Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

In South Asia, India’s expanding space program—featuring anti-satellite weapons (ASAT) to spy and surveillance satellites—is not motivated by technological ambitions but is instead a function of its deep strategic culture. Indian scholar Rajesh Basrur’s concept of deep Indian strategic culture is an apt lens to study India’s space politics. India’s space odyssey reflects its quest for autonomy and prestige, the two essential components of its deep strategic culture.

Basrur identifies two levels of strategic culture: ‘mutable strategic culture’ that can shift over time and ‘deep strategic culture’ that is a set of core strategic preferences derived from historical experiences. According to Basrur’s statement in his book chapter on Indian Strategic Culture, defining a deep strategic culture is “tricky, perhaps tautological since it is a recognition that is post facto (a long-term attribute is deep until it is not!).”  Still, he defines deep strategic culture as “patterns that are sustained unchanged over a long period of time (in the present context, since independence), irrespective of changing circumstance.” He further underscores the two most enduring pillars of Indian strategic culture as a persistent preference for strategic autonomy and a long-standing quest for status on the global stage.

India’s space politics is thus a reflection of its deep-rooted desire to achieve strategic autonomy. India has heavily invested in dual-use technologies, such as navigation satellites (NavlC) and communication satellites (GSAT). India leverages these dual-use technologies as a strategic enabler that allows real-time monitoring and surveillance of the South Asian region and beyond. Moreover, the indigenous development of launch vehicles like the PSLV (Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle) and GSLV (Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle) is adaptable for military purposes.

The Mission Shakti ASAT Test is evidence of using an indigenous launch vehicle for the delivery of kinetic anti-satellite weapons. It underscores the operational autonomy in space without reliance on external partners or even against them. The pattern of international space cooperation of India is also driven by its deep strategic culture. India engages with both the US and Russia as per its strategic needs. This multi-alignment strategy aims to get access to modern technology, expertise, and partnerships without committing to any one side.

Another deeply interwoven element of Indian strategic culture in its space politics is the pursuit of status. India leverages space as a key domain to achieve recognition as a technologically advanced and influential major power. India demonstrates its status through high-profile space missions, such as Chandrayaan, Mangalyaan, and the upcoming Gaganyaan mission. These missions garner international attention and enhance India’s prestige, signaling to the international community that the country has ambitious space aims.

Furthermore, to enhance prestige and status, India participates in international space forums of exploration and governance like the Artemis Accords, the TRUST initiative, and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). India harnesses these platforms to advance its national interests by gaining greater visibility, access to dual-use technologies, and opportunities for space exploration. India also leverages these forums for high-accuracy real-time data that allows it to do regional surveillance and monitoring.

Indian space politics is not only about capability but also about demonstrating it in ways that enhance its international standing. All this is not occurring in isolation but in a region with a fragile balance of power maintained by nuclear deterrence. This translation of Indian strategic culture into astropolitics has regional and global implications. At the regional level, India’s increasingly offensive space uses, such as surveillance, missile guidance, and precision strikes, are creating a security dilemma for its neighbors. This disrupts the regional balance of power and will motivate Pakistan to enter an arms race or to equip itself with non-military means to compete with India.

At the international level, India is actively involved in cooperation with both the U.S. and Russia; however, India’s multi-alignment strategy is not working as per its expectations. There are structural constraints at the heart of the implementation of Indian astropolitics. India is dependent upon the U.S. for advanced space technologies, intelligence, and commercial space opportunities. It erodes the very basic tenet of Indian astropolitics, strategic autonomy. Moreover, India and Russia have a joint historical space and defense ecosystem, which has become politically sensitive amidst international sanctions on Russia. The dual-track or multi-alignment strategy of India increases strategic ambiguity.

In a nutshell, strategic autonomy sounds sophisticated, but it is practically unlikely since alliances and power blocs are the pivot of international relations. The contemporary strategic rift between the United States and India is evidence of the backfiring of multi-alignment as the U.S. criticizes India on its strategy and close ties with Russia. If this strategic split expands, it reduces India’s technological options, putting serious constraints on its space program that is dependent upon both the U.S. and Russia. India’s strategic ambiguity exposes it to structural pressures and regional security dilemmas by reinforcing perceptions of India as a destabilizing actor in an already fragile strategic environment.

Areesha Manzoor is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, researching space politics. Her authorship includes articles and research papers on space politics. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

India’s Deep Strategic Culture Beyond the Skies was originally published on Global Security Review.

Whether knowingly or not, these headlines promote a false narrative that China wants the world to believe. As an example of complex psychological warfare, the narrative aims to weaken the will of the Japanese public and the international community at large to defend Taiwan against a future Chinese attack. To prevent the weakening of deterrence, it is necessary to set the record straight regarding Japan’s policy towards Taiwan.

The 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué

The previously cited news reports mischaracterize a comment made by Prime Minister Takaichi, who told lawmakers, “The Japanese government’s basic position regarding Taiwan remains as stated in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, and there has been no change to this position.” Specifically, she is referring to paragraph 3 of the 1972 communiqué: “The Government of the People’s Republic of China reiterates that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory of the People’s Republic of China. The Government of Japan fully understands and respects this stand of the Government of the People’s Republic of China, and it firmly maintains its stand under Article 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation.”

Importantly, the communiqué does not say that Japan “affirms,” “recognizes,” “endorses,” or “agrees with” the viewpoint of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the communist regime that governs the country today. The communiqué states only that Japan “understands and respects” the PRC’s position.

When the United States established diplomatic relations with the PRC, it used similar language. Paragraph 7 of the 1979 U.S.-PRC Joint Communiqué states, “The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.” In this context, the word “acknowledges” performs the same function as the phrase “understands and respects” does in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué.

A key legal distinction lies in whether a government uses the word “recognize,” which then constitutes formal acceptance of a claim’s legal validity. Japan and the U.S. both stated that they “recognize” the PRC as the “sole legal government of China.” By recognizing the PRC as the sole legal government of China, Japan and the U.S. were adopting a “One China” policy.

A crucial aspect of the “one China” policy adopted by both Japan and the U.S. is that neither recognizes the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a part of China; they merely take note of the PRC’s position. Where the American and Japanese policies differ is Japan’s insistence that it “firmly maintains” its stance under Article 8 of the 1945 Potsdam Declaration. Unpacking the meaning of Japan’s reaffirmation of Potsdam requires a review of multiple related declarations and treaties.

Shimonoseki to Cairo to Potsdam

Several treaties and declarations over the last century have shaped how the international community manages the Taiwan situation. Following the First Sino-Japanese War, China’s Qing government ceded, “to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty,” the islands of Taiwan and Penghu, as stated within the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki.

Fast forward to before the end of World War II, U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, United Kingdom (UK) Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Republic of China (ROC) President Chiang Kai-shek issued the 1943 Cairo Declaration, promising the return of territories like Taiwan and Manchuria to China.

At the time, the PRC did not exist. The ROC government replaced China’s Qing government in 1912 and continued to govern China until it was forced out by the Communists in 1949, at which point it took refuge in Taiwan, Penghu, and various other minor islands along the Chinese coast.

Days before the end of the war, the major allies of the U.S., the UK, and the Soviet Union held the Potsdam Conference and issued the Potsdam Declaration, preparing the terms of Japan’s surrender. Article 8 of the 1945 Potsdam Agreement states, “The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.”

Following the devastation from the atomic bombings, Japan signed the Instrument of Surrender at the end of World War II, agreeing to “carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith” and “take whatever action may be required…for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration.”  Japan transferred administrative control of Taiwan and Penghu to the ROC in 1945. Only a few years after the end of World War II, civil war broke out between the ROC and the PRC on mainland China, leaving Japan no opportunity to formally cede the islands to either rival government. Although the ROC continues to govern those islands to the present day, it never acquired legal sovereignty over them. This is why Taiwan’s status is still often described as “undetermined.”

An International Matter

The Cairo Declaration cannot be implemented as originally intended because the ROC no longer governs China, and even if it did, Japan no longer has the legal capacity to transfer sovereignty. In short, Japan has never recognized Taiwan as part of China. Since 1972, it has acknowledged the PRC’s position without endorsing it, while reaffirming its postwar obligation to comply with the terms of Potsdam and Cairo.

As part of re-establishing relationships with the allies, Japan renounced “all right, title, and claim” to Taiwan and Penghu without designating a recipient through the signing of the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty. Neither the ROC nor the PRC governments were invited to participate, nor were they even mentioned within the treaty.

The San Francisco Peace Treaty is the latest legal document to leave Taiwan’s status unresolved, transforming it into an international problem rather than a settled matter of China’s domestic sovereignty. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent remarks reaffirmed Japan’s longstanding position, which is essentially a position of neutrality. Claims to the contrary misread the Japanese Prime Minister’s words and the legal history behind them.

Lindell Lucy is based in Honolulu, Hawaii. He holds a bachelor’s degree in philosophy from Stanford University and a master’s degree in international relations from the Harvard Extension School.

Not Part of China: An Explanation of Japan’s Taiwan Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

China became the first nuclear state to sign this treaty’s protocols because the treaty aligns with its national security strategy and active-defense doctrine, which includes the unconditional no first use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states. Russia also expressed a willingness to sign. The US is evaluating its approach, boosting the chances of it being ratified worldwide.

While maintaining political neutrality can assist in lowering the risk of nuclear brinkmanship, SEANWFZ relies on ASEAN’s ability to manage great power competition. SEANWFZ is intended to provide “the regional pathway” to the ultimate objective of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Despite the treaty’s normative strength, four recognized nuclear weapon states (NWS), under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the US, do not provide assurances, or “protocol signatures,” which are essential for the effectiveness of SEANWFZ. By joining the protocol, the nuclear weapons states would be required to uphold the treaty, abstain from actions that would violate it, and offer negative security assurances (NSA), such as the promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the SEANWFZ states or within the zone.

The strategic interests of the major powers historically cross in Southeast Asia. Many regional states continue to have tight security relations or security alliances with outside countries. This is the fundamental cause of the NWS’s failure to sign its protocol. Beijing, which stands apart from other hesitant nuclear weapons states, frequently cites strategic ambiguity and alliance duties and has repeatedly stated that it is willing to sign the agreement. Its recent remarks confirm this commitment.

While strengthening long-standing cooperation with ASEAN, China’s decision to sign the nuclear-free zone established a norm regarding big powers assisting in the regional disarmament framework. By supporting SEANWFZ, China contributes significantly to a regional standard that deters the use, threat, or deployment of nuclear weapons. Along with that, China is also supporting larger international nonproliferation objectives, which is especially important considering global nuclear modernization tendencies and growing geopolitical tensions.

It is also noteworthy that this move by China comes at a time when the world is increasingly inclined toward acquiring military platforms and modernizing its already possessed weapons. China’s decision to sign a nuclear-weapon-free zone is also important for the credibility of international law and regimes governing disarmament. It will strengthen their provisions and set a precedent for other regional and global powers to follow China’s footsteps for global stability and security.

Strategically, China’s adoption of SEANWFZ can help counter the perceptions of rising assertiveness in the South China Sea by presenting itself as a responsible nuclear power committed to regional stability and nonproliferation. Diplomatically, China’s relationships with ASEAN strengthened and deepened, with its broader goal of a multipolar world where regional agreements carry more influence.

Notably, it also differs from the American position in Asia, where Washington’s long-standing nuclear deterrence approach frequently makes backing for nuclear-weapon-free zones difficult. China’s strong support for ASEAN’s nuclear-weapon-free zones boosts the global nonproliferation drive despite continuous disruptions to major treaties, such as the collapse of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) and the precarious situation of New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Agreement). Furthermore, in a zone that has so far rejected the lure of nuclear weapons, it strengthens the moral case for nuclear abstention.

China’s willingness to sign the SEANWFZ is a tool for norm-setting and cooperative security. The US and other nuclear-armed nations must follow suit for the treaty to be successful. ASEAN won diplomatically with China’s SEANWFZ commitment, but it needs other nuclear weapons states’ support. ASEAN’s efforts act as a small but significant barrier against the proliferation of nuclear weapons with China’s backing, reminding that regional actions can still be crucial in determining the parameters of the global nuclear order as strategic uncertainties across the world increase.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK.

China’s Support for the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary Hegseth, a veteran with combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, emerged from a military culture defined by counterinsurgency warfare, rapid technological adaptation, and constrained rules of engagement. His formative years were shaped by the leadership of prominent figures like General (Ret.) David Petraeus and General (Ret.) James Mattis, who emphasized adaptive leadership, decisive action, and strategic communication. The norms of that era often prioritized minimizing civilian casualties, leveraging asymmetric warfare, and coalition-based operations. Given this background, Hegseth’s emphasis on restoring a warrior ethos and projecting unyielding strength likely stems from his own military experiences and the influential leaders who shaped his perspective.

Hegseth’s message signals a deliberate shift away from the strategic ambiguity that may embolden adversaries. The emphasis on deterrence through strength suggests a belief that Russia’s nuclear brinkmanship, China’s rapid arsenal expansion, and North Korea’s unpredictability stem from a perception of American hesitancy. One might observe that the concept of strategic ambiguity, once hailed as a nuanced tool of deterrence, now appears as outdated as the punch-card computers that once calculated nuclear trajectories.

This shift reflects a growing concern about the credibility of extended deterrence and the need for more explicit signaling of American resolve. By modernizing the nuclear triad and reaffirming America’s willingness to use force, the Pentagon aims to reinstate fear as a core pillar of deterrence.

The emphasis on reviving the warrior ethos implies that nuclear deterrence must be as much about mindset as it is about capability. It is striking to note that the last time a Secretary of Defense emphasized a similar warrior ethos, the world was still reeling from the Cuban Missile Crisis, a stark reminder of the high stakes involved. The focus on a warfighting mentality suggests a move away from the bureaucratic approach that dominated nuclear policy in recent decades. It is a move toward a more operational and combat-focused posture.

The intent may be to move away from a risk-averse approach, ensuring that warfighters at all levels understand nuclear deterrence as an active, rather than passive, responsibility. This shift could result in more frequent readiness drills, a recalibration of nuclear employment thresholds, and strategic force posturing that prioritizes offensive capabilities over restraint.

China is projected to reach nuclear parity with the US by 2035, while Russia continues aggressive arsenal expansion and hybrid warfare tactics. Hegseth’s directive appears motivated by a desire to prevent a world where nuclear deterrence is no longer dictated by American supremacy. This shift away from the established norms of strategic restraint is a necessary adaptation to a multipolar world, or it could be a dangerous escalation that precipitates a new arms race.

There is an inherent tension between maintaining strategic dominance and fostering international stability. Modernization efforts—accelerated intercontinental ballistic missile production, hypersonic weapons, and a stronger nuclear-capable bomber fleet—align with an intent to sustain America’s dominant position before near-peer threats fully materialize.

The call to rebuild the military by rapidly fielding emerging technologies may suggest a strategic push toward AI tools that enable improved nuclear command and control, quantum-resistant encryption, and space-based early warning systems. The intent behind these investments appears twofold. First, there is a desire to ensure American nuclear forces cannot be neutralized by cyber, space, or electronic warfare. Second, there is a desire to establish deterrence dominance through superior technological integration before adversaries close the gap.

If this is a return to a bold, George S. Patton-style of leadership, where decisive action and unwavering resolve are paramount, it could also risk a dangerous overemphasis on military solutions at the expense of diplomacy. This approach raises crucial questions about the balance between technological innovation and strategic prudence.

Hegseth’s message reaffirms commitment to American allies, signaling that extended deterrence remains a central policy. The intent appears to be preempting concerns of American disengagement from NATO and Indo-Pacific security commitments while simultaneously warning adversaries, especially China, that American nuclear resolve is non-negotiable. Some may assume that a more aggressive posture inherently breeds instability, paradoxically, it could also create a more stable balance of power by clearly defining red lines and deterring potential aggression.

This strategy hinges on the assumption that adversaries will respond rationally to demonstrations of force. This could translate into increased nuclear deployments to allied territories; stronger trilateral deterrence initiatives between the US, UK, and Australia (AUKUS); and a renewed focus on NATO’s nuclear-sharing agreements to counter Russian regional threats.

Secretary Hegseth’s “Message to the Force” signals an intentional and urgent shift in US nuclear strategy—one motivated by a belief that deterrence is eroding and must be aggressively rebuilt. Whether through new weapons systems, a hardened warrior mindset, or the integration of cutting-edge technology, the modernization push under his tenure will likely define the next era of American nuclear policy.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Hegseth’s Doctrine: A Rebirth and Redefinition of American Deterrence? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Major events shaping the current arms control landscape include the unraveling of key treaties. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was triggered by Russian violations and the subsequent withdrawal by the United States—signaling a dangerous erosion of strategic stability. When coupled with the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which limits American and Russian operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, there are concerns about a return to unconstrained nuclear competition.

The last time such foundational treaties were absent the world was illuminated by the glow of vacuum tubes and dial telephones, not the intricate web of digital connectivity that now exists. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal, also suffered a significant blow when the first Trump administration lost faith in its validity—fueling anxieties about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the potential for regional proliferation.

Trends in arms control are marked by a resurgence of great power competition and a decline in multilateralism. The rise of China as a military power, coupled with its rapid nuclear modernization, challenges the existing arms control framework, which largely focused on Russo-American relations. It is noteworthy that the US sided with Russia against a Western-led effort to further punish Russia at the United Nations for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This was perhaps a move to spur Russian agreement to a truce in the conflict but is unusual.

The proliferation of advanced technologies, such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, further complicates arms control efforts, as these technologies have the power to threaten national sovereignty. The increasing use of cyber warfare and space-based weapons also creates new domains of conflict that are difficult to regulate.

Themes that dominate contemporary arms control discourse include the erosion of trust and the rise of strategic ambiguity. The breakdown of established treaties and the lack of transparency in military modernization programs are fueling distrust among nations. This apparent shift in doctrine may represent a genuine erosion of trust, or a calculated and abrupt pivot designed to reset a paradigm that is overly reliant on American leadership. The strategic ambiguity surrounding emerging technologies and the intentions of potential adversaries creates a climate of uncertainty. The rise of nationalist agendas and the decline of multilateral institutions can undermine efforts to build consensus on arms control and nonproliferation.

President Trump’s America First agenda and its associated call for allies to bare a larger burden of their own security impacts the arms control landscape. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the JCPOA was, for some, a rejection of multilateral agreements and a preference for unilateral action.

This approach stood to alienate allies and emboldened adversaries, undermining efforts to build international consensus on arms control. The Trump administration’s skepticism towards international institutions and its emphasis on American strength over international collaboration, which the administration sees as often at the expense of the United States, may contribute to the erosion of the remaining arms control framework. The reduction of funding for arms control initiatives and the appointment of officials with limited experience in this field signals a diminished commitment to nonproliferation.

The current arms control and nonproliferation landscape is marked by unprecedented challenges. The unraveling of key treaties, the resurgence of great power competition, and the rise of nationalist agendas create a volatile environment that may take unexpected turns. President Trump’s America First agenda and its efforts to require greater cost sharing leave adversaries wondering if the United States intends to leave existing alliances. Addressing the challenges posed by the changes requires a renewed commitment to multilateralism, transparency, and dialogue. Only through concerted international efforts can the world hope to mitigate the risks posed by unconstrained proliferation and ensure a more stable and secure future.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Role of First Use in Deterrence

American nuclear posture has long relied on an ambiguous first-use policy to enhance deterrence. Unlike a no-first-use policy, which commits a country to only retaliate in response to a nuclear attack. Ambiguity forces adversaries to consider the possibility that any aggression could provoke a devastating nuclear response, even in a non-nuclear conflict.

Today, the US faces a diverse array of threats from state and non-state actors, including revisionist powers like China and Russia, nuclear-armed rogue states like North Korea, and potential proliferators like Iran. The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent is critical in this environment. A first-use option deters conventional aggression from adversaries who may believe that their superior non-nuclear forces could overwhelm the US or its allies without triggering a nuclear response. If the US were to adopt a no-first-use policy, adversaries could be emboldened, believing they can engage in limited conflicts or conventional escalations without risking catastrophic consequences.

Credibility of Use

Nuclear deterrence rests not only on the existence of weapons but also on the belief that they will be used, if necessary. The credibility of the American nuclear deterrent, therefore, depends on a consistent and robust posture that leaves room for ambiguity. Even if morally troubling, this ambiguity serves to keep adversaries in check.

Credibility is essential in preventing both conventional and nuclear conflicts. The US must signal that it is willing to escalate when necessary, ensuring that adversaries believe they have no safe avenues to challenge American power. Both Moscow and Beijing are expanding their military capacities, with the Russian nuclear arsenal modernized and China rapidly growing its arsenal. Without the possibility of nuclear first use, these powers might test American resolve in regions like Eastern Europe, Taiwan, or the South China Sea, believing that Washington is reluctant to escalate.

This is where critics often misunderstand the moral and ethical dimensions of nuclear deterrence. A no-first-use policy may appear more humane, but by removing the strategic ambiguity that underpins deterrence, it risks emboldening adversaries to start conflicts that could spiral out of control. Paradoxically, maintaining a first-use option can be the best way to prevent nuclear war by ensuring adversaries never push the US into a corner where nuclear retaliation becomes necessary.

Continuity across Administrations

Regardless of who wins the November election, as Matthew Costlow noted, continuity in nuclear policy is essential for maintaining credibility. The US has had a bipartisan consensus on maintaining nuclear deterrence since the dawn of the atomic age. Both Republican and Democrat administrations preserved the first-use option because they recognize the value of strategic ambiguity in deterring aggression.

A Trump administration might be inclined to preserve a muscular nuclear posture to project strength, while a Harris administration might come under pressure from progressives to move towards a no-first-use policy—aligning with global disarmament movements. However, any shift towards no first use would erode the credibility of US commitments to allies in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in particular, relies on the American nuclear umbrella, and a no-first-use policy could cause allies to question Washington’s willingness to respond to conventional or nuclear threats. Such a policy could cause a cascading effecting of nuclear proliferation amongst our allies and adversaries.

Moreover, a shift in policy during an administration change could create instability by signaling to adversaries that US nuclear posture is fluid and negotiable, making deterrence less effective. Credibility in nuclear deterrence is not just about weapons but also about long-term consistency and resolve, which are crucial in managing the expectations of allies and adversaries alike.

Moral and Ethical Considerations

The moral and ethical dilemmas posed by nuclear weapons are undeniable. The catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear use make it tempting to adopt a policy that seeks to limit the circumstances under which such weapons might be employed. But the ethics of deterrence also hinge on preventing war in the first place. If the fear of nuclear first use keeps adversaries from initiating conflicts that could escalate into full-scale war, then the policy serves a larger ethical purpose: preserving peace.

In the real world of international politics, where states act for self-interest and survival, moral purity often clashes with pragmatic necessities. Nuclear deterrence, including the first-use option, is a grim but necessary strategy for ensuring peace and stability in a world still defined by competition among great powers.

Conclusion

As the 2024 election approaches, the future of American nuclear policy should be beyond partisan politics. The US must maintain its nuclear first-use policy regardless of which administration takes office, whether led by Donald Trump or Kamala Harris. The strategic logic of deterrence, the credibility of use, and the need to prevent adversary aggression all argue for preserving this policy. While the moral and ethical concerns surrounding nuclear weapons are valid, the preservation of peace and the deterrence of large-scale conflicts depend on maintaining the ambiguity that has underpinned nuclear strategy for decades. A stable and secure world requires that the US continue to hold the line on its nuclear posture—now and in the future.

Aaron Holland is a PhD candidate at the University of Utah and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Maintaining America’s First-Use Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.