Traditionally, major nuclear powers have developed and deployed strategic nuclear forces across three legs. This configuration, known as a nuclear triad, includes land-, sea-, and air-based strategic nuclear forces designed to ensure a survivable deterrent by complicating an adversary’s ability to eliminate a country’s nuclear retaliatory capability in a single attack.

First, the land-leg consists of silo-based and/or road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). The benefit of this leg is responsiveness in a launch-on-warning scenario and survivability for dispersed road-mobile ICBMs. Some posit that the silo-based systems also function as a “warhead sink”, targets meant to absorb an attacker’s first strike. Second, the sea-leg entails long-range submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Due to the concealed nature of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), the advantage of this leg is survivability. Third, the air leg comprises strategic bombers with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) or bombs. The additional value of this leg is flexibility and visibility. In other words, an air leg is useful for signaling resolve toward adversaries and reassuring allies. There are thus reinforcing military-strategic reasons to have these different capabilities.

In February 2024, the U.S. claimed that Russia is developing a nuclear anti-satellite capability. Such a capability could put current U.S. space-based nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3) at risk, and in the future, space-based components of the Golden Dome missile defense shield. Such a capability could enhance the effectiveness of the other legs of Russia’s strategic deterrent, for example, by disabling or destroying space-based missile-defense and warning assets prior to a ballistic missile strike. In short, Russia is adding a space-based leg to its strategic forces, thereby moving towards a nuclear tetrad posture. Subsequently, this commentary will focus on the novel capabilities intended to bolster Russia’s strategic forces.

Recent Russian Tests

During the past few months, Russia has been testing multiple novel, destabilizing nuclear capabilities that are intended to overcome U.S. missile defense systems. First, on October 21, 2025, Russia seemed to have successfully tested the 9M730 Burevestnik/Skyfall ground-launched, nuclear-armed, and nuclear-powered cruise missile. Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, claimed that the missile flew 14,000 kilometers in 15 hours. While the system is slow, its extremely long range can result in an unpredictable flight path, evading missile defense, or even lingering over a specific area as a deterrence signal. Moreover, intercepting such a system can be challenging due to the nuclear-powered engine and subsequent radiation hazard.

A test of the Poseidon/Kanyon long-range, dual-capable, nuclear-powered uninhabited underwater vehicle (UUV) occurred at the end of October 2025. The Poseidon will be deployed on specific nuclear-powered submarines, such as the operation Belgorod and the future Khabarovsk, which is under construction. The obvious advantage of a nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered UUV is that it cannot be intercepted easily, but the potential targets are confined to naval assets, such as a carrier strike group, and coastal areas.

More recently, Russia successfully tested the new RS-28 Sarmat heavy ICBM on May 12, 2026. According to Russian media, this system can carry different payloads, such as “10 large nuclear warheads, 16 smaller ones, a combination of warheads and countermeasures, or hypersonic boost-glide vehicles.” Notably, President Putin mentioned that the missile could strike targets “over 35,000 kilometers” and maintain a “suborbital” trajectory.

A suborbital trajectory may reference either the Avangard nuclear-capable, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle. However, the open-source range is only over 6,000 kilometers. Or it could indicate that Russia is potentially redeploying a so-called Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) capability. Such a system was deployed by the Soviet Union from 1968 to 1983, namely the R-36-O (RS-SS-9 Mod 3 Scarp). While it only covers a fraction of an orbital trajectory, a FOBS can be considered as a space-based weapon. China is similarly developing a FOBS. An additional theoretical space-based nuclear capability is a multiple-orbit bombardment system (MOBS). The difference between FOBS and MOBS is that the latter system would “complete one or more orbits before descending on its target.”

As stated in the introduction, Russia is developing a proper space-based option, specifically a nuclear anti-satellite capability. Many details of the program remain classified. However, on April 25, 2025, U.S. officials reported that a Russian satellite involved in the development of a space-based nuclear weapon, named Cosmos 2553, was malfunctioning. This is concerning because a nuclear detonation in space can result in a variety  of effects depending on the altitude. For example, a detonation in medium Earth orbit (MEO), at altitudes between 2,000 and 36,000 kilometers, could disrupt navigation systems such as the U.S. Global Positioning System and the European Galileo Global Navigation Satellite System.

Beyond MEO are the geosynchronous and geostationary Earth orbits, used by the U.S. Space Force’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency System, which is a joint service satellite communications system for tactical and strategic forces, and the Space-Based Infrared System that detects and tracks ballistic missile launches. With a MEO system Russia can hold an asymmetric advantage, as it can threaten the satellite capabilities on which the U.S. and NATO depend heavily. While this nuclear anti-satellite capability, once operational, probably will not stay permanently in orbit, the potential to launch such a system during conflict or war gives Russia an extra option to escalate. In other words, moving from a triad to a tetrad sends a clear strategic message to the adversary and add another way to “escalate to de-escalate.”

The U.S. Response

Given the second Trump Administration’s decision to create the Golden Dome, described by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth as “a next-generation missile defense shield,” the U.S. may have calculated that the renewal of the strategic triad is insufficient to face the two-peer nuclear challenge. Nonetheless, with recent adversary developments of novel capabilities, such as the Burevestnik, Poseidon, and FOBS, and the move towards a nuclear tetrad which include a nuclear anti-satellite capability, Russia can undermine the credibility and effectiveness of such a deterrence-by-denial capability. Therefore, deterrence by punishment, or having credible retaliatory strategic forces, should remain the backbone of U.S. and allied security.

Wannes Verstraete is a PhD Candidate at the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy of the Vrije Universiteit Brussel and an Associate Fellow at Egmont – The Royal Institute for International Relations, researching European nuclear weapon policies. His work has been published in The Washington Quarterly, European Foreign Affairs Review, Defense & Security Analysis, Journal of Policy & Strategy, and Æther: A Journal of Strategic Airpower & Spacepower. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

From Triad to Tetrad: Recent Developments in Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Forces was originally published on Global Security Review.

President Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized U.S. European allies for their alleged failure to assume a larger share of the responsibility for NATO deterrence and defense. Although most U.S. angst about European burden sharing concerns preparedness for a larger conventional war on the continent, the sharing of risk with respect to nuclear escalation has received less attention. Past practice suggested that the American nuclear umbrella would suffice to deter Russian threats of nuclear escalation. On the other hand, Europe’s indigenous nuclear forces may have the potential to serve as a sufficient deterrent against Russian nuclear first use.

French “Forwardism”

In March 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron announced a doctrine of “forward deterrence” regarding the future of French nuclear declaratory and employment policy. His statements amounted to the most important shift in French nuclear posture in decades. The more important components of this policy change are as follows: First, France will increase the size of its nuclear deterrent force (force de dissuasion) for the first time since 1992. The assumption behind this move is that the current nuclear force is too small to deter aggression beyond France’s borders. Second, France would permit the temporary deployment of nuclear-armed aircraft to allied countries. However, France will not delegate nuclear employment authority to other countries. Stationing nuclear forces outside France will reinforce France’s commitment to its European partners. Third, France would work more closely with allies to develop shared understandings of the nature of the Russian threat and to coordinate on the management of escalation control in the context of a conventional war. The first stage of this collaboration will include visits to strategic sites and/or joint exercises with Germany, the UK, and other NATO countries.

Trump’s Frustrations

The decision taken by Macron reflects a perceived need for upgrading the proficiency of France’s nuclear deterrent. It also represents a political statement about his doubts regarding the U.S. commitment to NATO. Despite improvements in European defense readiness and preparedness, President Trump has continued to disparage NATO as weak and “free riding” on the backs of the U.S. military. Trump has announced that he plans to remove 5,000 American troops from Germany and has suggested that the U.S. should leave the alliance despite being prohibited by Congress from unilaterally doing so.

There are several prompts for this continuing cold shoulder from Washington to Brussels. First, Trump is frustrated by Putin and Zelensky and their inability to negotiate a cease-fire and peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine. Second, the U.S. President launched a pre-emptive combat operation against Iran on February 28, 2026, without either consulting or informing NATO allies before the fact. Understandably, in this regard, European leaders have been hesitant to provide military support, and some have refused to grant access to American bases or airspace for Operation Epic Fury, further frustrating President Trump. Third, the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz has disrupted global supply chains and driven up the prices of fossil fuels and fertilizer worldwide.

European and U.S. Support for Ukraine

Despite distractions, NATO members remain committed to supporting Ukraine as long as needed. An agreement allows U.S. allies in Europe to buy weapons from the U.S. and pass them to Ukraine. The U.S. continues to upgrade its nuclear deterrent, especially the strategic nuclear triad, with a $71.4 billion FY27 plan for next-generation intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic missile submarines, strategic bombers with new Long Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missiles, and improved nuclear command and control.

It is doubtful that France’s nuclear force, which includes several hundred warheads with delivery systems such as submarine-launched ballistic missiles and both land- and sea-based aircraft, can replace the U.S. nuclear extended deterrent – nor was it meant to. Instead, France’s independent nuclear deterrence, designed to defend its own interests and sovereignty, along with the United Kingdom’s small ballistic missile submarine force, offers a minimal deterrent against nuclear threats from Russia at a level below strategic nuclear weapons.

Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded international audiences that Russia, under certain conditions of adversity in conventional war, might resort to nuclear first use of non-strategic or theater nuclear weapons (NSNW). These weapons, having shorter ranges and lower yields than strategic weapons, can be launched from land, sea, and airborne platforms and could number as many as 2,000 in Russia’s available inventory. In comparison, the U.S. deploys some 200 available NSNWs at several NATO bases.

U.S. Nuclear War Planning and NATO

This disparity in the number of NSNWs is not as alarming as it might seem because the nature of U.S. nuclear war planning has changed since the Cold War. Current U.S. operational plans include the full spectrum of nuclear and conventional kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities within one comprehensive plan. U.S. nuclear forces are expected to provide options for graduated escalation and flexible response. Toward that end, U.S. bomber deployments and military exercises provide additional support to U.S. European Command, bolstering NATO deterrence. In addition to the increased bomber presence, the Trump administration wants to add the flexibility of the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) for the deployment of weapons with variable yields. The purpose of SLCM-N is to deter limited nuclear use by adversaries and to provide reassurance to U.S. European and Asian allies.

France recognizes that deterrence is not only about the size of military forces, including nuclear arms, despite Macron’s plan to increase the number of French nuclear weapons. It also depends on perceived resolve among allies and potential adversaries. In Macron’s view, Russia should not expect that democratic Europe can be intimidated by threats of limited nuclear war because (in Russia’s mind) that threat is more realistic compared to strategic nuclear war. Nor should Russia expect that French support for NATO excludes the possibility of deploying French nuclear-capable launchers outside French national territory. French training exercises with NATO countries closer to Russia’s border will help send that message.

Conclusion

A more forward-leaning French military doctrine does not mean abandoning France’s commitment to European security. Nor does it replace the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Macron recognizes that, in defense matters, truth counts more than words: the United States cannot completely detach itself from NATO, nor can NATO sever its ties with America. NATO without the U.S. invites nuclear coercion upon Western Europe, while the U.S. without NATO risks political and military isolation instead of credible deterrence. The American and European pillars of NATO, as the French might say, are “condemned to succeed” together.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

Trump Wants NATO Allies to Step Up-Can France Lead the Way was originally published on Global Security Review.

The containers were then placed far inside Russia before launching the drones. One hundred seventeen drones were able to strike targets up to 2,500 miles away from Ukrainian territory. The hurdle of communicating with the drones and powering them was accomplished with local SIM cards and solar panels.

While the results are disputed, many Russian aircraft were damaged at a significant cost, especially since production lines for many of Russia’s bombers shut down decades ago. There is also the cost of embarrassment and the concern that Russia cannot protect its forces from drone threats. Understandably, there may be a concern that a similar follow-on attack is likely.

Those fears were proven correct, but in another country—Iran. Israel was able to strike numerous military and nuclear installations, as well as target specific individuals in air strikes throughout Iran, with minimal resistance and no known losses.

Despite Israel being only hours into a purported weeklong operation, they revealed they had a network within Iran that used drones to incapacitate anti-air defenses.

Incorporating covert use of drones into suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) doctrine is a critical development in air warfare. While unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) used in SEAD was theorized, this is the first time it was employed for that purpose. Unlike Ukraine, Israel used personnel within Iran to operate the drones. While increasing risk to their operatives, it most likely allowed more precise control of pre-placement and planning and minimized communications that could be intercepted or disrupted.

In the future, it is likely that covert pre-placement and distant operation will be used to “shape the environment” for more conventional strikes and attacks. The hurdles to overcome are power supply, detection, and communication. There is also the need to overcome any particular anti-drone technology that may exist.

Regardless, use of drones as a preliminary and surprise strike weapon works. It is a threat that will work particularly well against soft targets as well as military targets. While the US needs to develop its own capabilities, and fast, it absolutely needs to prioritize defeating drones and defending infrastructure from them. Whether they are pre-programmed or operated by fiber optics, radio, or lasers, the US must develop affordable ways to stop them.

The days of relying on a handful of military police to guard installations at home should have ended on September 11, 2001. In some cases, it did, but in others it did not. In the civil sector, not much has changed despite the increasing threat environment.

There are additional challenges that make attacks like Ukraine’s asymmetric attack more likely. The United States has seen tens of millions of illegal aliens enter the country, many from nations hostile to the United States. Many that do come legally come from every background imaginable and hold various ideologies, faiths, and allegiances that are not friendly to the United States. China’s extensive use of Chinese students and work visa holders to commit industrial espionage is another example of what can be turned into a fifth column.

Additionally, with only 6 percent of cargo entering American ports facing inspection, ports are also an easy target for exploitation. And as if this were not enough, Americans also allow hostile nations to purchase land next to military installations.

It is only a matter of time until such an attack happens on American soil. A terror attack, perhaps in retaliation for the recent air strikes in Iran or by Mexican drug cartels is possible. More likely and troublesome is the use of drones in conjunction with other strikes on infrastructure and installations, all to cripple the military in advance of conflict in the Pacific. The US Air Force and Navy are particularly at risk, as air frames and ships are expensive and take time to replace. The Navy, for example, struggles to build ships and submarines.

Today, the nation’s only defense against this threat is relying on signals intelligence to intercept communications, praying for defectors, and dumb luck. This is certainly no way to plan for asymmetric threats that are predictable. The time to find solutions is now, not after the attack.

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Ukraine’s Drone Attack: What It Means was originally published on Global Security Review.

As adversaries like China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia expand their arsenals and refine their strategies, the United States faces a stark choice: adapt and strengthen its nuclear posture or risk falling behind in an era of escalating threats. The time for hesitation has passed—reinforcing dominance, closing critical gaps, and securing global stability demands immediate action.

Russia presents the most immediate and multifaceted nuclear threat. Possessing the world’s largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW)—an estimated 2,000 warheads. Russia integrated nuclear threats and hypersonic capabilities into conventional military operations, as demonstrated in Ukraine.

With nearly 95 percent of its nuclear triad modernized, Moscow wields a highly flexible and sophisticated arsenal of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), strategic bombers, and regional nuclear forces. Its low threshold for nuclear use directly challenges American deterrence credibility, demanding a more dominant regional and global response.

China’s rapid nuclear expansion further upends strategic calculations. By 2025, Beijing’s warhead stockpile surpassed 600 and may well be much larger, with projections suggesting it could double by 2030. Chinese development of road-mobile missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and hypersonic glide vehicles signals an ambition to assert military dominance in the Indo-Pacific. Analysts now warn of an emerging “two-peer” nuclear world, where American US superiority cannot be assumed and extended deterrence in Asia becomes increasingly strained.

North Korea’s evolving nuclear capabilities continue to shape regional security dynamics. With an arsenal exceeding 50 nuclear weapons and advancements in missile survivability, Pyongyang’s strategic posture is increasingly resilient. While its impact remains largely regional, North Korea’s growing ties with Russia, including possible technology transfers and military cooperation, contribute to broader instability in the Indo-Pacific.

Given the United States’ close alliances with Japan, South Korea, and other regional partners, ensuring effective deterrence is crucial. The unpredictability of North Korean decision-making reinforces the need for American capabilities that not only deter conflict but effectively manage escalation dynamics to safeguard stability in the region.

Meanwhile, Iran edges closer to nuclear threshold status, posing a growing challenge to American interests and regional stability. Its advanced enrichment program, expanding missile forces, and deepening military partnerships with Russia alarm both Middle Eastern powers and the broader international community.

Beyond the nuclear threat, Iran’s influence extends across the region, fueling instability through its support for proxy forces in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. Its control over key maritime chokepoints, including potential disruptions to shipping lanes near the Suez Canal and the Strait of Hormuz, threatens global trade and directly impacts allies that are reliant on energy exports and supply routes. President Trump’s successful bombing of the Houthis has apparently ended that threat to shipping, but the Houthis were but one Iranian proxy.

Heightened tensions with Israel and Sunni Arab nations increases the risk of escalation, raising fears of a nuclear breakout that could spark an arms race across the Middle East. Securing dominance in this theater requires more than rhetoric; it demands credible, layered deterrence, reinforced regional security architectures, and responsive military capabilities.

Despite these growing threats, the current US nuclear posture remains heavily focused on modernizing the strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. While essential, this modernization effort falls short of meeting the complex demands of regional deterrence. Delays, budget overruns, and the absence of credible theater-range nuclear options—such as the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N)—erode deterrence credibility and open dangerous gaps adversaries can exploit.

Reasserting strategic dominance requires closing these vulnerabilities with urgency. The United States must accelerate the development and deployment of theater-range nuclear systems, including the SLCM-N and advanced hypersonic platforms. Modernizing the non-strategic nuclear arsenal will enable the US to counter China and Russia’s flexible regional nuclear strategies with equivalent or superior options.

Hardware alone will not deliver dominance. Integrated operations across nuclear and advanced conventional forces must be enhanced to manage escalation more effectively. Upgrading nuclear command, control, and communication (NC3) systems is critical to ensuring rapid, reliable decision-making and demonstrating resilient deterrent capabilities to adversaries.

Strengthening alliances must be an equally central pillar. Reinforcing extended-deterrence commitments through deeper consultations, expanded joint planning, and forward deployment of theater-range assets can provide vital reassurance to NATO and Indo-Pacific allies. A dominant US nuclear posture must visibly support allied security, preempting adversary coercion and preventing pressures on proliferation among partners.

Diplomatic initiatives must also evolve. Arms control dialogues with China and Russia are necessary, but they must be pursued from a position of strength—not accommodation. Risk-reduction measures, nonproliferation efforts, and regional security dialogues aimed at curbing North Korean and Iranian ambitions remain essential to managing global escalation risks.

Throughout history, the United States repeatedly adapted, asserted leadership, and reshaped global security in response to transformative threats. Today, as geopolitical tensions escalate and adversaries enhance their nuclear capabilities, passive deterrence is no longer enough. America must reaffirm its strategic dominance.

In this new era of competition, strengthening the American nuclear posture is not optional; it is imperative. The nation’s credibility, alliance cohesion, and global influence rest on a posture that deters aggression, assures allies, and prevails in any escalation scenario. As adversaries refine their arsenals, the margin for error diminishes, and hesitation invites instability.

To safeguard peace, security, and American leadership for generations to come, the United States must transition from deterrence to dominance. The time is now to close critical gaps, advance capabilities, and ensure its nuclear forces remain unrivaled in effectiveness and readiness. The future of global stability hinges on this decisive action.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

From Deterrence to Dominance: Strengthening US Nuclear Posture in a Shifting World was originally published on Global Security Review.

During the webinar, Lowther briefly touched on the alternative and numerically weaker concept of sizing America’s nuclear triad based upon “strategic sufficiency.” This approach would mean deploying just enough nuclear warheads to launch a counterforce first strike on the deployed nuclear delivery platforms of America’s adversaries. For example, it may be possible to strike eight nuclear-capable bombers, which carry 12 nuclear weapons each, with one intercontinental ballistic missile. Thus, the ratio, in this case, would be one American nuclear weapon for 96 (8×12) adversary nuclear weapons. One is strategically sufficient for 96.

Unfortunately, there are a number of challenges with strategic sufficiency as a concept. Let me explain.

It should first be noted that nuclear weapons do not exercise effective deterrence simply by their existence in the American inventory, nor merely by matching friendly weapons to enemy weapons on paper. American planners need to go much further.

The US needs to base its nuclear deterrent arsenal size, and its nuclear deterrent strategy and posture, on a realistic evaluation of possible scenarios. Adversaries will certainly perform such risk analysis. If America’s nuclear readiness falls short, in their minds, adversaries may seek openings to attack.

The American nuclear deterrent needs to include survivable, damage-limiting, and damage-equalizing second-strike capabilities, against both numerous enemy armed forces and extensive enemy countervailing (political control) assets. The US should also have the ability to restore intra-war deterrence and to have leverage during post-war armistice talks, a significant further number of warheads and delivery platforms deployed or in secure stockpiles.

Strategic Sufficiency

In the webinar, Lowther offers as an illustrative case where China’s new missile field deploys three hundred intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), each with eight warheads. In this case, strategic sufficiency may require fifty ICBMs to hold the three hundred Chinese missiles at risk. Dynamic parity, in contrast, would dictate the US should field an arsenal closer in size to China’s, which in this limited example would be 300 missiles with a similar number of warheads.

Admittedly, strategic sufficiency is attractive for a country with a smaller arsenal, but it is also attractive to an adversary with a larger arsenal. The adversary may see strategic sufficiency as a strategy of weakness and built on a lack of will. The approach has a number of flawed assumptions.

First, strategic sufficiency assumes that all American nuclear weapons will succeed in striking their targets and destroying them. While American delivery systems are reliable, they have no experience under the harsh conditions of a nuclear conflict. Some weapons may malfunction, others will be destroyed in a first strike, weapons may not hit their target, and some will be destroyed by enemy defensive systems.

This is why targeteers often allocate two or more warheads to one enemy silo, for example, which is generally considered necessary for a successful counterforce strike. On this count alone, strategic sufficiency underestimates sizing requirements.

Second, a more serious flaw is the assumption that the United States can always launch a counterforce first strike. An adversary’s remaining weapons will still be in their silos, or in their hangars, when American warheads arrive. This is a foolish assumption. The US is unlikely to initiate a first strike, which means it must be able to absorb a strike and respond. Strategic sufficiency does not allow that.

Making the situation much worse is that China, North Korea, and Russia possess nuclear delivery platforms that are mobile, making them far harder to strike. Ballistic missile submarines at sea are, for now, hard to strike. Mobile ICBM launchers move positions constantly, and might also be camouflaged, for example, while inside shipping containers or railroad freight cars. Strategic bombers can maintain airborne alert. Other ICBM launchers can be hidden inside caves or tunnels until the moment they are ready to fire.

Third, the US is highly unlikely, as said above, to employ nuclear weapons in a first strike. A number of wargames played by the military and senior government leaders only underscores the cultural aversion to nuclear weapons use. This means the homeland is likely to face a nuclear attack before the president responds with whatever nuclear weapons remain. If the American arsenal is already smaller than the arsenals of adversaries, the US becomes an inviting target for a second strike or a strike from a different adversary.

Fourth, strategic sufficiency gives allies the impression that the United States has too few weapons to defend North America and both Europe and Asia. This belief may lead allies to seek their own arsenals.

As McGiffin and Lowther argue, dynamic parity is designed to address these specific challenges. China, North Korea, and Russia are very clearly looking to topple the American-led international system. Should the United States seek to build an arsenal that is too small to effectively deter the Authoritarian triad discussed here, not only will Americans suffer, but so will the free world. Moving from 5 percent of the defense budget to modernize the current arsenal to 8 to 10 percent of the defense budget to build the arsenal needed is not in the “too hard to do” category. It is time to recognize that strategic sufficiency is not sufficient.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Strategic Sufficiency Is Not Enough was originally published on Global Security Review.

A Nuanced Continuity

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will likely continue the multilateral strategy that characterizes the Biden administration. As vice president, she demonstrated a deep commitment to international alliances and a keen understanding of national security. This suggests that a Harris administration will maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as a cornerstone of national defense, while also advocating for arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

Additionally, a Harris administration will benefit from a seasoned foreign policy team. Her national security advisor, Phil Gordon, and his deputy, Rebecca Lissner, are experienced Washington hands who advocate for a balanced approach to American leadership. Their influence will likely steer Harris towards policies that emphasize deterrence without escalation and maintaining a credible nuclear arsenal while pursuing arms reductions.

Modernization with a Purpose

The Biden-Harris administration supports nuclear modernization as a component of national security. This includes updating existing systems and ensuring that the nuclear triad’s land-based missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers remain effective and secure. Modernization efforts are aimed at addressing the evolving threats posed by adversaries such as China and Russia, who are investing in advanced nuclear capabilities.

Additionally, during her tenure as a senator, Harris endorsed the importance of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to prevent adversaries from exploiting perceived weaknesses. Her support for modernization reflects a recognition that technological advancements and evolving geopolitical dynamics necessitate a reliable and secure nuclear arsenal. This perspective aligns with her broader commitment to national defense and security.

Generational Shift in Perspective

Kamala Harris represents a generational shift. Unlike her predecessors, she brings a globalized outlook shaped by her immigrant heritage and diverse experiences. This worldview is likely to influence her approach to nuclear policy, emphasizing the interconnectedness of global security. Harris has frequently spoken about the importance of addressing modern threats such as climate change and human rights, which she sees as intertwined with traditional security concerns. This broader perspective could lead to a more integrated approach to deterrence, considering a wider array of factors influencing global stability.

Engagement with Allies

Harris’s extensive engagement with international partners signals a strong commitment to collective security. Her active participation in high-profile international summits, such as the Munich Security Conference, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, and the Conference of Paris (COP) climate summit in Dubai, underscores her belief in the power of alliances and multilateral cooperation. Harris has also demonstrated unwavering support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, reflecting her dedication to upholding international norms and supporting allies under threat.

Under her leadership, the US is likely to continue strengthening NATO and other strategic partnerships—presenting a unified front against nuclear threats. Harris’ approach would emphasize the importance of solidarity among allies to ensure that deterrence strategies are robust and effective. Her support for multilateralism suggests she will work closely with allies to enhance deterrence capabilities, sharing intelligence and coordinating military strategies to address potential nuclear challenges.

Moreover, Harris’ experience on the Intelligence and Homeland Security Committees, combined with her background as a prosecutor, equips her with the skills to navigate complex security issues and engage in rigorous policy discussions. This expertise is instrumental in developing nuanced and comprehensive approaches to nuclear deterrence, ensuring that the US and its allies are well-prepared to counter any threats.

Strategic Restraint and Humanitarian Concerns

Harris’ stance on Israel and Gaza underscores her readiness to challenge established policies when humanitarian concerns are prominent. This approach reflects a broader principle that could significantly impact her handling of American nuclear deterrence. Harris’ sensitivity to the human costs of conflict suggests a preference for strategies that go beyond military force. Harris’ focus on humanitarian issues and her critical stance on the conduct of international conflicts indicate that she will prioritize the development of policies that not only ensure national security but also reflect ethical considerations.

Policy Evolution and Public Sentiment

Harris’ approach to nuclear deterrence will also reflect evolving public sentiment, particularly among younger Americans who prioritize issues like climate change and human rights. This demographic shift indicates a growing preference for a security strategy that integrates traditional defense measures with contemporary global challenges.

Her administration could leverage this support to advance comprehensive security policies that address both traditional and emerging threats. This means not only maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent to deter adversaries but also incorporating measures to combat climate change, promote human rights, and address cyber threats. By doing so, Harris can appeal to a new generation of Americans who demand a more holistic and forward-thinking approach to national and global security.

Conclusion

A Kamala Harris presidency may be positioned well to navigate the complexities of nuclear deterrence with a blend of strategic continuity and innovative evolution. Harris’ experience and commitment to multilateralism suggests a firm dedication to maintaining a credible and secure nuclear arsenal while actively pursuing arms control and nonproliferation efforts. Her support for nuclear modernization underscores the necessity of a reliable deterrent in the face of evolving global threats, reflecting a pragmatic approach to national security.

At the same time, Harris offers a generational shift in perspective and emphasis on global interconnectedness. Her focus on integrating humanitarian concerns, strategic restraint, and diplomatic engagement could lead to a more balanced and ethical approach to deterrence. This perspective aligns with her commitment to addressing contemporary global challenges, such as climate change and human rights.

Harris’ extensive international engagement and support for multilateral cooperation highlight her belief in the power of alliances to bolster deterrence and manage nuclear risks. Her administration will likely continue to strengthen NATO and other strategic partners—ensuring that American nuclear policy is both robust and cooperative.

As public sentiment evolves, particularly among younger generations who prioritize a holistic security strategy, Harris’ approach may resonate strongly with voters. By integrating traditional defense measures with contemporary priorities, her presidency may offer a nuanced and forward-thinking approach to nuclear deterrence, addressing both immediate security needs and long-term global stability.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

What a Kamala Harris Presidency Means for Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.