Golden Dome is focused on specific missile threats to the American homeland. AUKUS pillar two is designed to reduce the significant lead China has in dual-use emerging technologies. An “extended” Golden Dome approach that produces strong and resilient allies may provide greater strategic deterrence than an America alone approach.

As stronger allies contribute more to collective defense through burden sharing, this can reduce the financial and military burden on the United States. Capable allies can deter aggression and manage local conflicts, promoting regional stability without constant American intervention.

If allies are seen as weak and easily overrun, it may undermine the credibility of alliances and security guarantees, thereby emboldening adversaries. Strong allies often bring advanced technologies and capabilities that enhance joint operations through interoperability and innovation.

Defeating fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), hypersonic glide weapons, and land-attack cruise missile threats is the focus of Golden Dome, which “proposes a multilayered defense network capable of intercepting threats during the boost, midcourse, and terminal stages of missile flight.” Some analysts argue that it is easiest to target these threats in the boost/ascent phase.

Targeting the boost phase can either occur from allied territory, targeting North Korean missiles from South Korea, or the homeland. The boost phase can also be targeted from space. However, targeting from space is not without its own unique set of challenges. Either way, it will not be solved by America without its allies.

Arguably, five-eyes countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom, and United States) are already entangled in American nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). Furthermore, the US operates in coordination with other military forces as part of broader coalition operations. Hence, extending Golden Dome to allies is not only possible, but can further leverage the AUKUS pillar two effort. Moreover, a missile defense system consists of sensors, interceptors, and command-and-control systems that work together to detect, track, and intercept incoming missiles.

These necessary components exist in AUKUS pillar two working groups like the cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy, quantum technologies, undersea capabilities, hypersonics and counter-hypersonics, electronic warfare capabilities, innovation and information sharing, and the deep-space advanced radar capability program (DARC).

AUKUS pillar two leadership should prioritize the development of technologies and supporting systems for an effective extended Golden Dome architecture. America is unlikely to solve the problem in isolation by building a “tightly integrated system of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites, terrestrial radar stations, directed-energy platforms, and kinetic interceptors” that senses, decides, and neutralizes incoming missiles. The linkages and opportunities for the prioritization of advanced technology development for missile defense can be found in the following summaries.

Cyber capabilities encompass both offensive and defensive operations for missile defense. Offensive cyber tools are used to deter adversaries and disrupt their operations through tactics such as cyber-reconnaissance, communication isolation, targeted strikes, and network intrusions. Defensively, military forces can prioritize robust network protection, active threat disruption, and seamless coordination across units to safeguard critical systems. Cyber operations can enhance intelligence gathering, command and control, and information warfare to shape public perception and the broader information environment. As conflict evolves, training personnel in cyber tactics and integrating machine learning for threat detection and analysis can maintain strategic advantage.

AI and autonomy can transform missile defense and military operations by enhancing efficiency, precision, and decision-making. Autonomous weapon systems are used for reconnaissance, surveillance, and combat missions. AI-driven wargaming platforms simulate real-world combat scenarios to help strategists test tactics and improve readiness. In command and control, AI supports real-time data processing and analysis. AI optimizes logistics by improving resource allocation, supply-chain management, and transportation.

In intelligence and surveillance, AI analyzes vast datasets to detect patterns and identify threats. Additionally, AI monitors threats and predicts future events. Human-machine teaming allows AI systems to collaborate with human operators, combining strengths and minimizing errors.

Quantum technologies transform missile defenses through enhanced security, operational efficiency, and advanced training. In cybersecurity, quantum-resistant cryptography is being developed to protect against the threat quantum computers pose to traditional encryption. Quantum key distribution offers highly secure communication by transmitting encryption keys through quantum channels, making interception nearly impossible.

In military operations, quantum algorithms can optimize logistics, supply chains, and battlefield strategies by analyzing complex data in real time. Quantum computing could process data in real time, enabling missile defense systems to rapidly analyze incoming threats, allowing for quicker decision-making and more effective interception. Additionally, quantum computing could enable highly accurate simulations of complex systems like nuclear reactions and weapon designs.

Undersea capabilities encompass a wide range of offensive and defensive functions that contribute to missile defense. Offensively, submarines and other undersea platforms can strike surface vessels, submarines, and land-based targets. They are also instrumental in inserting special forces into hostile territory for reconnaissance or sabotage missions. Undersea vehicles play a key role in mine warfare, either by laying mines or clearing minefields. On the defensive side, these platforms are vital for anti-submarine warfare, enabling the detection and neutralization of enemy submarines. They also support surveillance and reconnaissance efforts, gathering intelligence on enemy naval movements. Undersea systems help protect vital infrastructure such as pipelines and communication cables and help ensure safe navigation.

Hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonic systems are vital to missile defense operations. Hypersonic glide weapons and hypersonic cruise missiles are designed to strike targets with exceptional speed, maneuverability, and precision while evading traditional defenses. Counter-hypersonic capabilities include advanced sensors and tracking systems like radar and satellite imaging to detect and monitor hypersonic weapons. Hypersonic interceptors aim to neutralize threats mid-flight, while high-power lasers and microwave weapons can disrupt their guidance systems. Effective command-and-control systems are essential for coordinating these defenses, and soft-kill measures such as cyberattacks offer additional means to interfere with hypersonic weapons.

Electronic warfare is fundamental for gaining military advantages in cross-domain missile defense. Electronic attack includes jamming enemy communications, radar, and navigation systems. It also includes spoofing—sending false signals to enemy forces. Electromagnetic or directed-energy weapons disable or destroy enemy assets. Electronic protection ensures secure communication through encryption and satellite links and employs electronic countermeasures (ECM) to defend against attack. Electronic counter-countermeasures are used to overcome enemy ECM and maintain operational effectiveness. Electronic support can be focused on gathering intelligence through signals interception, using sensors for surveillance and target acquisition, and detecting threats in the electromagnetic spectrum.

            In short, under the auspices of AUKUS pillar two, Australia and the United Kingdom can contribute to Golden Dome in ways that many may not be thinking about. As longtime allies with a shared culture, history, and values, working together on Golden Dome just makes sense.

Natalie Treloar is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), a Non-Resident Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, and a cohost of the NIDS Deterrence Down Under Podcast.

Extending the Golden Dome: AUKUS Pillar 2 was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example is instructive. The rate at which aircraft locations are electronically manipulated, “spoofed,” increased 500 percent in the first three quarters of 2024. An average of 1,500 flights a day were impacted by the beginning of September. In a recent survey of almost 2,000 flight crew members, 70 percent described their concerns about the impact on aviation safety as either “very high” or “extreme.”

The world depends upon signals from GPS and other global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) to underpin virtually every technology. Yet the essential positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) service they provide is incredibly vulnerable.

Weak and Vulnerable Signals

These signals from space are, of necessity, very weak. The sun shining produces stronger radio signals than a GPS satellite. Yet, through a miracle of technology, receivers on earth can find coded signals in the radio noise floor, decipher them, and tell Americans where they are and the exact time.

Exceptionally weak signals mean that almost any interference on the right frequency can prevent them from getting through. For less than ten dollars, delivery drivers looking to electronically hide from their employers, people worried about being tracked by their spouse or the government, and bad actors wanting to disable receivers can buy a GPS “jammer” from any number of internet vendors. Such sales are illegal in most countries, as is the use of such devices. However, enforcement is almost always lax or nonexistent.

Keep in mind, signal specifications were made public as part of GPS becoming America’s “gift to the world,” with the US government encouraging GPS’s broad use. Other GNSS operators did the same.

While incredibly successful in promoting the wide adoption of signals, it has also facilitated spoofing. Compounding the problem, advances in digital technology brought inexpensive software-defined transmitters into the world. Now, for a few hundred dollars, a reasonably sophisticated hobbyist can easily imitate GPS and other satellite navigation signals.

The necessity of PNT services for everyday life and over-reliance on GPS/GNSS for PNT makes the vulnerability of signals to denial and imitation a primary weapon in conflicts around the globe.

This impacts millions of those not involved in these conflicts because any receiver within line-of-sight of the interfering transmitter can be affected. Thus, cell phone systems in Finland are degraded by drone defenses in St. Petersburg. First responders across the Middle East must use paper maps because of ongoing conflicts. Ships and aircraft, hundreds of miles from military actions, lose their navigation and collision avoidance systems. Given the number of conflicts around the planet, many regions of the world are adversely affected.

To date, appeals by international maritime and aviation professional organizations have failed to make an impact on the problem. The same is true for resolutions by the United Nation’s International Maritime Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which seems to have the principal jurisdiction for this, is proving similarly ineffective.

At its World Radio Conference in December 2023, ITU delegates approved what, at first glance, appears to be a strong resolution enjoining member states to refrain from interfering with GNSS signals. The only way the resolution could pass was with an exception allowing interference “for security or defense purposes.” It is hard to imagine any other reason for which a state would disrupt signals.

Despite the failures of international diplomacy to mitigate this growing problem, there is likely a path for it to be much more successful. Attacks on GPS and other GNSS signals are useful only because most nations and systems over-depend on them with few alternatives.

Fortunately, many countries are actively considering establishing robust and resilient terrestrial PNT systems to complement signals from space. These can provide GPS-like information, but do not have common vulnerabilities and failure modes with GNSS.

The US Department of Transportation, the lead in America for civil PNT issues, said that intelligently using a combination of independent signals from space, terrestrial broadcast, and fiber cable can be the foundation of a resilient national PNT architecture.

Establishing such a system of systems will not make the services invulnerable. However, it will make them hard enough to disrupt so that antagonists will look elsewhere for opportunities to create mischief. Some nations are already taking significant steps toward achieving such resilience.

South Korea and Saudi Arabia field high-power terrestrial systems that provide PNT. The United Kingdom fields a partial system and seems poised to expand it, as well as a deployable capability. Much of Russia is also served by such a system.

China has the world’s most complete and advanced resilient PNT architecture. It includes three constellations of satellites in different orbital planes, an extensive terrestrial broadcast system, and a 20,000-kilometer fiber timing network with 295 “timing stations.”

Yet much of the world remains vulnerable to disruption. Those who interfere are therefore incentivized.

International diplomacy, in the form of the United Nations, can help improve the inevitable transition to resilient PNT by encouraging states to implement sovereign terrestrial systems. These systems will complement and cooperate with GNSS, while also operating independently.

As part of this effort, international standards can be developed to ensure aircraft, ships, and vehicles are able to seamlessly transit between nations. Technical assistance can be provided to nations with little local expertise in the field.

These efforts will greatly reduce the incentive to interfere with GNSS, thereby making it safer and more reliable. It will also reinforce the sovereignty and security of every involved nation.

The alternative is to continue down the path of increasing interference and increasing risk to life and property. Safety margins are already impacted. Ships are already colliding, and passenger aircraft are nearly straying, unannounced, into hostile airspace, all because of spoofing. It is only a matter of time before the world witnesses an avoidable tragedy.

The international community, perhaps in the form of a United Nations task force, must intervene to protect these fragile signals from space and disincentivize future disruptions.

Safer and more reliable signals from space and resilient sovereign terrestrial PNT are in the long-term interest of every nation. Diplomatic efforts must illuminate that shared interest bring parties together and nurture progress for everyone’s benefit.

Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, www.RNTFnd.org, an educational and scientific charity. He is a member of the president’s National Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board and formerly served as the maritime navigation authority for the United States. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

How Diplomacy Can Save GPS was originally published on Global Security Review.