<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Topic:strategic depth &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/strategic-depth/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/strategic-depth/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Tue, 23 Dec 2025 12:53:32 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=6.9.4</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>Extended Deterrence and Strategic Depth</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-and-strategic-depth/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-and-strategic-depth/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Robert Peters&nbsp;&&nbsp;Christine M. Leah]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 23 Dec 2025 12:53:32 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence & Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government & Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[adversary military modernization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aerial fleet demands]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ammunition ship cycling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Australia–U.S. cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[basing scarcity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[carrier-based aerial refueling]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China strategic depth advantage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Chinese nuclear arsenal growth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[coercive actions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cold War deterrence lessons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[combat logistics forces]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional forward deployment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional munitions stockpiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional war in Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[credibility of deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deep hinterland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[deterrence operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dispersed allies and partners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[extended deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Extended nuclear deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[force posturing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[forward-deployed U.S. forces]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[forward-deployed U.S. nuclear weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fuel stockpiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Great Power Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[high-value bases]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Indo-Pacific security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[integrated air and missile defense (IAMD)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Japan–U.S. cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[limited defensible terrain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[limited strategic depth in Indo-Pacific]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[logistics stress]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile defense pre-positioning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile launch rates]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mutual defense treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO commitments]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[neutral/non-aligned states]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[normalization of nuclear threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[North Korean nuclear arsenal growth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear alliance responsibilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear arms control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[open-ocean battlespace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pacific coast infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[People’s Republic of China (PRC)]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pre-positioning capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rear bases to forward reload areas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional rules-based order]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[resupply and transit times]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sensor resource allocation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic competitor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic depth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sustaining operations over prolonged conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[target concentration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[targeting dilemmas for China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[vertical proliferation of defenses]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Western Pacific theater]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32033</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The world is entering a new age of nuclear competition, characterized by the breakdown of nuclear arms control and the return of great power competition and conventional war to Europe. Further compounding this issue is the increasing normalization of nuclear threats in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the rapid growth of Chinese and North Korean [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-and-strategic-depth/">Extended Deterrence and Strategic Depth</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The world is entering a new age of nuclear competition, characterized by the breakdown of nuclear arms control and the return of great power competition and conventional war to Europe. Further compounding this issue is the increasing normalization of nuclear threats in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific, the rapid growth of Chinese and North Korean nuclear arsenals, and the ongoing military modernization and expansion amongst America’s adversaries.</p>
<p>The return of great power competition is especially concerning in the Indo-Pacific, with the expansion of Chinese military capabilities <a href="https://deref-gmx.com/mail/client/xWja4nL_SY4/dereferrer/?redirectUrl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mod.go.jp%2Fj%2Fpress%2Fwp%2Fwp2025%2Fpdf%2FDOJ2025_Digest_EN.pdf">eroding</a> the status quo of a regional rules-based order. An evolution in Chinese strategic objectives has created a shift among American defense planners and strategists, who now see China as the primary adversary of the United States. As written within the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf">2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy</a>, “The [People’s Republic of China] PRC remains our most consequential strategic competitor for the coming decades&#8230; this conclusion [is based] on the PRC’s increasingly coercive actions to reshape the Indo-Pacific region and the international system to fit its authoritarian preferences, alongside a keen awareness of the PRC’s clearly stated intentions and the rapid modernization and expansion of its military.”</p>
<p>In the Cold War, Western strategists and planners spent most of their intellectual capital examining the challenges posed by the Soviet Union, in particular, the deterrence challenges posed by the Soviet nuclear <a href="https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/migrated_files/documents/atoms/files/pp36yost.pdf">arsenal</a>. Policymakers subsequently <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2152358?searchText=europe%20extended%20deterrence%20cold%20war&amp;searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Deurope%2Bextended%2Bdeterrence%2Bcold%2Bwar%26so%3Drel&amp;ab_segments=0%2Fspellcheck_basic_search%2Fcontrol&amp;refreqid=fastly-default%3Af402d220b2a1ff99475b4b3f61c30c1b">developed</a> defensive strategies and associated concepts including extended deterrence and force posturing in Europe and the role that the American industrial, economic, and military could play. Not least among these considerations was the role of U.S. extended deterrence commitments to its allies in NATO, particularly those allies on the front lines of the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/27695089?searchText=europe%20extended%20deterrence%20cold%20war&amp;searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Deurope%2Bextended%2Bdeterrence%2Bcold%2Bwar%26so%3Drel&amp;ab_segments=0%2Fspellcheck_basic_search%2Fcontrol&amp;refreqid=fastly-default%3Af402d220b2a1ff99475b4b3f61c30c1b">Cold War stand-off in Europe</a>.</p>
<p>Put simply, extended deterrence refers to the stated policy to defend a foreign ally, including the use of nuclear weapons in said defense, as part of a <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2010406">mutual defense treaty</a>. Many policies supported the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence commitments in Europe, to include public statements by American presidents, the presence of American military personnel abroad, and U.S. nuclear weapons forward deployed in Europe. Extended nuclear deterrence, along with the forward deployment of vast amounts of conventional power, was a central element of America’s defense of its European <a href="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-2346.2009.00826.x">allies</a>. One of the factors that strengthened the conventional defensive posture of Europe is that Europe enjoys a certain amount of <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg440af.12?searchText=strategic+depth&amp;searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dstrategic%2Bdepth%26so%3Drel&amp;ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&amp;refreqid=fastly-default%3A6118b8ac4c192694deb7811634867e7a&amp;seq=1">strategic depth</a>.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nation.com.pk/16-Oct-2015/the-strategic-depth-concept">Strategic depth</a> is defined as the space available within a territory to halt an adversary attack, execute a counterattack, and end the conflict on terms acceptable to the counterattacking party. During the Cold War, NATO enjoyed a regional depth which allowed not only for NATO forces to fall back to more defendable geographic features in the face of a conventional attack, such as the Rhine, the Rhone, or even the Pyrenees, but strategic depth within Europe allowed either side to carry out <a href="https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/02/14/a-european-nuclear-deterrent/">strikes</a> on European soil without escalating or expanding the conflict to a nuclear war on each other’s homelands.</p>
<p>While this geography served U.S. and allied interests in the Cold War, the United States lacks a similar level of strategic depth in the Indo-Pacific as it confronts the prospects of a large-scale conflict with China. Much of the geography in a U.S.-China conflict would take place over the open ocean and skies of the Western Pacific. As such, there are few defendable terrain features such as rivers or mountain ranges behind which an actor can rest, reset, and prepare for a counterattack.</p>
<p>Just as importantly, a battlefield in the Western Pacific means that there are fewer options for the distribution of basing. American and allied bases would therefore have to generate combat operations from a <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/air/2025/11/24/air-force-practices-operating-from-cut-off-bases-in-fierce-future-war/">limited number</a> of high priority bases in a conflict. The lack of defensible features and small number of high-value bases is in many ways the opposite condition of what the United States and its NATO allies experienced in the Cold War.</p>
<p>In contrast, China has enormous strategic depth due to its ability to generate combat power from any number of bases, launch sites, or ports along its enormous Pacific coast and its deep hinterland. In the Western Pacific, U.S. allies and partners are dispersed and in some cases thousands of miles away from each other, with neutral and non-aligned states dotted in between. As a result of the United States’ limited number of bases, owing to the scarcity of permanent land features in the Western Pacific, China can focus on a small number of critical targets to diminish American and allied combat effectiveness.</p>
<p>Further, the limited number of in theater bases increases the demands and stress on an aerial fleet and the logistics involved in keeping U.S. forces adequately supplied. It also makes for significantly longer ship and submarine <a href="https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/airsea-battle-concept">transit times</a> to and from more distant resupply points. Already in 2015 there was the issue of the rate at which missiles can be launched.</p>
<p>To counter China, the number and availability of sensor <a href="https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2015/04/13/bmd-mission-demands-outstrip-fleet-s-capabilities/">resources</a> that can be devoted to integrated air and missile defense systems versus other missions must increase given the vertical proliferation of such systems. Also, the capacity of combat logistics forces needed to cycle ammunition ships between rear bases and forward reloading areas, maintain long-range, high-capacity carrier-based aerial refueling, and to sustain different operational concepts over prolonged periods of conflict must be expanded.</p>
<p>The United States, Japan, and Australia should consider pre-positioning substantial amounts of military capabilities directly relevant to deterrence operations, such as missile defense capabilities, fuel, and conventional munitions, in each other&#8217;s territories to create targeting dilemmas for China. Doing so would not only enhance knowledge of deterrence methods and challenges between allies in theater that are vastly different from Western Europe during the Cold War but also create existential misery for PRC defense planners.</p>
<p>Regardless of personal preference, complex issues related to nuclear strategy are now central in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S. and its allies must deliberately evaluate the profound responsibilities that come with being members of a nuclear alliance.</p>
<p><em>Robert Peters is a Senior Research Fellow for Strategic Deterrence in The Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security. Prior to joining Heritage, Peters served as the lead strategist at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, where he oversaw the office that developed the Agency’s five-year strategy, conducted the Agency’s research and tabletop exercise program, and executed Agency-level program evaluations. Dr. Christine Leah is a Fellow at the US National Institute for Deterrence Studies and has worked on nuclear issues at Yale, MIT, and RAND and in London, Singapore, and Canberra. She is the author of </em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Consequences-American-Nuclear-Disarmament-Strategy/dp/3319507206/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&amp;dib_tag=se&amp;dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.soZRWNXZQ48LBhWvFbxlcMfFVCv6hL39gpEWyUb-ygdmf3hVMUon4gHm0SlXcyqb43EpNafIMHXgrF8qlJoCuw.qBCa72XAIoWMnkZU9wnLYT6dFxRhuGO_oJ4KzRvIwyo&amp;qid=1740973856&amp;sr=1-1"><em>The Consequences of American Nuclear Disarmament</em></a><em> and </em><a href="https://www.amazon.com/Australia-Bomb-C-Leah/dp/1349502138/ref=tmm_pap_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&amp;dib_tag=se&amp;dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.3xV2qqOd8g77TxJvfKJAC_lMqYBPBUuy0H-xK5EsL4zCK2DsjTwgu6PFtHYyhfRGlDFU2TMYyWmmFUi-2Gik83Bun-ETdhRM0aKzZwVuaVl0YaqNvyZYWHgXmgKoUvM2fp6QocHWVtCGOySgNuJflLKStT8Zasq15Q070CthQn1pprk7sL3Or740wfjpCCjtaVMZWFxO072930bbCWI-VIM89kVDk6tbSaiu_peMzIk.3ABDAYc6_c25KTZeYnVgfsPPAVmjcswYQs_waY_ThP8&amp;qid=1740973774&amp;sr=8-1"><em>Australia and the Bomb</em></a><em>. Views expressed by the author’s are their own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Extended-Deterrence-and-Strategic-Depth.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-and-strategic-depth/">Extended Deterrence and Strategic Depth</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/extended-deterrence-and-strategic-depth/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/understanding-the-pakistan-saudi-defense-agreement/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/understanding-the-pakistan-saudi-defense-agreement/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nawal Nawaz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 03 Nov 2025 13:14:20 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence & Foreign Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Al Udeid Air Base]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arab partners]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Center for International Strategic Studies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[CISS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[collective security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[conventional weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cybersecurity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense industry collaboration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense production]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Deterrence Posture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Doha]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drone technology]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic integration]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[foreign exchange reserves]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gulf States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[India]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[interoperability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Islamabad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israeli air raid]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kingdom of Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[KSA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Masoud Pezeshkian]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military alliance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Muslim world]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mutual defense pact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear umbrella]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[oil imports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Qatar]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional security architecture.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional stability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[remittances]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Riyadh]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Saudi Arabia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[SMDA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space-based defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic autonomy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic depth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic mutual defense agreement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technology transfer]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Nations General Assembly]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Vision 2030]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31770</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) signed a strategic mutual defense agreement (SMDA) on September 17, 2025, cementing a decades-long security partnership between Islamabad and Riyadh. This new mutual defense pact strengthens previous agreements with Riyadh that date back to the 1960s, further reiterating the principle that “aggression against either country shall be [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/understanding-the-pakistan-saudi-defense-agreement/">Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) signed a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-nuclear-armed-pakistan-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2025-09-17/">strategic mutual defense agreement</a> (SMDA) on September 17, 2025, cementing a decades-long security partnership between Islamabad and Riyadh. This new mutual defense pact strengthens previous agreements with Riyadh that date back to the 1960s, further reiterating the principle that “<a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-nuclear-armed-pakistan-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2025-09-17/">aggression against either country shall be considered aggression against both</a>.” Pakistan–Saudi agreements (past or present) are political pledges of solidarity and cooperation, but they do not create a treaty-based, institutionalized collective defense system like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).</p>
<p>While many analysts argue that this deal covers Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the reality is that this agreement augments the already existing strategic partnership rather than providing Saudi Arabia with a nuclear umbrella. Neither Pakistan’s nuclear policy nor its doctrine entails providing extended nuclear deterrence to any other state while Islamabad’s deterrence posture remains India-specific and does not extend to providing a nuclear umbrella to any state.</p>
<p>Islamabad and Riyadh have been tied in a mutual defense pact for decades. Pakistani forces, which account for <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/beyond-hype-pakistan-saudi-defense-pact-not-saudi-nuclear-umbrella-0">1,500–2,000 troops</a>, provide operational and technical help to Saudi forces. In regional conflicts, Pakistan safeguards Saudi frontiers under the defense protocol of <a href="https://pakobserver.net/dynamic-strategic-mutual-defence-agreement/">1967</a>. Over time, Pakistan trained approximately <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/beyond-hype-pakistan-saudi-defense-pact-not-saudi-nuclear-umbrella-0">8,000–10,000</a> Saudi military personnel.</p>
<p>The recent strategic mutual defense agreement further strengthens the historical alliance between Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), rather than creating a new pact. Even previous defense agreements do not guarantee a “nuclear umbrella.” In a similar vein, the recent mutual defense pact between Pakistan and the KSA serves the purpose of signaling solidarity and strategic cooperation, rather than providing an unconditional military guarantee for Saudi Arabia.</p>
<p>Pakistan does not seek to assume the role of a regional security guarantor. Rather, it contributes to collective security in line with international law and its national interests. However, Islamabad can be an essential actor in collective security arrangements in the Middle East in accordance with the norms of international law.</p>
<p>As the Israeli air raid on Doha sent shockwaves across the globe, Gulf States, particularly Saudi Arabia, realized that the United States is unlikely to go to the defense of its Gulf partners in times of crisis, despite deep ties with the Kingdom.</p>
<p>The reliability of the US as a security guarantor to its Arab partners in the Gulf region diminished after the United States tolerated the Israeli bombing of Hamas leadership in Doha, Qatar, September 9, 2025. Al-Udeid Air Base, in Qatar, is the largest US military base in the Middle East with 10,000 active troops.</p>
<p>Israel’s attack against <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/news/liveblog/2025/9/9/live-israel-pounds-gaza-city-as-netanyahu-tells-residents-to-leave-now">Hamas leadership</a> in Doha also infuriated Gulf countries. However, the lack of action by the US against its ally for the airstrike in Doha has damaged the image of the US as a reliable security partner. Therefore, Arab states are exploring new partners for their security against Israeli aggression.</p>
<p>Pakistan, with its battle-tested military and cordial relations with Gulf monarchies, appears to be a natural partner for the KSA. Its decades-old alliance with the KSA is rooted in deep strategic interests, shared faith, and economic interdependence. The presence of <strong>2.7 million Pakistanis in the KSA also matters as they </strong>contribute <strong>over $6 billion in annual remittances. P</strong>akistan’s reliance on <strong>Saudi oil imports</strong> is also important. These factors deepen mutual trust and economic interdependence.</p>
<p>Together, they reinforce the strategic logic behind the <strong>Pakistan–Saudi Mutual Defense Pact</strong>. Additionally, Pakistan’s participation in <a href="https://www.arabnews.com/node/2590446/business-economy">Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030</a> projects highlights opportunities for long-term economic integration and strategic cooperation.</p>
<p>The cardinal aspect of this new mutual defense pact lies in formalizing a deep alliance which has historical roots. With this agreement, both Islamabad and Riyadh vow <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/09/saudi-pakistan-defense-pact-brings-new-nuclear-player-to-region/">joint deterrence against any aggression</a>, institutionalizing their long-standing security cooperation. Both Pakistan and KSA view this pact as an outcome of a <a href="https://pakobserver.net/dynamic-strategic-mutual-defence-agreement/">decades-old partnership</a>, not a sudden alliance aimed at any adversary, as Pakistani officials reiterated in their statements. Similar to the previous defense agreements between Islamabad and Riyadh, this agreement does not offer any nuclear guarantee to the KSA.</p>
<p>Therefore, the idea of a nuclear umbrella remains speculative and the <a href="https://mofa.gov.pk/press-releases/joint-statement-on-the-state-visit-of-prime-minister-of-the-islamic-republic-of-pakistan-muhammad-shehbaz-sharif-to-the-kingdom-of-saudi-arabia">actual text</a> of this mutual pact, along with Pakistan’s <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2016/06/pakistans-nuclear-use-doctrine?lang=en">stated nuclear doctrine</a>, does not support it. Operational readiness and interoperability of both states’ armed forces will be significantly improved. The pact will foster defense industry collaboration on emerging technologies such as cybersecurity, drone technology, and space-based defense systems between both states. It will enable the co-production of conventional military equipment as well, paving the way for a promising future of strategic cooperation between Islamabad and Riyadh.</p>
<p>It may also be pointed out that Pakistan has not offered a covert “<a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/beyond-hype-pakistan-saudi-defense-pact-not-saudi-nuclear-umbrella-0">nuclear button</a>” to Riyadh and defense cooperation with Riyadh does not imply an automatic war pledge. While addressing the <a href="https://www.dawn.com/news/1944366">80th session</a> of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, also praised this defense deal between the two brotherly Muslim states, marking the pact as the beginning of a comprehensive regional security system.</p>
<p>A Pak–Saudi mutual defense pact enhances Pakistan’s strategic depth by reinforcing its defense cooperation with the Muslim world’s most influential state, thereby expanding Islamabad’s diplomatic leverage beyond South Asia. The pact bolsters <strong>Pakistan’s deterrence posture vis-à-vis India</strong>, as Riyadh’s political and strategic backing adds weight to Pakistan’s regional standing.</p>
<p>Economically, it promises deeper defense collaboration, potential joint production, and technology transfer. In December, the KSA loaned Pakistan <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-nuclear-armed-pakistan-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2025-09-17/">$3 billion,</a> shoring up its foreign exchange reserves, while politically reflecting its growing confidence in Pakistan’s <strong>professional military capability</strong> and responsible nuclear stewardship. In essence, the agreement strengthens Pakistan’s <strong>strategic autonomy</strong>, broadens its alliances, and projects it as a pivotal player in the evolving security architecture of the Muslim world.</p>
<p><em>Nawal Nawaz is a Research Assistant at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS).</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/11/saudi-Pak-defense-pact.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="227" height="63" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 227px) 100vw, 227px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/understanding-the-pakistan-saudi-defense-agreement/">Understanding the Pakistan–Saudi Defense Agreement</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/understanding-the-pakistan-saudi-defense-agreement/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geo-political-implications-of-new-syria-and-future-pathways/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geo-political-implications-of-new-syria-and-future-pathways/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Haseeb Riaz]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 27 Feb 2025 13:12:27 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[anti-imperialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[anti-Zionism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[armed struggle]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[authoritarianism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[autonomy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Bashar al Assad]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[civil war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[consociationalism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[governance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Hayat Tahrir al-Sham]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[humanitarian assistance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[internal reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ISIS]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kurdish]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[liberal government.]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mediator]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Middle East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[naval assets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pan-Arabism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political dissent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political reconciliation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[power-sharing mechanisms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[refugees]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regime change]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sanctions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sectarian fault lines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[secularism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Shia Crescent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[socialism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic depth]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic interests]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic partnership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Syria]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Turkey]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[United Nations Security Council]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30179</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The unceremonious ouster of Syrian President Bashar al Assad marks the demise of the last Ba’athist regime in the Middle East. The end of the 54-year-long Assad dynasty can herald a new era in the fragile body politic of Syria. The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geo-political-implications-of-new-syria-and-future-pathways/">The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The unceremonious ouster of Syrian President Bashar al Assad marks the demise of the last Ba’athist regime in the Middle East. The end of the 54-year-long Assad dynasty can herald a new era in the fragile body politic of Syria.</p>
<p>The relatively well-organized Hayat Tahrir al Sham rebel force liquidated the resistance power of government forces within just a few days. The regime change, and the resultant uncertainty in Syria, invite regional powers to intervene for political and strategic spoils. Israel also conducted <a href="https://www.cnn.com/2024/12/10/middleeast/israel-syria-assad-strikes-intl/index.html">numerous air strikes</a> to dismantle Syrian military and strategic capabilities.</p>
<p>The Asad regime posed a significant challenge for the US, which led the <a href="https://pakobserver.net/alarming-power-struggle-in-syria/">US to support rebel factions</a>. The loss of the regime is a <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-12-11/assad-fall-syria-axis-of-resistance-future-iran-hezbollah-hamas/104706528?utm_source=abc_news_web&amp;utm_medium=content_shared&amp;utm_campaign=abc_news_web">major setback</a> to Iran’s <a href="https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-10-03/what-is-irans-axis-of-resistance-who-is-part-of-it/104423298?utm_source=abc_news_web&amp;utm_medium=content_shared&amp;utm_campaign=abc_news_web">axis of resistance</a> and also puts <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-assads-fall-russia-pulling-some-but-not-all-of-its-forces-out-of-syria/">Russian strategic interests in jeopardy</a>. In the aftermath of the current development either the model of Libya or Iraq can be the possible trajectories for Syria.</p>
<p>Middle Eastern Ba’athist regimes emerged, in the second half of the century, as Arab nationalist leaders, championed the ideologies of Pan-Arabism, socialism, secularism, anti-imperialism, and anti-Zionism. Despite their lofty ideals, these regimes, exemplified by Assad’s rule in Syria, devolved into deeply authoritarian systems characterized by the centralization of power, political repression, and a departure from their original revolutionary aspirations.</p>
<p>Political oppression by the Assad regime created numerous ethnic and sectarian fault lines that were later exploited by the regional and extra-regional powers. The alleged <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/evolution-russian-and-iranian-cooperation-syria">Iranian support and Russin aerial cover</a> seem to have kept the Assad regime in power even after the so called Arab Spring removed numerous autocratic regimes across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.</p>
<p>Syria exemplifies the emerging threat of rebel movements to dysfunctional polities and how they gain national legitimacy. <a href="https://www.csis.org/programs/former-programs/warfare-irregular-threats-and-terrorism-program-archives/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir">Hayat Tahrir al-Sham</a> (HTS) is a Salafi-Jihadist organization and a splinter group of al-Qaeda. The avowed pronouncements of HTS allude to independence from al-Qaeda’s influence, thus forsaking any territorial claim in the name of the caliphate beyond Syria.</p>
<p>Assad’s Syria had also long been an irritant for US and Israeli interests by being a crucial component of Iranian perfidy in the region. HTS, however, is a United Nations <a href="https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1267?_gl=1*1a1xrgu*_ga*MzEwODExNDYyLjE3MzUyOTY5MzI.*_ga_TK9BQL5X7Z*MTczNTI5NjkzMS4xLjEuMTczNTI5NzA4OS4wLjAuMA..*_ga_S5EKZKSB78*MTczNTI5NjkzMi4xLjEuMTczNTI5Njk4MS4xMS4wLjA.#sanction_measures">designated terrorist organization</a> and is also considered one by the European Union and the US. Irrespective of this fact, America and its partners expressed jubilance over the HTS takeover, which creates room for speculation that the US and others <a href="https://pakobserver.net/author/dr-zafar-nawaz-jaspal/">covertly supported</a> HTS regime change in Syria.</p>
<p>Millions of Syrian refugees and the ongoing <a href="https://www.mei.edu/publications/dem-party-and-turkeys-kurdish-issue">Kurdish</a> desire for independence prompted Turkish involvement in the Syrian quagmire. Ankara makes little secret of its desire to neutralize the ambitions of Kurdish leaders demanding autonomy in the North of Syria. President Donald Trump described Turkey as the <a href="https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-17/trump-sees-turkey-as-key-player-shaping-syria-s-future-after-assad-s-fall?embedded-checkout=true">most important player</a> on the Syrian chessboard after the fall of Damascus.</p>
<p>Having much at stake in the future of Syria, Turkish involvement and material support cannot be ruled out in the overthrow of the Syrian government under Assad. Kurds control 25 percent of Syrian territory, including much of the <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/50464561">oil-rich area</a>, while being less than 10 percent of the total population. Kurdish administration of North and East Syria is also a strong bulwark against the <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/15/opinion/al-assad-syria-isis.html">ISIS threat</a>, and it was <a href="https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/kurdistan-and-united-states-isis-defeated-what-happens-now">supported by the US</a> in the past. HTS’s pronouncements regarding the formation of a secular and inclusive government will be tested in the crucible of time considering Kurd-Turkish animosity.</p>
<p>Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Assad regime stood the test of numerous crises in the Middle East. The so called Shia Cresent, along with the Houthis, provided a sense of strategic depth to Iran vis-à-vis military threats in the Middle East. With the axis of resistance being torn apart, Iran finds itself <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/fall-assad-has-exposed-extent-damage-irans-axis-resistance">deprived of deterrence capabilities</a>, in the backdrop of the fall of Damascus. Hence it must explore other strategic options to achieve its aims and objectives.</p>
<p>Russia has long used its strategic partnership with Damascus to project power across the MENA region through military and naval assets. Russian airstrikes were crucial instruments of subversion of the political dissent and armed struggle against the Syrian despot. The fall of Assad does not mean the strategic retreat for Russia. As Mohammad Al Jolani, the leader of HTS, stated, “<a href="https://youtu.be/eDb_BsKGV6I?si=J9HI6OqFZCrB54je">We don’t want Russia to leave</a>.”</p>
<p>This statement underscores the strategic importance of Russia in Syrian geopolitical calculus. It seems that Russia will stay in the region despite many analysts predicting a possible diminishing Russian presence in Syria.</p>
<p>China has emerged as a <a href="https://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/op-ed/saudi-iran-reconciliation-chinas-mediator-role-in-middle-east">credible mediator</a> on the Middle Eastern political horizon after the Saudi-Iran deal. China could potentially help resolve the differences among the warring factions within Syria. It could potentially transform the zero-sum strategic contestation in Syria. The importance of Syrian conflict for China could be discerned by its use of the veto <a href="https://eastasiaforum.org/2020/02/28/chinas-vetoes-during-the-syrian-conflict/">eight times</a>,  on related issues, during the past decade at the United Nations Security Council.</p>
<p>Syrians made history with their success in toppling the Assad regime, but their greatest challenge lies ahead, building a positive future. Syria is exactly at the point of its national history where Iraq and Libya were after the fall of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, respectively.</p>
<p>Both nations followed a contrasting trajectory with Libya continuing its struggle to end its violent conflict and build state institutions while Iraq had a series of elections since 2005, which helped to develop mechanisms for political bargaining, particularly between Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish factions. Syria faces similar challenges including the sectarian fault lines and Kurd minority.</p>
<p>The consociationalism model for governance practiced in Iraq may best fit the social and political imperatives in Syria. Although foreign aid and rescinding the sanctions could help build the Syrian state and society, internal reconciliation and power-sharing mechanisms could only satiate the concerns of stakeholders for lasting peace. The idiosyncratic socio-political climate of Syria requires the restraint and political acumen on the part of the victorious group to avoid another civil war.</p>
<p>HTS’s leadership has announced that it may take <a href="https://edition.cnn.com/2024/12/30/middleeast/syria-elections-four-years-intl/index.html">at least four years before Syria will have a general election</a>. Confidence in the state’s institutions must be restored and strengthened to create a viable state. Lifting sanctions and technical and humanitarian assistance can help build the Syrian state and society. But it will ultimately require the peaceful resolution of difference for any form of liberal government to succeed in Syria.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Haseeb Riaz is a Research Assistant at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/The-Geo-Political-Implications-of-New-Syria-and-the-Future-Pathways.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29719" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="342" height="95" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 342px) 100vw, 342px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geo-political-implications-of-new-syria-and-future-pathways/">The Geo-Political Implications of New Syria and Future Pathways</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-geo-political-implications-of-new-syria-and-future-pathways/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
