At the recent SAHA Expo 2026, Turkey unveiled a mock-up of the Yildirimhan (Thunderbolt) and released details about the long-range, four-engined, liquid-fueled ballistic missile. The designation “Yildirimhan” refers to Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I, known as “the Thunderbolt,” circa 1400 AD. He was known for acting faster than his enemies, striking before alliances formed, and crushing resistance with swift effectiveness. The naming approach sends a geopolitical message as loud as the missile itself.

Turkey’s pursuit of an advanced long-range missile capability reflects a broader shift in its strategic ambitions, regional influence, and state security priorities. Once seen as sufficient to defend NATO’s southeastern flank but not fit for EU membership, Turkey has increasingly sought to redefine itself as an independent geopolitical power. No longer willing to be merely a buffer state for Western interests, Ankara is actively transforming into an independent, assertive geopolitical power capable of shaping the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and even Europe itself.

A key part of this transformation has been Turkey’s increasing focus on defense self-sufficiency, domestic military technology, and strategic autonomy. Within this context, Turkey’s declared goal to develop long-range ballistic capabilities, including at Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) levels, demands America’s full attention.

We may be witnessing the ultimate manifestation of a state seeking to decouple its sovereign interests in security and power projection from historical external arms dependence and traditional “alliance reliance” Western security guarantees.

Turkey’s missile ambitions are likely part of a broader effort to reduce its dependence on foreign defense suppliers that either restrict access to advanced weapons capabilities or sell suboptimal weapons systems that are difficult to integrate, costly to maintain, or are just ineffective. Turkish leaders have frequently expressed frustration with arms embargoes, sanctions, and restrictions imposed by allies during political disputes. These tensions have accelerated Turkey’s investment in domestic aerospace, drone, missile, and satellite-launch industries, framing these programs as symbols of national sovereignty, technological progress, and strategic independence.

Concurrently, Turkey’s increasingly unstable security situation has incentivized its need for long-range deterrent capabilities. Ankara is not only positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, but it is also close to several regional flashpoints involving Ukraine, Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and ongoing tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey desires increased geopolitical influence and greater operational freedom. Developing long-range missile systems, therefore, has both military and political importance, boosting deterrence and signaling Turkey’s rise as a regional power capable of independent strategic action. In short, Turkey intends to shape these challenges moving forward, and more autonomy is the price of leadership.

Turkey’s long-range missile development, fueled by its National Technology Initiative, is part of a larger investment in civilian space and satellite launch initiatives, which were officially presented as peaceful technological advancements designed to strengthen communications, scientific research, and national prestige. Turkey’s commitment to this effort is now on display in Somalia, of all places, where it is constructing a spaceport to support future launch operations. The technologies required for satellite launch vehicles closely overlap with those needed for ballistic missile systems, including multi-stage rocket propulsion, precision guidance, and reentry vehicle engineering. As a result, advances in Turkey’s space program will expedite its long-range ballistic missile development.

Although Turkey does not possess nuclear weapons and is a signatory to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, occasional statements by Turkish officials criticizing the global nuclear order have fueled international speculation that Turkey might seek its own nuclear arsenal in the future. Any ICBM capable of carrying a 6,000-pound weapons payload over approximately 6,000 kilometers would have limited strategic value as a conventional weapon, but with a nuclear warhead, it would dramatically alter the strategic calculations across the region and beyond.

The possibility of a reduced American nuclear commitment to NATO Europe could increase Turkey’s importance in the same way. If European governments keep pushing Washington out of NATO, the result will be that Europe must pay for and develop its own nuclear capabilities—another form of deterrence. France has introduced its new doctrine of “forward deterrence,” which advocates for an expanded nuclear arsenal and a broader nuclear deterrence umbrella over all of Europe, but only under French operational control. Both Poland and Germany have conveyed interest in alternative nuclear arsenals to bolster European deterrence. In this context, Turkey could see its long-range missile capabilities as an opportunity to fill the deterrence gap identified by other NATO leaders and as a pathway toward future nuclear delivery capability if political circumstances change.

At the same time, Turkey’s pursuit of advanced missile systems could generate tensions within NATO if those capabilities are not carefully integrated into the alliance’s broader strategic framework. Some European allies may view Turkish missile development—and any potential future nuclear ambitions—as destabilizing, given Ankara’s sometimes contentious relationships with other NATO members. Such developments would inevitably raise questions regarding missile security, command-and-control arrangements, escalation risks, and about whether Turkey’s long-term strategic objectives remain fully aligned with broader alliance priorities.

Whether Turkey ultimately seeks to develop an arsenal of nuclear-armed ICBMs remains uncertain. What is clear, however, is that Turkey’s long-range missile ambitions are real and appear to support both a broader long-term strategy of autonomous power projection and a more immediate effort to expand capabilities that could contribute to NATO’s evolving long-range strike and nuclear deterrence requirements.

Turkey’s growing missile capabilities reflect a clear strategic goal: to make itself an independent, technologically advanced, and influential military power in an increasingly unstable region; thereby, demonstrating that Turkey is not only a force to be reckoned with but also a partner to be allied with. Its growing missile ambitions reflect a strategic objective of establishing Turkey as an independent, technologically advanced, and regionally influential military power capable of operating with greater strategic autonomy in an increasingly unstable security environment. Turkey should not be viewed merely as a state to be reckoned with, but as an indispensable ally and arms supplier.

Colonel Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, President of MCG Horizons LLC, and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has three decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service and is the co-host of the weekly The NIDS View podcast. The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and MCG Horizons LLC, and do not necessarily reflect the views of any other affiliated organization.

Turkey’s ICBM: Ambition for Autonomy was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1987, acclaimed feminist researcher Carol Cohn released a scathing gendered critique of Cold War nuclear deterrence. Cohn argued that the ‘technostrategic,’ masculinized language used to discuss deterrence strategy was not accidental. It obscured moral responsibility, normalized violence, and made nuclear war more plausible. As one of the most influential pieces within its subfield, Cohn’s conclusions are still cited more than three decades later in the growing cadre of women arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons is anti-feminist.

Cohn is part of a distinct group of political theorists referred to as international relations (IR) feminists. Rather than offering a causal explanation of war, IR feminists focus on exposing the gender hierarchies embedded in international politics. They specifically argue that the dominant classical IR theories, such as realism and liberalism, privilege masculinity and normalize violence through abstract language. War, in their view, is linked to masculinized norms of autonomy, aggression, and control. Nuclear weapons, as the ultimate instrument of war, are then the ultimate instruments of male violence.

So, what does it mean to be a woman working within the nuclear weapons complex today? Do all women who find themselves in such a position suddenly become anti-feminist? Given that the argument that nuclear deterrence is responsible for the sharp decline in major power conflict is quite persuasive, the answer is most certainly not.

At its core, feminism argues that women are affected differently than men for many things, yet still fundamentally deserve equal rights to life, liberty, and property. War, in particular, is a strong example of this. Unquestionably, sexual violence is a tactic used in genocides and ethnic cleansings; a type of violence that is predominantly perpetrated against women. Therefore, the prevention of war is also a feminist issue. Nuclear weapons are simply the key to deterring the very global wars that would result in mass atrocities like the Rape of Nanjing. These specific war crimes were enabled by a powerful, unchecked conventional army in an era without nuclear weapons.

Cohn’s critique of nuclear discourse is compelling on its surface, but it does not offer an alternative theory of deterrence. Nuclear war has not occurred since 1945, not because states abandoned violent thinking after World War Two, but because deterrence altered strategic calculations. Feminist IR theory does not explain this outcome.

The deeper issue is that feminist IR theory prioritizes deconstruction over explanation. Its intellectual roots in critical theory lead it to distrust policy-oriented thinking, viewing it as complicit in domination. As a result, IR feminist scholars often resist offering recommendations to leaders or engaging with strategic trade-offs. However, international relations theory exists to explain and manage conflict, not merely to critique it.

This gap becomes clear when IR feminists are asked the same question classical theories confront directly. Why do wars begin between states at particular moments? IR feminists often answer by pointing to patriarchy, masculinized institutions, or hierarchical gender norms. These may be part of the broader social environment, but they do not explain timing, escalation, or variation. Patriarchy exists in both peaceful and belligerent states.

States pursue deterrence because they cannot directly control their enemies’ actions and want to avoid war without capitulation. Deterrence is successful when a state’s credibility and capability are maintained. As Herman Kahn once bluntly put it, deterrence works because “the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.”

Cohn critiques the language used to discuss this logic: “Nuclear strategic thinking is a calculus of the relation of one set of weapons to another. As such, it is utterly bankrupt of possibilities for thinking about peace or meaningful security.” Cohn gets the argument of deterrence wrong, however. Nuclear strategic thinking is a calculus of the relationship between one state’s risk threshold and another’s. So far, thankfully, no nation has determined that the military benefit of using nuclear weapons in a conflict is worth the risk that nuclear weapons will subsequently be used against it. This has fundamentally maintained global peace; the fear of nuclear escalation has prevented small wars from intensifying into world wars.

Another element of Cohn’s argument, and those of IR feminists at large, is that there is no such thing as objective, impartial knowledge. Contending with this premise is intentionally made difficult by IR feminists as they further argue requests for evidence are themselves masculine-coded; these are arguments of bad faith. Their arguments against nuclear weapons have the same fallacies. Deterrence is measurably less aggressive than the alternatives of armed conflict.

Whether morally troubling others or not, deterrence operates within a realist framework in which adversaries’ perceptions determine outcomes. Feminist IR theory offers no alternative explanation for how nuclear war is avoided in a world where states cannot control their enemies’ choices. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warned that while a world without nuclear weapons might appear desirable, “you cannot base a sure defense on dreams.”

Unfortunately, IR feminists have co-opted the broader interaction of feminism with international relations theory. It has since made it difficult for other aspects of feminist thought to combine with IR theories to produce more nuanced explanations of war that do not rely on critical theory. As explanations of war ultimately seek to offer paths of war prevention, feminist IR theory as it stands remains an incomplete theory.

To want war to be avoided is a core feminist issue. Acknowledging that nuclear weapons are the key to this is not anti-feminist. Deconstructing the language of deterrence strategy does not explain why nuclear war has been avoided for nearly eight decades, nor does it offer a credible alternative for preventing it. Preventing global war protects the very populations feminists seek to defend. Women can therefore work in the nuclear enterprise without being morally bankrupt, and feminists can support nuclear deterrence because the prevention of catastrophic war is itself a profoundly feminist objective.

Alexis Schlotterback is the screening editor for Global Security Review and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Her experience includes a Masters Degree from Missouri State’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies and participation in the National Nuclear Security Administration Graduate Fellowship. The views of the authors are her own.

Yes, You Can Be a Feminist and Still Support Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.