Persistent geopolitical instability surrounding the Strait of Hormuz has renewed the debate about Indo-Pacific energy security and the need to diversify supply sources. However, diversification alone may not eliminate strategic vulnerability, even with alternative suppliers beyond the Gulf for the Indo-Pacific region, because the challenge lies not only in where energy is sourced but also in the maritime networks through which it travels. 

Recent warnings from the Australian Food and Grocery Council highlight how geopolitical instability in the Middle East is already contributing to broader cost pressures across Australia’s supply chains, especially through increasing fuel and logistics costs, as an example of a region at the heart of the Indo-Pacific. 

The Indo-Pacific’s capacity to decrease its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz is limited not by geography but by a broader network of contested maritime chokepoints influenced by proxy conflicts, especially the Bab el-Mandeb corridor connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In the event of a disruption in Hormuz, states such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand could theoretically turn to alternative suppliers in the Americas, Africa, or the Atlantic basin. 

However, diversifying suppliers does not necessarily reduce risk. Many of these alternative supply chains still rely on the same vulnerable maritime routes, exposing them to similar transportation and security dangers. For example, Bab Al-Mandeb (Red Sea gateway) continues to face significant disruptions from Yemen-based Houthi attacks. Meanwhile, Somali pirates have become more active due to the current regional crisis involving Iran, which raises risk premiums and causes delays in the Gulf of Aden. 

As a result, proxy warfare, rather than a formal state blockade, may also limit Indo-Pacific states’ ability to rely on alternative supplies. For example, non-state actors and proxy forces (especially in Yemen), along with regional instability, can disrupt the straits without owning them. Under these conditions, proxies can exert strategic influence over maritime corridors without officially controlling them. 

This indicates a shift in the international order where effective control of maritime corridors no longer requires sovereign ownership; disruption capability alone can achieve similar strategic results. Meanwhile, strategic geography links Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb together; disruption in one can increase pressure on the other. 

Proxy maritime actors like Yemen-based Houthis disrupt the Red Sea, while Somali piracy networks remain a persistent risk that could increase costs and uncertainty for shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden. As a result, energy security diversification in the Indo-Pacific region is limited not by a lack of alternative suppliers but by the concentration of global maritime energy flows at politically contested chokepoints. Therefore, these contested chokepoints are truly a security dilemma for the Indo-Pacific’s states. 

The growing capacity of proxy actors and non-state groups to disrupt these corridors transforms maritime geography into a web of vulnerabilities, undermining the effectiveness of traditional diversification strategies. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific’s energy security strategy must consider proxy-driven disruptions within maritime chokepoint networks, rather than relying solely on supplier diversification as a resilience measure. 

To address this risk, the Australian Defense Force has participated in coalition-based maritime security operations in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. However, its role has remained limited to multilateral frameworks rather than unilateral action. The escalating instability linked to Iran-related regional tensions and the widening insecurity from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa may increasingly pressure Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand to reassess their strategic posture toward key maritime chokepoints, including the scope, depth, capacity, and autonomy of their future engagement. 

This is especially significant as Iran continues to violate the current ceasefire with the U.S. and is eyeing Bab el-Mandeb, the only chokepoint after Hormuz that connects Asia, the Middle East, and Europe with the purpose of inflicting damage on the global economy and achieve a more robust position in its negotiations with Washington. 

Unlike Australia and Thailand, countries like Japan and South Korea are highly vulnerable to these threats because they are consistently among the top liquid natural gas and crude oil importers worldwide. This has led Seoul and Tokyo to sign a strategic agreement to strengthen energy cooperation despite longstanding historical disputes. 

A collective security action may be necessary if Indo-Pacific countries are to ensure energy security and strengthen domestic resilience amid rising geopolitical instability and the growing prevalence of regionally based asymmetric warfare. State and non-state actors increasingly employ coercion, sabotage, proxy forces, and physical attacks against critical supply lines to undermine political stability and disrupt economic activity. Because global and regional energy markets, maritime trade routes, and supply chains are highly interconnected, disruptions in or around a single country can cascade across the broader region. Consequently, Indo-Pacific nations have a shared interest in strengthening collective maritime security. By working together to deter threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and secure access to vital energy resources, regional states can enhance their ability to withstand external shocks and preserve the economic and social stability upon which long-term resilience depends. 

Shad Sherko is an independent journalist and security analyst specializing in Middle Eastern defense policy, regional proxy dynamics, and cross-border insurgencies. His work focuses on contemporary security threats across the Middle East and beyond. The views of the author are his own. 

Proxy Wars Threaten Energy Security in the Indo-Pacific Amid Regional Turmoil in The Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

Force protection, in its broadest sense, encompasses all measures taken to safeguard personnel, equipment, and facilities from hostile actions. For the military, this includes battlefield tactics, intelligence gathering, logistics security, and the establishment of robust defensive perimeters. For critical infrastructure, it involves physical security, cybersecurity, and contingency planning to mitigate the impact of attacks. Russia’s struggles in both areas are glaringly apparent.

On the battlefield, Russian forces repeatedly demonstrated a lack of effective force protection. From the initial botched attempts to seize Kyiv to the protracted and costly battles in eastern Ukraine, Russian units suffered heavy casualties. This was often due to a combination of poor tactical decisions, inadequate reconnaissance, and a failure to adapt to the evolving battlefield. Ambushes, artillery strikes, and drone attacks took a heavy toll, revealing vulnerabilities in their supply lines and a lack of situational awareness. This inability to protect its forces has not only hampered Russia’s military objectives but also had a cascading effect on the security of its critical infrastructure.

The vulnerability of Russia’s infrastructure, particularly its energy sector, is a direct consequence of these force protection failures. Oil and natural gas fields, pipelines, and processing facilities, often located in remote areas, require robust security to prevent sabotage or attack. However, the demands of the war in Ukraine stretched Russia’s military resources thin, leaving critical infrastructure exposed.

Ukraine’s ability to strike targets deep within Russian territory, including energy facilities, demonstrates this vulnerability. These attacks not only disrupt energy production and supply but also have a significant psychological impact, undermining public confidence in the government’s ability to protect its citizens and vital assets.

Several factors contribute to Russia’s struggles with force protection and the resulting infrastructure vulnerabilities. Firstly, the sheer size of Russia and the length of its borders make it incredibly challenging to secure all potential targets. This geographical challenge is compounded by the fact that many critical infrastructure sites are dispersed and remote, making them difficult to defend effectively. Secondly, there are indications of potential intelligence failures. Russia may have underestimated Ukraine’s resilience and its ability to conduct effective counter-offensives, leading to a misallocation of resources and a lack of preparedness for attacks on its own territory. Thirdly, logistical issues plague the Russian military. Supply-chain disruptions, shortages of essential equipment, and a lack of well-trained personnel have all contributed to the erosion of force protection capabilities.

Furthermore, the potential for internal dissent and sabotage cannot be discounted. The war in Ukraine fuels anti-government sentiment in Russia, and there is a risk that individuals or groups opposed to the regime may seek to exploit the vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure to express their discontent. Such internal threats further complicate the task of ensuring the security of these facilities.

The implications of Russia’s failure to implement effective force protection are far-reaching. The disruption of energy supplies can have a devastating impact on the Russian economy, leading to shortages, price increases, and social unrest. Moreover, the vulnerability of critical infrastructure can undermine Russia’s international standing and its ability to project power. The perception of weakness can embolden adversaries and erode alliances, further isolating Russia on the world stage.

Russia’s ongoing struggles with force protection in the context of the Ukraine conflict have exposed critical vulnerabilities in its infrastructure, particularly its oil and natural gas fields. These vulnerabilities stem from a combination of tactical miscalculations, logistical shortcomings, intelligence failures, and the inherent challenges of securing a vast and geographically dispersed territory. The consequences of these failures are significant, with the potential to destabilize the Russian economy, undermine public confidence, and weaken Russia’s international standing. As the conflict continues, Russia will need to address these shortcomings if it hopes to protect its critical infrastructure and safeguard its national interests. The ability to learn from these failures and adapt its security strategies will be crucial for Russia’s long-term stability and its ability to project power in the region and beyond.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) and doctoral student at Missouri State University. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection. Joshua currently resides in Columbus, Ohio.

Russia’s Vulnerable Underbelly: The Failure of Force Protection on Critical Infrastructure was originally published on Global Security Review.