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		<title>Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up-Can France Lead the Way</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-wants-nato-allies-to-step-up-can-france-lead-the-way/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-wants-nato-allies-to-step-up-can-france-lead-the-way/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 12:12:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32756</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 9, 2026 President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized U.S. European allies for their alleged failure to assume a larger share of the responsibility for NATO deterrence and defense. Although most U.S. angst about European burden sharing concerns preparedness for a larger conventional war on the continent, the sharing of risk with respect to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-wants-nato-allies-to-step-up-can-france-lead-the-way/">Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up-Can France Lead the Way</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: June 9, 2026</em></p>
<p>President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized U.S. European allies for their alleged failure to assume a larger share of the responsibility for NATO deterrence and defense. Although most U.S. angst about European burden sharing concerns preparedness for a larger conventional war on the continent, the sharing of risk with respect to nuclear escalation has received less attention. Past practice suggested that the American nuclear umbrella would suffice to deter Russian threats of nuclear escalation. On the other hand, Europe’s indigenous nuclear forces may have the potential to serve as a sufficient deterrent against Russian nuclear first use.</p>
<p><strong>French “Forwardism”</strong></p>
<p>In March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a doctrine of “forward deterrence” regarding the future of French nuclear declaratory and employment policy. His statements amounted to the most important shift in French nuclear posture in decades. The more important components of this policy change are as follows: First, France will increase the size of its nuclear deterrent force (<em>force de dissuasion</em>) for the first time since 1992. The assumption behind this move is that the current nuclear force is too small to deter aggression beyond France&#8217;s borders. Second, France would permit the temporary deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft to allied countries. However, France will not delegate nuclear employment authority to other countries. Stationing nuclear forces outside France will reinforce France’s commitment to its European partners. Third, France would work more closely with allies to develop shared understandings of the nature of the Russian threat and to coordinate on the management of escalation control in the context of a conventional war. The first stage of this collaboration <a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/dispatches/what-macrons-changes-to-french-nuclear-policy-mean-for-european-security/">will include</a> visits to strategic sites and/or <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2026/03/france-has-a-new-nuclear-doctrine-of-forward-deterrence-for-europe-what-does-it-mean/">joint exercises</a> with Germany, the UK, and other NATO countries.</p>
<p><strong>Trump’s Frustrations</strong></p>
<p>The decision taken by Macron reflects a perceived need for upgrading the proficiency of France’s nuclear deterrent. It also represents a political statement about his doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to NATO. Despite improvements in European defense readiness and preparedness, President Trump has continued to disparage NATO as weak and “free riding” on the backs of the U.S. military. Trump has <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/05/07/opinion/trump-europe-nato.html">announced</a> that he plans to remove 5,000 American troops from Germany and has suggested that the <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2026/04/01/middleeast/trump-nato-us-withdrawal-intl">U.S. should leave</a> the alliance despite being <a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R48868/R48868.3.pdf">prohibited by Congress</a> from unilaterally doing so.</p>
<p>There are several prompts for this continuing cold shoulder from Washington to Brussels. First, Trump is frustrated by Putin and Zelensky and their inability to negotiate a cease-fire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Second, the U.S. President launched a pre-emptive combat operation against Iran on February 28, 2026, without either consulting or informing NATO allies before the fact. Understandably, in this regard, European leaders have been hesitant to provide military support, and some <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/list-countries-denying-us-israeli-military-access-11762423">have refused to grant access to American bases or airspace</a> for Operation Epic Fury, further frustrating President Trump. Third, the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global supply chains and driven up the prices of fossil fuels and fertilizer worldwide.</p>
<p><strong>European and U.S. Support for Ukraine</strong></p>
<p>Despite distractions, NATO members remain committed to supporting Ukraine as long as needed. An agreement allows U.S. allies in Europe to buy weapons from the U.S. and pass them to Ukraine. The U.S. <a href="https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4474675/war-departments-15-trillion-budget-proposal-includes-sizable-nuclear-triad-inve/">continues to upgrade</a> its nuclear deterrent, especially the strategic nuclear triad, with a <a href="https://www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/68837">$71.4 billion FY27 plan</a> for next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers with new Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missiles, and improved nuclear command and control.</p>
<p>It is doubtful that France&#8217;s nuclear force, which includes several hundred warheads with delivery systems such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and both land- and sea-based aircraft, can replace the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent – nor was it meant to. Instead, France’s independent nuclear deterrence, designed to defend its own interests and sovereignty, along with the United Kingdom’s small ballistic missile submarine force, offers a minimal deterrent against nuclear threats from Russia at a level below strategic nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded international audiences that Russia, under certain conditions of adversity in conventional war, might resort to nuclear first use of non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons, having shorter ranges and lower yields than strategic weapons, can be launched from land, sea, and airborne platforms and could number as many as 2,000 in Russia’s <a href="https://thebulletin.org/premium/2026-05/russian-nuclear-weapons-2026/">available inventory</a>. In comparison, the U.S. deploys some 200 available NSNWs at several NATO bases.</p>
<p><strong>U.S. Nuclear War Planning and NATO</strong></p>
<p>This disparity in the number of NSNWs is not as alarming as it might seem because the nature of U.S. nuclear war planning has changed since the Cold War. Current U.S. operational plans include the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities within one comprehensive plan. U.S. nuclear forces are expected to provide options for graduated escalation and flexible response. Toward that end, U.S. bomber deployments and military exercises provide additional support to U.S. European Command, bolstering NATO deterrence. In addition to the increased bomber presence, the Trump administration wants to add the flexibility of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) for the deployment of weapons with variable yields. The purpose of SLCM-N is to deter limited nuclear use by adversaries and to provide reassurance to U.S. European and Asian allies.</p>
<p>France recognizes that deterrence is not only about the size of military forces, including nuclear arms, despite Macron’s plan to <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/02/world/europe/france-nuclear-arsenal-macron.html">increase the number of French nuclear weapons</a>. It also depends on perceived resolve among allies and potential adversaries. In Macron’s view, Russia should not expect that democratic Europe can be intimidated by threats of limited nuclear war because (in Russia’s mind) that threat is more realistic compared to strategic nuclear war. Nor should Russia expect that French support for NATO excludes the possibility of deploying French nuclear-capable launchers outside French national territory. French training exercises with NATO countries closer to Russia’s border will help send that message.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>A more forward-leaning French military doctrine does not mean abandoning France’s commitment to European security. Nor does it replace the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Macron recognizes that, in defense matters, truth counts more than words: the United States cannot completely detach itself from NATO, nor can NATO sever its ties with America. NATO without the U.S. invites nuclear coercion upon Western Europe, while the U.S. without NATO risks political and military isolation instead of credible deterrence. The American and European pillars of NATO, as the French might say, are &#8220;condemned to succeed” together.</p>
<p><em>Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/Trump-Wants-NATO-Allies-to-Step-Up-Can-France-Lead-the-Way.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="205" height="57" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 205px) 100vw, 205px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-wants-nato-allies-to-step-up-can-france-lead-the-way/">Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up-Can France Lead the Way</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>What Has Been the Impact on Our Nation?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-has-been-the-impact-on-our-nation/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-has-been-the-impact-on-our-nation/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Aug 2025 11:55:13 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31388</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that the US no longer needed a robust defense budget. As a result, the nation went on what Lt. Gen. Garret Harencak called a procurement holiday or a “holiday from history.” Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-has-been-the-impact-on-our-nation/">What Has Been the Impact on Our Nation?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that the US no longer needed a robust defense budget. As a result, the nation went on what Lt. Gen. Garret Harencak called a procurement holiday or a “holiday from history.”</p>
<p>Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.</p>
<p>Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.</p>
<p>President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.</p>
<p>From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.</p>
<p>The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.</p>
<p><strong>Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls</strong></p>
<p>While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.</p>
<p>When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.</p>
<p>The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.</p>
<p>Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.</p>
<p>By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (<em>Ohio</em>-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.</p>
<p>It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.</p>
<p>The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.</p>
<p>By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of <em>Ohio</em>-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.</p>
<p>As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.</p>
<p><strong>The Challenge Ahead</strong></p>
<p>The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The <em>Columbia</em>-class submarine, which will replace the <em>Ohio</em>-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.</p>
<p>Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.</p>
<p>Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are his own.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/What-has-been-the-impact-on-our-nation.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="227" height="63" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 227px) 100vw, 227px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/what-has-been-the-impact-on-our-nation/">What Has Been the Impact on Our Nation?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2025 12:53:20 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>ICBM Ear for the Week of January 23, 2025 Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies Key Takeaways Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia: Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/">ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ICBM Ear for the Week of January 23, 2025</strong></p>
<p><strong>Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies</strong></p>
<p><strong><u>Key Takeaways</u></strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia:</strong> Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend.</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Defense Leadership Changes:</strong> Senator Marco Rubio has been confirmed as Secretary of State, with several other key appointments, including Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense.</li>
<li><strong>Nuclear Policy and Strategic Posture Adjustments:</strong> Discussions on nuclear deterrence focus on the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, balancing deterrence against Russia and China, and the implications of extended deterrence.</li>
<li><strong>Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities:</strong> Reports indicate Iranian cargo vessels carrying crucial chemical ingredients for missile propellant, raising concerns about Iran&#8217;s growing missile capability.</li>
<li><strong>Ukraine Conflict and NATO’s Deterrence Mission:</strong> NATO leaders stress that a Russian victory would severely weaken the alliance&#8217;s credibility.</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Extended Deterrence Debates:</strong> Several officials emphasize the need for a robust and adaptable nuclear strategy to counter emerging threats from Russia, China, and Iran.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>International Developments</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Russia’s Defense Budget Expansion</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Russia&#8217;s military spending will increase to <strong>13.5 trillion rubles</strong>, estimated at <strong>7-8% of GDP</strong>, its highest post-Soviet military budget.</li>
<li>Significant investments in <strong>modernized nuclear and conventional forces</strong> to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO.</li>
<li>Russia’s total defense expenditure, when adjusted for purchasing power, rivals European military spending, highlighting its focus on long-term military capabilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Advancements</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Intelligence sources indicate <strong>Iranian cargo ships transporting missile propellant materials from China</strong>, raising alarms among Western security analysts.</li>
<li>Iran continues <strong>uranium enrichment</strong>, prompting <strong>warnings from the UN</strong> about Tehran’s growing nuclear capability.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>China &amp; Russia’s Nuclear Expansion</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Reports predict that by <strong>2035, China and Russia will collectively hold over 11,000 nuclear warheads</strong>, posing a direct challenge to U.S. nuclear deterrence.</li>
<li>Concerns grow over <strong>China’s accelerated nuclear development</strong> and its integration into a broader strategic competition with the U.S. and Russia.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Key Strategic Issues on the Horizon</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Escalation Risks in Space Warfare</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>RAND Corporation study</strong> warns that <strong>Russia may escalate conflicts in space</strong> early due to its <strong>heightened fears of a U.S. first strike</strong>.</li>
<li>The study underscores Moscow’s <strong>increasing risk tolerance</strong> and potential responses to perceived U.S. threats in space.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Ukraine’s Role in NATO’s Deterrence Strategy</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte</strong> warns that a Russian victory would weaken NATO’s credibility, requiring significant investments in deterrence.</li>
<li>U.S. extended deterrence remains <strong>under scrutiny</strong>, with debates over whether the <strong>Biden administration’s fear of escalation weakened deterrence against Russia</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The <strong>U.S. Air Force confirms</strong> that the <strong>Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider</strong> will remain the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence until at least 2050.</li>
<li>Discussions continue over potential <strong>mobile ICBM systems, expanded long-range bombers, and additional dual-use aircraft</strong> to ensure nuclear survivability.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>‘Iron Dome for America’ Missile Defense System</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>President <strong>Trump’s proposal for a nationwide missile defense system</strong>—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome—is gaining momentum.</li>
<li>Critics call it <strong>overly ambitious</strong>, but proponents argue that it is essential to <strong>counter growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Key Events</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Upcoming NIDS Seminar (January 31, 2025)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Speakers:</strong> Shoshana Byren (Jewish Policy Center) &amp; Ilan Berman (American Foreign Policy Council).</li>
<li><strong>Topic:</strong> Iranian security threats to the U.S. and its allies, with a focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>NIDS conference at Truman Library (August 6, 2025)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>4-star USAF officer</strong> will serve as the featured speaker.</li>
<li>Expected discussions on <strong>extended deterrence, strategic stability, and nuclear policy</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Conclusion</u></strong></p>
<p>The <strong>ICBM Ear report for the week of January 23, 2025</strong>, highlights key developments in <strong>U.S. nuclear policy, global security challenges, and strategic deterrence issues</strong>. With <strong>Russia&#8217;s increasing military budget, Iran&#8217;s missile advancements, and China’s nuclear expansion</strong>, the U.S. faces <strong>a growing multipolar nuclear environment</strong>. Discussions on <strong>extended deterrence, arms control, and new strategic capabilities</strong> will shape U.S. defense posture in the coming years. The upcoming <strong>TRIAD Symposium and NIDS events</strong> will provide further insights into these critical security matters.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-Ear-for-the-week-of-January-23.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/">ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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