As the world gears up for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, a new and multifaceted factor is complicating the global strategic calculus: Artificial Intelligence (AI). The “nuclear-AI nexus” has evolved from a niche technical interest to a prominent feature in global security discussions, with implications for every aspect of the NPT’s three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. However, as experts recently cautioned at the “Atoms for Algorithms” webinar, we need to cut through the speculative “AI hype” to ensure this technology remains a means for peace, not an avenue for unintentional escalation.

To regulate the nuclear-AI connection, we first need to understand the technology. As a United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research researcher, Dr. Yasmina Fina suggests, AI is not a monolithic entity, but a “construct” and a “system of systems,” made up of code, software, data, hardware, and sensors. It is a system used to fulfill certain functions, not a threat capable of usurping human decision-making. The risk is the “speed and scale” of AI, which can have myriad implications for performance and strategy. Moreover, Fina warns that comparing nuclear governance to AI governance is unhelpful because the technologies are not the same; nuclear materials are limited and tangible, whereas AI is ubiquitous and digital.

In the context of non-proliferation, AI is touted as a game-changing verification tool. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) could potentially use “AI agents,” semi-autonomous machines capable of processing large data streams and satellite images to verify the accuracy of declarations by states at a pace humans cannot match. However, Dr. Ian Stewart, Executive Director of the CNS Washington, states that AI will not help states develop nuclear weapons they could not otherwise build, for two physical reasons: AI cannot “magic up” fissile material, and there is no evidence that large language models can transfer the “tacit knowledge” necessary for weaponization.

When it comes to AI and nuclear weapons, political concerns are high. States have been reluctant to allow the IAEA to use open-source data or “black box” algorithms. Should an AI detect an event, the absence of “explainability” or how the machine arrived at its decision could lead to a crisis of political legitimacy for the safeguards system.

The most fraught part of the nexus is disarmament. We are now seeing a “race to adopt” AI in military strategies due to the perceived speed advantage it offers. AI can speed up threat identification and data integration, potentially freeing up more time for decision-making (or, on the other hand, reducing decision-making cycles to the point that humans are simply rubber-stamping decisions).

Aliche Sultini, senior research lead at the Rhode Island School of Design, explains that AI systems create new levels of uncertainty. If a state cannot grasp how an adversary’s AI operates in its decision-making, it might fall into worst-case scenarios, reinforcing alert postures that prevent disarmament. To support disarmament, AI must be used to enhance technical verification and confidence, not to shorten the path to war. Possibly the most disruptive aspect of this interaction is the NPT’s third pillar: peaceful nuclear energy applications. According to Mr. Shota Kamishima of the IAEA, an “affinity” is emerging between nuclear power and AI. We are now moving into a world where energy-hungry AI data centers need the clean, scalable, and reliable power offered by nuclear power, and where nuclear generation and maintenance are improved through AI.

This alliance is especially important for the rollout of Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), for which AI-optimized construction schedules and supply chains are critical. By enhancing predictability and avoiding cost overruns, a major issue for nuclear construction, AI could make nuclear projects more “bankable” and thus more attractive for the global shift towards clean energy. Despite technological progress, the experts agree: human responsibility is essential. Whether it is a safeguards inspector at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or a human commander in a nuclear-armed nation, humans are the “last line of defence”.

“Black box” systems are incompatible with a strong safety culture. Governance policies must ensure that AI is implemented with transparency, traceability, and “explainability”. We must also be alert to the potential for AI to be employed by “agents” to monitor sites, which could result in disinformation and the distortion of threat perception through “anomaly detections.” As the 2026 Review Conference draws near, policymakers’ mission should be to “denoise.” Nuclear policy decisions must not be based on science fiction or fear of competition. Rather, we should prioritize “lower stakes” opportunities where AI can help us now, such as employing AI agents to navigate the overwhelming output of the NPT process — making it searchable and highlighting inconsistencies in delegation positions.

The relationship between nuclear and AI is not a bug to be fixed with more software, but a circumstance to be managed by the international community. By prioritizing evidence-based policy and law, human-in-the-loop systems, and the common ground of the peaceful “Atoms for Algorithms” alliance, we can ensure that the digital revolution supports, rather than undermines, the global nuclear order. In the end, the fate of the NPT will not be determined by algorithms, but by human intelligence.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Centre for Strategic Studies, National Defence University (NDU), and Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Navigating the AI and Nuclear Nexus was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, there are at least two major areas of concern for an effective future USSF international strategy: divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues of a real space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy.

Divisive Geopolitics

Europe acknowledges space as congested and contested but stops short of calling space a warfighting domain. Europe adamantly refuses to declare China as a threatening adversary in the space domain. Not only does Europe struggle with a China dependency, chasing elusive economic benefits, but mainstream European diplomacy emphasizes engagement with China as a preferred way to hedge against (allegedly) unpredictable American behavior.

China managed to deter Europe from taking any offensive space posture, further making sure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains busy with relentless Russian threats. It remains unclear where Europe would stand in a collective space defense scenario resulting from a multi-theater conflict involving both Taiwan and Eastern Europe.

Strategic Quandary

The USSF international partnership strategy signals a service fixated on space support rather than getting after the real problem, which is defeating space threats. This cannot be achieved without offensive space capabilities that deter, and, if necessary, destroy enemy capabilities.

In Europe and the Indo-Pacific, France and Japan are technologically capable of developing offensive capabilities, but politics forbid them from fielding offensive weapons in space, leaving Russian and Chinese rendezvous and proximity operations and kill chains unchallenged. This means such partnerships are unlikely to support the US with truly offensive capabilities in space.

Effective Bilateral and Mini-lateral Partnerships

US Space Command shares space situational awareness data with 33 partner countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender (OOD) is a US Space Command operation to strengthen defenses and deter aggression in space, and involves more than six countries.

US Space Command and the US Space Force have agreements for exchange of personnel and liaison officers for these countries. Bilateral and mini-lateral partnerships include hosting payloads on allied systems such as Norway’s Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS aka Michibiki); Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) with the UK and Australia; and Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) using commercial space domain awareness data with allies and partners. Such needed bilateral and mini-lateral agreements get more done and faster.

Challenging Multilateral Partnerships

Implementing wideband global satellite communications (WGS) to provide satellite communications (SATCOM) to NATO can be challenging when over twenty nations all want to have their own homegrown terminals that can use any nation’s SATCOM satellites. This is made worse by the NATO Communications and Information Agency imposing further rules.

Bottlenecks with extremely high frequency (EHF) communications for nuclear deterrence means all capitals want to have a chance to say yay or nay on who makes the decision and communicates through the EHF with allied command operations. Compared with bi- or mini-lateral agreements, multilateral partnerships are complicated to implement.

The GAO Report on Organizational Politics

An earlier report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the US Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent challenges that impede its efforts to integrate allies and partners into space operations and activities by establishing joint goals. The unclassified version of the GAO report tackles organizational politics specifically.
The report identified that the DoD has several organizations that have overlapping roles and responsibilities for space-related security cooperation.

Several foreign government officials said that finding the appropriate DoD contact with whom to coordinate is difficult, resulting in confusion and missed opportunities. GAO found that USSF has not identified, analyzed, or responded to the risk of not filling positions within its service components, including space-related planning, information sharing, and security cooperation positions.

The USSF strategy acknowledges resource constraints: personnel, budget, and time are limited for all parties. Overclassification limits intelligence sharing and is a concern. Policy misalignment, lack of straightforward national policies, and interoperability risks hinder cooperation.

The USSF is already seeking $6 billion for its own unfunded priorities such as its nascent Military Network (MILNET) satellite constellation and various classified projects. Meanwhile, China appears eager to beat the USSF to the punch in space refueling. Hence the criticality of the USSF astroscale refueling deal. Europe and Japan remain in the process of developing elementary space-based surveillance and passive defense assets.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space?

Current USSF half-baked strategic and cooperation models, leadership alignment issues, capability gaps among allies, and inefficiencies in multilateral agreements are not helping the US to lead in solving allies’ collective space security quandaries, let alone guaranteeing the United States’ own homeland security. In a worst-case scenario, the US might need to be prepared to go it alone and add foreign capabilities as “nice to have.”

If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies, many of whom will be sitting on the fence. Furthermore, allies of the US could be knocked out, one-by-one, by China and Russia in orbit, leaving the US to go it alone anyway.

If the USSF international partnerships strategy is to be relevant, the USSF needs to further evolve from support functions to offensive space warfare, which should form the backbone of any allied international counterspace capabilities. Ultimately, in space, as on Earth, one either leads, follows, or gets out of the way. The US is allowing itself to be paralyzed by committee, which is a sure-fire way to lose the war in space that already started.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

As a strategy, MAD was considered but jettisoned by the United States 65 years ago. For example, President John F. Kennedy noted, “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy, or of a collective death-wish for the world.” Kennedy succeeded in adopting a strategy short of all-out retaliation that came to be known as “flexible response,” which, in 1974, was fully developed by James Schlesinger and eventually codified in Presidential Defense Directive 59.

Whether the United States has 10,000 or 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons, American forces were designed to have a secure retaliatory capability at any level of conflict. The objective was to end any conflict as soon as possible and at the lowest level of destruction. The American objective was not to burn an adversary’s cities to the ground. American deterrence strategy was to hold at risk what the adversary valued most.

Critics of current deterrence strategy assume that no nuclear-armed adversary of the United States believes in “fighting” a nuclear war. So, the US should drop its long-held deterrence strategy and go back to MAD or something like it. At the same time, many of these critics join nuclear abolitionists to support nuclear weapons but only to deter, not engage, in warfighting. If conflict breaks out and these weapons will not be used in retaliation, then nuclear forces are off the table and reduced to a bluff.

The mistaken notion that the US has a MAD strategy plays into the hands of Russia and China. These two nations both seek to escalate or threaten to escalate in a crisis or conflict with the limited use of nuclear weapons. The objective is to get the United States to stand down and not come to the defense of her allies, a restraint to give Russia and China a strategic advantage.

Unfortunately, much of the current commentary on nuclear threats still assumes the US and its adversaries maintain a mutually assured destruction strategy as the best means to avoid any use of nuclear weapons. Annie Jacobson’s recent book, On Nuclear War: A Scenario, describes a mutually assured destruction strategy, which she assumes the US maintains, as simply MAD or crazy. She posits that any initial use of nuclear weapons would almost automatically result in the all-out use of such weapons, leading to nuclear winter and killing billions. As such, she calls for the entirety of American nuclear deterrence to be jettisoned.

Being in the deterrence business, it is important for Congress, the media, the executive decisionmakers in the military and Department of Defense to fully understand what deterrence, as practiced by the United States, entails and why it must be sustained.

To explain this requires a review of history and an understanding that adversaries of the United States and the West sought military advantage through enhanced nuclear weapons technology. Over time the challenge for the US to sustain deterrence changed. The Soviets sought to put nuclear weapons in space, then built a huge first-strike missile force, then deployed thousands of medium-range SS-20s to intimidate and split NATO, and, most recently, built a theater-strike capability to keep the United States and NATO from winning the war in Ukraine.

The US nuclear deterrent was never one size fits all and automatically fit for purpose. For example, the US and NATO faced a huge conventional military threat from the Soviet Union from the beginning of the Cold War on the plains of central Europe, a place called the Fulda Gap. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact tanks were not matched by American conventional forces. President Dwight D. Eisenhower did not wish to bankrupt the US treasury by building such a large and costly conventional military. The available alternative was to establish a nuclear umbrella over Europe, primarily aimed at Soviet tank armies. Thus, in the initial Cold War period, the US assumed a nuclear conflict would most probably grow out of an initial conventional war.

As technology improved, however, a threat emerged that could markedly change the correlation of forces between the United States and the USSR. The US still sought to deter a potential Soviet push into central Europe, but an additional threat was a potential Soviet pre-emptive first strike seeking to eliminate much of the American extended deterrent, followed up by a subsequent conventional invasion of Europe.

In 1963, the American strategic nuclear deterrent consisted of 6,000 nuclear warheads while the Russians had 600 warheads. As President Kennedy remarked, this strength, and particularly the newly deployed Minuteman missiles, were “my ace in the hole” that gave the United States the strategic advantage that peacefully ended the Cuban Missile Crisis.

However, by the time the next decade ended, the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) “arms control” treaty process was implemented and the USSR largely caught up, deploying 7,800 warheads compared to the US force of 8,700 warheads. Most worrisome was the new Soviet land-based missile force of 3,000 warheads on highly accurate SS-18s—with the overall Soviet nuclear force projected to grow to over 24,000 warheads by 1993.

As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told Congress in 1974, “the Soviets are going for a first strike force and there is no doubt about it.” The SS-18 eventually held at risk the entirety of the US land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. This was the only American deterrent force that was sufficiently accurate to target key Soviet leadership and military targets without requiring “city busting.”

The US stopped deploying land-based missiles at 1,050 and associated warheads at around 2,000—assuming the USSR would show equal restraint. But Moscow built a huge land-based ICBM force that could take out the nation’s Minuteman missiles, leaving the US without the ability to hold key Soviet assets at risk. This perceived imbalance was known as the “window of vulnerability” where the US faced the prospects of a Soviet-initiated first strike that would leave US leaders exactly where President Kennedy worried it would.

The US solved the strategic equation of the window of vulnerability, the Soviet empire collapsed, the US added the Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile and Peacekeeper land-based ICBM, Soviet SS-20s were banned, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) arms control process brought Russian warheads down to under 2,000.

In April 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, economically unable to rebuild a Soviet-era nuclear force, decreed that Moscow develop highly accurate, small, low-yield, battlefield nuclear weapons, which his successor, Vladimir Putin, did in earnest. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten warned, these theater nuclear weapons were designed to “escalate to win” a conventional conflict or crisis between Moscow and Washington.

Putin thinks the US will not respond to the small-scale use of nuclear weapons because the US will not want to risk escalation and the possibility of strategic nuclear exchange. That is why Putin made exactly these threats over NATO’s intervention in the war against Ukraine.

Both Russia and China assume the relative weak theater nuclear forces the US maintains are now insufficient to match escalatory threats from Moscow and possibly Beijing. This point was emphasized by the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report in laying out the opening of a new window of vulnerability.

The US is indeed now developing a greater theater nuclear deterrent to close the technology gap. However, simply adding to America’s conventional deterrent is not sufficient. As military leadership has repeatedly emphasized, if adversarial nuclear forces are introduced into a conventional conflict, the American advantage ceases. In short, conventional military leverage disappears.

The central tenets of mutually assured destruction no longer apply. MAD was jettisoned long ago. More importantly, America’s adversaries employ credible threats with the nuclear forces. New technology and expanding adversary arsenals are undermining the limited deterrent value of the American nuclear arsenal, a fact that must change if the United States seeks to ensure it does not find itself embroiled in a conflict where capitulation or Armageddon are the nation’s only options.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Mutually Assured Destruction was originally published on Global Security Review.

As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the spillover effects threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit essential for effective arms control. These economic conflicts erode bilateral relationships, making it even more challenging to negotiate future agreements on critical and emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space.

Tariffs can disrupt trade, increase prices, stifle innovation, and agitate the supply chain. Moreover, it can weaken American global leadership as long-term allies face an American president unwilling to accept high tariffs on American exports while guaranteeing low tariffs on imports. American efforts to counter China are disrupted by tariff disputes as well, as allies and foes coordinate their strategies for countering President Trump’s effort to reduce tariffs on American exports. The president’s actions erode the confidence of allies in extended nuclear deterrence because allies begin to question whether the United States will continue to subsidize security, if they are demanding an end to protective tariffs.

The tariff dispute between China and the US, two large trading partners, severely affects arms control and strategic stability. It exacerbates crisis, heightens mistrust, undermines confidence-building measures, and curtails the possibility of a constructive arms control framework. It is, however, not unexpected. The United States long tolerated protective tariffs and poor intellectual property protections by the Chinese. Thus, rebalancing should not come as any surprise, even if it is disconcerting.

American technological superiority, innovation, cutting-edge military and civilian technology, and significant soft-power influence are the key components of its hegemonic status. Central to this dominance is access to rare earth minerals, which are critical for producing advanced weaponry, including missiles, drones, artificial intelligence (AI)–driven systems, and cutting-edge civilian technologies. However, the US faces a growing vulnerability in this domain, as China currently controls approximately 70 percent of the global supply of rare earth elements. This strategic dependency seriously challenges American innovation and military effectiveness.

However, the American military is already in decline according to a report from the US Army Science Board, which reveals the limitations of the American industrial base. The report warned that the US may be “incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.”

The conflict in Ukraine underscores this concern, as the US struggles to maintain adequate production levels of artillery shells, drones, rockets, and missiles primarily due to insufficient stockpiles of critical components. Furthermore, structural deficiencies are increasingly evident within the US Navy. As of 2023, less than 68 percent of surface fleet ships were rated “mission-capable,” with only 63 percent of attack submarines meeting the same standard. Compounding these challenges, American shipyards are currently unable to produce more than three destroyers annually. By contrast, China possesses 13 shipyards capable of constructing large and deep-draft vessels one of which reportedly surpasses the entire US shipbuilding capacity.

The ongoing US-China tariff dispute reflects a zero-sum strategic mindset, intensifying hostilities and reducing incentives for restraint or cooperation. This economic confrontation has already narrowed the space for meaningful arms control dialogue. The imposition of sanctions on each other’s officials and entities alongside increasingly provocative rhetoric from senior officials risks further erosions of the fragile trust necessary for future diplomatic engagement, particularly in arms control and emerging domains such as AI, cyber warfare, and outer space.

Traditionally, China rejects arms control as the US had far more weapons than China. Tarriff disputes reinforce the narrative that the US is using economic means to contain China’s rise, making China less likely to engage in future arms control discussions. Moreover, diplomatic relations and multilateralism will weaken and increase mistrust—leaving no room for constructive future arms control talks.

Arms control forums are increasingly fragile as mutual trust and respect for arms control and disarmament among the great powers declines. Tariff disputes create mistrust, which complicates the verification process, and the supply chain supporting the global cooperative arms control verification limits the ability to enforce or verify compliance with arms control agreements.

Trade disputes deepen mistrust and normalize confrontation over cooperation, secrecy over transparency, and arms racing over arms control. This leads to proliferation while making accountability less relative and paves the way for a fragmented world order with little or no hope for future arms control.

Moreover, it increases the chances future administrations face a backlash for rolling back policies that demand equitable treatment of American trade goods, fearing internal backlash for being soft on China. This will permanently lock both states into an adversarial stance, reducing any flexibility in arms control. Moreover, if the US wants to reconsider any future arms control discussion, political costs may prove too high, leaving fewer options to prevent an arms race.

In 2019, President Donald Trump withdrew the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, after Russian cheating became too hard to ignore.  Meanwhile, the future of New START remains uncertain and fragile.

At such a critical juncture, President Trump’s demand that American exports sent to foreign markets receive equal treatment to those foreign imports entering the United States, penalizing both allies and adversaries who enact punitive tariffs, may be unsettling for recipients of increased tariffs, but it should come as no surprise that an American president elected to stop the outflow of American wealth would seek equal treatment for American exports.

Many Americans are willing to see the subsidies to foreign nations—that are brought about by high tariffs on American exports and American extended deterrence—come to an end. This may lead to an erosion of confidence in American benevolence by some states.

South Korea, for example, was shocked that the United States took offense to the very protectionist policies that allowed South Korea to become the third largest auto producer in the United States, all while effectively preventing American automobile sales in South Korea. Thus, South Korea is reconsidering their non-nuclear status and exploring an independent nuclear deterrent. As President Trump seeks to level the playing field by forcing down the tariffs of trade partners, under the threat of higher tariffs on imported goods, allies should come to understand that the United States is increasingly unwilling to subsidize others. While this may be a jarring fact, it is not a purposeful effort to destabilize arms control.

Thus, trade disputes may cause allies and adversaries to reconsider American willingness to accept unequal trade and disproportionate burden sharing. In the long run, equilibrium will return. It is just a matter of what that equilibrium may look like.

Muhammad Shahzad Akram is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu Kashmir. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.

How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control was originally published on Global Security Review.

From counterterrorism efforts to geopolitical forecasting, the applications of AI in strategic intelligence operations span a diverse array of domains, shaping national security strategies and global geopolitics alike. However, alongside these transformative capabilities come complex ethical, legal, and policy considerations that necessitate careful navigation.

            Foremost, AI has the ability to continuously monitor news sources, social media feeds, and other open-source intelligence channels in real time, alerting analysts to relevant developments as they happen. Sifting through massive datasets from diverse sources that include both open-source and classified reporting will allow analysts to quickly dismiss the “noise” and more easily discover relevant information that might otherwise be missed by human-driven analysis. Tedious and repetitive tasks, like report generation or data cleaning, can be automated, increasing efficiency and allowing analysts to focus their time and efforts on critical strategic analysis.

Furthermore, algorithms will unearth subtle trends, correlations, and anomalies that traditional analytical methods often overlook. This enhanced capability will empower proactive decision-making based on insights that would have otherwise remained hidden. Algorithms can help identify and mitigate potential biases in human analysis, promoting more objective decision-making processes. AI tools can act as a “smart assistant,” highlighting relevant information, providing summaries, and offering different perspectives to enhance human analysis. This frees up analysts from mundane information-gathering tasks and allows them to focus on higher-order strategic thinking.

Expanding further, the advanced collection and analytical features of AI will greatly assist with gauging potential instability in regions of interest, analyzing competitor activities, patent filings, and market trends, which can be streamlined with AI to quickly identify threats and opportunities. AI can analyze network traffic to detect anomalies indicative of potential cyberattacks, allowing for a faster response to cybersecurity threat detection.

The capabilities of generating and analyzing various potential scenarios based on historical data and current trends, in a fraction of the time needed for humans, provides analysts with a more comprehensive analysis for decision-makers to assess the likelihood of different outcomes and a higher confidence in predicting and understanding the consequences of their decisions. The AI-powered predictive analytical forecasting potential of geopolitical events, economic shifts, or emerging technologies that might create future strategic risks or opportunities for governments is attractive to all states as they leverage advantages to expand influence and power.

Incorporating AI capabilities into the strategic intelligence realm is not without its challenges or concerns. It will be imperative to ensure meaningful human control over any AI systems associated with strategic intelligence. Other national security assets should be considered a high priority at this critical onset of AI applications focused on the establishment of safeguards against autonomous decisions.

Considering AI relies on the accuracy and completeness of data, ensuring effective measures are in place to maintain data integrity and avoid garbage-in, garbage-out scenarios is critical. It is vital that AI models are interpretable so that analysts can understand the reasoning behind recommendations. This builds trust and facilitates better decision-making. Addressing biases in AI models and ensuring algorithms are used in a transparent and responsible manner that aligns with organizational values is also important.

Advancing AI may process vast amounts of data in times of crisis, and do it far faster than humans, though there is understandable concern about the appropriate level of AI involvement in high-stakes decisions where time is of the essence. For example, should AI have any control over nuclear launch decisions, and if so, how much? Errors in AI analysis or reliance on faulty data could lead to miscalculations and unintended escalation.

As intelligence agencies increasingly rely on advanced technologies like AI, there is a need for robust regulation and oversight to prevent abuse of power, misuse of data, and violations of civil liberties. Policies should establish clear guidelines for the collection, storage, and use of intelligence data, as well as mechanisms for accountability and transparency.

The proliferation of intelligence data and the use of advanced analytics pose challenges related to data security and protection. Policies must address issues such as data encryption, secure storage, access controls, and measures to safeguard against cyber threats and breaches.

Given the global nature of many intelligence threats, there is a need for international cooperation and the development of norms and standards governing the use of AI technologies. Policies should promote collaboration among intelligence agencies from different countries while respecting sovereignty and legal frameworks.

AI algorithms used in intelligence operations may exhibit bias or produce unfair outcomes, particularly if trained on biased data or programmed with flawed assumptions. Policies should address these concerns through measures such as algorithmic transparency, fairness assessments, and diversity in data sources and large language model (LLM) development.

The development and deployment of AI technologies can confer strategic advantages to nations or organizations. Policies may need to balance the pursuit of such advantages with efforts to prevent destabilizing arms races or conflicts arising from the use of intelligence capabilities.

The use of AI capabilities, particularly in areas such as cyber warfare or information operations, can raise the risk of deterrence failures or unintended escalation. Policies should seek to establish clear deterrence strategies, rules of engagement, and mechanisms for de-escalation to mitigate these risks. As AI technologies become more sophisticated, intelligence operations will increasingly involve human-machine collaboration. Policies should address issues such as human oversight, accountability for algorithmic decisions, and the ethical implications of human-AI interaction in intelligence activities.

The future of AI and strategic intelligence operations is poised to be characterized by continued innovation, integration, and adaptation to evolving geopolitical, technological, and societal landscapes. Further breakthroughs in AI technologies, including deep learning, natural language processing, and reinforcement learning, will enable intelligence agencies to extract deeper insights from vast and diverse datasets. This will enhance capabilities for predictive analysis, anomaly detection, and decision support across a wide range of intelligence operations.

The integration of AI into autonomous systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), will certainly revolutionize intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. These systems will be capable of operating in contested or denied environments with reduced risk to human operators and logistical support assets.

The proliferation of cyber threats and the increasing reliance on information warfare tactics will drive the expansion of cyberintelligence capabilities. Intelligence agencies will focus on detecting, attributing, and mitigating cyberattacks, as well as leveraging information operations to shape narratives and influence adversaries.

The rise of social media platforms and digital communication channels will continue to reshape intelligence gathering and analysis. Open-source intelligence (OSINT) and social media analysis techniques will play an increasingly prominent role in monitoring global events, assessing public sentiment, and identifying emerging threats. Intelligence agencies will increasingly collaborate with other government agencies, international partners, and private-sector entities to leverage complementary expertise and resources. Fusion centers will facilitate the integration of intelligence from multiple sources to produce more comprehensive and timely assessments.

Intelligence agencies will need to enhance their resilience and adaptability to rapidly evolving threats, including emerging technologies, geopolitical shifts, and unconventional adversaries. This will require agile organizational structures, flexible operational frameworks, and continuous investment in training and capabilities development.

Overall, the future of AI and strategic intelligence operations will be characterized by a dynamic interplay between technological innovation, geopolitical dynamics, and societal trends. By embracing these trends and addressing associated challenges, intelligence agencies can enhance their effectiveness in safeguarding national security and advancing strategic objectives in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

As the United States intelligence community navigates the complexities of an increasingly interconnected and unpredictable world, the future of strategic intelligence operations will be defined by our ability to harness the power of AI technologies while mitigating their risks and ensuring their responsible and ethical use. By embracing innovation, fostering collaboration, and upholding democratic values, intelligence agencies can effectively confront the challenges of the 21st century and advance the interests of peace, security, and prosperity for all.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS). With over 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. The views expressed in this article are his own.  

Unveiling the Future: The Convergence of AI and Strategic Intelligence Operations was originally published on Global Security Review.

Key disparities in nonstrategic nuclear forces following decades of arms reductions now jeopardize American nuclear strategy. To resolve this, a rebalance of “theater-strategic” nuclear forces is needed for the US to credibly prevent conflict and dangerous escalation, uphold extended-deterrence guarantees, and avoid failure of central deterrence.

America’s adversaries are expanding their nuclear arsenals, including tactical, regional, theater, and strategic forces. For example, China already has multiple air-, land-, and sea-delivered systems deployed to counter the American military. In Europe, the US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states are outnumbered 10-to-1 against Russia in such systems, and only possess small numbers of tactical gravity bombs delivered by limited-range fighter aircraft.

Adversaries can target American forward-deployed forces, US territories, and the American homeland. Further, the homeland is now outnumbered in the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons, and this disparity is projected to reach 2-to-1 soon. With a weak tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear position, the US faces new threats by emboldened and unafraid adversaries.

The first problem with this asymmetry of nuclear strategy is that Russian or Chinese leadership may believe they have escalation advantage over the US during a regional conflict. Adversary nuclear forces employed early on the battlefield with the threat of incremental employment and with less escalatory short-range delivery systems would place the “burden of escalation” upon the United States. With each missile system of varying range, threatening attacks against targets of graduated value and stake to the US, the only retaliatory tool available to the US with sufficient power to create deterrent or compellent psychological effects is its intercontinental-range nuclear triad.

Chinese or Russian leaders may view such an American choice to be highly escalatory, triggering further nuclear escalation. Just as worrying, adversary leaders may well believe that once this “burden of escalation” is placed on the shoulders of the president, it would create such fear of uncontrolled nuclear escalation that the US will capitulate instead of choosing to escalate further. Current American nuclear capabilities provide very limited options to the president for battlefield objectives while managing escalation in conflict.

A second problem is extended-deterrence credibility. This security guarantee is for over 30 allies in Europe and Asia and involves American threats of nuclear retaliation against adversaries that attack the nation’s allies. Deterrence is “extended” to allies under the “nuclear umbrella.” However, for extended deterrence to be credible, American nuclear forces must be capable of defeating adversary threats to those allies. But this presents a problem because nuclear-armed adversaries possess the advantage in low-yield, short-, medium-, and intermediate-range nuclear force.

For American extended-deterrence credibility, the US requires damage-limitation capabilities for the homeland. Otherwise, the nation risks becoming “decoupled” from its allies in regional conflicts. This would place the adversary in a superior position to coerce American allies into submission under threat of nuclear attack. The US could credibly prevent decoupling through offensive forces that can destroy adversary nuclear capabilities capable of striking the homeland and through homeland missile defenses after adversary attacks.

However, US offensive damage-limitation strike capabilities cannot credibly target all Russian and Chinese strategic nuclear forces simultaneously. Further, US homeland missile defenses are deployed to limit damage primarily from states like North Korea, whereas the US relies on deterrence to address Russian and Chinese intercontinental-range nuclear missile threats to the US homeland. As a result, the ability of the US to credibly limit damage, avoid decoupling, and fulfill its extended-deterrence security guarantees is currently limited, and the disparity in American and adversary forces is also projected to widen.

The third principal reason the asymmetry of nuclear strategy is becoming increasingly problematic is the risk of effective adversary coercion directly against the US in a regional crisis or armed conflict. “Central deterrence,” or persuading adversaries from carrying out intercontinental nuclear strikes against the homeland, could be severely challenged should a regional war and threats of nuclear escalation overwhelm an American president faced with choices involving catastrophic attacks on the homeland.

Russia and China now possess sufficient operational and theater nuclear forces to convince their leaderships they hold escalation advantage over the United States. This would place the US president “on the horns of a dilemma,” choosing to fight a regional war against one or more nuclear-armed adversaries who possess battlefield and theater-nuclear escalation advantages over the US or choosing survival under conditions of nuclear coercion and regional capitulation. This is the exact opposite of where the US should be positioned to fulfill its nuclear strategy obligations and defend the nation and its allies.

An American theater-strategic nuclear force rebalancing recognizes the interplay between theater and strategic risks. If the US cannot meet its battlefield war aims or perform extended deterrence effectively, then it increases the risks of attack or escalation on the homeland. Such risks increase with simultaneous conflict and escalation with Russia and China.

The US needs to field low-yield air-, ground-, and sea-based theater nuclear forces in both the Pacific and Europe. For operational and psychological reasons, such forces should reflect the attributes of the strategic-level nuclear triad (responsive, flexible, survivable), giving the president a wide set of options and credible power.

The president also needs a substantially more robust strategic nuclear triad to simultaneously threaten the full range of homeland targets of value to Russia and China, including their entire fixed and mobile nuclear force. Critically, the president also needs assurances that the homeland can be defended against coercive decapitation or population center strikes.

Nuclear threats are rising and the challenge to security surpasses what a fully modernized nuclear triad can reasonably expect to provide. A modern nuclear triad is essential; it is just not enough. Rebalancing US nuclear and missile defense forces is needed to restore symmetry in nuclear strategy and establish strategic stability in the tripolar world.

Dr. Jonathan Trexel is a graduate faculty member with Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Countering the Asymmetry of Nuclear Strategy was originally published on Global Security Review.

By Lt Col Shawn Littleton

Wild Blue Yonder, By Lt Col Shawn Littleton

With the movie Oppenheimer bringing the Bomb back into our casual conversations, it is a good time to rethink how you feel about the Bomb. Its abstract but existential implications are especially present today as a driver of both conversation and human behavior in an unprecedented way. Will the unleashing of nuclear weapons be the sadly predictable end of mankind that our worst nightmares portend, or will the Bomb fulfill our greatest hopes and be a deterrent backstop that prevents a third World War and enables a global reconciliation that leads to total disarmament? Should we hate or love the Bomb, or somewhere in between?

Read more about the paradoxes, the hatelove of the bomb, and some unsolicited advice from a cat in the article on Wild Blue Yonder.

We Are the Cat: How Schrödinger Can Teach Us to Hatelove the Bomb was originally published on Global Security Review.

As the teams take the field, their profiles are worth noting. After all, they each bring a different style of play to the field of competition.

The United States

The United States is a titan of technological innovation and military prowess. With a defense apparatus that leverages cutting-edge technology, including cyber capabilities, stealth technology, and unmanned systems, the Americans exemplify agility both in thought and action.

Its strength lies not just in its superior hardware but in its ability to integrate information warfare, space dominance, and artificial intelligence to outpace and outthink its adversaries. These strengths are also seen as weaknesses by the opponent, which they plan to exploit.

The Challengers

On the other side, China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea form an axis of strategic adversaries. Each brings unique strengths to the table. What holds this team together is shared desire to defeat the United States.

China, with its rapid military modernization and significant advancements in areas like hypersonic weapons and space technology, poses a multidimensional threat. With the second largest economy in the world and a population only rivaled by India, is should come as no surprise that China finds itself in the Super Bowl of Deterrence.

Russia, seasoned in electronic warfare, unconventional strategies, and disinformation brings a wealth of experience in disrupting adversary operations. Although Russia’s performance shows a weakened player, the United States can never forget Russia’s trump card, which it has yet to play.

Iran, with its asymmetric warfare tactics, proxies, and extensive international network, excels in creating unpredictable challenges. In short, Iran is an agent of chaos on the field.

North Korea, as the smallest player on the field, adds a wildcard element with its nuclear capabilities and cyber warfare tactics. America’s advantage against North Korea is that the North Korean objective is a simple one: preserve the regime.

The Game Plan

The Super Bowl of Deterrence is not won by brute force alone but by the ability to disrupt the adversary’s decision cycle and achieve strategic overmatch. In many respects it is like a game of chess, where the objective is to force the other player into a position where the only option is defeat.

The US strategy hinges on its agility and technological edge, aiming to outmaneuver its opponents by disrupting their communications, blinding their sensors, and sowing confusion within their ranks. This game is about anticipation, where the US seeks to predict and counter its adversaries’ moves before they can execute, effectively scoring preemptive strikes in this lethal contest of wits and will.

The autocrats have a simple game plan: prevent the United States from moving forces into the region by making them blind, deaf, and dumb through cyberattacks on command-and-control systems and the American military’s logistics network. Attacks on American space assets is also a key element of the autocrat strategy.

Role of Allies and Partnerships

In this complex game, American allies and global partners play a crucial role, akin to the role played by special teams. The US leverages its network of alliances and partnerships to extend its reach, gather intelligence, and coordinate actions that pressure and isolate the opposing side. These relationships enhance the United States’ strategic positioning, providing logistical support and enabling joint operations that amplify its power-projection capabilities.

The autocrats do not have a similar set of alliances and partnerships. With their team built on a mutual desire to defeat the United States, the same level of trust and cooperation the United States has with its allies does not exist. Thus, team cohesion is tenuous.

Conditions for Victory

Victory in the Super Bowl of Deterrence is measured not in points on a scoreboard but in the ability to maintain global stability and prevent conflict. The ultimate goal for the United States is to deter aggression and ensure that its adversaries think twice before acting. This requires a delicate balance of showing strength without escalating tensions unnecessarily. This includes employing a mix of diplomacy, economic power, and military forces to maintain the status quo and protect national interests.

For the autocrats, victory is the toppling of the American-led international order. The asymmetry of interest in the contest means that the two teams will play a very different game for very different purposes. The dynamics of this contest are inherently unpredictable. Just as in football, where a single play can change the outcome of the game, the Super Bowl of Deterrence is fraught with uncertainties. Technological advancements, shifts in global politics, and unexpected moves by any player can alter the strategic landscape, requiring constant vigilance and adaptation by all involved.

Conclusion

The Super Bowl of Deterrence stands as a testament to the importance of strategy, technological supremacy, and the human element in the quest for global security. In this game, the stakes are immeasurably high, and the consequences of failure are real. Through agility, innovation, and strategic partnerships, the United States is positioned well and viewed by its opponent as a formidable contender that is ready to defend its title and ensure peace in an ever-changing world.

This epic contest is a vivid reminder that in the arena of global security, the game is always on, and victory favors the prepared, agile, and resilient. Like football, good intentions mean nothing. Preparation and capability mean everything.

Greg Sharpe is the Director of Communications and Marketing at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies

The Super Bowl of Deterrence: The Ultimate Showdown in Strategic Overmatch was originally published on Global Security Review.

As is the case with most congressional reports labeled “strategy,” it is a mixed bag of some good things that should be commended, with gaping holes that will have negative impacts on the strategic interests of the United States in space unless addressed. If left untouched, the United States could find itself a nation in danger of failing in the near future.

There are some good points in the document. It rightly explains the importance of the Space Force’s role as a service provider to the terrestrial (air, land, sea) services and combatant commands. Regional combatant commanders understand the “competitive advantage” that space systems like satellite communications, missile warning and tracking, and surveillance and reconnaissance provides. As such, combatant commanders worldwide have “requirements in space expertise, activities, and space capabilities.”

These are correctly explained in the document as something needing funding, support, and the right service posture to meet these requirements across the terrestrial services and agencies. However, while this is all true, it is not good to communicate the role of the Space Force as only an enabler of the Joint Force or “enhancing readiness of U.S. [terrestrial] forces” as if it is not a part of American forces or the Joint Force. It was created for much more than this.

Second, there are concerns about some aspects of the document, which are unhelpful to the service and the nation’s readiness for great power war in space. This is because the Space Force was not created to be primarily an enabler and supporter of the Joint Force, but to be the service responsible for organizing, training, and equipping space combat forces to address the threat posed by the growing space combat forces of China and Russia.

Rather than creating a superior war-winning force to deter attacks upon critical space infrastructure, the objectives of the current strategy is resilience and the ability of American warfighting support capabilities to “degrade gracefully under attack” while being “reconstituted in a reasonable time.” This approach is insufficient as China’s and Russia’s space forces do not exist to merely “deny the United States its access to the space domain.”

They instead mean to “kill” that access and the critical space capabilities leveraged by all instruments of American national power and influence. As such, the Space Force is not postured appropriately to deter, counter, and win against enemy warfighting capabilities that can currently degrade and destroy our critical space infrastructure.

In addition, the Space Force’s role in this document is focused more on protecting the terrestrial force structure from “space enabled attack” that, frankly, is not a new phenomenon and was accomplished when space was only a functional support area and not a warfighting domain—and area of responsibility (AOR) in its own right.

The document does correctly state that the United States “must be prepared to deny a potential adversary’s use of space systems to monitor, track, and enable attack of US, Allied, and partners’ military forces,” but space forces are just as much a part of military forces as air, land, and sea. The nation cannot achieve this objective if it does not treat warfighting support forces as part of the team, as well as create space combat forces capable of deterring attack by having the ability to wage a successful campaign in, to, and from space.

This means the nation must have “combat-credible forces” with the ability to fire and maneuver just like air, land, and sea forces can. The strategy mentions the types of forces that should demonstrate “the ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations against an adversary,” but this offensive and defensive objective is not the primary mission of the service, which it should be.

The primary mission of the air, land, and sea forces are not to “support the Joint Force,” but rather to project military power against any adversary region on earth to achieve military objectives and protect and advance strategic interests of the United States. As such, the Space Force’s reason for being is not supporting terrestrial actions, but to deter attack upon critical space infrastructure vital to society and commercial interests in space, and through that primary mission, achieve victory against enemy space and terrestrial forces from space.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, D.C. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the positions of the Department of Defense or his employer.

The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad was originally published on Global Security Review.