As the United States heads toward another set of midterm Congressional elections in November 2026, issues related to nuclear weapons, including deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation, will be important. Whether candidates will give issues of nuclear policy and strategy the attention that they deserve is another matter. Historically midterms have tended to focus on the state of the economy and the personalities of the respective candidates. The 2026 midterms should also see debates about foreign policy issues and U.S. national security. 

The first issue that U.S. politicians must address is the emerging new world order and the coalition of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK) opposed to American and allied vital interests worldwide. In this regard, the efforts to set back Iran’s progress toward development and deployment of nuclear weapons will continue to meet with resistance among the other CRINKS, each with its own nuclear arsenal and an ongoing program of nuclear modernization. Russia remains the country with the world’s largest numbers of operationally deployed and stored nuclear warheads. China is rapidly building new long-range delivery systems and warheads on a trajectory that will enable it to deploy some 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons on land based, sea based and airborne launchers by 2035. North Korea is also increasing and diversifying its inventory of nuclear weapons and launchers in addition to supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine with thousands of DPRK infantrymen. 

Given the preceding context, the U.S. must anticipate and plan for the contingency of two simultaneous large scale conventional wars in Europe and Asia. Either or both conflicts would be fought under the shadow of potential nuclear first use. Since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine in February 2022, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly warned of Russia’s willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons in various circumstances. Russia has in fact exercised its nuclear command and control systems in various war games over the past several years as a direct strategic signal. NATO has responded with significant improvements in its military preparedness for protracted conventional war, and by enhancing its protocols for sharing U.S. and allied nuclear weapons with other members of the alliance in time of need. France has adopted a revised nuclear policy doctrine that includes a more explicit commitment for its nuclear force de dissuasion to alliance wide deterrence in addition to deterrence of attack against French state territory. In the Far East, China is relatively ambiguous about the conditions under which it might engage in nuclear first use, but it would be safe to assume that the option remains open in case of a major U.S. military intervention to oppose a Chinese takeover of Taiwan.  

Second, and related to the preceding discussion about the possible behavior of existing nuclear powers, is the prospect of additional countries that decide to join the ranks of nuclear weapons states. In the Middle East. and especially in the aftermath of Operation Epic Fury and Iran’s reactions, some countries may be rethinking their commitment to nuclear abstinence. The most immediate concern among proliferation experts is Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has already decided to go forward with an ambitious civilian nuclear infrastructure plan as a hedge against future uncertainty in oil markets. At a certain level, this program would open the door to weaponization if the kingdom felt sufficiently threatened by Iran, since the latter has already targeted Saudi economic infrastructure and U.S. military bases throughout the region. In Asia, the threat posed by China and North Korea might increase interest in nuclear weaponization in Japan and South Korea. Although in theory, the U.S. nuclear umbrella extends as a deterrent that protects Japan and South Korea, a rising Chinese nuclear superpower and an unpredictable North Korea could shift public opinion and government policy in Seoul and-or Tokyo. 

In addition to the preceding challenges posed for U.S. national security and nuclear related defense policy, a third problem is the spread of technologies that are potential game changers for conventional war and/or nuclear deterrence. These technologies include hypersonic weapons, drones, artificial intelligence with strategic mind games, and space-based weapons.  

Hypersonic weapons reduce the time for opponents to close the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act loop) before disaster strikes. Drones have already changed the nature of the conventional battlefield in Ukraine and in the Middle East in myriad ways. Conceivably, they could eventually be nuclear armed with tiny nukes or mini nukes and even more precisely targeted than hitherto. Artificial intelligence will have enormous implications for the art of war, and deterrence: the applications are too numerous to mention in a single compass. But one immediate application of AI to strategy is the creation of strategic mind games for the purpose of deception. False images of political leaders making fake statements about military and political issues are already on offer. Future creative cyber warriors may, in the manner of William Randolph Hearst and the Spanish American war, be able to instigate public anger against one or more regimes and propel national leadership over the edge of brinkmanship into conventional or even nuclear conflict. Finally, space is now officially recognized as a domain for potential warfighting (along with land, sea, air, and cyberspace) and the deployment of space-based weapons by major powers is inevitable. Weapons once based in space will have to be defended against potential attacks from enemy space or terrestrially based weapons. The U.S. currently and prospectively depends at least partly on the safety and reliability of space-based assets for navigation, warning, command and control, and other components of the brain and nervous system for nuclear deterrence. Although the current environment for nuclear or space arms control among the great powers seems unpropitious presently, an eventual regime of “rules of the road” for orbital components of strategic power will have to be designed and agreed upon to avoid unacceptable celestial (and related terrestrial) chaos. 

In such a chaotic and uncertain strategic environment, citizens should know where their leaders stand on the challenges posed by foreign policy and nuclear war. Voters would be well served to demand those answers before a crisis arrives. 

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own. 

Nuclear Deterrence and the Midterm Elections was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia, which fields an arsenal of at least 2,000 such nuclear weapons, began modernizing its arsenal of intra-theater nuclear weapons more than a decade ago. These weapons can rapidly strike European NATO member-states—primarily with lower yield warheads.

Russia’s “escalate to deescalate” strategy relies on the use of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons could either be used to defeat Ukraine and force NATO capitulation in that conflict or win a possible war against a conventional NATO force advancing East. In short, Russia could seek a fait accompli using one or a small number of low-yield nuclear weapons in a limited capacity on the battlefield, for which NATO has no equal response.

What makes such an approach highly attractive to Russia is that NATO is unlikely to respond to a nuclear use in Ukraine or an attack on NATO’s eastern flank with nuclear weapons, because NATO’s dual-cable aircraft—fighter jets armed with B-61 nuclear gravity bombs—are not a combat-ready force that can effectively counter Russian nuclear use on a battlefield. Let me reiterate, Russia likely maintains 3,000–6,000 intra-theater nuclear weapons that vary from low to high yield and short to intermediate range. Low estimates suggest they have 2,000 such weapons.

A 2017 Defense Intelligence Agency report went deeper into Russia’s tactical nuclear warfare commitment revealing delivery systems that include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, gravity bombs, depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines. While it is only speculation, it is reasonable to suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin was building a nuclear capability for a circumstance like he finds himself in now.

As two and a half years of war in Ukraine illustrate, Russia does not maintain a conventional force sufficient to defeat an American-led NATO force. This leaves Putin more reliant on his nuclear forces.

Given Russia’s economic and strategic limitations, it should come as no surprise that Russia has pursued low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons as an asymmetric advantage against the United States. In many respects, Russia is pursuing a course of action not dissimilar from the New Look Policy of the Eisenhower administration.

For the Biden administration and, soon, either Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, the real threat of nuclear weapons use in Ukraine or against NATO cannot be ignored. Contrary to the mantra that all nuclear weapons are strategic and there is no such thing as a winnable nuclear war, the Russians and Chinese see things differently.

Low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons do not create a nuclear wasteland. In fact, an air burst at the right height of burst produces no fall-out at all—only heat, a blast wave, and prompt radiation that dissipate in hundreds or a few thousand yards.

With numerous low-yield nuclear options available to Russia, there is a very real need for the United States military to retrain for operating in a post–nuclear detonation environment. In a recent public discussion, the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency and the United Kingdom’s MI6 revealed that Putin came very close to using a nuclear weapon in Ukraine during the fall of 2022. Such a scenario can easily arise again.

American mirror imaging of Russian perspectives on nuclear use, to suggest they think like Americans and would therefore never violate the “nuclear taboo”, is a recipe for getting caught unprepared. While Russians do see nuclear weapons as different than conventional weapons, they do understand weapons effects and are not given to the hyperbole that is widespread in the United States.

The fact that American integrated deterrence was a disastrous failure in its attempt to forestall a Russian invasion of Ukraine and is failing to restore deterrence with Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine means that the Russians now understand that American sanctions and other threats are largely harmless. Since the implementation of sanctions following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Putin found alternative outlets for Russian exports (petroleum) and found alternate sources of imports—including military supplies.

Rather than breaking Russia, American action drove China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia together. This leaves Putin less reluctant to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine than he perhaps was before.

Of course, neither China nor Russia is seeking to start a nuclear conflict that sees the exchange of strategic nuclear weapons. That would be devastating for everyone. But the use of a small number of low-yield battlefield nuclear weapons is a different story.

Even a reluctant Biden administration, now that it is coming to an end, tossed the disarmament community’s ostrich strategy into the dustheap of history. It is now a matter of whether the United States has the will to embark on the expansive modernization effort required to fill the gap in battlefield nuclear weapons.

Adam Lowther, PhD is the Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Return of Battlefield Nuclear Weapons was originally published on Global Security Review.