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		<title>A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-blueprint-for-deterring-war-over-taiwan/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Alan Dowd]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 23 Mar 2026 12:09:45 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: March 23, 2026 Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-blueprint-for-deterring-war-over-taiwan/">A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: March 23, 2026</em></p>
<p>Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.</p>
<p><strong>Opposing Forces</strong></p>
<p>The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-46733174?utm_source=RC+Defense+Morning+Recon&amp;utm_campaign=74efb51fbd-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_01_02_10_54&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_694f73a8dc-74efb51fbd-81835633">declared</a> Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/cia-chief-says-chinas-xi-little-sobered-by-ukraine-war-2023-02-02/">deadline</a> of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2025/Dec/23/2003849070/-1/-1/1/ANNUAL-REPORT-TO-CONGRESS-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2025.PDF">reports</a> that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the <a href="https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF">capabilities</a> to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.</p>
<p>In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/inside-taiwans-massive-domestic-missile-arsenal">homegrown</a> antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2024/01/16/taiwan-missile-bases-china/">missiles</a>; expand production of <a href="https://www.npr.org/2023/08/18/1186919198/taiwan-military-weapons-manufacturing-industry">attack-drones</a>; and build a fleet of <a href="https://www.armyrecognition.com/news/navy-news/2025/taiwans-domestically-built-submarine-enters-sea-trials-to-strengthen-defense-against-chinese-invasion-threat">submarines</a>. Taiwan recently <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/taiwan-is-getting-its-u-s-weaponrybut-years-behind-schedule-11c151b1?mod=asia_news_article_pos1">received</a> ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion <a href="https://tsm.schar.gmu.edu/taiwan-arms-backlog-february-2025-update-early-trump-admin-arms-sales-and-rumors-of-a-big-request-from-taiwan/">backlog</a> of U.S. arms. Taipei also <a href="https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2024/11/11/2003826737">wants</a> F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.</p>
<p><strong>The United States Response</strong></p>
<p>While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.</p>
<p>The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he <a href="https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/06/10/taiwan-china-hellscape-military-plan/">plans</a> to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/u-s-plans-to-deploy-more-missile-systems-in-the-philippines-challenging-china-d0f42427?mod=world_feat2_asia_pos1">moved</a> Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled <a href="https://news.usni.org/2026/02/02/u-s-army-quietly-stands-up-rotational-force-in-the-philippines">Army Rotational Force-Philippines</a>, which will deploy <a href="https://news.usni.org/2026/02/20/u-s-philippines-commit-to-increased-missile-drone-deployments-in-first-island-chain">missile and drone assets</a>.</p>
<p>Currently the Pentagon is <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/inside-us-plans-to-reopen-wwii-air-bases-for-war-with-china-11286002">revitalizing</a> airfields in the Philippines, <a href="https://amp.cnn.com/cnn/2023/12/22/asia/us-air-force-pacific-tinian-island-airfield-intl-hnk-ml">Tinian</a> and <a href="https://www.15wing.af.mil/Units/11th-AF-Det-1-Wake-Island/">Wake Island</a>; basing top-of-the-line fighters on <a href="https://www.stripes.com/theaters/asia_pacific/2024-07-03/f-15ex-kadena-okinawa-japan-f-35-misawa-iwakuni-14380105.html">Okinawa</a>; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2024/06/25/us-armys-new-precision-missile-hit-moving-target-in-pacific-exercise/">Palau</a> have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying <a href="https://www.twz.com/air/f-35-shown-carrying-stealthy-long-range-anti-ship-missiles-for-first-time">long-range antiship missiles</a> tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.</p>
<p>Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/a-little-bit-of-fear-is-a-strong-deterrent/">reported</a> that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the <a href="https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/u-s-races-to-accomplish-iran-mission-before-munitions-run-out-c014acbc?mod=middle-east_more_article_pos9">limitations</a> of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to <a href="https://www.chosun.com/english/national-en/2026/03/03/OTCQNNDNORCHHG6Q5RB6YZ4NLA/">shuffle</a> assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.</p>
<p><strong>Allied Response</strong></p>
<p>America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.</p>
<p>Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi <a href="https://www.gmfus.org/news/japans-takaichi-stands-firm-taiwan">describes</a> an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/china/japan-us-alliance-would-crumble-if-tokyo-ignored-taiwan-crisis-pm-takaichi-says-2026-01-27/">assist</a> the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern <a href="https://news.usni.org/2024/04/01/japan-stands-up-amphibious-rapid-deployment-brigade-electronic-warfare-unit-for-defense-of-southwest-islands">territories</a>, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on <a href="https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Defense/Japan-boosts-defenses-on-remote-islands-near-Taiwan-amid-China-fears">Yonaguni Island</a> (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, <a href="https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/missile-dialogue-initiative/2026/02/japans-emerging-counterstrike-missile-posture/">producing</a> missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.</p>
<p>Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/australia-pledges-27-billion-progress-nuclear-submarine-shipyard-build-2026-02-15/">submarines</a> and B-52s.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/22/business/defense-industry-rare-earth-restrictions-china.html">Briain and France</a> have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship <a href="https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2024/11/14/kongsberg-wins-biggest-ever-missile-contract-from-us-navy-marines/">missiles</a> and <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/air-force-buys-first-lot-norwegian-joint-strike-missiles/">joint strike missiles</a>. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2025/10/israels-uvision-looks-to-cement-us-army-ties-after-nearly-1b-loitering-munition-win/">loitering munitions</a>, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France <a href="https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/uk-france-and-italy-align-carriers-for-indo-pacific-mission/">coordinating deployments</a> of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.</p>
<p><strong>Enhancing A Deterrent Posture</strong></p>
<p>China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.</p>
<p>Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.</p>
<p>Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a <a href="https://www.wicker.senate.gov/2024/5/senator-wicker-unveils-major-defense-investment-plan">plan</a> to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy <a href="https://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/NDS-commission.html">recommends</a> lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”</p>
<p>Although the president recently <a href="https://www.politico.com/news/2026/01/07/trump-calls-record-defense-budget-00715298">called</a> for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.</p>
<p><strong>The Way Forward</strong></p>
<p>It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.</p>
<p>There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”</p>
<p><em>Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the </em><a href="https://sagamoreinstitute.org/policy-2-2/defense/cap/"><em>Center for America’s Purpose</em></a><em>. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/A-Blueprint-for-Deterring-War-Over-Taiwan.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="184" height="51" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 184px) 100vw, 184px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/a-blueprint-for-deterring-war-over-taiwan/">A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>“Resumption of Nuclear Testing”—Not So Fast!</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[James Petrosky]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Nov 2025 13:16:00 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31813</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>On October 29, 2025, President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that he “instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis.” This statement, made just before a high stakes meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, marked a dramatic shift in American nuclear policy and raised immediate questions about [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/resumption-of-nuclear-testing-not-so-fast/">“Resumption of Nuclear Testing”—Not So Fast!</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>On October 29, 2025, President Donald Trump announced on Truth Social that he “instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis.” This statement, made just before a high stakes meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, marked a dramatic shift in American nuclear policy and raised immediate questions about intent, capability, and strategic signaling.</p>
<p>For advocates of renewed nuclear weapons testing, stop packing for the journey to the Nevada National Security Sites (NNSS). No mushroom cloud or subterranean detonation is soon to take place. Anti-nuclear protestors should also stay home.</p>
<p>The truth is less exciting. No real changes will happen “immediately” that “light up the sky and shake the ground.” This is not to say that the announcement had no effect. In fact, the statement was indeed monumental and incredibly significant.</p>
<p>Contrary to public perception, the US has never ceased testing its nuclear weapon systems. What has changed since the 1992 self-imposed moratorium on high-yield explosive testing is the nature of those tests.</p>
<p>Before 1992, the US conducted 1,054 nuclear weapon test explosions. The country detonated 839 of those warheads <a href="https://www.dtra.mil/Portals/125/Documents/NTPR/newDocs/22-Underground%20Testing%20-%202015.pdf">underground</a>, mostly at the then-named Nevada Test Site, where the last halted test, <a href="https://nnss.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/NNSS-ICEC-U-0046-Rev01.pdf">Icecap</a>, still stands as a memorial to the explosive testing days.</p>
<p>Several scientists involved in Icecap acknowledge that, owing to the extensive preparations undertaken, such as instrumentation, computational simulation, analysis, and test rigging, the most significant insights were gained from the limited number of unsuccessful tests. In other words, there is still great confidence in the performance and reliability of the American nuclear arsenal. It is this kind of “testing” to which President Trump’s declaration is likely referring.</p>
<p>Since 1992, testing has been through proxy systems that simulate a nuclear explosion’s unique energy output and then uses the results to validate physics models on advanced computer systems, known as physics-based modeling. This approach provides a way to validate the physics and predict the performance of a nuclear explosion under conditions that were never known in an underground test.</p>
<p>Scientists continuously conduct these tests, improving and refining them as added details are learned. They often report that scientists know much more now than possible from explosive testing.</p>
<p>Despite the president’s directive that testing “will begin immediately,” experts agree that resuming full-scale nuclear explosive testing is a complex and time-consuming endeavor. According to the Arms Control Association, it would take at least 36 months to prepare the Nevada Test Site for contained underground detonations.</p>
<p>This includes environmental assessments, infrastructure upgrades, and political approvals. This does not mean that explosive testing is impossible, but it represents a clear change in policy and a national effort to move nuclear weapons to the forefront of national strategy through an active nuclear explosive testing program.</p>
<p>The phrase “on an equal basis” is particularly provocative. It implies that nations like Russia and China may already be conducting nuclear explosive tests or at least advancing their capabilities in ways that challenge the spirit of the <a href="https://www.ctbto.org/our-mission/the-treaty">Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty</a> (CTBT). Either of these should sound alarms and rightly must elicit a response.</p>
<p>The president has chosen precisely the response as outlined in the National Institute for Deterrence Studies’ (NIDS) <a href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/dynamic-parity/">Dynamic Parity report</a>, where a response matches the activities of adversaries, giving them the option to continue expanding their nuclear capabilities, knowing how America will respond, or cease and return to the table to negotiate for a more stable relationship.</p>
<p>The announcement of an “immediate” resumption of (explosive) testing is monumental because of its effect on deterrence. In his international policy book, <a href="https://archive.org/details/necessityforchoi0000henr/page/n9/mode/2up"><em>The Necessity of Choice</em></a>, Henry Kissinger writes that deterrence is the (mathematical) product of will and capability. Few would question that the US has a nuclear arsenal and delivery systems that can cause incredible damage and harm. However, there is <a href="https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/ISAB-Report-on-Deterrence-in-a-World-of-Nuclear-Multipolarity_Final-Accessible.pdf">growing criticism</a> and concern that the US lacks resolve to deploy its nuclear weapons even if an existential crisis arises.</p>
<p>Without clear signals of resolve, adversaries may doubt American willingness to act, weakening deterrence. This declaration supports that resolve without making a direct threat to any adversary. It simply puts them on notice.</p>
<p>Whether President Trump’s message leads to actual detonations or remains symbolic, it marks a turning point in American nuclear policy. It also aligns with the <em>Dynamic Parity</em> framework advocated by Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther, which calls for symmetrical deterrence and strategic clarity.</p>
<p>President Trump is demonstrating resolve, assuring allies, and highlighting American commitment to nuclear deterrence. The path forward should prioritize modernization, transparency, and diplomacy—not a return to the destructive rituals of past decades.</p>
<p><em>James C. Petrosky, PhD, is the President and Co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and Professor Emeritus of the Air Force Institute of Technology. Views expressed in this article are the authors own. </em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/resumption-of-nuclear-testing-not-so-fast/">“Resumption of Nuclear Testing”—Not So Fast!</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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