Published: April 2, 2026

On December 23, 2025, the Pentagon released its annual 2025 China Military Power Report to Congress—a reminder that America is still trying to deter tomorrow with yesterday’s force. The report assesses China’s stockpile stayed in the low 600s through 2024 but remains on track to have over 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030, while Russia continues to brandish tactical (non-strategic) nuclear weapons to shield conventional aggression. Yet U.S. deterrence planning still assumes that sufficiency against one peer will scale to two.

Within the bomber community, personnel are trained to operate and make decisions amid uncertainty. Deterrence cannot rely on idealized scenarios. Washington, however, continues to plan and budget as if deterring one peer at a time is adequate to maintain peace. Since the Nixon administration elevated “strategic sufficiency,” the U.S. has preferred a survivable second-strike posture over matching adversary numbers, even as U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) Commander Adm. Charles Richard testified in 2020, “We do not seek parity.”

That posture of sufficiency made sense when the U.S. faced one major nuclear superpower at a time. It makes less sense when the U.S. must deter two nuclear peers, potentially in overlapping crises while also accounting for a third in North Korea. The 2023 Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States warned the nation is “ill-prepared” for a future where China and Russia can coordinate, or opportunistically exploit dual crises.

The issue is not that U.S. modernization appears timid on paper. Instead, it is optimized for a single adversary. A survivable second strike against one major nuclear opponent is not enough as a credible deterrent against two, especially if one adversary believes the other will absorb U.S. attention. Deterrence developed for one enemy breaks down when facing multiple opponents.

Modernization is also colliding with the same budget dysfunction that has battered conventional readiness for years. Continuing resolutions and shutdown threats do not just delay programs; they advertise doubt about U.S. resolve. In deterrence, doubt about political will can be just as harmful as uncertainty about capability.

Enter the logic of reciprocity. The White House’s February 2025 memorandum on Reciprocal Trade and Tariffs argues that reciprocal measures are not punishment; they are a way to restore balance when competitors exploit unequal terms. Reciprocity is a framework for fairness, and fairness is what makes commitments believable.

Deterrence needs a similar framework. Strategic fairness demands a posture calibrated to the combined capabilities of the adversaries the U.S. must deter, not an accounting trick that treats them sequentially. Dynamic Parity offers that calibration: match the aggregate nuclear threat, go no further, and use that ceiling to avoid both arms racing and strategic vulnerability.

Dynamic Parity is “parity without superiority.” It rebuffs a race for numerical dominance, but it also rejects minimalist postures that assume an adversary will politely wait its turn. It restores equilibrium as the foundation of deterrence in a multipolar era.

Skeptics argue that “parity” invites an arms race or abandons arms control. Dynamic Parity does the opposite: it clearly separates what is required from what is excess, with the numerical arsenals determined by the adversary and then matched by America. This establishes a disciplined standard for force planning. That discipline also enhances the U.S. position in future risk-reduction negotiations by making the baseline requirements explicit instead of improvised during a crisis.

Strategy, however, is not self-executing. If Dynamic Parity is the strategic logic, Congress needs a budgeting structure that can deliver it. The National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund provided the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine program with authorities that support long-lead procurement and multiyear contracting.

Congress should implement that approach throughout the nuclear enterprise via a National Strategic Deterrence Fund. The goal is not to escape oversight; it is to safeguard the core of deterrence from annual budget brinkmanship and start-stop inefficiency. If the fund is protected as non-discretionary spending with multiyear authority, modernization timelines become actual plans rather than mere hopes.

Here is what that would look like in practice:

• Direct the next Nuclear Posture Review to adopt a concurrency standard and use Dynamic Parity as the force-planning logic.
• Create a National Strategic Deterrence Fund with multi-year and long-lead authorities across delivery systems, warheads, infrastructure, and nuclear command, control, and communications.
• Require annual execution reporting, i.e., schedule, industrial capacity, and funding stability, so Congress can measure delivery and not intent.

This is about credibility, not bookkeeping. The State Department’s International Security Advisory Board warned in 2023 that extended deterrence hinges on the perception of sustained capability and resolve. Allies and adversaries do not parse budget documents; they watch whether the U.S. executes what it promises.

Execution is the signal. Russia’s 2024 Fundamentals of Nuclear Deterrence establishes clear redlines for potential nuclear use while deliberately preserving threshold ambiguity. China is building the force structure for nuclear coercion alongside conventional power projection. If Washington cannot modernize on schedule and at scale, because budgets lurch from continuing resolution to shutdown threat, adversaries will read that as strategic hesitation, not fiscal noise.

Reciprocity works only when it is enforced. In nuclear deterrence, enforcement means a posture designed for concurrency and a budget mechanism that delivers it. Dynamic Parity provides the standard; a National Strategic Deterrence Fund provides the spine. In a multipolar nuclear world, balance against combined nuclear threats is not a theory, it is the price of credibility.

Joseph H. Lyons is a career bomber aviator and a doctoral candidate at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, any other U.S. government agency, or Missouri State University.

Reciprocity in Deterrence, Not Just Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

At the time, the Soviet Union and United States committed to reducing their nuclear arsenals, eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons, and allowing thorough onsite inspections to ensure treaty compliance. During the Cold War, the INF Treaty served as a crucial stabilizing mechanism in the global nuclear order. Historically, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972 and 1979 were the first of several agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. As a result, both sides agreed to reduce their strategic weaponry, which included ballistic missile defenses, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. Additionally, they established inspection procedures to make sure both parties followed the agreement. Due to the treaty, 2,600 missiles were destroyed, marking a significant Cold War breakthrough. Despite decades of arms control, the US and Russia still field the largest nuclear forces. Although it is challenging to determine the exact extent of their stockpiles, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the US possesses 5,328 warheads, while Russia has 5,580.

In August 2025, Russia declared it would no longer fulfil its commitments under the INF Treaty, citing increasing threats from the United States and other Western nations. When the US withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 because of Russian noncompliance with treaty limitations, Moscow stated that it would not use such weapons as long as Washington did not. This may have served as an effective ruse, but it served a purpose.

Questions are increasing about the utility of nuclear proliferation, the threat of arms racing, and the future of nuclear deterrence following the decision of Russia to fully abrogate the INF Treaty. The collapse of the INF Treaty represents a significant shift in the trajectory of international arms control.

The situation took a more dramatic turn as President Donald Trump announced that the US would move two of its nuclear-armed submarines closer to Russia in reaction to the “inflammatory statements” issued by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. This action highlights the challenge that arises when arms control breaks down—the potential for misunderstandings and overreactions increase.

Among nuclear-armed states, communication, predictability, and a certain measure of self-control are essential elements of nuclear deterrence. They were shaped by the INF Treaty, which placed verifiable limitations on missile sites. With the failure of the INF Treaty, useful tools were removed.

The future deployment of intermediate-range systems in regions that were shielded from them may prove an urgent strategic issue. Once at the epicenter of Cold War nuclear worries, Europe may have to host such weapons once more, but with improved accuracy, shorter travel times, and, perhaps, lower yields.

Deterrence dynamics in the Asia-Pacific are more difficult, especially between the US, China, and Russia, after the INF Treaty. The great powers are now accelerating nuclear modernization, while non-nuclear states are reconsidering their nonproliferation commitments. A replay of the Cold War–era European missile crisis has emerged with the collapse of the treaty.

Now, both Russia and the US are free to use and develop short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles without any official restraints. One more issue concerns the intentions of other governments, who may be influenced by the deterioration of controls on nuclear systems. States that did not previously possess nuclear weapons may choose to acquire them. Modern arms racing may be fast, less predictable, and more destabilizing due to technological advancements, such as autonomous delivery systems, hypersonic weapons, and AI-assisted targeting.

There are limited prospects for cooperative tools to mitigate these risks of escalation between the US and Russia. The two largest nuclear powers have a special duty to control and limit the scope of their competition.

Measures that encourage openness, trust, and communication between nuclear and non-nuclear governments will be crucial. In the absence of a global treaty, regional security accords, tailored to today’s security challenges, can effectively restrict risky deployments and restrain great powers from further modernizing their nuclear arsenals.

Nations in the Asia-Pacific can, for example, agree to mutual missile deployment restrictions similar to those in the INF Treaty’s verification procedures, which include regular inspections and satellite monitoring by mutual compliance. This would prevent insecure military build-ups in the region and reduce mistrust between states. Whatever course nations take, the importance of preventing escalation to nuclear use is foremost.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, there are at least two major areas of concern for an effective future USSF international strategy: divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues of a real space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy.

Divisive Geopolitics

Europe acknowledges space as congested and contested but stops short of calling space a warfighting domain. Europe adamantly refuses to declare China as a threatening adversary in the space domain. Not only does Europe struggle with a China dependency, chasing elusive economic benefits, but mainstream European diplomacy emphasizes engagement with China as a preferred way to hedge against (allegedly) unpredictable American behavior.

China managed to deter Europe from taking any offensive space posture, further making sure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains busy with relentless Russian threats. It remains unclear where Europe would stand in a collective space defense scenario resulting from a multi-theater conflict involving both Taiwan and Eastern Europe.

Strategic Quandary

The USSF international partnership strategy signals a service fixated on space support rather than getting after the real problem, which is defeating space threats. This cannot be achieved without offensive space capabilities that deter, and, if necessary, destroy enemy capabilities.

In Europe and the Indo-Pacific, France and Japan are technologically capable of developing offensive capabilities, but politics forbid them from fielding offensive weapons in space, leaving Russian and Chinese rendezvous and proximity operations and kill chains unchallenged. This means such partnerships are unlikely to support the US with truly offensive capabilities in space.

Effective Bilateral and Mini-lateral Partnerships

US Space Command shares space situational awareness data with 33 partner countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender (OOD) is a US Space Command operation to strengthen defenses and deter aggression in space, and involves more than six countries.

US Space Command and the US Space Force have agreements for exchange of personnel and liaison officers for these countries. Bilateral and mini-lateral partnerships include hosting payloads on allied systems such as Norway’s Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS aka Michibiki); Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) with the UK and Australia; and Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) using commercial space domain awareness data with allies and partners. Such needed bilateral and mini-lateral agreements get more done and faster.

Challenging Multilateral Partnerships

Implementing wideband global satellite communications (WGS) to provide satellite communications (SATCOM) to NATO can be challenging when over twenty nations all want to have their own homegrown terminals that can use any nation’s SATCOM satellites. This is made worse by the NATO Communications and Information Agency imposing further rules.

Bottlenecks with extremely high frequency (EHF) communications for nuclear deterrence means all capitals want to have a chance to say yay or nay on who makes the decision and communicates through the EHF with allied command operations. Compared with bi- or mini-lateral agreements, multilateral partnerships are complicated to implement.

The GAO Report on Organizational Politics

An earlier report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the US Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent challenges that impede its efforts to integrate allies and partners into space operations and activities by establishing joint goals. The unclassified version of the GAO report tackles organizational politics specifically.
The report identified that the DoD has several organizations that have overlapping roles and responsibilities for space-related security cooperation.

Several foreign government officials said that finding the appropriate DoD contact with whom to coordinate is difficult, resulting in confusion and missed opportunities. GAO found that USSF has not identified, analyzed, or responded to the risk of not filling positions within its service components, including space-related planning, information sharing, and security cooperation positions.

The USSF strategy acknowledges resource constraints: personnel, budget, and time are limited for all parties. Overclassification limits intelligence sharing and is a concern. Policy misalignment, lack of straightforward national policies, and interoperability risks hinder cooperation.

The USSF is already seeking $6 billion for its own unfunded priorities such as its nascent Military Network (MILNET) satellite constellation and various classified projects. Meanwhile, China appears eager to beat the USSF to the punch in space refueling. Hence the criticality of the USSF astroscale refueling deal. Europe and Japan remain in the process of developing elementary space-based surveillance and passive defense assets.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space?

Current USSF half-baked strategic and cooperation models, leadership alignment issues, capability gaps among allies, and inefficiencies in multilateral agreements are not helping the US to lead in solving allies’ collective space security quandaries, let alone guaranteeing the United States’ own homeland security. In a worst-case scenario, the US might need to be prepared to go it alone and add foreign capabilities as “nice to have.”

If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies, many of whom will be sitting on the fence. Furthermore, allies of the US could be knocked out, one-by-one, by China and Russia in orbit, leaving the US to go it alone anyway.

If the USSF international partnerships strategy is to be relevant, the USSF needs to further evolve from support functions to offensive space warfare, which should form the backbone of any allied international counterspace capabilities. Ultimately, in space, as on Earth, one either leads, follows, or gets out of the way. The US is allowing itself to be paralyzed by committee, which is a sure-fire way to lose the war in space that already started.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

As a strategy, MAD was considered but jettisoned by the United States 65 years ago. For example, President John F. Kennedy noted, “Above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war. To adopt that kind of course in the nuclear age would be evidence only of the bankruptcy of our policy, or of a collective death-wish for the world.” Kennedy succeeded in adopting a strategy short of all-out retaliation that came to be known as “flexible response,” which, in 1974, was fully developed by James Schlesinger and eventually codified in Presidential Defense Directive 59.

Whether the United States has 10,000 or 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons, American forces were designed to have a secure retaliatory capability at any level of conflict. The objective was to end any conflict as soon as possible and at the lowest level of destruction. The American objective was not to burn an adversary’s cities to the ground. American deterrence strategy was to hold at risk what the adversary valued most.

Critics of current deterrence strategy assume that no nuclear-armed adversary of the United States believes in “fighting” a nuclear war. So, the US should drop its long-held deterrence strategy and go back to MAD or something like it. At the same time, many of these critics join nuclear abolitionists to support nuclear weapons but only to deter, not engage, in warfighting. If conflict breaks out and these weapons will not be used in retaliation, then nuclear forces are off the table and reduced to a bluff.

The mistaken notion that the US has a MAD strategy plays into the hands of Russia and China. These two nations both seek to escalate or threaten to escalate in a crisis or conflict with the limited use of nuclear weapons. The objective is to get the United States to stand down and not come to the defense of her allies, a restraint to give Russia and China a strategic advantage.

Unfortunately, much of the current commentary on nuclear threats still assumes the US and its adversaries maintain a mutually assured destruction strategy as the best means to avoid any use of nuclear weapons. Annie Jacobson’s recent book, On Nuclear War: A Scenario, describes a mutually assured destruction strategy, which she assumes the US maintains, as simply MAD or crazy. She posits that any initial use of nuclear weapons would almost automatically result in the all-out use of such weapons, leading to nuclear winter and killing billions. As such, she calls for the entirety of American nuclear deterrence to be jettisoned.

Being in the deterrence business, it is important for Congress, the media, the executive decisionmakers in the military and Department of Defense to fully understand what deterrence, as practiced by the United States, entails and why it must be sustained.

To explain this requires a review of history and an understanding that adversaries of the United States and the West sought military advantage through enhanced nuclear weapons technology. Over time the challenge for the US to sustain deterrence changed. The Soviets sought to put nuclear weapons in space, then built a huge first-strike missile force, then deployed thousands of medium-range SS-20s to intimidate and split NATO, and, most recently, built a theater-strike capability to keep the United States and NATO from winning the war in Ukraine.

The US nuclear deterrent was never one size fits all and automatically fit for purpose. For example, the US and NATO faced a huge conventional military threat from the Soviet Union from the beginning of the Cold War on the plains of central Europe, a place called the Fulda Gap. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact tanks were not matched by American conventional forces. President Dwight D. Eisenhower did not wish to bankrupt the US treasury by building such a large and costly conventional military. The available alternative was to establish a nuclear umbrella over Europe, primarily aimed at Soviet tank armies. Thus, in the initial Cold War period, the US assumed a nuclear conflict would most probably grow out of an initial conventional war.

As technology improved, however, a threat emerged that could markedly change the correlation of forces between the United States and the USSR. The US still sought to deter a potential Soviet push into central Europe, but an additional threat was a potential Soviet pre-emptive first strike seeking to eliminate much of the American extended deterrent, followed up by a subsequent conventional invasion of Europe.

In 1963, the American strategic nuclear deterrent consisted of 6,000 nuclear warheads while the Russians had 600 warheads. As President Kennedy remarked, this strength, and particularly the newly deployed Minuteman missiles, were “my ace in the hole” that gave the United States the strategic advantage that peacefully ended the Cuban Missile Crisis.

However, by the time the next decade ended, the 1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) “arms control” treaty process was implemented and the USSR largely caught up, deploying 7,800 warheads compared to the US force of 8,700 warheads. Most worrisome was the new Soviet land-based missile force of 3,000 warheads on highly accurate SS-18s—with the overall Soviet nuclear force projected to grow to over 24,000 warheads by 1993.

As Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird told Congress in 1974, “the Soviets are going for a first strike force and there is no doubt about it.” The SS-18 eventually held at risk the entirety of the US land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. This was the only American deterrent force that was sufficiently accurate to target key Soviet leadership and military targets without requiring “city busting.”

The US stopped deploying land-based missiles at 1,050 and associated warheads at around 2,000—assuming the USSR would show equal restraint. But Moscow built a huge land-based ICBM force that could take out the nation’s Minuteman missiles, leaving the US without the ability to hold key Soviet assets at risk. This perceived imbalance was known as the “window of vulnerability” where the US faced the prospects of a Soviet-initiated first strike that would leave US leaders exactly where President Kennedy worried it would.

The US solved the strategic equation of the window of vulnerability, the Soviet empire collapsed, the US added the Trident II D-5 submarine-launched ballistic missile and Peacekeeper land-based ICBM, Soviet SS-20s were banned, and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) arms control process brought Russian warheads down to under 2,000.

In April 1999, Russian President Boris Yeltsin, economically unable to rebuild a Soviet-era nuclear force, decreed that Moscow develop highly accurate, small, low-yield, battlefield nuclear weapons, which his successor, Vladimir Putin, did in earnest. As former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Hyten warned, these theater nuclear weapons were designed to “escalate to win” a conventional conflict or crisis between Moscow and Washington.

Putin thinks the US will not respond to the small-scale use of nuclear weapons because the US will not want to risk escalation and the possibility of strategic nuclear exchange. That is why Putin made exactly these threats over NATO’s intervention in the war against Ukraine.

Both Russia and China assume the relative weak theater nuclear forces the US maintains are now insufficient to match escalatory threats from Moscow and possibly Beijing. This point was emphasized by the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission report in laying out the opening of a new window of vulnerability.

The US is indeed now developing a greater theater nuclear deterrent to close the technology gap. However, simply adding to America’s conventional deterrent is not sufficient. As military leadership has repeatedly emphasized, if adversarial nuclear forces are introduced into a conventional conflict, the American advantage ceases. In short, conventional military leverage disappears.

The central tenets of mutually assured destruction no longer apply. MAD was jettisoned long ago. More importantly, America’s adversaries employ credible threats with the nuclear forces. New technology and expanding adversary arsenals are undermining the limited deterrent value of the American nuclear arsenal, a fact that must change if the United States seeks to ensure it does not find itself embroiled in a conflict where capitulation or Armageddon are the nation’s only options.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Mutually Assured Destruction was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia continued its bombardment of Ukraine with drone and missile strikes, and the US weighed the possibility of additional economic sanctions on Russia, including secondary sanctions against states trading with Russia. Debates among the Washington cognoscenti about possible peace settlements focused on two “baskets” of topics: what kind of “land swap” might be agreeable to Ukraine and Russia and what sort of security guarantees would be necessary for a postwar Ukraine. Amid all of this, one elephant in the room received little attention: the status of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in future relationships between Ukraine and Russia and between Russia and NATO.

President Donald Trump posted on social media in late July 2025, that Dmitri Medvedev, Russia’s former president, was a “failed former President of Russia” who had better “watch his words.” Trump was responding to earlier remarks by Medvedev, after Trump threatened economic sanctions against Russia unless Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a temporary ceasefire and expedited peace talks with Ukraine.

In the earlier exchange, Medvedev called Trump’s ultimatum about peace talks a threat and a step toward war. Most recently, Medvedev again warned against nuclear danger by referring to the American television series The Walking Dead and reminded Trump that Russia retains the Soviet “Dead Hand” system for automatic nuclear launch even under the most extreme postattack conditions.

In response, President Trump posted on social media that he ordered two nuclear submarines to be repositioned in response to Medvedev’s threats. Trump said he ordered the submarines “to be positioned in the appropriate regions, just in case these foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that.” In addition, the President noted that “[w]ords are very important and can often lead to unintended consequences. I hope this will not be one of those instances.”

Nuclear submarine movements are among the most highly classified information pertinent to military operations. If the reference was to American nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), this public announcement was unprecedented.

At one level, these interchanges between Medvedev and Trump are as much performative as they are substantive. During the early stages of Russia’s war against Ukraine beginning in February 2022, Putin issued frequent warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in response to actions taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that might be unacceptable to Russia. These warnings were dismissed by many Western political leaders and military experts as bluff to conceal Russia’s frustration at the prolonged military deadlock it faced in Ukraine, as well as distractions from looking too closely at Russia’s disappointing battlefield performances.

As Russia’s military operations on the ground seemed to improve in 2024 and 2025, nuclear threats became less frequent and less explicit. At present, Russia seems confident of maximizing its forward progress in military reach and operational control over the Donbass and other districts in the east and south of Ukraine.

Even a “small” nuclear war fought with tactical nuclear weapons would be a self-defeating endeavor for Russia. Fighting a conventional war under the shadow of possible nuclear escalation is sufficiently risky. If Russia were to cross the bridge into nuclear first use there would be a strong likelihood of a NATO nuclear response.

Russians need to interrogate their own military literature from the Cold War with respect to the challenge of conducting military operations in a nuclear environment. Troops seeking an operational breakthrough against enemy defenses would be fighting against the prompt and delayed effects of nuclear detonations that slow operational movement, inflict significant numbers of casualties, and corrupt the coordination and cohesion of combined arms. The Soviet Union could draw upon its ideological indoctrination and favorable memories of its victory in the Great Patriotic War (World War II) to maintain morale and avoid mass desertion, Russia cannot.

Nor would the economy of Europe, including Russia, survive anything beyond the very restrictive use of a few ultra-low-yield or low-yield in the sub-five kiloton range. In today’s world of social media and globally transmitted visual images, the meltdown of major financial and other institutions in Europe would trigger a global crash of markets, disrupt supply chains, let loose armed formations of criminals, and drive many leading politicians to abdication. Some in NATO might hope that Putin’s mistaken decision for nuclear first use would finally convince Russia’s military and security forces to overthrow their president and sue for peace, but Putin is not Lenin, and he is as likely to double down on escalation as he is to acquiesce to a nuclear ceasefire.

And therein lies the second danger, escalation to strategic nuclear war between the United States and Russia. Putin might calculate that he could hive off the nuclear deterrents of the British and French from their American allies and bully the former into submission while frightening the American government and public with separate threats of mass destruction. This would be a dangerous miscalculation because the nuclear forces of the United States are politically and operationally coupled to those of their European allies.

American nuclear weapons and American personnel deployed in Europe are effectively tied to the continent under Article V of the NATO charter. The idea that selective use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by Russia could be sealed off from wider and more deadly destruction, is beyond optimism.

In addition to misplaced optimism about escalation control during a major European war, there is also a lack of appreciation for the challenge of skillful crisis management that might avoid war altogether. Experience teaches that the requirements for nuclear and other crisis management include shared understandings and expectations about the risks of war and a willingness to consider the danger of misperceptions held by leaders in stressful situations. They may misjudge other national leaders as irrevocably committed to acts of conquest or aggression, when in fact those other heads of state may be undecided about their final judgments for or against war.

Communication between and among leaders may be incomplete and intelligence assessments can be blinkered by insufficient information or political bias. Examples of these and other maladies in crisis are provided by the July crisis of 1914 leading to the outbreak of World War I, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and by numerous other crises.

Russians playing with the rhetoric of Armageddon are legitimizing nuclear coercion in a time of troubles. The arrangement of a prompt ceasefire and peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia is of the highest significance for many reasons. These include putting an end to the loss of life and the destruction of national infrastructure. This objective should be pursued with aggressive diplomacy and without the distraction of references to the possibility of a war that would have no precedent in its capacity to do irreparable harm to civilization.

Steve Cimbala is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Danger Remains in Ukraine Peace Settlement was originally published on Global Security Review.

The simulated conflict ended without regime change in Pyongyang, allowing Kim Jong Un to claim a political victory. While avoiding nuclear escalation may seem prudent, such an outcome could deal a lasting blow to the credibility of America’s extended deterrence in East Asia.

The Guardian Tiger scenario should not be dismissed as an academic exercise. It reveals a critical vulnerability in the psychological foundation of deterrence: the perception among adversaries and allies of American willingness to use nuclear weapons in defense of its partners. If allies conclude that Washington will not cross the nuclear threshold even after a nuclear attack, they may question the value of the nuclear umbrella. Adversaries, meanwhile, may learn that nuclear coercion, carefully calibrated, can succeed.

In the simulation, North Korea escalated to a tactical nuclear strike against a South Korean Navy destroyer in the East Sea (Guardian Tiger I) and later against the Chinhae naval base (Guardian Tiger II), home to the Republic of Korea Navy’s Submarine Force Command and occasionally used for allied submarine visits. According to the report, American leaders debated nuclear retaliation but settled on conventional “pulsed” strikes.

In a real-world scenario, such strikes could plausibly involve precision-guided munitions from long-range bombers like the B1-B and Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, aimed at targets such as missile transporter-erector launchers, hardened artillery positions along the DMZ, and command-and-control facilities near Pyongyang. In the exercise, the US stopped short of regime change, seeking to avoid further nuclear escalation and prevent a direct war with China—a decision that would have allowed Pyongyang to absorb the damage, count the survival of its regime as a strategic win, and enter negotiations from a stronger position.

Extended deterrence depends on more than military capability. It is rooted in the belief, shared by allies and adversaries alike, that the United States is willing to defend its partners by all means necessary, including nuclear weapons. An American failure to respond in kind to North Korean nuclear use would plant seeds of doubt. Japanese and South Korean leaders could begin to question whether Washington would truly “trade Los Angeles for Tokyo or Seoul” if the stakes involved limited nuclear use rather than an existential threat to the United States.

That doubt could trigger cascading effects. Calls in Seoul’s National Assembly for indigenous nuclear weapons, expanded production of the Hyunmoo‑4 ballistic missile, and pressure on Tokyo to more seriously pursue nuclear sharing arrangements have already entered the political debate.

This concern is amplified by North Korea’s 2022 nuclear weapons law, which openly authorizes preemptive nuclear strikes in scenarios ranging from an imminent attack on leadership to undefined overwhelming crisis situations. Analysts note that the law’s language effectively lowers the threshold for nuclear use, implying tactical employment to repel invasion and seize the initiative in war. Rather than viewing nuclear use as a desperate last resort, Pyongyang now appears willing to employ such weapons early. For example, a low‑yield detonation against South Korean or American forward-deployed forces to shock Washington and Seoul into political concessions.

The challenge grows sharper in the event of a dual contingency: simultaneous crises on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait. Guardian Tiger II simulated such a scenario, with China launching a multi-domain assault on Taiwan while North Korea escalated on the peninsula. In such a real-world situation, US Indo-Pacific Command could be forced to divert the USS Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group from Yokosuka to the waters east of Taiwan, deploy B‑52H bombers to deter Chinese operations, and even consider repositioning some Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Patriot missile defense batteries from South Korea to protect American assets in Okinawa and Guam.

Such shifts illustrate how a stretched American posture could reduce missile interception capacity on the peninsula and temporarily remove some nuclear-capable platforms from immediate Korean defense. North Korea could calculate that Washington, already balancing a larger confrontation with China, would avoid nuclear escalation in Korea to conserve resources and limit the risk of an all-out US-China war.

The political and strategic consequences would ripple across the region. In Seoul, public and elite opinion could shift sharply toward developing an independent nuclear arsenal—something 71 percent of South Koreans already support. South Korea’s nuclear latency, widely assessed by proliferation experts, suggests it could potentially produce a weapon in as little as 6 months if political consensus formed.

In Tokyo, the debate over counterstrike capabilities, missile defense expansion, and potential nuclear sharing with the United States would intensify, potentially accelerating deployment of Tomahawk missiles and further integration of F‑35A fighters, which, in the US fleet, are being certified for B61‑12 nuclear bombs, into allied defense planning. Beijing, meanwhile, could seize the opportunity to position itself as a stabilizing broker, offering to mediate between Seoul and Pyongyang while shielding the latter from full international accountability, further eroding American influence.

Avoiding nuclear escalation in a limited-strike scenario is understandable, but Washington cannot afford such a decision to be interpreted as weakness. Strengthening deterrence credibility in Northeast Asia will require more than declaratory statements. Clear and credible red lines for nuclear use must be communicated both publicly and privately. Integrated nuclear-conventional planning with allies should ensure that flexible response options, from proportionate nuclear strikes to overwhelming conventional retaliation, are executable on short notice. Contingency planning must explicitly account for simultaneous conflicts in Korea and Taiwan, with pre-positioned munitions, dispersed basing arrangements for nuclear-capable aircraft, and rotational deployments of dual-capable ships and submarines to maintain strategic presence even under force diversion.

Equally important is sustained alliance signaling. These include high-visibility joint exercises like the US-ROK Freedom Shield exercises, regular port visits by nuclear-capable submarines, and trilateral missile tracking drills with Japan. These measures reassure allies, complicate adversary calculations, and demonstrate that any nuclear use will incur unacceptable costs.

The Guardian Tiger exercises are valuable not because they predict the future, but because they reveal how quickly deterrence can fray in the fog of crisis. A single decision to refrain from nuclear retaliation, however understandable at the time, could reverberate for decades and reshape the strategic balance in East Asia. In the nuclear age, preserving deterrence means guarding against both uncontrolled escalation and the perceptions of hesitation that could invite it.

Dr. Ju Hyung Kim, President of the Security Management Institute, a defense think tank affiliated with the South Korean National Assembly, is currently adapting his doctoral dissertation, “Japan’s Security Contribution to South Korea, 1950 to 2023,” into a book.

A Nuclear Umbrella in Peril: Lessons from North Korea’s Escalation Scenarios was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic Drivers

There are several strategic imperatives driving Israel’s likely military action against Iran. This includes the full neutralization of Iran’s regional military ecosystem. Israel’s continuous operations in Gaza and its persistent pressure on disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon are not isolated campaigns. They are shaping operations aimed at reducing the two-front (or three-front) threat Israel faces in a direct confrontation with Iran. By degrading proxy capacity now, Israel frees resources and attention for a larger, concentrated blow against Iranian assets without the burden of sustained high-intensity proxy retaliation.

Moreover, it might be viewed by Israel that the current timing is an opportunity to exploit internal Iranian fault lines where it can be obvious that Israeli intelligence may take advantage of the exploitable rifts in the Iranian leadership ecosystem. This includes the ongoing rifts between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular Iranian army, as well as between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s advisory council. Altogether, these seams, if widened, could limit Iran’s unified response and complicate its chain of command in the early hours of an Israeli strike.

Aligning a strategic military timeline within a political context is also another factor that may trigger a more expansive attack on Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s possible target date before October 7, 2025, is symbolically and politically loaded. Delivering a strategic blow before this anniversary serves multiple purposes, including but not limited to consolidating his domestic political standing, demonstrating Israel’s capacity to impose strategic costs on Iran, and shaping the broader narrative in the US.

Operational Indicators of Preparation

Mossad has already intensified intelligence and special operations inside Iran, including target acquisition and asset positioning. This was also very apparent in the drone attacks by Israel, that took place from within Iran, in the recent confrontation. They resulted in the successful elimination of many of Iran’s senior military members. These activities are not stand-alone intelligence-gathering missions; they are preparatory steps for synchronized special forces, air, and cyber composite operations. Accordingly, expanded Israeli intelligence and activity against Iran is highly likely with the operational aim to pre-emptively disable Iranian sensor grids, command nodes, and ballistic missile launch infrastructure.

Indications within the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) suggest a possible force regeneration, given the apparent contradiction between political calls for full Gaza occupation and the IDF chief of staff’s emphasis on giving forces a rest. This is consistent with a combat reconstitution phase. This also aligns with the doctrine of unit rotation, replenishment, and training for the demands of long-range precision strike and high-tempo air operations.

At this stage, signs of Iranian defensive mobilization are extremely important. Tehran’s formation of a National Defense Council under Ali Larijani and consolidation of 13 security agencies into three “super-agencies” is an unmistakable sign that Iran expects a broader confrontation. Such a restructuring’s purpose is to tighten internal security, improve rapid mobilization of conventional and unconventional forces, and streamline command and control. Ironically, such rapid reorganizations can create bureaucratic friction—an exploitable weakness during the chaos of an initial strike.

Political Leverage and Timing

US involvement and the “Trump factor” are critical for Israel. Netanyahu’s priority is securing at least limited US involvement or political cover. Persuading Trump to back a strike or provide overt/implicit support could blunt international pushback and potentially extend Israel’s operational window. Netanyahu’s engagement with the pro-Israel lobby in the US is also aiming to mitigate more isolationist resistance, which is anchored in Trump’s “end wars” philosophy.

Many currently view Israel’s great power triangulation as political leverage. For example, Israel is engaging in calculated quid-pro-quo diplomacy where it is coordinating with Russia in order to possibly avoid Russian obstruction in Syrian and regional airspace. In parallel, Israel is supporting Trump’s interests in Ukraine negotiations and the recently announced Azerbaijan-Armenia reconciliation in exchange for flexibility on Iran. This triangulation reduces the risk of multi-front geopolitical friction during the strike window.

The Anticipated Israeli Operational Concept

Consistent with IDF doctrine, a multi-domain composite strike operation is highly likely. Such a strike is likely to combine precision air/missile strikes and cyber-sabotage. Sequence effects would aim to blind Iranian radar, degrade command-and-control (C2) nodes, and neutralize ballistic missiles at launch sites within the first hours as well as exploit “left-of-launch” interception to deny Iran its most potent retaliatory capability. Additionally, ongoing operations in Gaza and along the Lebanese border serve as “maskirovka,” where a strategic deception fixes adversary focus away from the Iranian theater and provides live operational rehearsal for air-to-ground coordination, precision targeting, and strategic messaging.

However, Israel’s plan is expected to involve pre-emptive or concurrent action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This is very likely given the fact that Hezbollah vowed not to disarm and give armaments control to the Lebanese army. Accordingly, Iran’s proxy neutralization remains one of the most important steps ahead of a full-scale attack on Iran. This procedure is critical to prevent logistical and operational disruption to the main Iran-focused strike locations as well as protect regional Arab states indirectly supporting Israeli strikes on Iran from the latter’s proxies’ retaliatory actions.

International Pressure Tolerance and Timeline Assessment

Israel’s willingness to accept higher casualties and endure reputational costs has already been demonstrated in its Gaza and Lebanon campaigns, as well as the limited strikes it conducted against Iran. This signals a political readiness to withstand the diplomatic fallout of striking Iran, and a military posture aligned with completing decisive action before the strategic window closes.

Key risks exist with a full-scale attack on Iran. First, American political dynamics, where, for instance, isolationism and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize ambitions could temper military participation or support. Second, the threat from Iran’s regional proxies still exists, where the risk of multi-proxy escalation is very likely. In this regard, full activation of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the PMF would complicate Israel’s operational tempo. Third, there is the chance of an Iranian counter-surprise, where Tehran attempts its own pre-emptive measures (cyber, proxy action, or limited missile strikes). That said, Israel’s concept appears to be structured for first-mover advantage, assuming Iran’s reorganized security apparatus is slow to adapt in the initial strike window.

Forecast and Likely Outcomes

Given the current convergence of strategic necessity, operational readiness, and political opportunity, the probability of a renewed, larger-scale Israeli attack on Iran before year-end is very high. The planned operation will probably try to take advantage of divisions within Iran to create more chaos, reduce the chances of retaliation from its proxies, and cause major damage to Iran’s missile, nuclear, and command systems—all with an aim of shaping the regional balance in Israel’s Favor ahead of the October 7 anniversary.

If executed, such a strike would represent the most significant escalation between Israel and Iran to date as well as a defining test of Israeli air and missile defense capacity against retaliatory salvos, which then would reshape Middle East strategic alignment and potentially lock in a more aggressive Israeli doctrine of direct confrontation with regional adversaries, rather than proxy containment.

While forecasts will continue, the coming period may include several operational watch points. This includes anomalies in which sudden spikes in Israeli aerial reconnaissance occur over Iraq, Syria, or along Iran’s western approaches. Additionally, force posture shifts are a significant indication; noticeable redeployment or reinforcement of Israel’s Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow batteries are highly likely to be a main indicator of Israel’s reinforcement for defensive systems against any Iranian missile attack. Diplomatic traffic is also a key indicator, where intensified Israeli engagement in Washington, Moscow, and key Arab Gulf capitals may indicate Israel’s preparation for an expanded offensive on Iran.

Whatever may occur, vigilance is required. Without it, the implications are significant for nations and people across the region.

Mohamed ELDoh is a guest writer for Global Security Review.

Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.

The war was not won by overwhelming force—it was won by precision, persistence, and a new kind of visibility. This shift was not just tactical; it was existential. Drones lowered the cost of engagement and shattered the old logic of deterrence. Military planners who once relied on large arsenals and conventional firepower now face a battlefield defined by bandwidth, optics, and algorithms. Nagorno-Karabakh was not an anomaly; it was a preview of what is coming.

Drones Tilt the Balance of Power

Azerbaijan’s drone fleet, led by Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2s and Israeli loitering munitions, did more than support ground troops. These drones destroyed tanks, artillery, and air defense systems with surgical precision.

Drone footage flooded social media and state television, galvanizing public support and intimidating adversaries. The battlefield became a stage and drones the lead actors in a performance of technological supremacy.

This was not a remote skirmish; it was a full-spectrum demonstration of how drones can tilt the military balance. Azerbaijan used converted Soviet-era aircraft as bait to expose Armenian air defenses, then struck with precision-guided drones. Air dominance was no longer reserved for wealthy superpowers; it was achieved through strategy and innovation.

Deterrence No Longer Works the Way It Used To

Deterrence did not fail for lack of firepower; it failed because the rules changed faster than anyone could adapt. Armenia’s conventional forces, built on Cold War assumptions, could not withstand the precision and persistence of drone strikes. The belief that large-scale military assets could prevent escalation collapsed under the weight of smaller and smarter systems.

This was not just a tactical failure; it was a conceptual one. Drones lowered the threshold for engagement and allowed Azerbaijan to strike decisively without risking pilots or exposing vulnerable assets. Deterrence, once rooted in overwhelming retaliation, now faces a new reality: speed, precision, and deniability.

Hybrid Warfare Is the New Normal

The war was not fought only in the skies; it unfolded across screens, networks, and supply chains. Azerbaijan blended conventional ground operations with cyber tactics, information warfare, and economic pressure. This hybrid model reflects a broader shift in twenty-first century warfare, where victory depends as much on narrative as on firepower.

Azerbaijan’s goals were clear: reclaim a contested enclave and secure vital energy corridors. But its drone-led offensive carried a deeper message—technological capability is political will. The signal to adversaries was unmistakable: resistance will be met with precision, persistence, and total visibility.

Small States Can Now Challenge Big Powers

            For Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh represents cultural survival and historical identity. Its defense relied on asymmetrical tactics and guerrilla resilience. But against a technologically superior adversary, these methods faltered. Civilians and soldiers alike were left exposed, sheltering under skies that no longer offered cover.

This vulnerability is not unique to Armenia. Small states with access to drones can now challenge larger powers. Taiwan, for instance, is rapidly scaling up domestic drone production to counter China and support Western allies. Its “Drone National Team” initiative aims to produce 15,000 drones per month by 2028, positioning the island as a global hub for secure, AI-enabled drones.

Deterrence Must Be Reimagined

Nagorno-Karabakh may be the first war won by drones, but it will not be the last. The conflict offers a sobering lesson; deterrence must evolve or risk obsolescence. Integrated deterrence—blending military, economic, cyber, and diplomatic tools—is no longer optional. Unlike nuclear weapons, drones are accessible, scalable, and deniable. Their proliferation is horizontal, not vertical, spreading across small states, insurgent groups, and private firms.

As drone technology spreads, so does the risk of escalation, miscalculation, and asymmetric retaliation. The battlefield is no longer bound by geography; it is shaped by bandwidth, optics, and algorithmic intent.

Conclusion

            Nagorno-Karabakh was not just a battlefield; it was a turning point. It exposed how technological agility can dismantle legacy doctrines and how drones, once tactical novelties, now shape strategic outcomes. In this new era, deterrence is not about mass or might; it is about adaptability, integration, and speed. For nations still clinging to Cold War paradigms, the message is clear: evolve or be outmaneuvered. The future belongs to those who understand not just how to fight, but how to think in bandwidths, algorithms, and stories that shape the battlefield before the first shot is fired.

Evolution demands more than procurement; it requires imagination. Nations must rethink not only how they defend, but what they defend and why. As drones blur the line between war and surveillance, between deterrence and provocation, the strategist of tomorrow must be fluent in both geopolitics and code. The age of unmanned warfare is here and it is rewriting the rules faster than most doctrines can keep up.

Vikramaditya Shrivastava is a master’s student in international relations, security, and strategy at OP Jindal Global University.

Drones and the Death of Deterrence: Lessons from Nagorno-Karabakh was originally published on Global Security Review.

The credibility of the nation’s nuclear deterrent, the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty, is inextricably linked to domestic well-being. Economic prosperity, social cohesion, and the trust citizens have in their institutions are all part of that amorphous concept. Adversaries like Russia and China understand that it is in their interest to undermine American societal health; it is time Americans realize the challenge facing the nation.

For decades, the logic of nuclear deterrence rested on a triad of capabilities, credibility, and communication. The United States fielded the world’s most advanced nuclear arsenal and communicated credibility effectively. But credibility—the unwavering belief in America’s will to act—is the lynchpin.

This is where the home front becomes the front line. A nation that is prosperous, unified, and optimistic possesses the strategic endurance to maintain its commitments. Societal well-being is not a “soft” issue separate from “hard” power; it is a foundational strategic asset that fuels long-term political resolve.

The mechanisms connecting a healthy society to a credible deterrent are not merely theoretical. They are etched into recent history. Consider the 1980s under President Reagan. An economic resurgence and a renewed sense of national confidence provided the political capital and financial resources for a sweeping modernization of nuclear forces that saw the Peacekeeper ICBM and the B-2 stealth bomber enter service.

This was not just a military build-up; it was a clear signal to the Soviet Union, born from a nation that had the resources and the will to compete over the long haul. High public trust, buoyed by economic stability, sustained the political commitment for these massive, multi-decade investments.

Contrast this with the period following the 2008 financial crisis. The ensuing economic pain, political polarization, and public discontent led directly to the Budget Control Act and sequestration, which imposed punishing cuts on the defense budget. Allies and adversaries alike watched as Americans debated whether they could afford to modernize an aging nuclear triad. The signal was one of constraint and introspection, raising quiet questions in foreign capitals about the long-term reliability of America’s security guarantees. A nation struggling with internal economic and social crises inevitably projects an image of distraction and dwindling resolve.

Adversaries did not miss this lesson. They astutely integrated America’s domestic vulnerabilities into their national security strategies. China and Russia are engaged in a relentless campaign of information warfare designed to exacerbate our societal fissures. State-controlled media outlets like CGTN (Chinese) and RT (Russian), amplified by armies of bots and trolls on social media, relentlessly spotlight American inequality, racial tensions, and political gridlock.

Their goal is twofold: erode the confidence of Americans in their own democratic system and persuade the world that the United States is a chaotic, declining power whose deterrence is brittle and promises are hollow. By turning societal metrics into weapons against Americans, adversaries aim to achieve strategic gains without firing a shot.

Of course, the relationship between societal health and defense is not without its complexities. A valid counterargument holds that a society enjoying high well-being might become complacent, preferring to spend its “peace dividend” on social programs rather than defense. The post–Cold War era saw this exact debate, as calls to shift funding from “guns to butter” grew louder.

This presents a genuine leadership challenge that requires articulating why investments in national security are essential to protecting the very prosperity and stability Americans enjoy. The choice is not always between a new healthcare program and a new submarine. A strong, healthy, and educated populace, free from economic precarity, is the very foundation that allows a nation to project power and afford the tools of its own defense. A robust social safety net and a powerful military are not mutually exclusive—they are mutually reinforcing pillars of a resilient state.

This calculus extends to the nation’s most critical strategic advantage: America’s network of alliances. The strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for instance, is not purely a measure of its combined military hardware. It is rooted in a collective commitment to democratic values and the shared societal well-being of its members.

A stable, prosperous, and unified America reassures allies and strengthens collective deterrence. Conversely, an America seen as internally fractured and unreliable invites doubt, weakening the very alliances that magnify American power. When allied societies are confident in American leadership, collective credibility soars.

Therefore, Americans must rethink national security for the twenty-first century by placing American well-being at the very heart of our strategic imperatives. Bridging the economic divide not only broadens our tax base but also strengthens social cohesion, enabling sustainable defense budgets without overburdening taxpayers. Revitalizing education fuels scientific breakthroughs and cultivates the skilled workforce needed to modernize our nuclear command, control, and delivery systems. Upgrading infrastructure, from critical ports and highways to resilient cybersecurity networks, enhances our logistical agility, accelerates force deployment, and bolsters the credibility of our deterrent. By fostering political unity, we project resolve to allies and adversaries alike, inoculating our society against foreign information warfare and ensuring decisive, coordinated responses in times of crisis.

The defining contest of this century will not be waged on traditional battlefields but in a struggle of systems: our free, prosperous, and cohesive society versus an authoritarian model of centralized control. To secure our peace, we must fortify America’s Silent Shield at home. The credibility of our nuclear deterrent, and, by extension, our global leadership, will always mirror the resilience and unity of the nation it protects.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

America’s Silent Shield: How Domestic Strength Sustains Nuclear Power was originally published on Global Security Review.

Professional diplomats in the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies might have wondered if this was an unrehearsed skit from Saturday Night Live.  Only Alec Baldwin playing the role of Trump was missing. Allies do not talk to each other like in front of the media.

It was clear that Trump and Vice President JD Vance expected to have a pleasant conversation in front of the cameras, have a nice private lunch, and then publicly sign a mineral deal with President Zelensky. They did not expect the pushback and demands that came near the end of the conversation. As a famous French diplomat once said, with respect to another diplomatic blunder, it was “worse than a crime. It was a mistake.”

Zelensky ended up being unceremoniously escorted out of the White House without lunch or a deal. The agreement that would allow the United States to mine rare Earth minerals in Ukraine was that it would repay the United States for the more than $160 billion that American taxpayers have invested in Ukraine’s defense. Profits from American mining operations would also help rebuild Ukraine. American businesses operating in Ukraine would also offer de facto security guarantees to Ukraine. Absent such an agreement, it was feared that China may partner with Ukraine to mine these critical minerals.

While President Trump is likely genuine in his desire to see the killing end and Ukraine rebuilt, Ukraine is only a small part of a larger strategic game the United States is playing. The Trump administration believes that Europe is no longer the strategic pivot of international relations. Instead, the focal point of American diplomacy and military preparedness is the Far East, with a rising China as the main adversary standing in the way of American global leadership and international influence. Europe is a secondary theater of operations, and it is time Europeans bare the burden of their own defense.

This view is a tectonic shift in American focus, but understandable. China has ambitions that go well beyond military and political competition with the United States in China’s backyard.

China’s global strategy of multi-domain competition with the US includes all spheres of power and influence. Its tool kit includes explicit challenges to the United States in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, the military use of space, artificial intelligence development, cyberwar, and economic influence.

China’s ambitious naval expansion may fall short of driving the US Navy from the high seas, but its combined arms approach to anti-access and area denial (A2AD) in East Asia is intended to deter and, if necessary, defeat any power that would oppose China’s mastery of its immediate sphere of influence, including Taiwan.

Nevertheless, recognition of the threat posed by a rising China does not invalidate the strategic significance of events in Europe. America’s commitment to the defense and security of a free Europe is not transactional, it is existential. This is embodied in the NATO alliance.

NATO is the result of symbiotic relationships among democratic states that provide collective security within a context of political freedom. Ironically, this is why JD Vance’s challenge to European allies at the Munich Security Conference was so interesting. Vance noted that the United States and Europe are linked, not only by procedures and financial commitments, but also by shared values, including free speech. He rightly urged the European members of NATO and the European Union to enhance their commitments to free speech that, in his view, are in decline across Europe.

Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, with its objective of destroying Ukraine’s armed forces, economy, infrastructure and its viability as a state is clearly grossly immoral. But evil in the world is nothing new, nor is it incumbent on the American taxpayer to fund every effort to eradicate all evil in the world. American efforts to impose liberal democracies where they do not exist has a poor track record of success.

Europe was the cradle of American civilization, but Americans fled Europe because of religious persecution, a lack of economic opportunity, and other reasons that are inconsistent with freedom. Doubtless, Zelensky and other European politicians drive their American partners crazy at times. During the Second World War, Charles de Gaulle drove British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower to distraction.  But the imperious de Gaulle was the symbol of French nationalism for those who opposed Germany and the Vichy regime.

An American abandonment of a free Europe would leave Europe to repeat its past mistakes, which the continent has repeated over and over and over again. Zelensky is far from an ideal partner. However, a Ukraine swallowed by Russia will result in a less stable Europe.

Vladimir Putin clearly sees a free Ukraine as a political and economic threat to Russia.  He denies that Ukraine is a distinct civilization or country. He constantly refers to Ukrainians as neo-Nazis. A negotiated settlement will not change this perspective. Any agreement with Putin must follow President Ronald Reagan’s dictum, trust but verify.

Ironically, one outcome of the war between Russia and Ukraine is the enlargement of NATO with the addition of Finland and Sweden. Thus, NATO added considerable strategic depth and an ability to prevent Russian ships from leaving port in the Baltic Sea. Without the United States, European NATO may waiver. In the end, President Trump’s efforts to push European states to play a larger role in their own security are important, but they should never lead to an American departure from the Alliance.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Professor at Penn State University at Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Trump and Zelensky: Bad Manners or Strategic Disaster? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Current challenges include the disparity in nuclear capabilities, with Russia’s projected 7,500 warheads and China’s rapid buildup to 3,500 by 2035. The U.S. TRIAD faces maintenance issues, necessitating immediate investments in updated systems to avoid strategic vulnerabilities. Recommendations highlight the need to accelerate programs like the Navy’s nuclear-armed cruise missile initiative, expand the B-21 bomber fleet, and consider additional Columbia-class submarines. These steps are presented as crucial to addressing the growing threats from adversaries while ensuring strategic balance.

The report underscores the urgency of modernizing the U.S. nuclear deterrent to sustain global power and uphold international credibility. Strategic insights from leaders like General McMaster and Secretary Frank Kendall advocate for overcoming budgetary constraints and reinforcing the defense industrial base. The document also highlights broader geopolitical concerns, such as the implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Iran’s nuclear ambitions, framing modernization as a central pillar of U.S. security policy.

ICBM EAR Report 13 Jan 2025 was originally published on Global Security Review.

What about potential nuclear weapon employment via the use of the Air Forces’ Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA)? An unmanned, autonomous, AI-piloted aircraft, the CCA will fly alongside crewed fighters, presumably to fly combat sorties resulting in casualties and battle damage. CCAs are intended to cost-effectively augment and enhance USAF combat capabilities and capacities without aggravating the fighter pilot shortage. These CCAs must be able to operate as loyal robotic wingmen tethered to manned fighter jets, as well as fly untethered with a high level of autonomy and trust when required. The real value of the untethered CCAs is the potential to deliver the most consequential weapons, through the most contested environments, against the most significant of targets without risking aircrew. The Secretary of the Air Force (SECAF) plans to build about 1,000 CCAs by the end of the next decade.

As conveyed by SECAF Frank Kendall in his Sept 5^th, 2023 memo to Airmen and Guardians, the Department is “not optimized for great power conflict” and the Department must devise and “implement the changes needed to meet our pacing challenge.” The SECAF’s clarion call to reorganize and reorient the Air Force must also encourage innovative and bold forms of integrated deterrence that include deploying AI-empowered CCAs with appropriate “strategic” capabilities like the new B61-13 intended to hold hard-to-reach targets at risk. Now is the time to begin crafting the prerequisite planning and acquiring to ensure this capability is possible in the future to avoid the much more costly retrofitting after delivery. Hermann Kahn once said, “Usually the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.” This is essential for maintaining America’s nuclear deterrence and assurance credibility beyond 2030.

AI-Empowered Collaborative Combat Aircraft Can Enhance US Nuclear Deterrence Beyond 2030 was originally published on Global Security Review.