The conclusion of the scenario is that terrorists could easily do the same, and that the American security apparatus needs to take action to prevent a possible wave of bioterrorism before it is too late. But given the knowledge starting point of the scientists, and ease of more proven violent methods, is this a really legitimate concern?

The simulated test was overseen by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and saw the players involved, two Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) graduate students, successfully place orders for DNA fragments of the virus from 36 of 38 providers, despite obvious red flags, like the organization not being one that does lab experiments or the address for delivery not being a laboratory facility. According to MIT Professor Kevin Esvelt, who oversaw the students, they then were able to employ “standard biochemical techniques” to create the deadly virus.

That these graduate students were able to successfully complete such a purchase 36 out of 38 times is alarming, but consider how these MIT students compare to an aspiring terrorist; is there perhaps a knowledge and capability gap? MIT is among the top-ranked schools in the world and, according to EduRank, number 1 in biomedical engineering. Hardly a representation of the average knowledge base. Even knowing how to go about purchasing viral DNA fragments is highly specialized knowledge, let alone having the expertise to successfully engineer those fragments to a level needed for weaponization.

According to research out of the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), chemical-biological-radiological-nuclear (CBRN) attacks are seldom in the wheelhouse of terrorist groups. In fact, the use of weapons in this category has been in an overall downward trend since 2000. Terrorists “generally lack significant chemical or biological skills or experience.”

However, there is a first time for everything, which is why such red-team events occur. While many believed the idea of al-Qaeda using hijacked planes as missiles after the September 11, 2001, attacks to be anathema, it was presented as a possibility in a red-team event after the 1993 World Trade Center bombing—following a series of terrorist hijackings in 1994 and 1995, indicating a growing trend.

What are current trends in terrorism showing? Another START report focused on terrorism and targeted violence between January 2, 2023–September 26, 2024. The report analyzed 1,509 reported incidents in the US. Filtering out categories such as hate crimes and school and workplace violence, and focusing on just terrorism, there were 366 domestic incidents.

The START data offers further filters by weapon type, showing 196 firearm incidents, 80 incendiary device attacks, 60 explosives used, 16 sharp objects used, 10 chemical attacks, eight melee attacks, six vehicles, three sabotage efforts, and two blunt objects used. There were also 15 noted under “other” and “unknown” weapon types. Zero radiological incidents were found during the time period.

While no biological category exists, looking at chemical incidents could offer an example comparable to a biological terror attack. The events break down into one pepper spray incident, an unknown noxious aerosol attack, a novelty stink spray use, an attempted ricin poisoning, and six fentanyl-laced letter attacks.

The multiple fentanyl-laced letters could possibly indicate a terrorism trend related to scientific know-how. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) reports the majority of domestic fentanyl is “manufactured in foreign clandestine labs and smuggled into the United States through Mexico, [and] is being distributed across the country and sold on the illegal drug market.”

While a clandestine lab could certainly hire itself out to a terrorist organization, no arrests were made for such incidents. It is impossible to know if the fentanyl was purchased domestically in illegal drug transactions, purchased directly from a lab, or manufactured by the perpetrators themselves.

Reporting from Reuters confirms that fentanyl is actually relatively simple for scientists to manufacture, and virtually all fentanyl in the US is produced in Mexican labs, many affiliated with Mexican drug cartels, which were recently designated as terrorist groups by President Donald Trump. These labs are able to skirt chemical regulations by switching from one method to another using different ingredients to produce the same result. The cartels have financial motivations, rather than ideological ones, as with terror groups.

The manipulation of regulations by these labs in Mexico is eerily similar to the MIT red-team concerns—a security gap worth addressing. It is still too limited to call it a trend in terrorism attack types. Historic outliers (such as the 1995 sarin gas attack in Tokyo) are just that, outliers.

Over 90 percent of START’s analyzed terrorist incidents use firearms, incendiary devices, or bombs. Only 2.7 percent are chemical in nature (with 1.6 percent fentanyl). It is clear where counterterror resources should be directed. Concerns over technological or scientifically advanced terrorist attacks are closer to fear mongering than reality.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. The views expressed are his own.

Is Bioterrorism Really on the Horizon? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since 2021, Russia upgraded or modernized approximately 85 percent of its strategic nuclear arsenal. China undertook what then-Commander of United States Strategic Command, Admiral Charles Richard, called “a strategic breakout,” with “explosive growth in their nuclear and conventional forces.” North Korea went from a fledgling 1980’s nuclear program to possessing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the continental United States. Iran’s nuclear program goes deeper underground, figuratively and literally, to avoid US threats and complicate US risk assessment.

Little occurred in the US nuclear arsenal during the same two decades. The nuclear enterprise is attempting to modernize each leg, with debatable levels of success. In June 2023, the Biden administration publicly confirmed and accepted American numerical nuclear inferiority for the first time since the end of the Cold War. The administration posits deterrence comes from quality over quantity. But how is a triad that is 30–50 years old qualitatively better than a new Russian arsenal?

The non-strategic nuclear arsenal rose in prominence as the Ukraine war began and Russia began making threats to attack the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s member states. Production of the B61-13 and life extension of the W80-4 emphasize regional nuclear deterrence and may preempt strategic conflict at a lower level but may arrive too late. Retiring the B83 purportedly transfers the hard and deeply buried target (HDBT) responsibility to the B61-13, streamlining the Department of Energy’s sustainment and modernization expenses. The Department of Defense is still weighing a 2022 study, evaluating future HDBT targets to demonstrate viability of the non-strategic capability.

Since 2021, the nuclear enterprise began receiving long-overdue attention, but it will take years to yield results. The enterprise competes for American talent, amongst lucrative technological fields, that it needs for successful reconstruction and for addressing the needs of the triad. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) authorized $500 million more than requested for plutonium pit production reconstitution at Savannah River and Los Alamos National Laboratories.

The National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) goal is to produce at least 80 plutonium pits per year, between the two facilities, by 2030. Assuming 80 pits per year went into refurbishing 85 percent of deployed nuclear warheads, matching Russia’s accomplishment, that pace would require nearly 16.5 years and almost 20 years for a 100 percent refurbishment. In FY 2024, the NNSA is requesting 8.6 percent more money than enacted in FY 2023 for the Product Modernization Program to support strategic nuclear weapons modification and life extension.

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, refocused on strategic-level concerns, reprioritizing strategic power over Russia and China higher than post-9/11 terrorism. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) called for nuclear modernization, as previous NPRs did, but was followed by the financial resources outlined in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act required for execution.

There is a nexus between terrorism, nuclear weapons, and immigration. Iran sponsors Hezbollah, Houthi rebels, and Hamas’ terror campaign against Israel. If Iran develops a nuclear weapon and provides it to any of these groups, the US may be left searching for nuclear fingerprints in the aftermath of a detonation. The Federation for American Immigration Reform reported Customs and Border Patrol data showing 3.2 million aliens illegally crossed into the US between October 2022 and October 2023. Among those apprehended, 172 aliens were suspected terrorists. One hundred sixty-nine attempted an illegal entry at the southern border. The notion of an attack on the homeland by terrorists using a smuggled weapon of mass destruction is a credible threat.

Law Enforcement sources assert terrorists can employ nuclear weapons without sophisticated delivery systems on US soil. Former FBI Assistant Director Chris Swecker described the US as extremely vulnerable to a catastrophic terrorist attack. Swecker suggested that the mismanaged southern border is the key source of that vulnerability, concurring with a warning presented in December 2023 by the Department of Homeland Security. Preventing such dangerous exposure belongs at the forefront as policymakers seek to correct three years of negligent border protection. American strategic deterrence once overshadowed immigration, reducing temptation from adversaries abroad.

Nuclear-armed nations and proliferators alike must remember any nuclear attack against the United States from a terrorist organization will result in retaliation against the nation providing the weapon, as codified in the Bush Doctrine found in the 2002 National Security Strategy. While internal politics unnecessarily expose the US, those responsible can project strength by reiterating the consequences of exploiting that vulnerability and reemphasizing nuclear deterrence.

Terrorism and nuclear war are real. The US cannot afford to alternately overlook one in favor of the other. When adversaries see vulnerabilities, it invites aggression. Controlling who and what comes across US borders is essential to keeping Americans safe. Maintaining a modern, reliable, and lethal nuclear deterrent can foundationally dissuade terrorist attacks on US soil.

Dan Wasserman was both a missile operations and maintenance officer in the United States Air Force. He remains active in the field. The views expressed are his own.

Do Not Let Terrorism Distract from Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.