Advances in space technology are making the extraction of lunar and asteroid materials increasingly feasible. These capabilities promise the potential for significant economic gains, greater energy security, and new avenues of geopolitical influence for any spacefaring nation capable of developing and sustaining resource-extraction operations. As competition accelerates, the question is no longer whether space mining will occur, but who will shape the rules, norms, and capabilities that govern it.

To preserve American power in space, the United States must take formative policy action and protective research and development (R&D) measures to define the future of space mining before rival nations do. Building on the strategic momentum established in the space domain during the first Trump Administration, namely the creation of the U.S. Space Force, securing an early foothold in space mining will help counter adversarial efforts to undermine American leadership and preserve space as a key frontier for American power.

Formative Policy Action in Space Mining

In emerging domains, the first actors often leave a legacy that serves as a reference point for subsequent laws and behavior, such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed outer space beyond its initial symbolic and scientific uses. Concerns over nuclear escalation prompted the creation of a legal framework that addressed non-weaponization and restrictions on national sovereignty. Despite approaching its 60th anniversary, the OST remains a foundational pillar of outer space governance, demonstrating how proactive U.S. leadership defined the rules of engagement and established operational precedents in an emerging domain. Sustaining this proactive approach is critical if the U.S. is to seize the strategic opportunities in outer space.

Space mining is among the more recent technical opportunities to emerge, alongside satellite constellations, orbital maneuvering, and AI-enabled platforms. Yet space mining is unique in that it offers potential energy security and trillions of dollars in economic value to those possessing return-to-Earth capabilities (currently limited, forcing a focus on in-situ resource utilization (ISR) for propulsion and life support). According to NASA’s Asterank database, extracting resources from the ten most cost-effective asteroids could yield profits exceeding $1.5 trillion. The promise of energy resilience and economic gain has captured the attention of global powers and middle-state actors alike, leading to a growing number of spacefaring nations and sparking geopolitical friction.

The U.S. and Luxembourg were among the first to formalize space mining in their legal frameworks, recognizing outer space resources as property subject to ownership and commercial trade. Conversely, Russia cites the Outer Space Treaty’s designation of space as the “province of all mankind” as a basis for prohibiting resource extraction and ownership. In response to the Trump Administration’s proposed lunar mining initiatives, Russian officials went so far as to accuse the U.S. of orchestrating an “invasion” of the Moon, likening it to “another Afghanistan or Iraq.” Russia’s actions, however, contrast sharply with its public stance, given its willingness to explore an agreement on space mining with Luxembourg in 2019.

Yet American space mining laws have been relatively insulated from further international criticism because they align with formative international frameworks. For example, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 reflects Article II of the OST, which prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies. Additionally, the 2020 National Space Policy aligns with the Artemis Accords by emphasizing transparency in national space policies and space exploration plans, as well as the sharing of scientific information. The legitimacy of U.S. legal principles has been strengthened by demonstrating its commitment to sharing the space domain as a collaborative partner while advancing its own interests and strategic advantages.

Critical questions about access to mining sites, extraction limits, and fair participation remain unanswered because frameworks such as the OST predate the concept of space mining. Addressing these questions and providing certainty before capabilities mature or competing nations establish their own frameworks is essential to preserving a U.S. strategic advantage in space.

Protective R&D Measures for Space Mining Capabilities

As the future of space mining and its economic potential threaten to catalyze geopolitical tensions, it is crucial for the U.S. not only to be among the first to establish governance frameworks but also to develop tangible space mining capabilities. Yet space is no longer a domain of uncontested U.S. dominance, as China has evolved from a near-peer to a peer competitor. Initiatives such as the Tiangong Space Station and the International Lunar Research Station underscore China’s growing space capabilities and its ambitions to assume a leadership role.

China’s rapid rise may be attributed in part to its exposure to U.S. space technologies, as bilateral cooperation agreements have provided avenues for interaction with U.S. research and development efforts. Despite the Wolf Amendment, which prohibits bilateral cooperation with China without explicit authorization from Congress and the FBI, numerous violations of the provision have likely conferred strategic benefits on China, eroding the competitive edge the U.S. seeks to maintain. In 2024, the Office of the Inspector General investigated a state University for violations of the Wolf Amendment and announced in December that the University agreed to pay $715,580 to resolve civil allegations. When applying for and receiving NASA research grants, the University failed to disclose a professor’s affiliations with and support from the Chinese government. Similarly, according to a report published by the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), hundreds of articles crediting NASA funding were identified that were jointly published by U.S. researchers (including public universities and federal research entities) and CCP institutions. In early February 2026, the University of Texas at San Antonio agreed to pay nearly $130,000 in penalties after federal investigators alleged that the lead principal investigator for a NASA-funded Center for Advanced Measurements in Extreme Environments failed to disclose affiliations with researchers in China.

China’s sustained intellectual property theft is eroding U.S. dominance in space and diminishing the impact of formative U.S. space mining policy measures. Prioritizing R&D for space mining, particularly return-to-Earth capabilities, is a central focus for spacefaring nations and must be a priority for the United States. However, R&D initiatives must be paired with enforceable oversight structures that protect intellectual property from adversarial appropriation. Enforcement entities should also demonstrate a clear commitment to implementing protective measures and punishing violators. Without such protections, any research investments risk benefiting adversarial states as much as the U.S., as evidenced by instances in which China has capitalized on U.S.-funded advancements.

Conclusion

Although the U.S. is facing increasing demands across emerging warfighting domains, with numerous competing national security concerns, space resource governance and capability development can no longer be sidelined. The U.S. must act decisively and with strategic clarity to build the legal and behavioral foundations for space mining, and to enact protections for space mining R&D, as competitors advance their own initiatives. Space mining has become a strategic imperative, one that this Administration must seize to ensure that American values, interests, and leadership define this emerging domain, resource governance and capability development resource governance and capability development.

Rachel Butler is a doctoral student in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University. She holds master’s degrees in history and strategic studies, with research interests focused on ethical and cognitive warfare. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Seizing the High Ground: The Case for U.S. Leadership in Space Mining was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, there are at least two major areas of concern for an effective future USSF international strategy: divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues of a real space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy.

Divisive Geopolitics

Europe acknowledges space as congested and contested but stops short of calling space a warfighting domain. Europe adamantly refuses to declare China as a threatening adversary in the space domain. Not only does Europe struggle with a China dependency, chasing elusive economic benefits, but mainstream European diplomacy emphasizes engagement with China as a preferred way to hedge against (allegedly) unpredictable American behavior.

China managed to deter Europe from taking any offensive space posture, further making sure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains busy with relentless Russian threats. It remains unclear where Europe would stand in a collective space defense scenario resulting from a multi-theater conflict involving both Taiwan and Eastern Europe.

Strategic Quandary

The USSF international partnership strategy signals a service fixated on space support rather than getting after the real problem, which is defeating space threats. This cannot be achieved without offensive space capabilities that deter, and, if necessary, destroy enemy capabilities.

In Europe and the Indo-Pacific, France and Japan are technologically capable of developing offensive capabilities, but politics forbid them from fielding offensive weapons in space, leaving Russian and Chinese rendezvous and proximity operations and kill chains unchallenged. This means such partnerships are unlikely to support the US with truly offensive capabilities in space.

Effective Bilateral and Mini-lateral Partnerships

US Space Command shares space situational awareness data with 33 partner countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender (OOD) is a US Space Command operation to strengthen defenses and deter aggression in space, and involves more than six countries.

US Space Command and the US Space Force have agreements for exchange of personnel and liaison officers for these countries. Bilateral and mini-lateral partnerships include hosting payloads on allied systems such as Norway’s Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS aka Michibiki); Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) with the UK and Australia; and Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) using commercial space domain awareness data with allies and partners. Such needed bilateral and mini-lateral agreements get more done and faster.

Challenging Multilateral Partnerships

Implementing wideband global satellite communications (WGS) to provide satellite communications (SATCOM) to NATO can be challenging when over twenty nations all want to have their own homegrown terminals that can use any nation’s SATCOM satellites. This is made worse by the NATO Communications and Information Agency imposing further rules.

Bottlenecks with extremely high frequency (EHF) communications for nuclear deterrence means all capitals want to have a chance to say yay or nay on who makes the decision and communicates through the EHF with allied command operations. Compared with bi- or mini-lateral agreements, multilateral partnerships are complicated to implement.

The GAO Report on Organizational Politics

An earlier report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the US Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent challenges that impede its efforts to integrate allies and partners into space operations and activities by establishing joint goals. The unclassified version of the GAO report tackles organizational politics specifically.
The report identified that the DoD has several organizations that have overlapping roles and responsibilities for space-related security cooperation.

Several foreign government officials said that finding the appropriate DoD contact with whom to coordinate is difficult, resulting in confusion and missed opportunities. GAO found that USSF has not identified, analyzed, or responded to the risk of not filling positions within its service components, including space-related planning, information sharing, and security cooperation positions.

The USSF strategy acknowledges resource constraints: personnel, budget, and time are limited for all parties. Overclassification limits intelligence sharing and is a concern. Policy misalignment, lack of straightforward national policies, and interoperability risks hinder cooperation.

The USSF is already seeking $6 billion for its own unfunded priorities such as its nascent Military Network (MILNET) satellite constellation and various classified projects. Meanwhile, China appears eager to beat the USSF to the punch in space refueling. Hence the criticality of the USSF astroscale refueling deal. Europe and Japan remain in the process of developing elementary space-based surveillance and passive defense assets.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space?

Current USSF half-baked strategic and cooperation models, leadership alignment issues, capability gaps among allies, and inefficiencies in multilateral agreements are not helping the US to lead in solving allies’ collective space security quandaries, let alone guaranteeing the United States’ own homeland security. In a worst-case scenario, the US might need to be prepared to go it alone and add foreign capabilities as “nice to have.”

If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies, many of whom will be sitting on the fence. Furthermore, allies of the US could be knocked out, one-by-one, by China and Russia in orbit, leaving the US to go it alone anyway.

If the USSF international partnerships strategy is to be relevant, the USSF needs to further evolve from support functions to offensive space warfare, which should form the backbone of any allied international counterspace capabilities. Ultimately, in space, as on Earth, one either leads, follows, or gets out of the way. The US is allowing itself to be paralyzed by committee, which is a sure-fire way to lose the war in space that already started.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Bottom line: The center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs, and our adversaries are acting as if they know it. NATO voices now openly frame space as a war-fighting domain, while Europe moves from point defense to deep strike, Washington debates force-design trades (B-52J vs. more B-21s), and Iran/Russia press for coercive advantage amid sanctions friction. The strategic task is to turn language and spending into tested, resilient, allied operational architectures, and fast.

Unifying Trends

1. Space goes operational, not “supporting.”
   NATO leaders’ tone shift (Germany, France, Spain, Canada) treats space as a domain for defense and offense (“shield and sword”), demanding common doctrine, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch (<96 hours) to restore/augment constellations under attack.
2. From point defense to deep strike.
   Denmark’s decision to field long-range precision fires (Tomahawk/JASSM-ER class and European options) reflects a continental realization: you can’t intercept your way out of massed salvos—you must hold launchers, C2, and magazines at risk.
3. U.S. force-design inflection.
   Cost/schedule breaches on B-52J upgrades collide with contested-airspace realities, strengthening arguments to expand and accelerate B-21. This is a survivability vs. standoff trade with industrial-base and budget consequences.
4. Great-Power coercion is coordinated.
   ISW’s readout on Moscow’s aims, Iran’s missile signaling and suspected tests, and Beijing’s pressure campaigns (incl. Taiwan wargaming counters) form a convergent pressure track seeking to outlast Western cohesion and exploit cost-asymmetry (cheap counter-space/EW vs. exquisite satellites).
5. Homeland defense as a system-of-systems problem.
   “Golden Dome” can work only if rigorous end-to-end (E2E) testing—across space sensors, comms, C2, effectors, cyber—starts now and leverages commercial testbeds/digital twins. Otherwise, the architecture risks beautiful fragility.
6. Forward posture debates return.
   Talk of re-entering Bagram underscores a broader theme: geography for deterrence matters again, but must be weighed against access, legitimacy, and escalation dynamics with the Taliban and China.

What This Means Operationally

• Speed is deterrence. Time to detect-decide-deliver (and to replace space capacity) is now a primary measure of merit.
• Proliferation beats pedigree. Multi-orbit, proliferated constellations with rapid reconstitution are more survivable than few exquisite assets.
• Kill webs over platforms. Advantage will come from tested integration of sensors, AI-enabled C2, and multi-domain effectors, not any single “silver bullet.”
• Allies are moving—synchronize them. Europe’s deep-strike pivot and NATO’s space posture create a window to standardize doctrine, data, and munitions.

Risks to Watch

• Doctrine lag in space. Without common allied space ROE/authorities, response times will miss the fight.
• Testing shortfalls. If E2E campaigns are under-funded or staged too late, integration debt will surface in crisis.
• Budget whiplash. Raiding legacy accounts for survivable capacity is necessary—but undisciplined shifts can hollow critical standoff magazines and training.
• Cost asymmetry. Adversaries’ cheap EW/dazzling/cyber vs. our pricey satellites remains a structural vulnerability.

Priority Actions (next 6–12 months)

1. Adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0
   Codify protect/defend, attribution thresholds, delegated authorities, and tactically responsive launch across NATO.
2. Stand up a Joint Tactically Responsive Space (TacRS) pipeline
   Contract now for rideshare, hot-spare payloads, and 96-hour launch/checkout drills; exercise quarterly.
3. Golden Dome: lock an Integrated Master Test Plan
   Fund E2E test events that include on-orbit sensing + ground C2 + live/interoperable interceptors + cyber red-teaming. Mandate industry-in-the-loop from day one.
4. Rebalance the bomber portfolio toward survivability
   Protect B-21 ramp; scrutinize B-52J scope/schedule to preserve standoff munitions buys and mission-planning AI.
5. European deep-strike integration
   Fast-track common mission planning, targeting data standards, and logistics for JASSM-ER/Tomahawk/European LR strike across F-35 and surface fleets.
6. Harden the space kill web
   Deploy optical crosslinks, jam-resilient waveforms, PNT alternatives, and autonomous battle management aids to ride through EW/cyber.
7. Tighten economic levers against Russia/Iran
   Enforce oil price caps/leakage, expand sanctions on dual-use microelectronics, and close maritime re-flag loopholes that fund attritional strategies.
8. Wargame access/logistics for any Afghanistan posture
   If Bagram re-entry is pursued, pre-plan overflight, basing, sustainment, and escalation controls; build non-permissive extraction branches.

Concrete Measures of Effectiveness

• Time-to-Replace-On-Orbit (TTRO): target ≤ 96 hours from loss to restored coverage.
• Find-Fix-Finish latency: median time from first detection to effect in minutes, not hours.
• E2E test cadence: quarterly cross-domain integrated events; zero critical interoperability defects carried forward.
• Allied deep-strike coverage: % of NATO targets held at risk at >500 km with validated comms/targeting.
• Resilience index: % of space services with disaggregated backups (multi-orbit/multi-vendor).

Longer Perspective

Deterrence now hinges on resilient connections more than singular platforms: space that can fight and recover, kill webs that integrate fast, and alliances that can reach deep. If we test as we will fight, standardize with allies, and bias for speed and survivability, we deny adversaries the slow-motion coercion they seek—and keep escalation ladders short, clear, and in our control.

This Week in Deterrence (September 15-19, 2025) was originally published on Global Security Review.

Recent scientific research at Sandia National Laboratories proves that carefully aimed nuclear detonations in space, early enough in an object’s approach to Earth, can deflect a threatening comet or asteroid by enough to put it on a safe trajectory. The idea is not to try to pulverize the object by a direct hit, which might still shower Earth with debris. Rather, by detonating the warhead at a modest distance from the object, the forceful ablation (evaporation) of one side of its surface, induced by the intense X-ray of a nuclear detonation, would cause the entire object to move away from the detonation.

This would be an example of what has been called a peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE). Back in the early Cold War, the US Atomic Energy Commission looked into potential applications of nuclear detonations for peaceful civil engineering purposes. These included digging canals, creating harbors, and moving mountains. And yes, fallout was expected, which is why these terrestrial applications were abandoned. An underground nuclear blast was also tested as a way to extract natural gas, by creating in some geologically promising area a subterranean cavity that could then be tapped. The test was not a success because the natural gas was radioactive.

Later, India’s first successful nuclear test (1974) was announced as a peaceful nuclear explosion, for oil extraction and mining purposes, not a weapon test. Then, in 1976, the U.S. and the USSR signed the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, which permitted such blasts anywhere on Earth if the host country gave permission. Thus, there is some precedent for the use of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes.

Certainly, non-nuclear methods for diverting menacing space objects are possible. For instance, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) test-demonstration DART high-velocity inert impactor mission was successful. But the object whose orbit was changed slightly was a very small moonlet of a slightly less-small asteroid. Other techniques being studied include attaching rocket motors to a threatening object or moving it aside via space tugs deploying giant nets. Such motors or tugs could be driven by chemical engines, or non-explosive nuclear propulsion, or solar power (either solar panels, or light sails).

These latter techniques are years or decades away from meaningful deployment. Due to their lower specific energy compared to a PNE, they would need for the inbound object to be detected very early and to be comparatively small.

For the largest potential Earth-bound objects, especially those coming from sunward, which can make them hard to detect very early, peaceful nuclear explosions might be an essential diversion method.

Obviously, such use of nuclear devices, well away from any people living on Earth or in space, would be for the benefit of mankind. However, nuclear devices can also be deadly weapons of war. They are indeed being looked at by America’s adversaries for purposes of space-based coercion and blackmail and even warfighting in space. Examples include Russia’s “Sputnuke” and China’s fractional orbital bombardment system. Effective strategic deterrence thus continues to require American preparedness and vigilance, throughout the cislunar and beyond the Moon.

However, nuclear explosives in space are truly a dual-use technology. There are already copious amounts of natural hard radiation throughout the solar system. An asteroid- or comet-moving PNE blast’s fallout would dissipate relatively harmlessly.

PNEs in space raise troubling but pressing questions about the need to rethink and update the Outer Space Treaty, since it prohibits placing any nuclear devices anywhere in space. On the one hand, all nuclear weapons based on-orbit should continue to be forbidden. But on the other hand, the same warheads used to defend Earth against space rocks simply must be allowed.

This might be achieved in one of two ways. One is to create a “Planetary Defense Guard” under the auspices of the UN, with the necessary nuclear devices put under UN Security Council control. However, the UN does not have a record of success regarding cooperative use of nuclear devices. A proposed plan in the early Cold War called for all nuclear arms to be pooled under central UN control. It went nowhere. The modern UN attempt at a treaty banning all nuclear devices everywhere (including PNEs) is also going nowhere, for the same reason. States owning nuclear warheads have no desire to give them up.

The other way to get the protection Earth requires is to recognize that planetary defense is a necessary and unavoidable aspect of the “Scramble for the Skies” now emerging. In this alternate scheme, rival powers compete using nuclear devices in a peaceful way for space-based civil engineering purposes. They vie to develop the best suite of proprietary systems, procedures, and technologies for deflecting Earth impactors via peaceful nuclear explosions. They could then also “race” to launch them whenever actually needed. Such healthy competition might significantly increase the odds of at least one contender making a successful diversion, while letting all contenders participate in this ultimate “space Olympic decathlon.”

Changing the OST out of sheer necessity, to allow PNEs for planetary defense, would have several very significant societal benefits. It would more rapidly and effectively advance humanity’s space defenses. It would urgently accelerate everything needed for the successful commercialization, industrialization, and colonization of space, which advocates say could take pressure off Earth’s endangered environment, too.

Allowing PNEs in space would also give spacefaring nuclear powers a way to stay within Cold War–style safety guardrails against nuclear crises and nuclear war. It would allow them to instead compete to show their culture’s and their government’s superiority through the peaceful, beneficial harnessing of both spaceflight and nuclear energy. Such a grand competitive program would help address three existential threats to the human race at once, three possible extermination events: a large asteroid strike, a climate catastrophe, and a nuclear holocaust.

Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Devices in Space was originally published on Global Security Review.

Real Space Strategy: Starlink, Key Tool in the Battle for Freedom? was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, one area the report does not cover is how the United States can ensure the advantages created by an expanding critical space infrastructure will remain “enduring” under direct threat of space attack without the weapons systems capable of deterring or defeating such aggression. Without a US Space Force capable of achieving measurable space superiority against a continual growth in Chinese and Russian space attack forces, new technologies and capabilities for terrestrial advantage will create more targets and vulnerabilities.

At present, there is much to do in space to continue to maintain what advantages and leadership the United States has managed to keep in the past twenty years of passivity and talk. At present the Space Force and its combatant command cousin US Space Command, while capable organizations for enabling terrestrial actions and providing situational awareness of space activities, are fully incapable of addressing the threat of armed aggression in and from space. Having an ability to take a hit and not proactively retaliate in and from space creates more, rather than less, vulnerability for exploitation and weakness in times of conflict. Would the nation take this type of approach with other services? Take the Air Force as an example.

Suppose the US was seeking to maintain its airpower advantage through the improvement of fuel efficiency, navigation routes, wing design, air traffic control modernization, and speed and distance characteristics of aircraft. Meanwhile, the enemy is building vast integrated air defense systems of missiles and fighter-interceptors, and long-range bombers, to take out the industrial and operational infrastructure of American civil and military aviation.

While the US has the advantage of outstanding technology in the air, the adversary fielded an ability to deny, degrade, and destroy that advantage in rapid fashion. Instead of building a US Air Force that fights, the nation responds by building an Air Force that can conduct limited electromagnetic jamming, overhead reconnaissance, and movement of equipment.

The Air Force’s position is that the service can take the hits and replace the airplanes in a reasonable time frame. All the while, in a great-power war, airports, air bases, and aircraft that provide an enduring advantage in economic and military support are now smoking debris. Regardless of the advantage airpower provides in this scenario, the United States possesses no means for strategic attack or air superiority.

This is exactly where the nation is with the Space Force. The urgency of the times is having little effect in shaping the actions of planners or political leaders.

At the low end, the Space Force has a very small number of electromagnetic jammers and geolocation systems. While such a small number was good for rotating them over time into a largely uncontested Middle East operating environment in the Global War on Terror, such numbers are wholly inadequate for requirements in the Indo-Pacific theater, much less the entirety of combatant command requirements worldwide.

The United States lacks options that are known to friends, neutrals and enemies alike with a clear declaratory policy highlighting American willingness and ability to project force in and from space to deter or win a conflict in space. Knowing what is happening in space is important, but there is no such thing as deterrence by attribution. Americans knew the Russians were amassing troops outside Ukraine and communicated that publicly, but Putin still invaded. The United States is pushing for norms of behavior and bans on destructive ASAT testing—to mitigate long-lived debris fields—but Russia and China oppose these efforts and continue to test, deploy, and use their space forces on a near daily basis, as former Vice Chief of Space Operations, General David Thompson, noted before his retirement.

The time has come to fix this and to do so publicly and aggressively. Passivity and resiliency alone will not defend America’s critical space infrastructure and the advantage that it provides. Only with a force projection capability that can achieve space superiority in and from space, as the Chinese and Russians both believe is key to deterrence, can the nation achieve credible deterrence in the minds of our adversaries.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the former special assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

There Can be No “Enduring Advantage in Space” without Space Superiority was originally published on Global Security Review.

The FY 2025 budget focuses on simpler satellite networks. Notable decreases occur in launch and classified activities, while increases are found in position, navigation, and timing. The Space Force continues moving towards more distributed, resilient, and cost-effective space capabilities, including GPS satellites and narrowband communications. The intention signaled for space operations is to enhance the Space Force’s ability to adapt and respond to emerging threats. By prioritizing the development of distributed and proliferated satellite networks to ensure resilient space operations, the Space Force places a continued focus on low Earth orbit (LEO). This aligns with defense goals of redundancy and rapid deployment, enhancing space “competitive endurance,” a strategy announced in early 2023 by Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman.”

In General (Ret.) John Raymond’s often quoted words, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Space Force need to “exploit what we have, buy what we can, build what we must.” The DoD will increase the integration of commercial satellite services to reduce costs and accelerate deployment. The belief behind this policy is that to strengthen partnerships with commercial satellite providers is to capitalize on existing technologies and infrastructure, which is largely preferable to government doing it by itself. While it is a politically and operationally challenging process, the budget sequence necessitates more flexible and adaptive budget planning processes within the Space Force and other related agencies. By adopting these practices, the Space Force might better navigate budget constraints and funding adjustment, while advancing its strategic goals in space defense.

Regarding proliferation of smaller commercial assets for the sake of resilience in space, and within the currently prevalent DoD cognitive framework for the Space Force, the link between resilience and deterrence was further validated in April 2023 by John F. Plumb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. In remarks at the Space Foundation’s 38th Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Plumb said, “We will do that first and foremost by investing in resilience. We must expect to take punches in space in a near-peer conflict. A resilient architecture means we will be prepared to absorb those blows. With sufficient resilience, we hope to deter an adversary from attacking in the first place, because the value of any such attack will be greatly diminished.”

However, in space as in any other domains, resilience does not qualify as deterrence. Before events occur on the battlefield, deterrence is first and foremost built not merely based on actual capabilities, but on the ability to clearly communicate to the adversaries what such capabilities will do to them, if used. But deterrence requires a third factor, which is credibility. And the credibility of passive defensive posturing is where the real problems start.

To prevail over adversaries such as Russia and China, the West requires a genuine understanding of the adversary’s own decision-making process. If the West fails to understand that adversaries fundamentally value space as an offensive domain, the West will fail to protect its space assets—unless the Space Forces build a credible offensive counterforce capability. For active defense of critical Western space and terrestrial infrastructures to be sufficient to ensure credible deterrence, the Space Force must view space systems as a critical infrastructure and not merely a support desk for terrestrial operations.

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on June 14, 2024, cleared its version of the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The bill was then headed to the Senate floor. The legislation, which is yet to be released in full, includes compromise language on a long-standing dispute over the transfer of Air National Guard space units to the active-duty Space Force. That does not mean the political process ends there. In the meantime, the House passed its own version of the NDAA, which includes several social policy amendments, that eliminates paid leave for servicemembers to cross state lines for an abortion, eliminates controversial diversity initiatives, and eliminates taxpayer funding for “gender-affirming care,” which is likely to start another cycle of congressional haggling.

There are professionally constructive developments on the commercial side, though, as the Senate Armed Services Committee includes requirements for reviews of investment policy and performance evaluation. The bill also authorizes DoD to identify poor-performing contractors and require approval for additional contracts. The question remains, though, whether government should still retain an exclusive role in building certain specific space defense capabilities on its own and which ones these should be.

When and how the congressional process concludes, and the end game for the FY 2025 Space Force budget, remain to be seen. It should be extremely clear—no less is at stake than the US and its allies prevailing against common adversaries, for, in, and from space. In short, getting funding priorities right may affect who controls the high ground.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Congressional Haggling Jeopardizes the US Space Force FY 2025 Budget was originally published on Global Security Review.

Though data on the breakdown of aerospace engineers employed in space-related projects versus solely terrestrial-based aircraft is not readily available, the above statistic represents a worrying trend for a field (space) that is heavily reliant on aerospace engineers and at the center of American preeminence. More concerning, it is important to also ask if these known unemployment numbers are a deterrent for graduates entering into a dedicated space-focused workforce. Space is a critical part of national security and without a comprehensive understanding of how to entice applicants into priority positions, the new space race with China may not be so easily won.

On the surface, the situation does not appear dire. The Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated aerospace engineering jobs should grow by 6 percent between 2021 and 2031. However, the Bureau of Economic Analysis reported that the number of space private-sector jobs is down 12,000 from a decade prior. Additionally, an article from major consultant McKinsey & Company noted an 8 percent decline in aerospace, aeronautical, and astronautical engineering hires over the past five years within the broader aerospace and defense sector. It characterized the situation as an “intense competition for talent,” with younger graduates more interested in pursuing the highly lucrative computer and software engineering careers.

“Right now, we have a STEM crisis,” Mel Stricklan of the Space Workforce 2030 initiative spoke in an interview at the 39th Space Symposium. Further exacerbating the space employment challenge is how the overall number of science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) graduates decreased despite the number of job openings increasing. As the purpose of her organization’s mission is to develop the next base of qualified professionals, Stricklan was passionate in suggesting, “The next generation needs to understand that they have a place in space.” In the same interview, Mike French, formerly Vice President of Space Systems for the Aerospace Industries Association, warns companies need to pay attention to their retention rates, the impact of retirements on workforce demographics, and security clearance requirements dissuading applicants.

According to Pew Research, a majority of Americans believe the US needs to be a leader in space, including from within the private sector. Though analysts predict a space market valuation of over $1 trillion in under a decade, it is not yet clear if the path to reach this estimate is through increasing the number of professionals and therefore varied projects in the industry or by simply increasing the price to fund space projects already in existence.

For a recent parallel example, the collapse of cryptocurrency bank FTX was in part due to customers discovering sister-company Alameda Research artificially propped up the value of FTX by inflating the value of FTX’s nascent exchange coin rather than providing liquidity backed by fiat or already proven cryptocurrencies. Looking at the current trends in the space market, the Space Launch System rocket produced by Boeing keeps increasing in cost for the Artemis lunar exploration mission despite NASA’s goal to switch contracting methods. Young graduates may be paying attention to these trends and hedging their bets elsewhere.

As Americans wait for the space tourism industry to flourish, traditional aerospace companies are generally limited to selling only to governments and major commercial companies. When a project cancellation hits the industry, such as the OSAM-1 satellite mission, the engineering specialists and mission support staff find themselves in a precarious position of not knowing if they will remain employed. Following this development came whispers of more contractor layoffs hitting the Goddard Space Flight Center after previous cuts in 2023, although NASA committed to funding the 450 personnel working on the program through fiscal year 2024. The recent news of cuts at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory, which saw 8 percent reductions of the workforce following budget cuts to the Mars Sample Return program, also adds to the uncertainty of job stability for the space industry. Without a new project to immediately switch to, the unemployment rate of aerospace engineers may be partially explained by this phenomenon.

A lack of understanding of why engineers are moving away from space-related careers displays an incongruity within a space strategy that calls for the integration of commercial and military space capabilities. Paid training and a guaranteed job after completion will be necessary to persuade the upcoming Generation Z to choose a space career. Regardless of the numerous factors contributing to a decreasing space workforce, companies and government agencies must first recognize the extent of the problem before an adequate solution can be developed. Whatever solution industry and government leaders may choose, it is important it comes soon.

Alexis Schlotterback is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Is the United States Losing Aerospace Engineers? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since June 2023, there is increasing attention on space security, with a particular focus on collaboration with private-sector space businesses. In situations like the Ukraine conflict, private companies’ satellite imagery and satellite communication services are utilized. It is therefore crucial for the Japanese government to leverage the technology and innovation of private companies, and for the private sector to integrate space security into their business. Close collaboration between the two, advancing public-private partnerships, is a key factor.

The event opened and closed with Kenji Minami, Director, Business Planning Division 2 of the Defense Department, Air Staff Office, at the Japanese Ministry of Defense. The first keynote session, “The Forefront of Public-Private Collaboration in the Security Domain: The Case of the United States,” was delivered by Yasuhito Fukushima, Senior Researcher at the Global Security Laboratory of the Policy Research Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. The session reviewed the current American model of space development. It took a close look at several programs (SpaceWERX), US efforts at connecting industries with government, and expanding the industrial base of space innovation, along the motto: “Exploit What We Have, Buy What We Can, and Build Only What We Must.” Kenji Minami moderated the ensuing panel discussion, “Expectations for Private Companies to Strengthen Space Security,” which gathered participants from the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, and Keio University, at senior researcher, director, and professor level, respectively.

Masayasu Ishida, CEO of SPACETIDE, moderated the second part of the event, with a session called, “Opportunities and Challenges in Space Security from the Perspective of private companies.” It featured the C-Suite representatives of three Japanese space Businesses: Shunji Izutsu, Vice President of Astroscale Co., Ltd., Akiko Kitahara, Executive Vice President and CFO of Warp Space Co., Ltd., and Yoshihiro Ota, Executive Officer and CSO of Axel Space Holdings Co., Ltd. Astroscale is dedicated to on-orbit servicing, such as active debris removal, refueling, and space situational awareness. Warp Space is focused on solving the problem of communication via optical link. Axel Space is a global leader in micro-satellite technology with a strong Earth-observation focus.

The session discussed the potential for public-private cooperation. The three representatives spoke about the potential and challenges of space security–oriented business from the perspective of commercial companies, taking examples from current conflicts and issues. The discussion covered the importance of community building through regular events, and the use of study contracts to demonstrate and introduce new private-sector technologies.

Topics such as legal, financial, commercial, and technical development challenges related to dual-use technologies, and managing risk when involving commercial entities as services providers in relation with a conflict zone, were also reviewed.

On the same day this Space Security and Business event took place, SPACETIDE, the co-organizer of the event, announced that it had been awarded the Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Award at the 6th Space Development and Utilization Grand Prize for its significant contributions to the advancement of the space business and the formation of the industrial ecosystem. The selection committee commended SPACETIDE for its significant contributions to the formation of the space industry community in Japan, comprehensive research on the space industry, promotion of networking among entrepreneurs and businesses, and facilitation of talent mobility—thereby contributing to the promotion of the space business and the formation of the space industry ecosystem, fostering national awareness and understanding, while promoting sustainable space utilization.

The conference was a clear demontration that Japan is on the right track to develop a strong industrial base that sustains the nation’s space power development course for both civilian and defense purposes. The Japanese government and its Ministry of Defense are dedicated to advancing close collaboration with the private sector in the field of space security. And as its defense strategy aims at deploying a more credible space deterrent, the nation of Japan further positions itself as a reliable ally of the US in the Indo-Pacific region.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense: Opening Space Security to the Commercial Sector was originally published on Global Security Review.

They continue similar priorities and themes to the previous coalition government’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update and Force Structure Plan on the space domain. As with those documents, the 2024 NDS and IIP highlight the importance of space as a critical enabler for terrestrial military operations and an operational domain in a multi-domain approach to a strategy of deterrence by denial.

Furthermore, they identify three broad capability areas for further development.  These include (1) the provision of space support, notably through satellite communications to be provided by Australian-owned satellites through project JP9102 in geosynchronous orbit; (2) the establishment of enhanced space domain awareness, with the establishment of a Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) at Exmouth in Western Australia—part of a global network of three such sensors—in collaboration with the US and UK; and (3) the development of space control capabilities.

This last aspect of the NDS and IIP opens some intriguing possibilities for future development that could be announced in subsequent policy documents, with the next NDS and IIP due in 2026. It also raises the possibility that space could start to play a larger role as a priority area in AUKUS Pillar 2. Already, the agreement to establish DARC is seen as part of AUKUS and will extend Australia’s ability to undertake space domain awareness out to geosynchronous orbit (GEO) at 36,500 kilometers. That complements the existing C-Band radar and space surveillance telescope already located at Exmouth and will dramatically enhance the ability of Australia to undertake space surveillance under Operation Dyurra. This is an essential requirement for Australia to undertake the space control mission, so it would make sense to bring this role into AUKUS Pillar 2 as well and see the two missions as integrated.

Just how Australia will undertake space control needs further clarification. There is only the following paragraph in the IIP, which states that space control will include “measures to enhance Defence’s space control capability to deny attempts to interfere with, or attack, Australia’s use of the space domain. These will help ensure the ADF is able to continue using the space capabilities it needs to support its operations.”

Australia has signed the ban on undertaking destructive testing of direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons as part of steps to promote responsible action in space, and it is extremely unlikely that Australia would pursue destructive “kinetic kill”’ ASATs, either direct-ascent or co-orbital in design. Exactly what Australia could pursue in terms of space control is open to speculation at this stage. Defence has undertaken work toward a space-electronic warfare capability under Defence Project DEF 9358, and this would be consistent with the 2024 IIP’s stated approach to space control, as well as the 2020 Force Structure Plan.

A “soft kill” capability, which is either ground-based or co-orbital, that could deliver scalable and reversible effects without creating space debris would contribute directly to the need for space control in a manner that is also consistent with Australian approaches to responsible actions in space. In the same way, other non-kinetic approaches—directed-energy or cyber—might open up opportunities for Australia to develop space control in the future.

The 2022 Defence Space Strategy, released by Defence Space Command, makes clear the importance of assured access to space. This can be achieved in part through resilience of space support, including through defending satellites on-orbit via space control. But it also can be strengthened through enhancing sovereign launch capability. It is in this area where the 2024 NDS and IIP misses a valuable opportunity to integrate the space needs of defense with the growing commercial space sector.

There is no mention whatsoever of Australia’s vibrant commercial space sector in the 2024 NDS and IIP. It is almost as if the view from Defence is that this growing sector does not exist. Yet, Australia’s space sector is fast emerging as the basis for an end-to-end ecosystem, comprising not only the ground segment, but also satellite design and manufacturing through to sovereign launch capabilities.

Indeed, Australia is truly blessed in geographic terms for sovereign launch, with launch sites in the north located close to the equator to take full advantage of Earth’s rotational energy for cheaper cost per kilogram into equatorial low-earth orbit, and launch sites along the south of the continent that are well placed to access polar and sun synchronous orbits. Australia’s launch geography is a key factor prompting the signing of a Technology Safeguards Agreement with the United States on launches and returns.

Defence missed this opportunity to strengthen space resilience through supporting sovereign launch of small satellites that could complement large satellites in GEO, such as those envisaged for JP9102 with proliferated LEO (pLEO) constellations of small satellites for satellite communications and earth observation, to support both civil and defense needs. It missed the clear benefits of sovereign launch to reinforce assured access to space, through rapid augmentation of existing space capabilities in a crisis—or reconstitution of those capabilities in the event of an adversary employing counterspace capabilities against Australian satellites. It missed the opportunity for Australia to take a new step forward to do more to burden share in orbit with allies and strengthen the resilience of space support in the face of counterspace threats from China and Russia.

As the NDS and IIP are biennial documents, the opportunity is still there for Defence to embrace a bolder vision for Australia in space in the next release in 2026, whilst government more fully supports the growth of the commercial space sector. The question is whether Defence and the government will have the vision and determination to do something new. They have begun to think in these terms, given their support for developing space control capabilities, but they can do so much more.

Malcolm Davis, PhD, is a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute.  

Where Next for Australia’s Defence Force in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Then it was argued that spacepower is solely a federal mission and the states have no role or requirement for space forces. The federal system of checks and balances purposefully divides power between the active and reserve component controlled by the president and the national guard controlled by governors.

While many Americans may remember from high school civics or college government class the Constitution’s separation of powers between the three branches of the federal government and the states, the Constitution also deals with a separation of military power. It was not in the founding father’s plan for all military power to be vested in the hands of the capitol and the president. It was intended to be distributed between the states and in partnership with the federal government.

If the federal bureaucracy’s push for centralization of American military spacepower is successful, it will set a dangerous precedent that ultimately leads to the consolidation of all national guard forces of the states (Army and Air Force) into the single component service model with the rest of the service branches. This, according to sources, was discussed as part of the plan. If it works for the Space Force, it will work for the rest of the services. Therefore, the states who created the federal government are at risk of losing even more power of self-defense to the federal leviathan than intended by the founding fathers and current law.

The active component has long sought to exercise day-to-day control over National Guard units that are not under Title 10 federal orders. Day-to-day, National Guard units answer to their governors and the adjutant general, who is appointed by the governor. As such, a working relationship between state military departments and the federal department of defense is a required check upon federal overreach.

This is frustrating to federal commanders, but as the Federalist Papers denote, this was part of the plan. James Madison stated in Federalist 46 that “the federal and state governments, are…[to] resist and frustrate the measures of each other.” The military and militia (now National Guard) were intended to be a security for the rights of civilians and a check against a large federal force from the “oppression of the several states.”

In fact, it was thought that the federal force should be smaller than the aggregated strength of state military forces as a means of defense from an overreaching federal force. The border situation is one example of where state control of armed forces as a means to fill a void left open by the federal government is so important. Hamilton agreed but thought that the states could also be overpowering if not checked by a federal force answerable to the president. So, a compromise was decided that a federal force combined with the checks of the states would be the best option in the constitutional system.

If military space forces are denied the states, who, despite the messaging of some in Washington, DC, that are actively leveraging space systems for state roles and functions, will challenge the idea circulating in the Pentagon and Biden administration that it is necessary to convert all military services to a federal-only single component of part-time and full-time forces? This is a move that is contrary to the Constitution’s purposeful efforts to create a system of checks and balances.

If successful, the single component concept will neuter the states’ abilities to check and be engaged in their policy of state self-defense and the broader national security debates of our time. The single component service model must be opposed, and the Space National Guard should join the established components of the Army and Air Force to ensure that the separation of military power between the states and the federal governments continue to provide the security we need as a country in this ever-growing time of geopolitical and astropolitical strife.

Christopher Stone is a Senior Fellow for space deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Stone is a former U.S. Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for space policy. The opinions expressed in this commentary are his own and do not necessarily reflect those of Core-CSI nor the Defense Department.

Space Guard Opponents Seek Unraveling of Constitution’s National Defense Framework was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two years have passed since the United States announced a unilateral ban on the testing of destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The ban was announced on April 12, 2022, and hailed as a first step towards establishing a norms of responsible behavior to further the ideal of sustainability in outer space.

Several states, including many that do not possess nor intend to deploy such a capability, made similar proclamations. The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and India, however, refused to make the pledge. The US also sponsored a resolution, which was a lead-in to the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, led by the United Kingdom and supported by the US. With the blinding effect of celebration subsiding, a more reasoned look at the drawbacks and weaknesses of the ban is in order.

Unilateral Arms Control Concession

Lost in the euphoria of the ban is the reality that the ban is a unilateral arms control concession. The US ignored an important tenet of diplomacy and negotiation and frittered away destructive ASAT testing without exacting similar concessions from Russia and China. American idealists believed that by signing the ban, the US would show leadership as a responsible actor and encourage both Russia and China to abandon their threatening counterspace build up. However, the American precedent of unilaterally banning direct-ASAT testing on its own without seeking concessions from either Russia or China signals to both that the US may be convinced to make more concessions without either adversary surrendering any of their own capabilities.

Sacrificing Freedom of Action

The unilateral American concession is not about giving up something vital to national security, but rather forfeiting freedom of action with no tangible benefit—other than creating positive political optics and an illusory norm of behavior. Many of the states pledged to the ban and the resolution lacks the requisite technology, capabilities, or the political desire to develop or acquire such technology. In other words, these states pledged to give up a freedom of action and a capability they neither possess nor plan to acquire. Conversely, Russia, China, and India, who all possess the capability, are not willing to give up their freedom of action to the advantage of the United States.

Demonstration Versus Test

The premise of the destructive test ban is the kinetic actions involving destructive ASATs are tests to determine whether a capability works. What the ban ignores is that these events are demonstrations and not tests.

The distinction between “test” and “demonstration” is not a matter of semantics but rather it is the difference between a state ascertaining whether it has a capability as opposed to showing others that it has a capability and a capacity. Ground-launched ASATs are an ancillary capability to missile defense technology, and the know-how for that capability has existed for decades.

Any state that possesses a missile defense capability is presumed to have a rudimentary ASAT capability that can transition to a break-out capability. Thus, a test ban is nonsensical as the need to test a capability is unneeded and any event involving an ASAT is considered a demonstration, including India’s 2019 satellite intercept and Russia’s 2021 intercept. Thus, the US has unilaterally sacrificed freedom of action for “destructive testing” when the capability is already proven and no longer necessary.

Implications for Missile Defense

An outright ASAT ban implicates the testing and development of mid-course missile defense systems. Direct-ascent ASATs are an ancillary capability to missile defense and destructive mid-course missile defense testing against dummy warheads could open the opportunity for Russia and China to complain that the United States is going back on its commitment and testing ASAT technology. This would fall in line with their narrative of “space weapons” given the impetus for this talking point is to stunt the development of American missile defense technology and capabilities. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics focusing on sustainability would also foster this narrative and create public pressure for the US, both in and out of international organizations, to suspend missile defense testing.

Ceding Space Control

Space control is the unspoken chip on the table, especially since the US does not have an operational destructive counterspace capability and restricts its ability to develop offensive capabilities necessary to achieve deterrence through superiority with Russia and China. According to Dana Johnson, “Space control in geopolitical terms is the capability of a nation to maintain freedom of action in outer space and to deny the same to an adversary should national interests dictate.” The unilateral concession by the US bargains away kinetic space control for the ideal of sustainability and the anticipation it will create leverage and put international pressure on Russia and China to restrict their counterspace capabilities and thus ensure sustainability.

Conclusion

At its core, the unilateral ASAT test ban is a sacrifice of freedom of action made for political convenience and to check off a bucket list item for NGOs, academics, and civil servants. The US unilaterally forfeited something of major significance for something trivial and of questionable significance without taking into consideration it would not be reciprocated. The American attempt to use the ban to create momentum for its effort to create pseudo-norms and the drafting of a legally binding treaty to the same end is misplaced and is a detriment to American standing in outer space law, policy, national security, and deterrence.

Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert and practitioner in outer space law, policy, security, and lawfare/hybrid warfare strategy. He is the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis. Views expressed are the author’s opinion and not legal advice.

Two Years After the ASAT Test Ban: A Realistic Assessment was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s coercive but indiscriminate “Sputnuke” concept lies at one end of a spectrum of potential space-based nuclear weapons. The remainder of the spectrum also offers significant offensive capabilities that could make space a very difficult place for the United States.

Prepositioning nuclear weapons in space would violate the Outer Space Treaty (1967). However, Moscow or Beijing gain significant coercive capability against the United States should they move forward with such a capability.

At least three classes of nuclear weapons could, potentially, be based in orbit. Any such weapon is likely to be disguised as some non-military type of spacecraft.

The first class of nuclear weapons in space are those in low Earth orbit. They are detonated from a position where they can disable adversary satellites. One or a small number of devices could create a wide-ranging electromagnetic pulse, which, by disabling satellites, could also cause an immense zone of debris along with a longer-lasting cloud of high-energy charged particles.

The combined effects would likely degrade this region of space for an extended duration. Spacecraft transiting low Earth orbit would also face the risk of a collision with orbiting debris.

Moscow or Beijing, if at a serious disadvantage to the United States during a conflict, may “escalate to win,” setting off nuclear weapons to wreak as much havoc in space as possible. This “scorched space” tactic would seek to level the playing field and slow American efforts to both mobilize force and command and control those forces.

The second class of nuclear weapons in space are those used for ground attacks. If, for example, intercontinental ballistic missile reentry vehicle-like weapons were covertly stationed on-orbit, their launch would be difficult to track. Such a weapon placed in low Earth orbit would strike a ground target in a matter of minutes.

Third are fission reactors based in orbit to power directed-energy weapons firing microwave, infrared, or optical laser beams. These travel at the speed of light, simplifying fire control. Out in the vacuum of space, a directed-energy beam would not suffer blocking or bending due to smoke, clouds, or atmospheric refraction.

With their reactors generating power, they do not need conspicuous and vulnerable solar panels. Firing energy pulses, they do not use chemical propellants or kinetic projectiles, and so do not run out of ammunition. Their fissionable fuel can last decades.

Their pinpoint, medium-power beams could at least temporarily blind or cripple soft or semi-hardened satellites over tremendous engagement ranges, and with much less collateral damage than a nuclear blast or conventional anti-satellite weapon. A small constellation of these systems could give Russia or China offensive and defensive coverage. Fortunately, there is no evidence either adversary is developing such a weapon at present.

Current and future American presidents are unwise to dismiss the dangers posed by these different classes of space-based nuclear weapons. To deter adversaries, in some cases, rough parity via on-orbit basing may be required.

For spaced-based nuclear weapons targeting American and allied satellites, the United States’ dominance in space-based surveillance, reconnaissance, and communications make space-attack attractive. Should the United States perfect ballistic missile defenses and integrated air and missile, launching nuclear weapons from space toward ground targets may also prove an attractive option.

In many respects, the above discussion is prospective in contemplating how Russia and/or China might use nuclear weapons in space, but it is far from science fiction. For Western defense analysts, playing the part of futurist is a proactive approach to protecting American vital interests. Congressman Mike Turner’s open concern over intelligence suggesting that Russia may place nuclear weapons in space is only one example of Russian interest in weaponizing the domain.

The United States understands Chinese capabilities less well than those of Russia and their plans are even more difficult to predict. This leaves President Biden and his successors in a difficult position in the years ahead. Space is certainly a domain that will see weaponization sooner rather than later. For Americans, the question remains, who will dominate space?

 Joe Buff is a risk-mitigation actuary researching modern nuclear deterrence and arms control. The view expressed in this article are the author’s own

To Deter in Space, the US Needs On-Orbit Parity was originally published on Global Security Review.

Rather than an aggressive push in space strategy, policy, and guidance for the DoD’s emergent roles and missions in such things as cislunar operations, in-space manufacturing, low earth orbit operations (LEO), space weather, science, technology, engineering, and math skills, planetary defense, and support for deep space exploration and development; the only substantive document produced by the office was an updated directive for the Department of Defense on space policy. While this usefully collects and repeats a number of high-level policies, it falls short as it fails to codify the most important policies and taskings material for strategic, great power competition, which were released by the two previous administrations.

Reading the updated directive gives the impression that the DoD is not subject to any of the space-specific national strategies and appears to indicate that the National Strategy for Space, as developed in 2018, is defunct. The DoD’s space policy completely ignores the nation’s legal and policy direction to economically develop space and continue to lead the free world in this vital domain.

Worse, the absence of forward-leaning enabling policy leads to hesitation on the part of key players in government and industry that increase uncertainty and reduce synergies within the interagency, and their allies and partners.

Some apologists for the lack of thought leadership from ASD Space Policy argue that the office is held hostage by an administration whose National Space Council is overly focused on a norms-based approach and is overly passive about developing the key material capabilities needed to address America’s ever-diminishing advantage in strategic competition in the space domain. While the Biden administration kept the Artemis program, and released a cislunar science and technology strategy, they were overly tolerant of NASA’s delays, budget overruns, and failure to meet the intent of SPD-1—to facilitate a permanent and industrial base on the moon. While the administration kept the Space Force, it allowed both ASD Space Policy and the Space Force to operate for nearly four years without a future operating concept or strategy for strategic competition in the space domain.

To address this flagging advantage in space, and the lackluster focus of ASD Space Policy and the administration, Congress must play a stronger role to ensure that the strategy, guidance and resources are committed to ensure American leadership in space through the following actions:

First, Congress needs to ensure the ASD Space Policy is not distracted from their intended duties. When Congress elevated the position, in concert with the establishment of the Space Force, Congress envisioned a dedicated shop which would enable concentrated and singularly space focused, civilian oversight and rapid yes/no decisions in support of the Space Force and overarching national security space requirements. This would enable more agile evolution and employment of the force—in some ways analogous to ASD for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC).

Rather, the administration convoluted the new office with other strategic capabilities for integrated deterrence, including cyber, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and countering weapons of mass destruction. This should be reversed and should provide the dedicated strategy/policy focus space requires for the US to compete and win against adversaries in space.

Second, task ASD Space Policy, in partnership with OSD Net Assessment to provide Congress with a bigger-picture net assessment and strategy for great-power competition in space. In the 2021 NDAA Section 1614, Congress asked the National Space Council to do a comprehensive net assessment and to produce a comprehensive strategy to compete with China. The National Space Council proved uninterested in the task.

Congress should re-assign this primarily security-focused study to ASD Space Policy as lead. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), who historically pushed for the creation of both the ASD Space Policy and the Space Force, should ensure that their fiscal needs reach Congress in a timely manner, and not compromise the long-term effectiveness of ASD Space Policy by exacerbating perceptions of the office’s tardiness and non-responsiveness.

Third, Congress should direct ASD Space Policy to update the Defense Space strategy. It was argued at the time of release that the 2020 Defense Space Strategy was already out of date. Since 2020 a diversity of higher-level policies has established major components of a broader national grand strategy in space. New joint doctrine better articulates the DoD’s role in strategic competition; the Defense Space Strategy has not aged well. Congress should therefore ask for a new Defense Space Strategy that acknowledges the nation’s grand strategy in the domain. In particular, the nation’s civil and commercial ambitions in cislunar space must be included, with provisions for enabling policy to US Space Command (USSPACECOM) and the Space Force—to support and protect those equities.

Fourth, accompanying this broad defense space strategy should be a specific DoD cislunar strategy. Just as the DoD has an Arctic strategy, which articulates the manifold ways in which the department supports primarily civil and commercial actors in the Arctic, A whole-of-nation strategy is needed for space. ASD Space Policy should be directed to author a DoD cislunar strategy which articulates how DoD postures, invests, and operates to support broader national goals.

Finally, Congress should also ask ASD Space Policy to update the DoD directive on space policy and the DoD directive on functions of the Department of Defense, with the specified tasks in Title 10, the Unified Command Plan, National Space Policy, national cislunar strategy, In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy, LEO strategy, and planetary defense strategy. These White House documents detail US Space Command, US Air Force, and US Space Force responsibilities to protect and defend commerce, develop technologies of strategic interest, and develop capabilities for homeland defense against asteroids and comets. Just as NASA provides implementing guidance for the national planetary defense strategy, ASD Space Policy should provide implementing guidance for each of those mentioned above.

In short, Congress must ensure that ASD Space Policy is not a stumbling block to America’s grand strategic ambitions in space. Toward that end, Congress should give that office some much needed homework.

Peter Garretson is Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Congress Must Demand Stronger Leadership from OSD Space Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The European Commission is the European Union’s (EU) executive arm, responsible for drafting legislative proposals. It also implements the decisions of the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. This means the EC calls the shots when it comes to the outline of policy. For EU member-states, they must balance national interest against the sovereignty relinquished to the EC.

Breton, the current Commissioner for the European Union Internal Market at the European Commission, leads, among many markets, the space sector. His political mandate is to ensure European access to space. Furthermore, Timo Personen, head of the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space at the EC, made it clear that Europe must take responsibility of its own defense in space.

While the European Commission’s key actions for 2024 start with the creation of a single market for space, regaining independent access to space begins with Ariane VI and Vega-C, which are set to become operational this year. Additional launch programs are also coming, protecting space systems and boosting space commercialization are also important.

Commissioner Breton put an emphasis on delivering new services for space defense needs. The EU’s efforts to address challenges, foster innovation, and deliver strategic autonomy in space appear to be serious efforts this time around. And while these remain forward-looking statements, the new European Strategy for Security and Defense and the above-mentioned EC decisions are triggering a renewed dynamic of bolder and better aligned European leadership and stronger political will in upgrading its defense. This is all while reckoning with the central role the space domain will play. Including proper capacity-building for the new European secure connectivity satellites constellation IRIS2—pending resolution of current issues—is also an important move.

While the EC is taking over European space policy, starting with independent launch and defense, there is still a role left to national space agencies and the European Space Agency (ESA) itself. ESA will remain in its various roles and funded by individual member states. These agencies, including ESA, have mandates in space science and exploration—cis/lunar space and beyond—and anything “space for Earth,” such as Earth observation supporting downstream data markets.

ESA is also deeply involved in space-based solar power studies, and its overall activity goes far beyond launch. However, the current programing, funding, and execution model for Western space agencies is a question. One may wonder whether that model remains relevant, also looking at the weight of the military among Indo-Pacific space powers. Should European nations relinquish the leadership and execution of land, maritime, and air economies and defense to agencies respectively in charge of agriculture and forestry, oceanography, and atmospheric studies? Of course not, but then why are they doing exactly that in the space domain?

For example, Europe has shipyards that are owned by the government, the private sector, or a combination of both, and they serve military and civilian markets. Some would argue that the current space agency model is simply broken. Many also believe that commercial and economic space development, together with defense, should eventually be tackled by organizations that are fit-for-purpose. The mindset for such purposes is not prevalent among space agencies, satisfied with basic science and exploration only. Setting up fit-for-purpose organizations would not exclude cooperation with space agencies, but it would streamline the policy budgeting and execution for each purpose.

The doubts expressed by Mike Griffin concerning the Artemis program is one example. Such concerns may eventually lead to considerations about what forms or organizations are fit-for-purpose to effectively run economic development and defense programs in space—on budget and on schedule. However, major institutional changes in the foreseeable future should not be the expectation.

As the Biden administration and Congress further address the defense of the United States, the space domain looms large. Defense of national interest needs to continue to involve deep engagement and multi-domain cooperation with Indo-Pacific, Middle East, and European allies—space included. It sounds strategically and fiscally reasonable to expect allies to provide a stronger contribution to their own defense and the joint-interest of collective defense. Should NATO require serious recalibration, that might start with aligning the actual weight of European contributions with the rhetoric. European states need to walk the walk of “strategic autonomy” by taking responsibility, starting with some fiscally irreversible defense and security engagement in the space domain.

Europeans must take charge of their own defense, focusing on space. Commissioner Breton decided, the EU will take substantially increased responsibility for its own defense as part of the alliance—an essential step to taking the alliance to the next level. It is crucial for a fiscally responsible EU to shoulder its fair share of the burden. Seen from an orbital space perspective, it becomes apparent that the security of the alliance goes beyond the North Atlantic. The Arctic, the Eurasian continental plate, and Indo-Pacific all matter. Europe is better off if it fosters alliances/partnerships and advocates for policymakers who support such policies.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views in this article are the authors own.  

European Commission: Taking Charge of Space Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

It calls for a coordinated response using all available tools and those of member states. This includes dual-use space systems and services. However, the policy remains confined to an emphasis on resilience of space assets and confidence-building measures to clarify intentions behind various space activities. While this is not a bad thing, it does not express the European Union’s readiness to prevent and respond to space attack by deterring adversaries from hostile actions.

 Space Threat Analysis

The EU proposes an annual classified analysis of space threats called the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), a system of systems where both civilian and military contributions are used for all-sources intelligence assessments. This integrates all space threat analyses within the broader EU threat analysis process. However, its key asset, the EU Satellite Center, requires timely geospatial and orbital intelligence capabilities. It needs to see that long-acknowledged technological shortcomings in early warning and conflict analysis  are effectively addressed.

Space Threat Response Architecture

When responding to space threats, the strategy calls for a comprehensive toolbox of joint EU state responses but goes no further in stating what these responses might look like. It does emphasize information-sharing and regular exercises. While the EU considers preventive and restrictive measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it has yet to determine whether to treat attacks in the space domain as armed aggressions under Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty.

The EU rightly acknowledges the need to enhance the use of space for security and defense and intends to do so by integrating the space dimension into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. Strengths include additional communication services through IRIS² and relying on assured independent access to space. IRIS² is the new EU secure satellite constellation which stands for Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity, and Security by Satellite. However, while IRIS² is a credible prospect, European independent access to space remains hindered by bureaucratic processes.

Indigenous Launch Capabilities

The EU made the strategic mistake of not developing any heavy lift reusable launch vehicles and the maiden flight of its expendable heavy lift launcher program, Ariane 6, is delayed until 2024. Even if successful, it will remain expensive and subsidized to survive. This led to contracting SpaceX for launch services for such EU mainstays as the Galileo navigation satellites.

Space Norms of Behavior

On norms for responsible behaviors in space, the EU reaffirms its commitment to norms and joined the US in condemning destructive anti-satellite missile (ASAT) tests. The strategy underscores the priority of dialogue with spacefaring nations and international organizations to ensure norm implementation. While the establishment of a structured dialogue on space norms between the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations (UN) is a step in the right direction, the strategy falls short in acknowledging that normative cooperation alone will not deter adversary behavior. This is due in part to Russia and China’s opposition for such norms and their rapid buildup in ASAT weapons and other offensive space forces. In short, the EU is posturing for resilience, not deterrence.

Resilience-based Posture

Back to the very core of the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, which is to “enhance resilience and protection of space systems,” the document emphasizes the need for a common resilience framework, proposing the creation of an EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC). In the realm of defense space systems, EU member states tend to develop indigenous capabilities. The United Kingdom leads with the sixth-generation Skynet for military telecoms, followed by France’s Syracuse, and Italy’s Sicral. Despite attempts at common definitions, a shared system remains elusive. An exception is the joint high-speed communication satellite Athena-Fidus by France and Italy. The EU Commission aims for the GOVSATCOM system, providing secure government communications. Observation satellites for reconnaissance see France pioneering with Helios, while European collaboration efforts falter due to national-centric approaches and protective industrial interests.

Strengthen EU Space Industry

Overall, the intention to reduce European strategic dependencies on foreign-produced critical technologies, while keeping the industrial base for its civilian and defense value chains sovereign and competitive, is a good goal. This will be easier said than done, considering the entanglement of Europe with technologically advanced economies such as the US and Japan. Moreover, challenges stem primarily from economic dependency on China. The solution has been defined as “de-risking” rather than “decoupling.” It is not entirely clear how that might work.

In conclusion, the new EU strategy addresses challenges and outlines goals for strengthening capabilities and cooperation in the space domain. Unfortunately, it fails to address gaps in deterrence measures and consider the evolving geopolitical landscape to ensure the security of EU space systems. While Russia showed some restraint in orbital warfare by relying on non-kinetic and reversible capabilities against Ukrainian and Western space assets, there is no guarantee China would similarly restrain itself. Are the EU and its allies ready for prime time in a major space conflict? The answer to that question might come earlier than we think.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin.

European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.

The concept of a successful deterrence strategy in any domain boils down to three key requirements: a credible threat (capability to support such a threat), the will to carry out the threat, and effective communications. Part of the problem for Japan is that it failed to develop a credible capability. Furthermore, the three non-nuclear principles (not possessing, not producing, and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons on the Japanese territory) leave Japan fully dependent on the American nuclear umbrella.

For Japan’s effective deterrence in all domains, mere rhetoric about threats is insufficient. As an island nation entirely dependent on maritime access, Japan needs a military capability and clear communication of its determination to achieve domain superiority and escalation dominance over adversaries.

Credibility is based on a nation’s past behavior and its demonstrated willingness to respond to aggression. Clearly, Japan has baggage in its history of aggression and colonization in the Indo-Pacific. Both North Korea and China consistently frame a pacified post-war Japan as the aggressor every time Japan makes a move to survive and claim its right to defend itself in a hostile neighborhood. Japan, however, is now rearming itself.

Space, as a domain, is no exception to deterrence principles. The 2007 anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test by China triggered Japan’s review of its passive approach to space infrastructure defense. Japanese spacecraft are at risk of attack through such means as jamming, close approaches by anti-satellite vehicles, and kinetic and non-kinetic weapons that are designed to disrupt or destroy satellites. China has further demonstrated its ability to capture uncooperative spacecraft in geosynchronous Earth orbit, posing a significant concern to Japanese assets in space—and to any critical space infrastructure.

Japan’s transition to a militarily sovereign posture is a protracted process. Japan began by cutting the Gordian knot of post–World War II pacifism in 2014 when it “reinterpreted” Article 9 of its constitution, rather than revising or adjusting it. That sea change operationalized Article 14 of Japan’s 2008 Basic Space Law, Ensuring International Peace and Security as well as the National Security Strategy of Japan, which stipulates, “The State shall take necessary measures to promote space development and use to ensure international peace and security as well as to contribute to the national security of Japan.”

Over the next decade, Japan’s posture evolved from a non-military use of outer space to a deterrence-oriented military capability in space. In 2018, Japan’s defense policy introduced the concept of multi-domain operations, emphasizing national security space capabilities as a central aspect of Japanese strategy. And in 2022, Japan expanded its Space Operations Squadron into a Space Operations Group, responsible for the Japan Air Self-Defense Force’s (JASDF) space domain awareness operations.

For too long Japan’s space sector development was constrained to civilian aims only. Faced with existential threats, Japanese policymakers realized how vital it was to foster civilian and military cooperation in space for economic gain and furthering national security. Japan’s strategy is to develop an Earth-orbital-cislunar ecosystem.

In the same vein as Japan relies on free sea lanes for communications across the Indo-Pacific, at sea and in space, Japanese-American security cooperation is paramount. The threat of attacks on commercial satellite constellations and spacecraft in orbit and cislunar space is all too certain a reality, in view of already occurring daily threats and attacks on space and cyber assets.

As space continues to be a domain of strategic importance and increasing economic value for Japan, its Space Operations Group must strengthen its space situational awareness capabilities to track and identify hostile objects in space. However, while space situational awareness is essential, Japan must ultimately develop a war-winning space force to effectively deter attacks and win conflicts in space.

The JASDF should be given the policy direction and resources to develop agile, responsive, and lethal capabilities to ensure the protection of Japanese and allied commercial and military assets in space. For that matter, so should the US Space Force.

Challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and globally resemble a gathering storm. Yet, Europe, in part due to its quasi-irreversible techno-economic entanglement with China, remains unclear on what it will do in case of a Taiwan or Japan contingency. An informal yet functional partnership between NATO and the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) is already established. Yet, France, furthering its relationship with China, recently opposed the opening of a NATO liaison office in Tokyo.

On November 11, 1983, Ronald Reagan addressed the Diet in Tokyo, “I have come to Japan because we have an historic opportunity, indeed, an historic responsibility. We can become a powerful partnership for good, not just in our own countries, not just in the Pacific region but throughout the world. Distinguished ladies and gentlemen, my question is: Do we have the determination to meet the challenge of partnership and make it happen? My answer is without hesitation: Yes we do, and yes we will.” Forty years later, the Gipper’s words have not aged a bit.

In space, as on Earth, the mutual commitment of Japan and the US, as staunch allies, should ensure the Indo-Pacific region remains free and open, all the way to orbit, cislunar space, and beyond.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin.

Japanese Space Strategy: Deploying a Credible Deterrent was originally published on Global Security Review.

After getting many high-level threat briefings from across the intelligence community and hearing from American allies, the commission found the US is running out of time to remedy a sharply deteriorating strategic nuclear environment. The speed of the threat is accelerating, leading the commission to recommend dozens of new initiatives, some to be initiated immediately, with the remainder fully implemented in a phased manner over the next fourteen years.

Notably, the commission recommended an even stronger bolstering of the delivery options and capacity of the modernized nuclear triad by deploying multiple warheads on the new Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), building a road-mobile version, adding more strategic Columbia-class submarines, and acquiring more B21 strategic bombers. Additionally, the commission recommended the deployment of an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) system for the protection of the continental United States against threats from China and Russia, including, if technologically feasible, space-based components.

Such missile and air defenses are critically important to deal with coercive nuclear threats from Russia and China, especially in the context of enemy “escalate to win” strategies. The commission concluded that China and Russia will both continue their aggressive policies seeking to replace the United States as the leading power in the world. And Russia and China will continue their modernization and expansion of their conventional, space, cyber, and nuclear capabilities.

The commission warned that regional conflicts with China and Russia are the most likely future conflicts and could escalate to direct confrontation. Expanding on this point, commission co-chairs Creedon and Kyl underscored, in Senate testimony, that “coercive or bullying strikes” with cruise and hypersonic missiles could be used to make the US “buckle” under Chinese or Russian threat.

Neo-isolationism was rejected. Instead, the commission implored the US to work with allies and cooperate with partners while improving American security policy. The whole-of-government approach was also noted as key to better deterrence policy, including diplomatic and financial measures.

One of the commission’s more interesting points was the emphasis on the urgency of these recommendations. This position was underscored by their assertion that even if many of their recommendations were adopted immediately the United States will lag until modernization programs are complete.

Nonetheless, commission proposals would be adopted in a phased manner as the United States moves from legacy forces to modernized elements of the nuclear enterprise. The period 2023–2027 is the first phase and beyond 2035 is the last phase, including building additional Columbia-class strategic submarines after the current 2042 planned program sunset.

The commission also highlighted the fact that the current nuclear program of record is based on an old assessment of the threat. For example, the program of record limits nuclear warheads to 1,550, a number that is insufficient for the current threat. Thus, an additional margin of deployed capability, including hundreds of new nuclear warheads, is desired.

It was also noted that, as compared to the strategic environment of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), it is important to acknowledge the dramatic changes of the past decade. For example, explained one commission member, at the time of the 2010 NPR, the US assumed China and Russia would engage with the US to help deal with that time period’s top nuclear priority, preventing nuclear proliferation to terrorists. This is no longer the primary concern.

The commission did encourage lessening American dependence on nuclear weapons, which lines up well with the current administration’s goals. However, the report indicated that strategy would require deep investments with the acquisition of not 100 but 200 or even 300 new stealth bombers along with the requisite number of new refueling aircraft to make such a recommendation possible.

Also of import was the commission’s recommendation that the US field the “hedge,” contained in all nuclear arms deals—adding to deployed nuclear warheads. Such an expansion of deployed warheads would be a reversal of American policy since the adoption of the START I reductions in 1991.

Nevertheless, the commission recommended the US maintain its targeting policy that avoids infrastructure and population centers while still holding at risk what America’s adversaries value most: their leadership, the security apparatus that maintains their power, and their exquisite weapons. The commission was open to future arms control agreements, but as Creedon explained, “[t]he prospects for arms control remain bleak.”

Finally, perhaps the most surprising statement came when the commission called for deployment of a national missile defense system. Not simply to defend against the growing North Korean “rogue” missile threat but to expand American missile and air defenses to the point of being able to credibly defeat “coercive nuclear threats” from China and Russia.

This change in US policy would jettison the notion that US missile defenses have to be “limited” in scope and defend only against rogue state threats. Such thinking assumed that a robust American missile defense would create an unstable strategic situation vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.

In late 2002 Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the American withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty would have no deleterious impact on Russia’s security. Nevertheless, the United States has not deployed more than a relatively limited number of interceptors and currently has no plans for a space-based system, which is necessary for an effective national missile defense capability, a point the commission underscored.

To implement the recommendations found in the report, the commission estimated it would require 6 percent of the defense budget. Such an expenditure is certainly affordable. As former Secretary of Defense General James Mattis once said, “America can afford survival.”

Understanding the Strategic Posture Commission Report was originally published on Global Security Review.

Yet, due to several factors including the American moratorium on testing destructive ASAT weapons, concerns of environmental sustainability, and increased use of grey-zone tactics by adversaries, inferential and non-kinetic ASATs may be the primary means with which conflict in outer space is waged in the immediate future. Thus, emphasizing potential negative impacts upon strategic deterrence for both nuclear and space arenas is essential.

Contrasted with kinetic physical ASATs, which are highly attributable, cause permanent damage, and simultaneously signal both capability and the political will of the aggressor, inferential ASATs are a broad categorization comprised of capabilities that do not create debris fields and are significantly less visible to third-party observers. This grouping, which encompasses directed energy, electromagnetic, radiofrequency, and cyber capabilities, does not strictly align with the traditional categorizations of kinetic physical and non-kinetic physical ASATs, and can include non-kinetic physical attacks.

For example, military-use electromagnetic pulse (EMP) weapons are categorized as non-kinetic physical attacks but may be categorized as “inferential” because they are rapid, invisible, and can affect damage with indirect contact with a satellite. Considering this proposed categorization, changing technological environment, and increased used of grey-zone tactics in the space domain, it is time to take a hard look at the underlying theories guiding national security strategies such as strategic-level deterrence; specifically, its tenants of credibility and signaling, which could be negatively impacted by the inferential attributes of new weapons systems.

Successful deterrence theory and practice is contingent upon (1) credible psychological impact upon the adversary; (2) communication of an attributable weapon capability, wherein the ability to visibly detect or identify the negative consequences of attack are clearly signaled; and (3) the political will to carry out such an attack if attacked by an aggressor. The proliferation of inferential ASAT capabilities significantly alters this cost-benefit calculus due to the difficulty of attributing their use in attacks.

Moreover, since conventional weapons capabilities evolved to include virtually undetectable forms of attack with little progress towards attribution, it is reasonable to conclude that the successful operationalization of deterrence against inferential ASATs will be difficult to achieve in outer space.

Credibility and Signaling

Generally, credibility is characterized as the effective communication (signal) to an adversary through deterrence posture, so as to compel the adversary to believe the utility of the planned attack, thereby, psychologically registering the attack as a sufficient threat. Since the value of signaling lies in the opponent’s perception, and because inferential capabilities engender difficulties in attribution, adversaries remain undeterred so long as the attack does not register as a threat.

Degradation of credibility occurs when signals are misinterpreted or misperceived, as well as if there are differing belief systems and intentional interference by the adversary. If present, these factors are likely to result in a weakened deterrence posture; this remains especially true when such signals are below the escalatory threshold of retaliatory response, as is the case with grey-zone tactics that employ inferential capabilities.

Proposed Solutions

A potential solution to the credibility and signaling problem in the space domain would be to bolster deterrence strategies with an integrative triad that combines special operations, cyber, and space force capabilities. While still largely in development, the triad could leverage space-based competencies such as space domain awareness, space forensics, dual-use spacecraft, proximity operations, or on-orbit servicing to fill the gap left open by weakened attribution capacity and to deter actions below the threshold of conflict without having to resort to kinetic-type ASAT.

The question here is whether such space-based capabilities, especially dual-use spacecraft, serve to deter or escalate conflict. In 2022, China’s Shijan-21 docked with a defunct Chinese satellite and towed it into a graveyard orbit. This not only demonstrated China’s technological advancement, but also its ability to conduct counter-space operations under the pretense of debris-removal operations. Such developments point to the trend of increased reliance on inferential capabilities by adversaries and negative implications of strategic-level deterrence in outer space.

In an explosive, technological growth environment, the non-demonstrable nature attributed to inferential ASATs are allowing an increasing number of non-state actors adverse to the United States to take self-motivated action in ways that hinder the successful application of deterrence strategies. While a deterrence triad can bolster credibility and signaling, inferential ASATs remain below the threshold for escalation, degrading the integrity and security of outer space systems over time. Thus, the salience for deterrence within this context in this discussion is not only meaningful for its theoretical applications, but also because its successful implementation implies that deterrence as a theory is highly adaptable, resilient, and will continue to remain relevant in formulation of the United States’ national space strategies going forward.

Kaili Ayers is a JD candidate at the University of Oregon School of Law and Law Clerk at the Space Court Foundation. The thoughts, opinions, and analysis presented here are her own and do not reflect the position of the University of Oregon or the Space Court Foundation.

Anti-Satellite Capabilities and American Options for Strategic Deterrence in Outer Space was originally published on Global Security Review.

As is the case with most congressional reports labeled “strategy,” it is a mixed bag of some good things that should be commended, with gaping holes that will have negative impacts on the strategic interests of the United States in space unless addressed. If left untouched, the United States could find itself a nation in danger of failing in the near future.

There are some good points in the document. It rightly explains the importance of the Space Force’s role as a service provider to the terrestrial (air, land, sea) services and combatant commands. Regional combatant commanders understand the “competitive advantage” that space systems like satellite communications, missile warning and tracking, and surveillance and reconnaissance provides. As such, combatant commanders worldwide have “requirements in space expertise, activities, and space capabilities.”

These are correctly explained in the document as something needing funding, support, and the right service posture to meet these requirements across the terrestrial services and agencies. However, while this is all true, it is not good to communicate the role of the Space Force as only an enabler of the Joint Force or “enhancing readiness of U.S. [terrestrial] forces” as if it is not a part of American forces or the Joint Force. It was created for much more than this.

Second, there are concerns about some aspects of the document, which are unhelpful to the service and the nation’s readiness for great power war in space. This is because the Space Force was not created to be primarily an enabler and supporter of the Joint Force, but to be the service responsible for organizing, training, and equipping space combat forces to address the threat posed by the growing space combat forces of China and Russia.

Rather than creating a superior war-winning force to deter attacks upon critical space infrastructure, the objectives of the current strategy is resilience and the ability of American warfighting support capabilities to “degrade gracefully under attack” while being “reconstituted in a reasonable time.” This approach is insufficient as China’s and Russia’s space forces do not exist to merely “deny the United States its access to the space domain.”

They instead mean to “kill” that access and the critical space capabilities leveraged by all instruments of American national power and influence. As such, the Space Force is not postured appropriately to deter, counter, and win against enemy warfighting capabilities that can currently degrade and destroy our critical space infrastructure.

In addition, the Space Force’s role in this document is focused more on protecting the terrestrial force structure from “space enabled attack” that, frankly, is not a new phenomenon and was accomplished when space was only a functional support area and not a warfighting domain—and area of responsibility (AOR) in its own right.

The document does correctly state that the United States “must be prepared to deny a potential adversary’s use of space systems to monitor, track, and enable attack of US, Allied, and partners’ military forces,” but space forces are just as much a part of military forces as air, land, and sea. The nation cannot achieve this objective if it does not treat warfighting support forces as part of the team, as well as create space combat forces capable of deterring attack by having the ability to wage a successful campaign in, to, and from space.

This means the nation must have “combat-credible forces” with the ability to fire and maneuver just like air, land, and sea forces can. The strategy mentions the types of forces that should demonstrate “the ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations against an adversary,” but this offensive and defensive objective is not the primary mission of the service, which it should be.

The primary mission of the air, land, and sea forces are not to “support the Joint Force,” but rather to project military power against any adversary region on earth to achieve military objectives and protect and advance strategic interests of the United States. As such, the Space Force’s reason for being is not supporting terrestrial actions, but to deter attack upon critical space infrastructure vital to society and commercial interests in space, and through that primary mission, achieve victory against enemy space and terrestrial forces from space.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies in Washington, D.C. He is the former Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the positions of the Department of Defense or his employer.

The Comprehensive Strategy for the Space Force: The Good and Bad was originally published on Global Security Review.

Deterrence Is Domain Agnostic  

Thomas Schelling, in Arms and Influence, writes, “Deterrence involves a threat to keep an adversary ‘from starting something,’ or ‘to prevent [an adversary] from action by fear of consequences.’” That threat must include not only a capability but the political will to use that capability if an adversary decides to “start something” despite the capability being threatened.

If an adversary decides the political will does not exist to use the capability, there is no deterrence. Conflating deterrence with academic concepts such as hard deterrence, soft-deterrence, or integrated deterrence does not create deterrence. Rather, these concepts deny the fundamental truth of what deterrence is and what it takes to achieve it; a nation must possess the capability and will to use force.

In the space domain, this means the United States must have the capability and will to apply force in outer space. It is also important to remember that adversaries like Russia and China may view deterrence differently.

The United States is consistently guilty of mirror imaging when it comes to its views on deterrence—assuming the Russians and Chinese think in similar terms about costs and rewards. This creates the false belief among Americans that a capability designed to deter will do so, when, in fact, the adversary thinks very differently. For the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), for example, preemption or compellance is a deterrence doctrine. What does this mean for deterrence in outer space? Consider the following scenario.

The PLA launches a limited kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) attack on American space assets or those of an ally. The attack destroys key space assets vital to mount military operations prior to an invasion of Taiwan. Simultaneously, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) utilizes ASAT capabilities in geosynchronous orbit to interfere and disable commercial space assets, which affect the general population of the United States.

Following these attacks, the PRC employs hybrid warfare to encourage the US to avoid interfering with its annexation of Taiwan or risk the loss of further space assets. The loss of these space assets, while not debilitating, coupled with the PRC’s messaging, creates a psychological response that compels the president to sit out the conflict. In short, the lack of American offensive and defensive space capabilities forces the United States to capitulate when it cannot deter Chinese aggression.

A second scenario involves the PRC employing fractional orbital bombardment systems (FOBS) utilizing nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicles. The PRC employs multiple FOBS as a first strike against the United States’ nuclear arsenal. With no space-based capabilities to deter or defend against such systems, the US loses critical second-strike assets.

After the attack, the PRC takes advantage of the psychological impact of a first strike to fracture the confidence of the American people and compel the president to restrain from using the nation’s ballistic missile submarines, which are still needed to deter Russia and additional strikes from China. In short, the lack of effective space-based deterrence capabilities once again play a critical role in American decision-making.

In both cases, deterrence failed because of assumptions about the PRC rooted in mirror imaging. The lack of acknowledgment of the PRC’s stance on deterrence, which is compellance, results in the political failure to deploy a capability to deter attack and, if deterrence fails, respond with overwhelming force.

Resilience Is Not Deterrence

Over the past decade, many space professionals turned to resilience as the best method for deterrence in space. The theory of resilience relies on the redundancy of American space assets as the means for deterring adversary attack. This view also mirror images adversary thinking and makes assumptions about adversary behavior that is rooted in idealism and not realism.

Resilience is not deterrence. It is a quiet acknowledgement of inadequate defensive/offensive capabilities and a façade for a lack of space-based deterrence capabilities and the will to use them. At present, the United States lacks the capability needed to hold adversary space assets at risk and, by default, deter those adversaries from harming American interests in space.

Conclusion

Deterrence is not complicated. The formula is simple. Effective deterrence = capability x will x communication. Norms, resilience, and other alternatives to this simple formula never set the conditions for effective deterrence. At best, they give the allusion of deterrence and allow politicians to temporarily escape hard decisions.

However, that time is quickly coming to an end. President Biden and future presidents will undoubtedly face increasing risk in space and must make the tough decisions. The United States cannot afford to lose the next war because it is left blind and deaf because of attacks on its space assets. Now is the time to take a hard look at Russian and Chinese views on space warfare and stop assuming they have the same aspirations as Americans.

Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert in outer space law, outer space policy, and lawfare strategy and the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis.

Deterrence in Space: It’s Not Complicated was originally published on Global Security Review.