal, refueling, and space situational awareness. Warp Space is focused on solving the problem of communication via optical link. Axel Space is a global leader in micro-satellite technology with a strong Earth-observation focus.

The session discussed the potential for public-private cooperation. The three representatives spoke about the potential and challenges of space security–oriented business from the perspective of commercial companies, taking examples from current conflicts and issues. The discussion covered the importance of community building through regular events, and the use of study contracts to demonstrate and introduce new private-sector technologies.

Topics such as legal, financial, commercial, and technical development challenges related to dual-use technologies, and managing risk when involving commercial entities as services providers in relation with a conflict zone, were also reviewed.

On the same day this Space Security and Business event took place, SPACETIDE, the co-organizer of the event, announced that it had been awarded the Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Award at the 6th Space Development and Utilization Grand Prize for its significant contributions to the advancement of the space business and the formation of the industrial ecosystem. The selection committee commended SPACETIDE for its significant contributions to the formation of the space industry community in Japan, comprehensive research on the space industry, promotion of networking among entrepreneurs and businesses, and facilitation of talent mobility—thereby contributing to the promotion of the space business and the formation of the space industry ecosystem, fostering national awareness and understanding, while promoting sustainable space utilization.

The conference was a clear demontration that Japan is on the right track to develop a strong industrial base that sustains the nation’s space power development course for both civilian and defense purposes. The Japanese government and its Ministry of Defense are dedicated to advancing close collaboration with the private sector in the field of space security. And as its defense strategy aims at deploying a more credible space deterrent, the nation of Japan further positions itself as a reliable ally of the US in the Indo-Pacific region.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense: Opening Space Security to the Commercial Sector was originally published on Global Security Review.