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		<title>A Counterintelligence Profile: Are High-Fliers Ready?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-counterintelligence-profile-are-high-fliers-ready/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hamza Chaudhary]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 12:12:41 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32664</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: May 7, 2026 For the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is a time of great anxiety. With the non-Arab actors engaging in another tense series of regional infighting, coercive diplomacy and modern warfare have halted episodic interventions from the Arab counterparts. The MENA high-fliers have moved from their traditional [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-counterintelligence-profile-are-high-fliers-ready/">A Counterintelligence Profile: Are High-Fliers Ready?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: May 7, 2026</em></p>
<p>For the geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), it is a time of great anxiety. With the non-Arab actors engaging in another tense series of regional infighting, coercive diplomacy and modern warfare have halted episodic interventions from the Arab counterparts. The MENA high-fliers have moved from their traditional stances of diplomatic arrangements and prioritized military readiness in the current spiraling crisis. For decades, the dominant challenge for the Arab nations has not been Israel’s aggression nor Iran’s ambitions, but their inability to sustain collective agreement in coalitions. The MENA region has seen countless alliances fracturing over the years, resulting in a region without one superpower. If the Gulf states continue to rely on the United States’ changing focus in the Middle East, it will end up losing more than its economic potency and military confidence. It will lose the ability to arrange the chessboard.</p>
<p>The inability of the Arab world to synchronize with its proximate neighbors has weakened the prospects of creating a counterintelligence structure in regional flare-ups. Is staying mutually vulnerable to modern intelligence operations a mistake worth repeating in traditional alliances?</p>
<p>To mitigate conflict spillovers, the Arab nations have prioritized active defense <a href="https://manaramagazine.org/2025/07/missile-defense-in-the-middle-east-a-smart-investment-that-must-evolve/">investments</a> and air denial <a href="https://thesvi.org/from-air-superiority-to-air-denial-the-global-turn-toward-integrated-air-defence-systems-iads/">practices</a>. Systematic <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/sponsors/2025/02/global-snapshot-middle-east-and-north-africa-defense-environment/402670/">defense</a> procurements have <a href="https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2025/07/27/arab-gulf-states-multilayered-air-defenses-are-all-battle-tested/">streamlined</a> their multi-domain operations to prevent entanglements, but out-spying Iran’s asymmetric warfighting or Israel’s intelligence warfare remains a political test. Israel’s intelligence <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/report-israel-hacked-tehran-traffic-cameras-to-track-khamenei-ahead-of-assassination/">directives</a> of movement profiling and persistent surveillance of the Supreme Leader highlight the necessity to advance intelligence methodologies. MENA’s defensive architecture requires an additional protective layer over deterrence: counterintelligence. Not <a href="https://www.thedailyjagran.com/world/why-dont-arab-and-muslim-countries-unite-to-support-iran-against-israel-5-reasons-10301373">synchronizing</a> against a common enemy caused several problems: domestic fracturing, outdated doctrines, historical distrust, and interoperability gaps. Investing rapidly in modern war equipment has erased the Arab world’s warfighting inferiority. Still, the mismatch continues to exist in indigenous productions of air defenses, military intelligence, and technical expertise. Despite inter- and intra-regional strategic <a href="https://strategyinternational.org/2025/10/09/publication207/">connections</a> existing as a starting point, the underlying factors of alliance fragmentation have increased.</p>
<p>Consistent <a href="https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190827-the-middle-east-strategic-alliance-is-just-another-marginalised-initiative/">strategic</a> differences are fracturing the prospects of political reconciliation and strategic retrospection. Facing multiple power projectors, shared security architecture has <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/how-the-gulf-states-can-navigate-the-middle-easts-new-alliance-politics/">reshaped</a> how the geography collaborates during political flare-ups. MENA’s high-fliers see this geography without one dominant actor. This vacuum has yet to be filled, but complete dominance requires incremental layering, which Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, the UAE, and Iran seek. The Gulf’s current strategy to <a href="https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-890655">combine</a> deterrence with diplomacy has been met with historical, geopolitical tests. From Kuwait (1990) to Bahrain (2011), this geography has had its <a href="https://www.crownprince.bh/en/speech/1924/">fair share</a> of regional adventures. The fear of exposing warfighting weaknesses has halted political adventures in MENA. Aside from weak engagements in Yemen and Syria, and confused performances with Israel and Iran, the geopolitical awareness to arrange the Middle East offers a</p>
<p>complex silver lining. The ongoing crisis demands more than a <a href="https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/to-protect-its-strategic-interests-the-gulf-must-form-a-more-cohesive-bloc/">cohesive</a> block from the Gulf. Moving in line with other MENA actors invites multidimensional risks, gambles, and prospects in managing the evolving theater.</p>
<p>Israel’s <a href="https://politicsociety.org/2025/09/24/the-evolution-of-israeli-intelligence-in-the-technological-and-military-context/?lang=en">versatile</a> intelligence alters political <a href="https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-us-israel-regional-hezbollah-huthis/33693186.html">entanglements</a> for the Gulf. It introduced a hybrid wave of <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/opinion/5165943-israel-and-iran-usher-new-era-psychological-warfare">targeted</a> psychological operations (PSYOPS). The open <a href="https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-03-25/the-war-that-israel-never-loses-its-secret-services-once-again-carry-out-assassinations-in-iran.html?outputType=amp">presence</a> of Israel’s intelligence in the Middle East has resulted in its neighbors’ doctrinal fatigue. This ‘eye in the sky’ layering impacts the susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability of MENA’s doctrinal postures. It pushes the Persian Gulf to <a href="https://linkdood.com/how-technology-powering-new-digital-battlefield-in-the-persian-gulf/">enhance</a> battlespace in three settings: Iran’s <a href="https://www.inbarspace.com/missiles-intelligence-and-nukes-irans-arms-race-reaches-space/">predictive</a> intelligence, the Gulf’s <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/security-challenges-and-threats-gulf-0">threat</a> assessment, and <a href="https://www.wired.com/story/how-each-gulf-country-is-intercepting-iranian-missiles-and-drones/">integrated</a> weapons systems. Still, the <a href="http://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2020/1/7/why-doesnt-the-middle-east-have-a-nato">absence</a> of collective military intelligence and interoperability is glaring.</p>
<p>To keep a watchful eye on regional aggressors, the Gulf adopted a <a href="https://themiddleeastinsider.com/2026/02/08/analysis-gulf-defense-industry-shifts-buyer-manufacturer/">threefold</a> approach, by formalizing passive defense, security clusters, and proactive diplomacy. With multiple doctrines, MENA struggles to <a href="https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/why-does-the-arab-world-fear-the-blue-and-white/">succeed</a> in collectively <a href="https://www.thestandard.com.hk/world/article/311619/Iran-and-Egypt-lead-push-for-NATO-style-alliance-in-Middle-East-at-emergency-Islamic-summit">preserving</a> power, let alone <a href="https://www.crisisgroup.org/cmt/middle-east-north-africa/united-arab-emirates/myth-emerging-mideast-nato">projecting</a> it. Be it Iran or Israel, a common pattern in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) strategic behavior was observed. It preferred<a href="https://alhurra.com/en/7633"> personalized</a> military innovations and <a href="https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/saudi-pakistan-defense-deal-rewiring-the-kingdoms-gulf-strategy/">investments</a>, while securing inter-regional <a href="https://www.cnbc.com/2026/03/27/zelenskyy-saudi-visit-us-troops-middle-east-iran-ukraine-aid-shahed-drones.html">strategic</a> alliances. From the Levant to North Africa, the GCC to Iran, and Tukey to the broader Middle East, this reality articulated the <a href="https://www.iemed.org/publication/regional-powers-in-a-transforming-middle-east/">disconnected</a> objectives. However, the Gulf’s common direction to domestically upgrade remained constant, and it offers three scenarios for a future strategy.</p>
<p>First, to become innovative by forming a layered intelligence coalition with regional military sectors in different geographical quadrants, making <a href="https://theconversation.com/how-israels-famed-intelligence-agencies-have-always-relied-on-help-from-their-friends-264818">Five Eyes</a> a blueprint to align domains, departments, and systems. Second, to continue <a href="https://www.deloitte.com/middle-east/en/Industries/government-public/perspectives/gcc-creation-localized-defense-industry.html">investing</a> in personalized, ad-hoc <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/15/global-arms-transfers-level-off-but-middle-east-imports-grow">security</a> investments before <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2632756">active</a> defense localization. In the current situation, this strategy <a href="https://english.aawsat.com/gulf/5256035-gulf-defenses-continue-confront-iranian-threats-high-efficiency">provided</a> the Gulf with ample psychological and operational confidence to fuse other arrangements together. Third, use the <a href="https://icds.ee/en/the-shifting-patterns-of-alliances-in-the-middle-east-surveying-the-fluid-geostrategic-landscape/">previous</a> geopolitical arrangements of MENA to innovate. The Middle East Strategic Alliance (MESA) was the rump administration’s <a href="https://www.heritage.org/middle-east/report/the-middle-east-strategic-alliance-uphill-struggle">idea</a> to bring the Arab states together for a joint cause: unifying against Iran. The Qatar blockade and Egypt’s <a href="https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/israels-attack-on-qatar-and-the-failure-of-gcc-defense-cooperation/">withdrawal</a> soured the idea MESA became a memory. Therefore, the prospects of coordination by cross-regional powers require a consensus.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/why-arab-states-now-oppose-us-israel-attack-iran">Currently</a> the urgency to upgrade counterintelligence structures is neither lacking incentives nor temptations. The urgency to innovate in multiple spheres of traditional power is a matter of strategic inevitability. MENA has found a cogently balanced geostrategy to maneuver in multidirectional geopolitical dimensions. Natural resources, chokepoints, and trade passages give significant bargaining chips to MENA. It has shaped its strategic profile to constructively depend on geostrategic positioning. Using traditional elements of power with natural commonalities and conditionalities offers alliance politics. In a not-so-friendly neighborhood, finding common ground remains an Achilles &#8216; heel. Bringing elements of confidence-building from <a href="https://dergipark.org.tr/en/download/article-file/816888">inter-regional</a> coalition lessons is one go-to strategy.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Hamza Chaudhary is a student of International Relations at the Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan. He has published his work in the </em><em>Small Wars Journal, Modern Diplomacy, and the Center for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR). The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-counterintelligence-profile-are-high-fliers-ready/">A Counterintelligence Profile: Are High-Fliers Ready?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Achieving Peace Through Strength: A Sustainment Imperative</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/achieving-peace-through-strength-a-sustainment-imperative/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Mar 2025 12:13:21 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30390</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s directive to achieve “peace through strength” inherently relies on a restored warrior ethos, a rebuilt military, and reestablished deterrence. However, sustainment challenges within the Air Force—including personnel shortfalls and aging infrastructure—threaten the execution of this mission. Addressing these challenges is vital for maintaining operational readiness and strategic deterrence against pacing [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/achieving-peace-through-strength-a-sustainment-imperative/">Achieving Peace Through Strength: A Sustainment Imperative</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s directive to achieve “<a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4040940/secretary-hegseths-message-to-the-force/">peace through strength</a>” inherently relies on a restored warrior ethos, a rebuilt military, and reestablished deterrence. However, sustainment challenges within the Air Force—including personnel shortfalls and aging infrastructure—threaten the execution of this mission. Addressing these challenges is vital for maintaining operational readiness and strategic deterrence against pacing threats, particularly posed by nations like China and Russia.</p>
<p>Informed by the works of Lieutenant General Tom D. Miller, particularly “<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjb-tm8gO6LAxWZE1kFHf72ALEQFnoECBQQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdml.armywarcollege.edu%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2023%2F01%2FMiller-Defense-Sustainment-Industrial-Base-2010.pdf&amp;usg=AOvVaw3ZXraxctSKJCCoB3YUd09V&amp;opi=89978449">The Defense Sustainment Industrial Base</a>” and “<a href="https://www.brookings.edu/articles/capability-capacity-and-risk-in-the-sustainment-of-air-force-weapon-systems/">Capability, Capacity, and Risk in Sustainment of Air Force Weapon Systems</a>,” it is clear that the challenges and strategies surrounding maintenance of Air Force weapon systems are multifaceted. The first article highlights the foundational elements necessary for a robust defense sustainment industrial base, emphasizing the need for a resilient infrastructure. The second publication further develops this analysis, delving into the evolving landscape of capability, capacity, and risk management in the context of sustaining advanced weapon systems. Collectively, these works offer critical insights and recommendations on optimizing the sustainment process, ensuring readiness and effectiveness in a changing security landscape.</p>
<p>This passage highlights a significant juxtaposition of key themes present in the Secretary of Defense’s goals and Gen. Miller’s examination of Air Force sustainment challenges. To navigate these challenges effectively, specific focus must be placed on three pivotal areas: restoring the warrior ethos, rebuilding the military, and reestablishing deterrence.</p>
<p>In the effort to restore the warrior ethos, the military needs skilled personnel, modern facilities, and a sustainable defense industrial base. Workforce retention and a shortage of technical expertise undeniably impact operational readiness. According to the Secretary of Defense’s mandate, there is a pressing need to “revive the warrior ethos and restore trust in our military.”</p>
<p>Miller’s analysis reveals that the sustainment workforce is facing severe challenges such as an aging workforce, a lack of recruitment, and significant technical expertise gaps. <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjLxI_1gO6LAxUTElkFHeEwDmYQFnoECCUQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.afsc.af.mil%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw0NR4JOXP31-7yi8FPQ96DQ&amp;opi=89978449">The Air Force Sustainment Center (AFSC)</a> is currently experiencing a 30 percent shortage in experienced depot maintenance personnel. This shortfall adversely affects the maintenance and throughput of mission-critical aircraft. A 2022 report by the <a href="https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-23-105571">Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported</a> that workforce shortages at Air Logistics Complexes (ALCs) contribute to an average delay of 20 percent in aircraft depot maintenance cycles, diminishing operational readiness.</p>
<p>Transitioning from a counterterrorism focus to one that emphasizes great power competition necessitates a sustainment workforce capable of advanced manufacturing and software maintenance, but current training pipelines struggle to produce such expertise. The implications are stark; a degraded sustainment workforce directly undermines operational readiness, particularly in maintaining high-end platforms like the F-35, which are essential for effective deterrence.</p>
<p>In relation to rebuilding the military, the defense industrial base faces significant hurdles due to aging infrastructure, inefficient procurement processes, and inconsistent funding. Secretary Hegseth emphasizes the importance of this rebuilding process, stating the need to match threats with capabilities. Gen. Miller’s assessments indicate that the Air Force’s sustainment infrastructure is outdated and that funding for depot modernization is inconsistent. The average age of Air Force maintenance depots exceeds 60 years, with several facilities dating back to World War II. Supply-chain vulnerabilities also arise. Significant dependence on a sole supplier for 67 percent of critical spare parts for legacy aircraft creates potential crises during conflicts. Moreover, extended procurement cycles often delay readiness enhancements, averaging 8 to 10 years from requirement to fielding for sustainment modernization projects.</p>
<p>Thus, without rapid modernization of sustainment infrastructure and necessary acquisition reform, the Air Force will struggle to maintain aging fleets while simultaneously integrating essential next-generation capabilities for initiatives like joint all-domain command and control (JADC2) and agile combat employment (ACE).</p>
<p>Reestablishing deterrence requires a comprehensive assessment of readiness to ensure that sustainment capacity effectively aligns with the threats posed by nations such as China and Russia. As stated in the SECDEF mandates, deterrence must be reestablished through defense of the homeland and collaboration with allies. However, Miller’s 2022 assessment points out a disconnect between current sustainment funding models and the operational requirements of deterrence in contested environments. For instance, from 2012 to 2022, the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwj27azYge6LAxVNEVkFHbfnNVUQFnoECBQQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.airandspaceforces.com%2Fair-force-mission-capable-rates-fiscal-2024%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2KqGvEhWtyOQhQbIcC9ztO&amp;opi=89978449">readiness rates</a> for the USAF fighter fleet plummeted from 75 to 57 percent, with sustainment backlogs contributing significantly to non-mission-capable status. Only 40 percent of American sustainment infrastructure is currently forward-positioned in the Indo-Pacific, which is crucial for countering aggressive actions from adversaries.</p>
<p>To counter these challenges and bolster national defense strategy, courses of action should be implemented. First, revitalizing the sustainment workforce through expanded training and technological improvements is essential. According to projected outcomes, this could reduce depot maintenance delays by 15 to 20 percent within five years while raising mission-capable rates for advanced platforms.</p>
<p>Second, prioritizing infrastructure and acquisition reform will require streamlining procurement processes and integrating industry best practices. This reform could lead to a reduction in aircraft downtime and enhance rapid repair capabilities essential for operating within geographic regions such as the Indo-Pacific. Finally, adopting a risk-based resource-allocation strategy aligned with high-threat mission areas can significantly strengthen deterrence, ultimately raising mission-capable rates of critical platforms.</p>
<p>By aligning sustainment actions with the objectives of the <em>National Defense Strategy</em>, the Air Force can demonstrate improved deterrence capabilities, build enduring advantages, and modernize its force. An immediate investment in revitalizing the sustainment workforce, modernizing depot infrastructure, and aligning resources with operational needs is imperative. A reformative approach to sustainment is not merely an operational necessity; it constitutes a vital aspect of maintaining peace through strength. Without these necessary adjustments, the Air Force risks facing severe mission degradation in high-threat scenarios, ultimately jeopardizing national defense.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Achieving-Peace-Through-Strength.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="295" height="82" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 295px) 100vw, 295px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/achieving-peace-through-strength-a-sustainment-imperative/">Achieving Peace Through Strength: A Sustainment Imperative</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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