Rather than an aggressive push in space strategy, policy, and guidance for the DoD’s emergent roles and missions in such things as cislunar operations, in-space manufacturing, low earth orbit operations (LEO), space weather, science, technology, engineering, and math skills, planetary defense, and support for deep space exploration and development; the only substantive document produced by the office was an updated directive for the Department of Defense on space policy. While this usefully collects and repeats a number of high-level policies, it falls short as it fails to codify the most important policies and taskings material for strategic, great power competition, which were released by the two previous administrations.

Reading the updated directive gives the impression that the DoD is not subject to any of the space-specific national strategies and appears to indicate that the National Strategy for Space, as developed in 2018, is defunct. The DoD’s space policy completely ignores the nation’s legal and policy direction to economically develop space and continue to lead the free world in this vital domain.

Worse, the absence of forward-leaning enabling policy leads to hesitation on the part of key players in government and industry that increase uncertainty and reduce synergies within the interagency, and their allies and partners.

Some apologists for the lack of thought leadership from ASD Space Policy argue that the office is held hostage by an administration whose National Space Council is overly focused on a norms-based approach and is overly passive about developing the key material capabilities needed to address America’s ever-diminishing advantage in strategic competition in the space domain. While the Biden administration kept the Artemis program, and released a cislunar science and technology strategy, they were overly tolerant of NASA’s delays, budget overruns, and failure to meet the intent of SPD-1—to facilitate a permanent and industrial base on the moon. While the administration kept the Space Force, it allowed both ASD Space Policy and the Space Force to operate for nearly four years without a future operating concept or strategy for strategic competition in the space domain.

To address this flagging advantage in space, and the lackluster focus of ASD Space Policy and the administration, Congress must play a stronger role to ensure that the strategy, guidance and resources are committed to ensure American leadership in space through the following actions:

First, Congress needs to ensure the ASD Space Policy is not distracted from their intended duties. When Congress elevated the position, in concert with the establishment of the Space Force, Congress envisioned a dedicated shop which would enable concentrated and singularly space focused, civilian oversight and rapid yes/no decisions in support of the Space Force and overarching national security space requirements. This would enable more agile evolution and employment of the force—in some ways analogous to ASD for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC).

Rather, the administration convoluted the new office with other strategic capabilities for integrated deterrence, including cyber, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and countering weapons of mass destruction. This should be reversed and should provide the dedicated strategy/policy focus space requires for the US to compete and win against adversaries in space.

Second, task ASD Space Policy, in partnership with OSD Net Assessment to provide Congress with a bigger-picture net assessment and strategy for great-power competition in space. In the 2021 NDAA Section 1614, Congress asked the National Space Council to do a comprehensive net assessment and to produce a comprehensive strategy to compete with China. The National Space Council proved uninterested in the task.

Congress should re-assign this primarily security-focused study to ASD Space Policy as lead. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), who historically pushed for the creation of both the ASD Space Policy and the Space Force, should ensure that their fiscal needs reach Congress in a timely manner, and not compromise the long-term effectiveness of ASD Space Policy by exacerbating perceptions of the office’s tardiness and non-responsiveness.

Third, Congress should direct ASD Space Policy to update the Defense Space strategy. It was argued at the time of release that the 2020 Defense Space Strategy was already out of date. Since 2020 a diversity of higher-level policies has established major components of a broader national grand strategy in space. New joint doctrine better articulates the DoD’s role in strategic competition; the Defense Space Strategy has not aged well. Congress should therefore ask for a new Defense Space Strategy that acknowledges the nation’s grand strategy in the domain. In particular, the nation’s civil and commercial ambitions in cislunar space must be included, with provisions for enabling policy to US Space Command (USSPACECOM) and the Space Force—to support and protect those equities.

Fourth, accompanying this broad defense space strategy should be a specific DoD cislunar strategy. Just as the DoD has an Arctic strategy, which articulates the manifold ways in which the department supports primarily civil and commercial actors in the Arctic, A whole-of-nation strategy is needed for space. ASD Space Policy should be directed to author a DoD cislunar strategy which articulates how DoD postures, invests, and operates to support broader national goals.

Finally, Congress should also ask ASD Space Policy to update the DoD directive on space policy and the DoD directive on functions of the Department of Defense, with the specified tasks in Title 10, the Unified Command Plan, National Space Policy, national cislunar strategy, In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy, LEO strategy, and planetary defense strategy. These White House documents detail US Space Command, US Air Force, and US Space Force responsibilities to protect and defend commerce, develop technologies of strategic interest, and develop capabilities for homeland defense against asteroids and comets. Just as NASA provides implementing guidance for the national planetary defense strategy, ASD Space Policy should provide implementing guidance for each of those mentioned above.

In short, Congress must ensure that ASD Space Policy is not a stumbling block to America’s grand strategic ambitions in space. Toward that end, Congress should give that office some much needed homework.

Peter Garretson is Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Congress Must Demand Stronger Leadership from OSD Space Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

In a security climate where problems must be tackled in weeks, months, or a year rather than decades or centuries, decision-makers need to prioritize and focus on end-states that are delivered in a finite time horizon with a limited budget and achievable outcomes. A Sum Greater Than Its Parts: Integrated Deterrence and Strategic Competition, a recent report by MITRE and the Aspen Strategy Group, addresses this issue.

The abstract is promising, claiming that integrated deterrence offers a strategy for “managing strategic competition, maintaining peace, and, if necessary, prevailing in conflict” during competition with China. The report also promises “actionable recommendations for policymakers, military leaders and private sector stakeholders” and delivers a laundry list of 31 major initiatives to enhance deterrence.

While a few of the recommended initiatives are sensible and would be useful for deterring China, like modernizing military capabilities to provide assurance and demonstrate resolve, several others are unproven and their implementation could distract from a laser-focused deterrence strategy needed for China. Indo-Pacific nations are acutely affected on a regular basis, either by economic coercion or the looming possibility of conflict over Taiwan or other contested territory. As a result, effective deterrence of China’s increasingly aggressive and coercive behavior must initially rely upon regional solutions to limit China’s most dangerous ambitions.

For a document proposing a China strategy, there is a strange obsession with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European issues. The term NATO appears nine times in the report, including a recommendation to consider internal dynamics in the alliance, while front-line allies in the Indo-Pacific that are key to deterrence (Australia, Japan, and South Korea) are mentioned as mere afterthoughts.

While there are good reasons to consider NATO, as part of any global strategy that includes deterring Russia, the emphasis on NATO seems misplaced given likely targets of Chinese aggression. The report also focused a large set of recommendations on developing public-private partnerships for deterrence, going as far as to “encourage all companies from allied nations to actively participate in strategic initiatives.” While portions of the private sector play a critical role in national security initiatives, it is unclear how a restaurant owner in Latvia could actively contribute to deterring Chinese aggression, for example.

Another group of recommendations suggests the broader use of economic levers including the use of “economic warfare” to undermine an adversary’s willingness to wage war. This ignores the fact that a broad range of economic measures aimed at isolating Russia had a limited impact on the Russian economy and proved to be an abject failure in deterring Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The utility of economic sanctions in deterring adversaries has historically proven to be questionable. One study shows the use of sanctions leads to a higher probability of future conflict for democracies, as sanctions tend to signal weakness rather than strength. The utility of economic sanctions and other types of economic warfare to deter remains unproven.

The final grouping of recommendations in the report proved the most useful, suggesting that we must understand the adversary, define clear objectives, and build a grand strategy to win a strategic competition with China. MITRE needed to lead with clear objectives and an understanding of China’s goals and decision calculus. Instead, a long list of potential actions that might deter China is presented without sufficient links to China’s objectives. Rather than utilizing a strategy-to-task framework that links ways and means to the ends in a logical fashion, the report presents a broad range of ways and means primarily focused on integration.

Allies and diplomatic measures should play a crucial role in the realization of integrated deterrence, but policymakers must have clear and pragmatic options available. Prioritization of resources and initiatives to maximize deterrence requires a strong appreciation for the Indo-Pacific region, its unique dynamics, and China’s role in the region. Allies and partners must work bi-laterally and multi-laterally to operationalize deterrence in the region.

China is a significant and well-resourced adversary. To compete with and deter China effectively, the United States and its allies must be thoughtful about what initiatives are pursued and what resources are expended. Integration can improve outcomes, but only when it improves outcomes as part of a unified deterrence strategy. In a world where deterrence of China is urgently required, proven and effective measures that deliver deterrence must be brought together under a unifying strategy. This is the type of integration which should be implemented.

Carl Rhodes is a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and is founder of Robust Policy, a Canberra firm providing high-quality analysis and policy solutions. Previously, he served 25 years with RAND Corporation including a term as director of RAND Australia.

 Leigh Ramsay is a graduate of the National Security College at the Australian National University.

The views of the authors are their own.

Integrated Deterrence: Which of These Two Words Is More Important? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The article’s opening line sets the articles tone, “The world is entering a dangerous nuclear arms race unlike anything since the first atomic bomb, but it does not have to end in catastrophe.” The problem with this assertion is twofold.

First, the one example of nuclear arms racing we saw, which took place between the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, was likely responsible for the fact that the two great power never fought World War III. Rather than sparking conflict, the arms race deterred it.

Second, what is happening today is in no way comparable to the Cold War arms race, which saw global nuclear arms climb to a total of 63,632 fielded weapons in 1985. According to the Washington Post, the Russians field 1,588 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 1,912 tactical nuclear weapons. The Chinese number is less well known but the Department of Defense’s Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (2023) estimates the People’s Liberation Army fields about 500 nuclear weapons and will field about 1,500 by 2035. The same Washington Post article suggests the United States fields 1,644 operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons and 200 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe—with no plans for growing the size of the American arsenal.

This about a 90 percent reduction in the number of fielded nuclear weapons at the end of the Cold War. For example, the United States removed more than 3,000 tactical nuclear weapons from Europe between 1991 and 1993.

This means that the number of deployed strategic and tactical nuclear weapons for the three major powers sits at about 5,050 weapons. If you include the arsenals of India, Pakistan, North Korea, France, and the United Kingdom, the number rises to about 6,000 operationally deployed nuclear weapons.

It is hard to compare what is taking place today with what occurred during the Cold War. For an arms race to take place, there must be participants. The Biden administration has made it very clear; the United States will not increase the size of the nation’s nuclear arsenal. Russia has the capacity to expand its arsenal rapidly. China is doing just that. The United States is sitting in the stands and watching its adversaries.

The editorial board then laments the lack of arms control agreements to prevent adversaries, the Chinese in particular, from growing the size of arsenal. If the editorial board shares the view of many within the arms control community, then they too incorrectly assume that all arms control agreements are inherently good and stabilizing. In reality, arms control agreements are only good when they advance the United States’ national interest, which is not synonymous with their very existence.

When you take into account Russian violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological Weapons Convention, the Vienna Document, Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, Opens Skies, Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and likely violation of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the at all costs desire for arms control with Russia is too often a bad deal for the United States that sees the nation constrain its military capability while the Russian buy time to overcome military weakness.

In short, arms control for arms control sake is neither an inherent American interest, nor is it inherently stabilizing.

The editorial board also places great hope in recent meetings between the United States and China in which arms control was discussed. What the editorial board’s article fails to reveal is that the November talks were an utter failure in which the Chinese made it clear that no arms control agreement is possible.

Finally, there is a mistaken and unsubstantiated belief that more nuclear weapons is inherently destabilizing. This idea is not born out by the historical record. A careful reading of Cold War history makes it clear that the large Soviet and American nuclear arsenals of the era caused leaders in both the United States and Soviet Union to exercise great caution, avoid provocative actions, and demonstrate restraint in the face of uncertainty.

It is not strength that is provocative but weakness. If the United States seeks to ensure nuclear weapons are never used, it should meet the threat head on and follow the recommendations of the bi-partisan Strategic Posture Commission Report. Authoritarians respect strength. It is time the United States shifts from blind optimism to just that.

Adam Lowther is the Vice President for Research and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, and Curtis McGiffin in the Vice President for Education and co-founder of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

The Faux Nuclear Arms Race that Isn’t was originally published on Global Security Review.

The report is urgent, reasonable, and sound, assessing emerging threats in the international security environment, the United States’ posture against those threats, and offering sound recommendations to address urgent deficiencies. The report consolidates the strategic threats facing the US and defines the context of the nation’s new strategic posture. These threats are addressed by others, but the report captures them collectively, presenting a menacing glimpse into the future. It is vital that the country gets behind these recommendations without delay.

Sound Recommendations

The nation’s current strategic posture is predicated on a benign threat environment, favorable political relationships, arms control, and a post–Cold War system of international cooperation. The report draws attention to vast and worsening threats, with implications for US and global security.

Today, the risk to strategic stability is simultaneous regional conflicts escalating to threaten the homeland, allies, and partners. The US must adapt the Defense Planning Guidance to address this new environment. This logic undergirds the rationale for sweeping changes to the nation’s strategic posture, to include enhancing our conventional, nuclear, and strategic defense forces to meet this new era’s deterrence, assurance, warfighting, and war termination requirements.

In isolation, the strategic threats are deeply troubling; combined they are alarming. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine includes repeated coercive nuclear threats. Russia may feel confident making such threats and unilaterally suspending adherence to the New START, given its 10-to-1 advantage in “non-strategic nuclear forces” and its modernized strategic nuclear forces. China undertook a rapid and comprehensive nuclear breakout, described as “breathtaking” by the former commander of USSTRATCOM. This breakout is propelling China to peer status with the US and Russia and posturing it to pursue a coercive strategy. Meanwhile, North Korea continues its nuclear expansion, threatening the US homeland with ballistic missiles. Iran persists in fomenting regional instability as it stubbornly progresses toward becoming a nuclear weapons state.

The commission correctly warns that the US must presume that the Russia-China strategic partnership could include cooperation in waging war against the US and its allies in ways that maximize their advantages. This means, the US must deter both, and be prepared to combat both simultaneously, with the potential for simultaneous nuclear escalation.

The Report is Reasonable

When considering US strategic posture force requirements, the commission cites the traditional role of nuclear weapons, including deterrence, assurance, achieving objectives if deterrence fails, and hedging the force. The report also ascribes common, basic tenets of American nuclear strategy to include assured second strike, flexible response, tailored deterrence, extended deterrence and allied assurance, the policy of calculated ambiguity, and hedging for future uncertainty.

When these roles and tenets are overlaid with simultaneous two-war planning, a wide-ranging set of recommendations necessarily results. These include tailored responses to threats, such as defense against decapitation strikes; the need to address the imbalance in strategic nuclear forces between the US and its adversaries; regional risks associated with theater nuclear force disparities; and comprehensive infrastructure reform of the nuclear weapons complex and defense industrial base.

For American strategic nuclear forces, this could include replacing delivery platforms, modernizing warheads and command and control, recapitalizing the entire nuclear enterprise infrastructure, preparing to upload some or all of our hedge warheads, deploying the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (with some road-mobile), building more B-21 bombers and supporting tankers (with some bombers on alert), and building more ballistic missile submarines, Trident missiles, and ship-building facilities.

To address widening disparities in theater nuclear forces, modernized nuclear forces need to be developed and deployed to provide forward-basing, survivability, yield variation, penetrability, and promptness in both INDOPACOM and EUCOM. Certainly, this alludes to the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile and similar platforms. But the report does not stop there.

The United States’ nuclear weapons complex is vast but outdated, limited in responsiveness, and ill-equipped to meet existing and emerging threats. Therefore, the complex needs modernization and expansion to meet requirements, as well as to hedge against technical failures, delays, delivery system losses, or a further worsening of the threat environment. This includes recapitalization of nuclear weapon pit production and nuclear enterprise technical expertise.

Other significant recommendations include fielding missile defense systems designed to deter and defeat limited attacks by Russia, China, and North Korea. This is a significant expansion of the scope and mission of missile defenses. The report also recommends developing offensive and defensive space assets, fielding increased numbers of long-range (hypersonic) conventional strike weapons; improving our strategic supply chain; improving private-sector contracting processes; pursuing a global ban on fractional orbital bombardment systems; and establishing nuclear deterrence as the top priority in the Departments of Defense and Energy.

 Getting Behind It

The US believed conventional dominance would deter conflict. Theater nuclear forces were removed from the Pacific and modernization of strategic nuclear forces was consistently delayed. Americans forgot that to first deter war and then wage war, if necessary, “quantity is a quality all its own.” The nation allowed the industrial base to both atrophy and be outsourced.

In a world marked by diverse threats and the prospect of simultaneous armed conflict against multiple nuclear adversaries, there are no reasonable alternatives to the report’s recommendations. Arms control is not the answer to risk-tolerant adversaries and others seeking an organic deterrent capability. Allies and partners could and should share the burden of deterrence in the long run but that will take unavailable time.

The costs and risks of simultaneous armed conflict with nuclear-armed peers is unquestionably higher than the costs associated with a strong strategic posture aimed at preventing conflict and associated escalation of nuclear risks. America’s Strategic Posture is a sound, reasonable, and urgent document and stands alone as the most credible solution to the nation’s current challenges. It is time to once again “awaken a sleeping giant” and set America on the right path.

Dr. Jonathan Trexel is a graduate faculty member with Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

America’s Strategic Posture Report: Get Behind It was originally published on Global Security Review.