In the past three years, the war in Ukraine has marked a decisive turning point in global security. Low-cost, mass-produced unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become the decisive factor on the battlefield, fundamentally altering the economics of modern warfare. Expensive, low-volume traditional weapon systems are increasingly being neutralized by drones priced at just a few thousand dollars. This inversion has established a new guiding principle of defense: countering low-cost threats with low-cost means. This shift extends beyond state-on-state conflict. Affordable drone technology is expanding the military potential of small and medium-sized nations. At the same time, it multiplies the operational capacity of non-state actors, terrorist organizations, extremist groups, insurgent movements, and criminal networks that are turning what was once an expensive domain into an accessible tool of asymmetric warfare.

The Economic Inversion of Warfare

Traditional defense procurement has long relied on high unit costs and limited production runs. A single main battle tank or advanced air-defense missile can cost tens of millions of dollars. Yet, inexpensive drones costing as little as $500 have repeatedly destroyed or disabled assets worth millions. A commercially modified quadcopter or loitering munition can achieve effects once reserved for precision-guided munitions costing orders of magnitude more. The result is a dramatically altered cost-exchange ratio that favors the attacker. This forces even well-funded militaries to reconsider force structures and procurement chains. For smaller nations with constrained budgets, affordable and scalable drone systems offer a way to build credible denial capabilities without disproportionate spending.

Ukrainian Technology Transfer

A recent example of technology diffusion is the strategic investment announced on March 31, 2026, by Japan’s Terra Drone Corporation in Ukraine’s Amazing Drones LLC through its subsidiary Terra Inspectioneering. The partnership includes the launch of the Terra A1 interceptor drone: an electrically propelled system with a 32 km range, maximum speed of 300 km/h, 15-minute flight time, low noise and heat signature, and the ability to perform airspace surveillance, target detection, and neutralization in a single sortie.

Empowering Non-State Actors and Implications for the Asia-Pacific Region

The most destabilizing aspect is the accessibility of these systems to non-state actors. Terrorist and extremist organizations no longer require state sponsors or complex supply chains. Commercial components, open-source software, and simple assembly have lowered the barrier to entry, allowing insurgent groups, criminal syndicates, and ideological extremists to field effective aerial capabilities.In the Asia-Pacific, where vast maritime spaces, porous borders, and multiple gray-zone disputes already exist, the proliferation of cheap drones carries specific risks. Small terrorist cells or insurgent movements could use first-person view (FPV) drones or loitering munitions to disrupt shipping lanes, attack critical infrastructure, or conduct targeted operations with minimal logistical needs. The same technology that enables smaller states to deter larger neighbors also equips criminal networks and extremist groups to challenge law-enforcement or rival factions in remote areas. The combination of low cost, commercial availability, and rapid adaptability means that non-state actors in the region can now sustain prolonged asymmetric campaigns. Reports from other conflict zones show terrorist and insurgent groups already employing commercial UAVs for resupply and precision strikes, and similar patterns are emerging in Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands.

In Southeast Asia, the risks are particularly acute. The Philippines’ ongoing insurgencies in Mindanao and the porous maritime borders of the Sulu Sea already see small extremist cells experimenting with commercial drones for reconnaissance and occasional strikes. Similar patterns are visible in Myanmar’s borderlands, where insurgent groups have modified off-the-shelf UAVs for logistics and targeted operations. In the Malacca Strait and South China Sea gray zones, low-cost drone swarms could disrupt vital shipping lanes or harass naval patrols with minimal investment. These developments lower the threshold for violence: a terrorist or criminal network with a few thousand dollars can now field persistent aerial surveillance or precision munitions that once required state-level resources. The combination of vast ungoverned maritime spaces and readily available commercial technology creates ideal conditions for prolonged asymmetric campaigns by non-state actors across the region.

Conclusion

The convergence of economic inversion, widespread accessibility, and rapid technology transfer has created a more volatile global security environment. In the Asia-Pacific—a region defined by strategic chokepoints, unresolved territorial disputes, and active non-state threats, the democratization of lethal drone capabilities lowers the threshold for conflict and expands the operational reach of terrorist, extremist, insurgent, and criminal organizations. Policymakers can no longer rely solely on high-end systems. The principle of “countering cheap threats with cheap means” has become the new baseline for credible defense. Without scalable, affordable countermeasures and domestic production ecosystems, states risk ceding initiatives not only to peer competitors but also to far smaller and resource‑constrained actors operating in the region’s gray zones. The economics of war have changed, and the Asia-Pacific region is one where the consequences of the new economics will play out.

Andrey Koval is a defense planner working on issues of military effectiveness and long-duration conflict. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The New Economics of War: Cheap Drones, Asymmetric Threats, and the Democratization of Destruction was originally published on Global Security Review.

The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was intended to limit the spread of nuclear weapons, and it has achieved remarkable success. Since the treaty was entered into force in 1970, only three states have managed to acquire a nuclear weapons capability, namely India, Pakistan, and North Korea. The collective West initially opted for peaceful measures to ensure non-proliferation, such as the formation of NSG after India’s 1974 test aimed at limiting the flow of nuclear fuel and technology to “could be” nuclear states.

However, there have also been forceful measures to prevent nuclear proliferation. The U.S. and Israel have repeatedly engaged in counterproliferation (CP) and in some cases, “offensive counterproliferation” such as in Iraq, and Syria, and most recently Iran. But does this forceful compliance achieve lasting non-proliferation goals? Or does it entrench the target state’s psychological dependence on nuclear weapons for survival?

As the decade of 1980s unfolded, non-proliferation efforts turned violent when the Iraqi nuclear reactor at Osirak was attacked by Israel and subsequently destroyed. Although the reactor program was severely damaged, Iraq continued to pursue a nuclear weapon. Thereafter, the Gulf-War of 1991 put an end to Iraq’s nuclear program forever. Although Richard Betts argues otherwise; he notes that Osirak was not the key component to weapons production.

Like Osirak, the Al-Kibar nuclear facility in Syria was targeted by Israeli airstrikes in 2007. The site was alleged to be a plutonium production facility based on a North Korean reactor. Syria, a signatory of the NPT, could not protest Israeli violation of its airspace and the destruction of a site undeclared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2008, the IAEA concluded, after a visit, that chemically processed uranium traces were found around the site of the destroyed reactor. The IAEA requested further inspection, but the Syrian government denied access. The attack on Al-Kibar demonstrates limited success in offensive CP. Although it is not yet certain whether Syria was close to making a bomb or even attempting to make one, the attack certainly imposed a logistical setback on Syria, triggered the IAEA inspections on a site which was undeclared to the agency, and resulted in greater international scrutiny of Syrian nuclear activities.

The most significant factor in the Israeli CP strategy is Iran. The CP strategy in Iran was marked by the targeted assassination of individuals associated with Iran’s nuclear program. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, who was considered responsible for the Iranian nuclear weapons program, was assassinated in 2020. In addition to this, another peculiarity of the Iran CP involves the use of cyber-attacks to disrupt reactor operations. The infamous Stuxnet had damaged a considerable number of centrifuges in the Natanz nuclear facility and highlighted lapses and vulnerabilities in its cyber and operational security.

In 2025, Iranian nuclear facilities became targets of kinetic attacks by the U.S. and Israel. The U.S. claimed victory by announcing the “obliteration” of the targeted Iranian nuclear facilities. However, Iran, several independent analysts, and even the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) disagreed with the U.S. president. Nonetheless, the twelve-day war concluded in a ceasefire, which did not last and the U.S. and Israel resumed actions to curtail Iranian nuclear ambitions.

Contrary to the instances in Iraq and Syria, the IAEA agrees more with Iran than with the U.S. and Israel on matters of Iran’s enrichment, nuclear facilities, and nuclear weapons ambitions. As the war began in early hours of March 2026, the IAEA chief Antonnio Grossi said that Iran has “no structured program to build nuclear weapons”. Not to mention Iran is a signatory to the NPT, its government has no plans to acquire nuclear weapons, and the late Ayatollah Khamenei had even issued a religious verdict, acting as the principal block to Iran’s nuclear weapons.

In Iraq, Syria, and Iran, it can be argued that offensive CP yields unsatisfactory results and often backfires on legitimate, peaceful non-proliferation efforts. The 2003 U.S. invasion, which forced regime change in Iraq, was initiated under the pretext of Iraqi WMDs and nuclear weapons program. It was later concluded that no substantial proof existed that the Iraqi nuclear weapons program continued after the 1991 Gulf War. David Allison and Tyler Brown note that “The Gulf War destroyed much of Iraq’s ability to acquire material for a nuclear weapon, and the program was abandoned in the early 1990s in the face of international sanctions and inspections.”

But the Iranian case might become the most striking example of a failed offensive CP effort. The assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists, politico-military leadership, and nuclear facilities has only emboldened Iran and the hardliners within. According to John J. Mearsheimer, Iran’s new Ayatollah may consider going nuclear. Although offensive CP may reduce a state’s opportunity to build a nuclear weapon, it always backfires as far as the willingness of the target country to acquire nuclear weapons is concerned. A state that becomes vulnerable to foreign invasions/surgical strikes will certainly be more inclined than before to acquire nuclear deterrence.

In conclusion, non-proliferation efforts tend to yield positive results if they remain peaceful. The NPT’s peaceful mechanisms have prevented even technologically capable states, such as Japan and Germany, from acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is to the NPT’s credit that Libya stopped its nuclear program. Ukraine was disarmed in 1994, and South Africa abandoned its fully operational nuclear weapons between 1989 and 1991. Using military means against a proliferator not only does not dismantle the target nuclear program but may instead bolster the target country’s resolve to rely more on nuclear deterrence to secure state sovereignty. The same effect is generated in other states too, those who may fear their survival and seek nuclear weapons to offset adversary disarmament or decapitating strikes. With treaties faltering, increased signaling, and continued breach of state sovereignty, states that subscribe to hardcore realist points-of-view will inevitably choose the nuclear route over arms control.

Ali Abbas is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network. He writes on Nuclear Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Arms Control, and Emerging Disruptive Technology. He can be reached at aliabbas_changezi@hotmail.com.  Views expressed in the article are the author’s own. 

The Pitfalls of Offensive Counterproliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.

Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for 1,500–2,000 troops, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of 1967. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately 8,000–10,000 Saudi military personnel.

The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.

Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.

As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.

The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.

Israel’s attack against Hamas leadership in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.

Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of 2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they contribute over $6 billion in annual remittances. Pakistan’s reliance on Saudi oil imports is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.

Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030 projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.

The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow joint deterrence against any aggression, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a decades-old partnership, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.

Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the actual text of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s stated nuclear doctrine, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.

It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “nuclear button” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the 80th session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.

A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.

Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan $3 billion, shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s professional military capability and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s strategic autonomy, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.

Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).

Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s anti-satellite (ASAT) test, held on March 27, 2019, highlights its growing space capabilities and intent to weaponize space. India’s test, known as “Mission Shakti,” demonstrated its ability to intercept and destroy a satellite in low Earth orbit, positioning India as one of only four countries with such capabilities. While Indian officials maintain that the test was aimed at strengthening national security and not directed toward any particular country, such a capability would pose a significant threat to Pakistan’s space assets, which would undermine Pakistan’s situational awareness, communication, and command-and-control capabilities during a conflict.

The implications of India’s recent MIRV test to its intent in the space domain have received little scrutiny, with one Indian analyst suggesting that the country’s MIRV efforts complement its space ambitions. However, analysts did not address the potential implications on regional stability. India’s development and testing of advanced missile technologies suggest that New Delhi could use these capabilities for counter-space missions, including the targeting of satellites, and their expansion of counter-space weapons may disrupt the strategic equilibrium in South Asia.

Bringing MIRVs to Space

While the primary use of MIRV ballistic missiles is not in counter-space missions, there are scenarios and technologies related to MIRVs that could potentially be adapted for anti-satellite (ASAT) roles. Instead of carrying nuclear warheads, the MIRV could be equipped with kinetic kill vehicles (KKV) or other payloads designed to disable or destroy satellites through collision or other means. A missile equipped with MIRV technology could launch multiple payloads into space, each with its own propulsion and guidance systems, allowing them to maneuver into specific orbits close to target satellites. Moreover, the independent targeting capability of MIRVs means each payload could be directed to a different satellite, potentially allowing for simultaneous attacks on multiple targets in different orbits.

In addition, co-orbital systems can loiter in space and potentially engage targets when needed, providing a persistent threat compared to direct-ascent ASAT systems. MIRVs could be adapted for co-orbital ASAT missions by modifying their payloads and utilizing their independent targeting capabilities. Russia and China have demonstrated co-orbital ASAT systems, while the United States maintains advanced space technologies that could potentially be used in similar roles. The adaptation of MIRVs for such purposes would be complex and carry significant strategic and legal implications.

Implications for Regional Stability

Outer space is considered a global common, a concept established by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, which ensures that space is free for exploration and use by all countries, cannot be claimed by any nation, must be used for peaceful purposes, and should be preserved for future generations. It is crucial that this principle should be consistently applied to preserve space for the benefit of all states for communication, navigation, weather monitoring, and scientific research. However, the growing overlap between military and space technologies is blurring the lines between these fields and raises apprehensions about the militarization and potential weaponization of the domain.

The advancements made by India in military technology and satellite capabilities, which integrate military and space capabilities, have raised significant concerns about the weaponization of space in Pakistani policy circles. Pakistan also tested a MIRV capability on its Ababeel missile. However, it never demonstrated its intent to develop counter-space weapons through policy or capability development. Pakistan’s space policy and activities are focused on peaceful uses of outer space, such as satellite communications, remote sensing, and scientific research. Islamabad has participated in international initiatives aimed at promoting the responsible and peaceful use of outer space, including discussions on space security and arms control within forums such as the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).

Considering India’s development and modernization of its military beyond traditional security needs, such as its ASAT capability and advanced missile ranges, there is a possibility that New Delhi may use MIRVs for counter-space missions in the future. In a scenario of escalating tensions with Pakistan, India could conduct counter-space missions by either placing co-orbital ASAT systems during a brewing crisis or launch KKVs during a conflict by using MIRV capability. This would enable India to destroy Pakistani satellites, severely impairing Pakistan’s situational awareness, disrupting secure military communications, and degrading command-and-control functions.

As New Delhi strengthens its counter-space capabilities, its potential development of counter-space capabilities can upset the balance maintained by Pakistan’s effective deterrence posture in South Asia. The complex interplay between nuclear and conventional forces maintains this balance. However, there is a growing asymmetry between India and Pakistan in space capabilities.

New Delhi’s substantial advancements and investments in space technology and infrastructure outmatch Pakistan’s space capabilities, creating a significant power disparity where India has a much greater capacity to deploy and utilize space-based assets for various purposes, including military and intelligence gathering. India’s disproportionate expansion of space capabilities not only poses a threat to Pakistan but also China. Their reliance on satellites for command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) functions is growing to address genuine security needs. Pakistan recognizes the strategic importance of information superiority in modern warfare.

With evolving security challenges, including border surveillance and counter-terrorism operations, Islamabad is enhancing its C4ISR capabilities through significant technological upgrades such as satellite programs and advanced communication systems, along with the integration of centralized command centers and secure communication networks. The expansion includes increased use of drones for surveillance and reconnaissance, development of electronic warfare capabilities, and robust cybersecurity measures.

Human resources are being developed through specialized training and international collaboration, particularly with China and Turkey, to facilitate technology transfer and interoperability. These efforts aim to improve situational awareness, decisionmaking, and operational effectiveness, strengthening Pakistan’s overall national security.

During a crisis, Pakistan may face the risk of its satellite assets being targeted which could have significant impact on its military and strategic capabilities. Pakistan could face severe constraints in its C4ISR capability. Moreover, the integration of satellite communication into Pakistan’s drone operations and C4ISR framework highlights the dependence on these assets for maintaining robust communication. Hence, the loss of satellite communication could disrupt command-and-control functions, impairing coordination and timely decisionmaking across the armed forces.

In view of these reasons, it is possible to conclude that India’s MIRV test represents a dangerous shift in the domain of space weaponization. The integration of MIRV technology with India’s missile systems not only enhances its nuclear deterrence but also signals its potential use for counter-space capability. Therefore, while India’s achievements in missile technology and space capabilities are notable, they carry significant risks for regional stability.

Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer & Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad. Views expressed in this article are the authors own.

India’s MIRV Development – A Latent Counter-space Capability was originally published on Global Security Review.