Pale hulls painted with “China Coast Guard” cut the waters around Taiwan, the Philippines, near Alaska, and across the deep blue of the Pacific. Such actions are not, however, common patrols so much as sublimated aggression to which the world has become habituated.  

Overt invasions, military aggression, and acts of war are unacceptable in today’s world order. Such actions undermine the legitimacy of foreign policy, leaving only the exercise of power. To preserve at least some international legitimacy, nations therefore pursue aggression in a more undeclared manner. China and Russia best exemplify this in their maritime operations. The coordination of these powers in this aggressive grey-zone policy reflects a larger shift in how the world applies legitimacy and force.  

The China Coast Guard (CCG) and the Border Service of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) function primarily as domestic forces, tasked with serving state security and sovereignty, while upholding legal precedents through their internal authority. Their actions, however, have been less about policing than about perpetration. In 2018, the CCG shifted its official status from the People’s Armed Police to the Central Military Commission, giving it authority to enforce laws in areas under Chinese jurisdiction that statutes do not clearly define. It is authorized to use all necessary means to prevent any infringements of sovereignty or jurisdiction. As a result, it acts like a military force in the region. Since 2023, it has expanded its operations, reaching as far as the Aleutian Islands and the waters around Alaska.  

The following year, Chinese Coast Guard Regulation No. 3 was implemented, allowing the detention of foreign nationals suspected of border violations and the detention of ships in Chinese territorial waters. The USINDOPACOM legal team assessed this development as the first document permitting CCG detention and emphasized the vagueness of the territory in question. In February 2026, CCG activity in the Taiwan Strait increased, underscoring, on the law’s fifth anniversary, “institutionalized control in sensitive maritime areas.” CCG deployments spiked, reaching 933 ship-days in the first six months of 2026. The following months were no less eventful, with CCG operations expanding east of the main Taiwan island and into outlying islands.  

Additionally, 2026 saw striking aggression in both diplomacy and physical action between China and the Philippines, as CCG cutters blockaded Philippine resupply ships to the grounded military outpost BRP Sierra Madre in September 2026. This followed high diplomatic tensions preceding Chinese claims to the Batanes and surrounding waters, increased military presence and operations, including an incident in which Chinese personnel struck a Filipino sailor with a baton, as well as the persistent harassment of fishing boats by the CCG. Japan Coast Guard data records Chinese vessel activity in the Senkakus’ region on 357 of 365 days in 2025, with a constant presence spanning 335 days, from November 2024 to October 2025, with over 1,300 vessels recorded in the region. Japan’s Naha Coast Guard director said Chinese vessels have grown increasingly aggressive, while Japan has not acted to deter them, given that China operates more than twice as many coast guard vessels as Japan and is more heavily armed. Such aggressive actions pose clear threats that require a response; however, the long, slow build-up of involvement has become habitual.  

Russia’s gray-zone aggression tactics parallel those of China, particularly around the Baltic and the Gulf of Finland, as well as in the Pacific. Japan Coast Guard figures from 2006 cite Japanese boats and crews seized near Hokkaido, 30 of which occurred between 1994 and 2005, including a fisherman injured by Russian Coast Guard fire. The legal frameworks established in the case of China are reflected in Russia as well, as the 2024 Defense Ministry decree proposed revising baselines that bind Russia’s territorial limits in the Gulf of Finland and Kaliningrad. Finland, Estonia, and Lithuania objected. Days later, Russian border guards removed nearly half of the navigation buoys established by Estonia, an act the EU deemed a hybrid action by Moscow. In May 2026, the head of the FSB Border Service accused Estonia of shifting away from agreements regarding Lake Peipus and the Narva River, a framing used to justify Russian actions as defensive rather than aggressive. When Estonia tried to halt the shadow-fleet tanker Jaguar, Russia responded with a fighter jet. Russia then detained ships, such as the Greek Green Admire, as it left the Estonian Sillamäe port.  

On land and on the river, the border service role is clearer. A Russian coast guard cutter flew a Wagner banner on the Narva in early November 2025, and on December 17, 2025, three Russian border guards entered Estonian territory near the breakwater where the Narva meets Lake Peipus for about 20 minutes; Estonia’s interior minister said it was unclear whether the incursion was intentional. This year, the FSB also imposed temporary restrictions on movement, hunting, and river access along a five-kilometer strip on its side of the border, citing frontier security, through September 2026.  

Overall, Russia and China have acted in gray-zone regions using aggressive tactics that skirt overt aggression, while projecting power in international waters. They have justified these maritime actions under legal, albeit deliberately vague, frameworks, ultimately expanding not only Russia’s and China’s reach but also their justification for force. 

Jack Lindstrom is a Junior Researcher at the Mackinder Forum, conducting research on geopolitics and security in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic. He also founded Arctic Ledger and is a member of the San Diego World Affairs Council Writer Corps. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

White Hulls, Gray Zones: China, Russia, and a Habituated World was originally published on Global Security Review.

An Exclusive Economic Zone does not grant absolute territorial sovereignty to a coastal state. However, it secures the exclusive rights of a coastal state to explore and exploit vital economic resources within the water column and the seabed. In an era of intense geopolitical competition, Türkiye introduced the Blue Homeland doctrine as a comprehensive maritime strategy. This visionary strategic framework protects these rights and safeguards Ankara’s long-term interests in its surrounding seas. The implementation of this doctrine represents a fundamental shift in regional maritime geopolitics. 

The Aegean Sea and the Territorial Waters Status Quo 

Greece has long-standing ambitions to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles in the Aegean Sea. This proposed move would severely threaten regional stability and the delicate balance established over decades. Historically, Türkiye has declared that such an extension is an indisputable cause of war. 

Currently, Türkiye is not a signatory to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This abstention stems from the unique geographical structure of the Aegean Sea. Historically referred to as the Sea of Islands, the Aegean defies standard nautical mile limitations designed for open oceans. Applying these standard rules would severely restrict international airspace and maritime navigation. 

While Athens maintains a six-mile limit for now, it has militarized numerous Aegean islands despite Turkish claims that such deployments violate the demilitarization provisions of the Lausanne and Paris treaties. These historical agreements explicitly conditioned Greek sovereignty over these islands on their strict demilitarization. Consequently, the current militarization efforts undermine the foundational legal texts governing the region. 

Fault Lines in the Eastern Mediterranean 

In the Eastern Mediterranean, shifting geopolitical fault lines have given Türkiye a significant strategic advantage. In 2019, Ankara signed a Maritime Delimitation Memorandum of Understanding with Libya. This pivotal agreement completely dismantled the maritime containment strategy devised by Greece, Egypt, and the Greek Cypriot Administration. 

Simultaneously, lucrative natural gas discoveries have transformed the Eastern Mediterranean into a focal point of global energy competition. Initial efforts by opposing blocs attempted to exclude Türkiye from regional energy infrastructure, notably through the unviable EastMed pipeline project. However, the subsequent failure of these exclusionary projects proved that no regional energy equation can succeed without Türkiye’s participation. 

Today, Türkiye systematically codifies its maritime jurisdiction zones to consolidate these strategic gains. By defining legal boundaries for disputes dating back to 1982, Ankara actively redraws the Eastern Mediterranean energy map. Domestically, the Blue Homeland doctrine enjoys a robust bipartisan consensus across the political spectrum. The Turkish parliament is expected to legalize these maritime boundaries soon. Moving forward, Greece must face this newly established strategic reality. Athens must factor in both the regional energy resources and the renewed Libyan geopolitical equation. Rejecting diplomatic negotiations in favor of maximalist policies will not yield favorable outcomes for Athens. 

The Legalization of the Blue Homeland 

Declaring an exclusive economic zone establishes a definitive and recognized legal framework. It places all living and non-living resources within the water column and the seabed under the strict jurisdiction of a single state. The upcoming legislative steps of Türkiye will reinforce its sovereignty in the Aegean Sea. This definitive legal action preempts Greek claims to these contested waters. 

Crucially, this legal framework encompasses one hundred and seventy-six islands, islets, and rocks whose sovereignty remains disputed. Historical treaties never explicitly ceded the sovereignty of these specific geographic formations to Greece. Thus, this upcoming legislation solidifies both the legal and practical reality of the Blue Homeland doctrine. 

Under the current Territorial Waters Law of Türkiye, the Aegean boundary remains at six nautical miles strictly out of geographical necessity. In contrast, Türkiye applies the standard 12-mile limit smoothly in the Mediterranean and Black Seas. Despite this delicate equilibrium, Greece recently announced plans to create large national marine parks slated for 2025. This environmental initiative reveals a clear intent to establish unilateral control over disputed waters. Consequently, it poses a direct and unacceptable challenge to Türkiye’s maritime rights. 

Growing Concern in Athens 

Unsurprisingly, these structural moves trigger profound anxiety within political circles in Athens. The Greek government publicly expresses fears that codifying Türkiye’s maritime claims could be an immediate cause of war, as the Turkish parliament declared in 1995. Meanwhile, the Greek domestic press frequently accuses its administration of underestimating these significant developments. 

Greek media openly acknowledges that Türkiye’s growing geopolitical influence fundamentally shifts the regional balance of power. Greek outlets often mischaracterize this growing influence as Turkish revisionism. This rhetoric serves to mask that Ankara seeks to secure its rights under international law. 

Toward a New Regional Security Architecture 

The international system of today faces profound crises of global hegemony and a turbulent transition of power. Leaving maritime boundaries ambiguous in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean creates a massive and dangerous security vacuum. The recent initiative of Türkiye anchors its Blue Homeland vision upon a solid, unshakeable legal foundation. 

This codification is a proactive measure carefully designed to close the existing security gap. The international community and regional actors should not view Ankara’s actions as aggressive revisionism. Instead, they represent the foundational building blocks of a new regional security architecture. This new system is firmly grounded in legal clarity, effective deterrence, and geopolitical realism. 

Nazım Fatsa is a public sector professional and independent researcher based in Türkiye, currently completing his master’s studies in International Relations at Kütahya Dumlupınar University. His primary research focuses on regional security dynamics, Middle Eastern geopolitics, and maritime strategies such as the Mavi Vatan doctrine. He also serves as a Language Editor for several peer-reviewed publications, including the ASSAM International Refereed Journal and the Academic Thought Journal. The views of the author are his own. 

Redrawn Boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean: Türkiye’s New Legal Moves was originally published on Global Security Review.