Secretary Meink’s wake-up call deserves restating,

One area of particular focus for the US Space Force is “space control,” the ability to ensure that US satellites can operate without interference while denying adversaries the same freedom. Unfortunately, 10 to 15 years ago, some of our adversaries started to weaponize space, and weaponized space aggressively. We stood on the sideline, probably too long. We didn’t want to go down that path, but now we are pushing hard. We didn’t start the race to weaponize space, but we have to make sure we can continue to operate in that domain. Going forward, we can’t lose that high ground.

This long overdue improvement in strategic communication marks a turning point toward rebuilding a credible American space deterrent. China seized the high ground through a rapid build-up of space deterrence and warfighting forces, while Australia, Japan, and South Korea observed warily this tipping of the strategic balance. The US and Europe pretended it was not a problem at all.

This was part of a broader trend for the West to bury its head in the sand for most of the past 35 years, from nuclear deterrence to space warfare. As adversaries weaponized space, the US Space Force (USSF) acknowledges at long last it must focus on fielding credible and effective deterrence and warfighting forces in space.

The USSF published an International Partnership Strategy, where “strength through partnerships” aligns allies with US space efforts. There are challenges, however, for an effective USSF international strategy. These include divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues surrounding space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy. If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies.

It turns out allies make similar moves. The US and UK Space Commands conducted their first-ever coordinated satellite maneuver in early September 2025. Among Quad members, Japan’s new space domain defense guidelines spearhead rapid battlespace awareness and real-time detection and tracking of threats. This further reinforces the importance of disrupting adversary command, control, communications, computers, and information (C4I) and other expanding threats. India will develop “bodyguard satellites” after an orbital near-miss. France’s National Strategic Review 2025 makes space central to sovereignty and defense, to acquire rapidly deployable ground and space capabilities to deny, disable, or disrupt adversaries. Last, but certainly not least, Germany is ramping up its military space posture.

When Boris Pistorius, Federal Minister of Defense of Germany, announced a $41 billion investment to counter the “fundamental threat” posed by Russia and China, he mentioned their targeting and tracking of Western satellites. While flying over Germany on reconnaissance missions, two Russian Luch-Olymp spy satellites tracked two Intelsat satellites used by the German Bundeswehr.

Pistorius suggested the Bundeswehr could centralize Germany’s military space functions to quickly respond in conflict. That requires investment in hardened systems less prone to Russian and Chinese jamming, spoofing, and manipulation. Installing “guardian satellites” to provide defensive and offensive capabilities to boost deterrence is required.

Insufficient yet required functionalities need fixing. This includes resilience of satellite constellations and ground stations, secured launch functions, improved space domain awareness capabilities, and space surveillance satellites.

This does not happen in a capability vacuum and leaves some questions unanswered on how to square that with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite Ariane 6 and rocket ventures, Europe does not have the required launching capability and still depends on SpaceX. IRIS², the European security-oriented constellation, will not be operational until the 2030s. Until then, dependency on Starlink remains.

Industry partners, such as Eutelsat, SES Satellites, Airbus Defense and Space, Thales, and OHB SE, will get the contracts for the German and European military space systems, but are they financially fit-for-purpose and able to deliver quickly? It depends. Airbus and Thales have heavy defense order backlogs. Eutelsat must recover from its acquisition of OneWeb, and SES just acquired Intelsat.

The question of military space capacity building for non-US NATO allies further resonates outside NATO. Japan does everything to strengthen its military space industrial base, while India puts in a serious effort from space situational awareness to launchers to warfighting satellites. Allies will get there eventually, but it may not be fast enough vis-à-vis Russia and China.

One thing is clear, the center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs. With NATO officially calling space a warfighting domain, it is no longer a support area. Non-US NATO leaders need to build military space capacity. They should not wait another decade to adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0.

Indo-Pacific allies should endeavor for a similar effort, all while leveraging NATO’s military space experience. That might include some degree of coordination between NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, especially for areas of concern to all, such as the Arctic. Without delegated authorities, codified protect-and-defend protocols, attribution thresholds, tactically responsive launch (less than 96 hours), and common allied space rules of engagement, the good guys’ response times will miss the fight as adversaries dominate orbit.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

A Realist Shift in Western Military Space Posture was originally published on Global Security Review.

The challenge is clear; adversaries are developing ASAT weapons, electronic warfare capabilities, and cyber threats that can disable American satellites—disrupting military operations, global communications, and economic stability. Without a robust deterrence framework, adversaries are emboldened to target space infrastructure. To counter these threats, the US must enhance resilient space architectures, strengthen policy frameworks, and refine operational doctrine to deter and, if necessary, defeat adversarial actions in space.

Resilient Space Architectures: Hardening the Backbone of American Space Operations

One of the most effective deterrence measures is making space assets more difficult to target and replaceable, if attacked. The United States is shifting from large, centralized satellite systems to disaggregated and proliferated constellations, reducing the risk posed by any single point of failure. The Proliferated Warfighter Space Architecture (PWSA), led by the Space Development Agency, aims to deploy a network of small, low-cost satellites that provide redundancy, making it harder for adversaries to cripple American space capabilities with a single strike.

Additionally, on-orbit servicing, maneuverable satellites, and rapid launch capabilities enhance resilience. SpaceX’s Starlink and the Rapid Agile Launch Initiative ensure that the US can quickly replenish space assets, denying adversaries the ability to achieve lasting effects through space attacks. By maintaining a dynamic, self-healing space architecture, the US strengthens deterrence by signaling that any attempted disruption will be ineffective.

Counterspace Capabilities: Strengthening Active and Passive Defenses

While resilience is key, deterrence also requires credible counterspace capabilities to impose costs on adversaries. The US Space Force and other defense agencies are investing in defensive counterspace measures, such as jamming-resistant communications, maneuverable satellites, and cyber-hardened space systems to protect critical assets.

At the same time, the US must maintain offensive counterspace capabilities as part of a deterrence posture. This includes electronic warfare tools to disrupt enemy satellite operations, rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) for on-orbit inspection and intervention, and ground-based kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities to neutralize hostile space threats. By demonstrating both defensive resilience and credible response options, the US reinforces deterrence by denial and punishment.

Policy and Alliances: Strengthening Space Norms and Collective Security

A strong policy framework and allied cooperation bolster deterrence by shaping adversary behavior and reinforcing international stability. The Artemis Accords, a multinational agreement on responsible space conduct, establish norms that promote transparency and discourage hostile activities. The US must continue leading diplomatic efforts to build consensus on space security standards, making aggressive actions politically and strategically costly for adversaries.

Additionally, alliances like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), partnership with the Quad (Australia, India, Japan, and the US), and Five Eyes intelligence network provide collective security in space. The Combined Space Operations (CSpO) initiative, which includes Australia, Canada, France, Germany, New Zealand, the UK, and the US, enhances shared situational awareness and rapid coordination in space crisis scenarios. By integrating allied capabilities, the US deters adversaries by presenting a unified, multinational response to any hostile space activity.

Space Domain Awareness: Gaining the Tactical Advantage

Deterrence depends on knowing when and where threats emerge. The US Space Force and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) are advancing Space Domain Awareness (SDA) through advanced radar systems, AI-powered surveillance, and persistent monitoring of space objects. Programs like the Deep Space Advanced Radar Concept (DARC) and the Space Surveillance Telescope provide real-time tracking of adversary satellite maneuvers, ensuring that hostile actions do not go undetected.

By integrating AI and machine learning, the US can predict and respond to potential threats before they escalate. Improved SDA capabilities deny adversaries the element of surprise, reinforcing deterrence by ensuring that any aggressive move is immediately identified and countered.

Military Space Operations: Defining Rules of Engagement

To deter and defeat adversary actions, the US must develop clear space warfighting doctrine and operational concepts. The Space Force’s “competitive endurance” strategy emphasizes continuous engagement with adversaries to counter gray zone tactics, such as cyber intrusions, satellite blinding, and electromagnetic interference. Establishing clear rules of engagement for responding to hostile actions in space strengthens deterrence by ensuring decisive and proportional responses when necessary.

Additionally, the integration of space with multi-domain operations ensures that any adversary attack on space assets is met with cross-domain retaliation, whether in cyber, air, land, or sea. This raises the stakes for adversaries, reinforcing deterrence by making space conflict an unattractive option.

Conclusion: A Comprehensive Approach to Space Deterrence

The US must pursue a multi-layered strategy to deter and defeat adversary actions in space. Resilient architectures, credible counterspace capabilities, strong alliances, superior space domain awareness, and well-defined military operations are essential to ensuring freedom of action in space and securing national security interests. As space becomes increasingly contested, the ability to deter, detect, and defeat threats will determine whether the US maintains its strategic advantage beyond the atmosphere.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, is an engineer and career civil servant with the Department of the Air Force. The views expressed are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the US Air Force. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond the Atmosphere: Strengthening US Space Deterrence in a Contested Domain was originally published on Global Security Review.

The FY 2025 budget focuses on simpler satellite networks. Notable decreases occur in launch and classified activities, while increases are found in position, navigation, and timing. The Space Force continues moving towards more distributed, resilient, and cost-effective space capabilities, including GPS satellites and narrowband communications. The intention signaled for space operations is to enhance the Space Force’s ability to adapt and respond to emerging threats. By prioritizing the development of distributed and proliferated satellite networks to ensure resilient space operations, the Space Force places a continued focus on low Earth orbit (LEO). This aligns with defense goals of redundancy and rapid deployment, enhancing space “competitive endurance,” a strategy announced in early 2023 by Chief of Space Operations General B. Chance Saltzman.”

In General (Ret.) John Raymond’s often quoted words, the Department of Defense (DoD) and Space Force need to “exploit what we have, buy what we can, build what we must.” The DoD will increase the integration of commercial satellite services to reduce costs and accelerate deployment. The belief behind this policy is that to strengthen partnerships with commercial satellite providers is to capitalize on existing technologies and infrastructure, which is largely preferable to government doing it by itself. While it is a politically and operationally challenging process, the budget sequence necessitates more flexible and adaptive budget planning processes within the Space Force and other related agencies. By adopting these practices, the Space Force might better navigate budget constraints and funding adjustment, while advancing its strategic goals in space defense.

Regarding proliferation of smaller commercial assets for the sake of resilience in space, and within the currently prevalent DoD cognitive framework for the Space Force, the link between resilience and deterrence was further validated in April 2023 by John F. Plumb, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. In remarks at the Space Foundation’s 38th Space Symposium in Colorado Springs, Plumb said, “We will do that first and foremost by investing in resilience. We must expect to take punches in space in a near-peer conflict. A resilient architecture means we will be prepared to absorb those blows. With sufficient resilience, we hope to deter an adversary from attacking in the first place, because the value of any such attack will be greatly diminished.”

However, in space as in any other domains, resilience does not qualify as deterrence. Before events occur on the battlefield, deterrence is first and foremost built not merely based on actual capabilities, but on the ability to clearly communicate to the adversaries what such capabilities will do to them, if used. But deterrence requires a third factor, which is credibility. And the credibility of passive defensive posturing is where the real problems start.

To prevail over adversaries such as Russia and China, the West requires a genuine understanding of the adversary’s own decision-making process. If the West fails to understand that adversaries fundamentally value space as an offensive domain, the West will fail to protect its space assets—unless the Space Forces build a credible offensive counterforce capability. For active defense of critical Western space and terrestrial infrastructures to be sufficient to ensure credible deterrence, the Space Force must view space systems as a critical infrastructure and not merely a support desk for terrestrial operations.

The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on June 14, 2024, cleared its version of the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The bill was then headed to the Senate floor. The legislation, which is yet to be released in full, includes compromise language on a long-standing dispute over the transfer of Air National Guard space units to the active-duty Space Force. That does not mean the political process ends there. In the meantime, the House passed its own version of the NDAA, which includes several social policy amendments, that eliminates paid leave for servicemembers to cross state lines for an abortion, eliminates controversial diversity initiatives, and eliminates taxpayer funding for “gender-affirming care,” which is likely to start another cycle of congressional haggling.

There are professionally constructive developments on the commercial side, though, as the Senate Armed Services Committee includes requirements for reviews of investment policy and performance evaluation. The bill also authorizes DoD to identify poor-performing contractors and require approval for additional contracts. The question remains, though, whether government should still retain an exclusive role in building certain specific space defense capabilities on its own and which ones these should be.

When and how the congressional process concludes, and the end game for the FY 2025 Space Force budget, remain to be seen. It should be extremely clear—no less is at stake than the US and its allies prevailing against common adversaries, for, in, and from space. In short, getting funding priorities right may affect who controls the high ground.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Congressional Haggling Jeopardizes the US Space Force FY 2025 Budget was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since June 2023, there is increasing attention on space security, with a particular focus on collaboration with private-sector space businesses. In situations like the Ukraine conflict, private companies’ satellite imagery and satellite communication services are utilized. It is therefore crucial for the Japanese government to leverage the technology and innovation of private companies, and for the private sector to integrate space security into their business. Close collaboration between the two, advancing public-private partnerships, is a key factor.

The event opened and closed with Kenji Minami, Director, Business Planning Division 2 of the Defense Department, Air Staff Office, at the Japanese Ministry of Defense. The first keynote session, “The Forefront of Public-Private Collaboration in the Security Domain: The Case of the United States,” was delivered by Yasuhito Fukushima, Senior Researcher at the Global Security Laboratory of the Policy Research Department at the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo. The session reviewed the current American model of space development. It took a close look at several programs (SpaceWERX), US efforts at connecting industries with government, and expanding the industrial base of space innovation, along the motto: “Exploit What We Have, Buy What We Can, and Build Only What We Must.” Kenji Minami moderated the ensuing panel discussion, “Expectations for Private Companies to Strengthen Space Security,” which gathered participants from the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo, the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry, and Keio University, at senior researcher, director, and professor level, respectively.

Masayasu Ishida, CEO of SPACETIDE, moderated the second part of the event, with a session called, “Opportunities and Challenges in Space Security from the Perspective of private companies.” It featured the C-Suite representatives of three Japanese space Businesses: Shunji Izutsu, Vice President of Astroscale Co., Ltd., Akiko Kitahara, Executive Vice President and CFO of Warp Space Co., Ltd., and Yoshihiro Ota, Executive Officer and CSO of Axel Space Holdings Co., Ltd. Astroscale is dedicated to on-orbit servicing, such as active debris removal, refueling, and space situational awareness. Warp Space is focused on solving the problem of communication via optical link. Axel Space is a global leader in micro-satellite technology with a strong Earth-observation focus.

The session discussed the potential for public-private cooperation. The three representatives spoke about the potential and challenges of space security–oriented business from the perspective of commercial companies, taking examples from current conflicts and issues. The discussion covered the importance of community building through regular events, and the use of study contracts to demonstrate and introduce new private-sector technologies.

Topics such as legal, financial, commercial, and technical development challenges related to dual-use technologies, and managing risk when involving commercial entities as services providers in relation with a conflict zone, were also reviewed.

On the same day this Space Security and Business event took place, SPACETIDE, the co-organizer of the event, announced that it had been awarded the Japanese Minister of Economy, Trade, and Industry Award at the 6th Space Development and Utilization Grand Prize for its significant contributions to the advancement of the space business and the formation of the industrial ecosystem. The selection committee commended SPACETIDE for its significant contributions to the formation of the space industry community in Japan, comprehensive research on the space industry, promotion of networking among entrepreneurs and businesses, and facilitation of talent mobility—thereby contributing to the promotion of the space business and the formation of the space industry ecosystem, fostering national awareness and understanding, while promoting sustainable space utilization.

The conference was a clear demontration that Japan is on the right track to develop a strong industrial base that sustains the nation’s space power development course for both civilian and defense purposes. The Japanese government and its Ministry of Defense are dedicated to advancing close collaboration with the private sector in the field of space security. And as its defense strategy aims at deploying a more credible space deterrent, the nation of Japan further positions itself as a reliable ally of the US in the Indo-Pacific region.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Japan’s Ministry of Defense: Opening Space Security to the Commercial Sector was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two years have passed since the United States announced a unilateral ban on the testing of destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons. The ban was announced on April 12, 2022, and hailed as a first step towards establishing a norms of responsible behavior to further the ideal of sustainability in outer space.

Several states, including many that do not possess nor intend to deploy such a capability, made similar proclamations. The People’s Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and India, however, refused to make the pledge. The US also sponsored a resolution, which was a lead-in to the Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats, led by the United Kingdom and supported by the US. With the blinding effect of celebration subsiding, a more reasoned look at the drawbacks and weaknesses of the ban is in order.

Unilateral Arms Control Concession

Lost in the euphoria of the ban is the reality that the ban is a unilateral arms control concession. The US ignored an important tenet of diplomacy and negotiation and frittered away destructive ASAT testing without exacting similar concessions from Russia and China. American idealists believed that by signing the ban, the US would show leadership as a responsible actor and encourage both Russia and China to abandon their threatening counterspace build up. However, the American precedent of unilaterally banning direct-ASAT testing on its own without seeking concessions from either Russia or China signals to both that the US may be convinced to make more concessions without either adversary surrendering any of their own capabilities.

Sacrificing Freedom of Action

The unilateral American concession is not about giving up something vital to national security, but rather forfeiting freedom of action with no tangible benefit—other than creating positive political optics and an illusory norm of behavior. Many of the states pledged to the ban and the resolution lacks the requisite technology, capabilities, or the political desire to develop or acquire such technology. In other words, these states pledged to give up a freedom of action and a capability they neither possess nor plan to acquire. Conversely, Russia, China, and India, who all possess the capability, are not willing to give up their freedom of action to the advantage of the United States.

Demonstration Versus Test

The premise of the destructive test ban is the kinetic actions involving destructive ASATs are tests to determine whether a capability works. What the ban ignores is that these events are demonstrations and not tests.

The distinction between “test” and “demonstration” is not a matter of semantics but rather it is the difference between a state ascertaining whether it has a capability as opposed to showing others that it has a capability and a capacity. Ground-launched ASATs are an ancillary capability to missile defense technology, and the know-how for that capability has existed for decades.

Any state that possesses a missile defense capability is presumed to have a rudimentary ASAT capability that can transition to a break-out capability. Thus, a test ban is nonsensical as the need to test a capability is unneeded and any event involving an ASAT is considered a demonstration, including India’s 2019 satellite intercept and Russia’s 2021 intercept. Thus, the US has unilaterally sacrificed freedom of action for “destructive testing” when the capability is already proven and no longer necessary.

Implications for Missile Defense

An outright ASAT ban implicates the testing and development of mid-course missile defense systems. Direct-ascent ASATs are an ancillary capability to missile defense and destructive mid-course missile defense testing against dummy warheads could open the opportunity for Russia and China to complain that the United States is going back on its commitment and testing ASAT technology. This would fall in line with their narrative of “space weapons” given the impetus for this talking point is to stunt the development of American missile defense technology and capabilities. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and academics focusing on sustainability would also foster this narrative and create public pressure for the US, both in and out of international organizations, to suspend missile defense testing.

Ceding Space Control

Space control is the unspoken chip on the table, especially since the US does not have an operational destructive counterspace capability and restricts its ability to develop offensive capabilities necessary to achieve deterrence through superiority with Russia and China. According to Dana Johnson, “Space control in geopolitical terms is the capability of a nation to maintain freedom of action in outer space and to deny the same to an adversary should national interests dictate.” The unilateral concession by the US bargains away kinetic space control for the ideal of sustainability and the anticipation it will create leverage and put international pressure on Russia and China to restrict their counterspace capabilities and thus ensure sustainability.

Conclusion

At its core, the unilateral ASAT test ban is a sacrifice of freedom of action made for political convenience and to check off a bucket list item for NGOs, academics, and civil servants. The US unilaterally forfeited something of major significance for something trivial and of questionable significance without taking into consideration it would not be reciprocated. The American attempt to use the ban to create momentum for its effort to create pseudo-norms and the drafting of a legally binding treaty to the same end is misplaced and is a detriment to American standing in outer space law, policy, national security, and deterrence.

Michael J. Listner is a licensed attorney in the State of New Hampshire and the founder and principal of Space Law and Policy Solutions. He is a subject matter expert and practitioner in outer space law, policy, security, and lawfare/hybrid warfare strategy. He is the author and editor of the space law and policy briefing-letter, The Précis. Views expressed are the author’s opinion and not legal advice.

Two Years After the ASAT Test Ban: A Realistic Assessment was originally published on Global Security Review.

Rather than an aggressive push in space strategy, policy, and guidance for the DoD’s emergent roles and missions in such things as cislunar operations, in-space manufacturing, low earth orbit operations (LEO), space weather, science, technology, engineering, and math skills, planetary defense, and support for deep space exploration and development; the only substantive document produced by the office was an updated directive for the Department of Defense on space policy. While this usefully collects and repeats a number of high-level policies, it falls short as it fails to codify the most important policies and taskings material for strategic, great power competition, which were released by the two previous administrations.

Reading the updated directive gives the impression that the DoD is not subject to any of the space-specific national strategies and appears to indicate that the National Strategy for Space, as developed in 2018, is defunct. The DoD’s space policy completely ignores the nation’s legal and policy direction to economically develop space and continue to lead the free world in this vital domain.

Worse, the absence of forward-leaning enabling policy leads to hesitation on the part of key players in government and industry that increase uncertainty and reduce synergies within the interagency, and their allies and partners.

Some apologists for the lack of thought leadership from ASD Space Policy argue that the office is held hostage by an administration whose National Space Council is overly focused on a norms-based approach and is overly passive about developing the key material capabilities needed to address America’s ever-diminishing advantage in strategic competition in the space domain. While the Biden administration kept the Artemis program, and released a cislunar science and technology strategy, they were overly tolerant of NASA’s delays, budget overruns, and failure to meet the intent of SPD-1—to facilitate a permanent and industrial base on the moon. While the administration kept the Space Force, it allowed both ASD Space Policy and the Space Force to operate for nearly four years without a future operating concept or strategy for strategic competition in the space domain.

To address this flagging advantage in space, and the lackluster focus of ASD Space Policy and the administration, Congress must play a stronger role to ensure that the strategy, guidance and resources are committed to ensure American leadership in space through the following actions:

First, Congress needs to ensure the ASD Space Policy is not distracted from their intended duties. When Congress elevated the position, in concert with the establishment of the Space Force, Congress envisioned a dedicated shop which would enable concentrated and singularly space focused, civilian oversight and rapid yes/no decisions in support of the Space Force and overarching national security space requirements. This would enable more agile evolution and employment of the force—in some ways analogous to ASD for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD-SOLIC).

Rather, the administration convoluted the new office with other strategic capabilities for integrated deterrence, including cyber, missile defense, nuclear weapons, and countering weapons of mass destruction. This should be reversed and should provide the dedicated strategy/policy focus space requires for the US to compete and win against adversaries in space.

Second, task ASD Space Policy, in partnership with OSD Net Assessment to provide Congress with a bigger-picture net assessment and strategy for great-power competition in space. In the 2021 NDAA Section 1614, Congress asked the National Space Council to do a comprehensive net assessment and to produce a comprehensive strategy to compete with China. The National Space Council proved uninterested in the task.

Congress should re-assign this primarily security-focused study to ASD Space Policy as lead. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB), who historically pushed for the creation of both the ASD Space Policy and the Space Force, should ensure that their fiscal needs reach Congress in a timely manner, and not compromise the long-term effectiveness of ASD Space Policy by exacerbating perceptions of the office’s tardiness and non-responsiveness.

Third, Congress should direct ASD Space Policy to update the Defense Space strategy. It was argued at the time of release that the 2020 Defense Space Strategy was already out of date. Since 2020 a diversity of higher-level policies has established major components of a broader national grand strategy in space. New joint doctrine better articulates the DoD’s role in strategic competition; the Defense Space Strategy has not aged well. Congress should therefore ask for a new Defense Space Strategy that acknowledges the nation’s grand strategy in the domain. In particular, the nation’s civil and commercial ambitions in cislunar space must be included, with provisions for enabling policy to US Space Command (USSPACECOM) and the Space Force—to support and protect those equities.

Fourth, accompanying this broad defense space strategy should be a specific DoD cislunar strategy. Just as the DoD has an Arctic strategy, which articulates the manifold ways in which the department supports primarily civil and commercial actors in the Arctic, A whole-of-nation strategy is needed for space. ASD Space Policy should be directed to author a DoD cislunar strategy which articulates how DoD postures, invests, and operates to support broader national goals.

Finally, Congress should also ask ASD Space Policy to update the DoD directive on space policy and the DoD directive on functions of the Department of Defense, with the specified tasks in Title 10, the Unified Command Plan, National Space Policy, national cislunar strategy, In-Space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy, LEO strategy, and planetary defense strategy. These White House documents detail US Space Command, US Air Force, and US Space Force responsibilities to protect and defend commerce, develop technologies of strategic interest, and develop capabilities for homeland defense against asteroids and comets. Just as NASA provides implementing guidance for the national planetary defense strategy, ASD Space Policy should provide implementing guidance for each of those mentioned above.

In short, Congress must ensure that ASD Space Policy is not a stumbling block to America’s grand strategic ambitions in space. Toward that end, Congress should give that office some much needed homework.

Peter Garretson is Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, DC. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Congress Must Demand Stronger Leadership from OSD Space Policy was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United States’ current National Security Strategy states that an era of “strategic competition” exists, which the recent Joint Concept for Competing defines as “a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.” It notes how America’s “adversaries are employing cohesive combinations of military and civil power, below the level of armed conflict, to pursue objectives that threaten the strategic interests of the United States, its allies, and its strategic partners” and to “win without fighting.”

If NASA is a national security organization, then it may be a primary, even principal tool to protect America’s strategic interests and to achieve America’s strategic objectives and should act responsibly as a custodian of America’s security interests, rather than merely as a science and exploration agency. So, is NASA a national security organization?

Many will say no and argue that NASA has a science and exploration mission, and that “NASA doesn’t do security.” Some assert that NASA was specifically created by President Eisenhower, distinct from the military industrial complex to be a tool of diplomacy, with national security belonging elsewhere.

Of course, that might come as news to President Dwight D. Eisenhower himself, who partially created NASA as a cover for his top-secret National Reconnaissance Organization (NRO). It likely would also come as a surprise to President Kennedy and to the first generation of Cold Warriors at NASA, who heeded President John F. Kennedy’s call that “the eyes of the world now look into space, to the Moon, and to the planets beyond. And we have vowed that we shall not see it governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom and peace.” They won the first great victory of the Cold War—America’s first strategic competition.

President Lyndon B. Johnson said, “control of space means control of the world.” In fact, declassified documents reveal that NASA’s Mercury, Saturn, and the Apollo Manned Lunar Landing Programs were designated as the “highest national priority category” under the Defense Production Act.

It would surprise Congress, who authorized NASA, the most. NASA’s purposes are codified in Title 51–National and Commercial Space Programs of the United States Code. The law states,

Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the United States require that adequate provision be made for…space activities. Congress further declares that such activities shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by, a civilian agency exercising control over…space activities sponsored by the United States, except that activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the development of weapons systems, military operations, or the defense of the United States (including the research and development necessary to make effective provision for the defense of the United States).

It also unambiguously states, “the making available to agencies directly concerned with national defense of discoveries that have military value or significance,” and that “the administration and the Department of Defense, through the president, shall advise and consult with each other on all matters within their respective jurisdictions related to…space activities and shall keep each other fully and currently informed with respect to such activities.” In fact, NASA has a long history of direct cooperation, during the Cold War, with the Air Force,  DARPA, SDIO, and NRO to advance the nation’s security interests through peaceful means and applications.

NASA’s primary job during the first strategic competition was to showcase the vibrancy of democratic capitalism over the Soviet Union’s centrally planned economy. Landing a person on the Moon, a symbol for national strength, was a way to woo newly independent states to the West’s side of the Cold War.

When the Cold War ended, NASA still had a security mission, but without the broader context of strategic competition it was asked to enhance security through diplomacy. This also included employing Russian rocket scientists and engineers to prevent them from building intercontinental ballistic missiles for Iran, Iraq, and North Korea.

According to the NASA Administrator, America is in a new space race as part of a broader strategic competition with China and Russia. This time it is not using space technology as a symbolic proxy of national power, but rather developing space technology to secure long-term national economic power. Thus, NASA was given a mission to lead the “return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization.”

The national vision begins with a “campaign to utilize…the surface and resources of the Moon, and cis-lunar space to develop the critical technologies, operational capabilities, and commercial space economy.” The National Cislunar Science and Technology Strategy explains that the United States will “leverage collaborations with private entities to enable capabilities for large-scale ISRU and advanced manufacturing at the Moon.”

Despite such clear policy direction from two administrations, it is not uncommon to hear NASA personnel eschew any mandate for economic development or industrial development in space, preferring to concentrate only on what advances their own exploration. The mandate is crystal clear in law.

In Title 51, NASA’s purpose includes, “the preservation of the United States preeminent position in…space through research and technology development related to associated manufacturing processes” and the “preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in…space science and technology.” Title 51 also calls for the “establishment of long-range studies of the potential benefits to be gained from, the opportunities for, and the problems involved in the utilization of…space activities.”

NASA is a national security organization whose duties include ensuring the pre-eminence of the United States. Its job is not to build weapons or engage in conflict—but to pursue American strategic objectives below the threshold of armed conflict. Now that the US is once again in strategic competition, it is time for NASA to return to its roots as a primary competitor in seeding and cultivating economic, industrial, and logistical expansion. Thus, NASA’s Artemis planning must not be only in the narrow context of a Moon-to-Mars exploration program, but also must be made in the broader context of securing long-term economic security for the United States and its partners.

Peter Garretson is a Senior Fellow in Defense Studies at the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC), co-director of AFPC’s Space Policy Initiative, and author of Scramble for the Skies: The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space and The Next Space Race: A Blueprint for American Primacy. The view’s expressed are the authors own.

Is NASA a National Security Organization? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Today we see America’s allies supporting the fundamental rights of access to space and its derived services. The United Kingdom (UK) leads work in the United Nations to create a space norms of behavior mandate that will enable the UN to hold irresponsible nations accountable for their behavior. Holding nations accountable is vital. Russia and China are deploying anti-satellite (ASAT) and direct energy weapons (DEW) that can target commercial and military space infrastructure. The Combined Space Operations (CSPO) Vision’s role is to develop and share a common understanding of military space operations and policy. It is a critical framework that serves as a foundation for such allied enforcement mechanisms. It recently expanded to include Italy, Japan, and Norway.

These new initiatives are not just a good idea, they are threat driven and a reaction to adversarial space activity that threatens allied space infrastructure. ASAT deployments and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) by China and Russia are of concern and the aggressor nations must be held to account—through strong allied military and political efforts. Attempts to reduce the risk of misunderstandings on orbit are also of paramount importance, because the United States does not want a Cuban Missile Crisis in space.

UK Space Command was created in April 2021 to act as the single UK military voice in allied enforcement efforts, and rather than duplicating American capabilities UK Space Command seeks to supplement American systems by enhancing resilience. This can be multifaceted. It can include the addition of novel sensors as well as increasing satellite communication capacity. CSPO members also provide capabilities that increase resilience and operational effectiveness. A few examples are instructive.

First, the UK and US share Royal Air Force (RAF) Base Fylingdales in Yorkshire. This base combines missile warning and space surveillance at one place. In addition, RAF space operators and planners have been leveraged in numerous command-and-control facilities worldwide, including US Space Command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The UK is a leader in providing satellite communications’ capabilities to NATO through the SKYNET constellation.

Second, Australia, like the UK, has a Defence Space Command and a civilian space agency working in unison. This civilian and military relationship ensures that if an adversary were to attack a commercial satellite the military could act to defend it. Australia has gone further to align itself to American space deterrence and warfighting capabilities by declaring possession of offensive space control capabilities. These capabilities are important to maintain credibility in the minds of adversaries. China maintains an “attack to deter” mindset, and without such capabilities the credibility of extended deterrence in space is lost.

Third, Canada contributes additional space situation awareness (SSA) capabilities, an example being their Sapphire satellite which feeds into several US and allied SSA systems. As is the case with the UK and Australia, Canada also contributes skilled space professionals to American and allied space commands, staffs, and space robotic systems to enhance resiliency in the face of threats in, from, and to space.

In addition to the “Five Eyes” partnership, NATO is a vital organization for deterrence in space and on earth. Article 5, and the commitment to collective defence, is one of the most potent forms of deterrence in place in any military alliance around the world and is applicable to elements of space infrastructure. To enhance NATO’s operational support to deterrence capabilities it established the NATO Space Centre of Excellence in France and the NATO Space Operations Centre in Germany. These initial steps enable NATO military commanders and political leaders to deter attacks on the critical space systems that enable successful terrestrial operations. For NATO to deter it must act upon the call for defensive capabilities and communicate coherently about rising threats. Failure to do so will erode the alliance’s unified front and therefore its credibility.

Deterrence in space is hard but by integrating the evolving capabilities of allies at a greater depth deterrence can be achieved not only in space but across all domains. The rise of allied space commands, capability integration, and enhancements of resiliency will only grow in importance as space expands its reach into the day to day lives of our peoples and societies.

Major Robert Atchison QRH is a British Army officer who serves as the Military Assistant to Commander of UK Space Command.

Allied Contributions for Combined Space Operations and Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

It calls for a coordinated response using all available tools and those of member states. This includes dual-use space systems and services. However, the policy remains confined to an emphasis on resilience of space assets and confidence-building measures to clarify intentions behind various space activities. While this is not a bad thing, it does not express the European Union’s readiness to prevent and respond to space attack by deterring adversaries from hostile actions.

 Space Threat Analysis

The EU proposes an annual classified analysis of space threats called the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), a system of systems where both civilian and military contributions are used for all-sources intelligence assessments. This integrates all space threat analyses within the broader EU threat analysis process. However, its key asset, the EU Satellite Center, requires timely geospatial and orbital intelligence capabilities. It needs to see that long-acknowledged technological shortcomings in early warning and conflict analysis  are effectively addressed.

Space Threat Response Architecture

When responding to space threats, the strategy calls for a comprehensive toolbox of joint EU state responses but goes no further in stating what these responses might look like. It does emphasize information-sharing and regular exercises. While the EU considers preventive and restrictive measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it has yet to determine whether to treat attacks in the space domain as armed aggressions under Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty.

The EU rightly acknowledges the need to enhance the use of space for security and defense and intends to do so by integrating the space dimension into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. Strengths include additional communication services through IRIS² and relying on assured independent access to space. IRIS² is the new EU secure satellite constellation which stands for Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity, and Security by Satellite. However, while IRIS² is a credible prospect, European independent access to space remains hindered by bureaucratic processes.

Indigenous Launch Capabilities

The EU made the strategic mistake of not developing any heavy lift reusable launch vehicles and the maiden flight of its expendable heavy lift launcher program, Ariane 6, is delayed until 2024. Even if successful, it will remain expensive and subsidized to survive. This led to contracting SpaceX for launch services for such EU mainstays as the Galileo navigation satellites.

Space Norms of Behavior

On norms for responsible behaviors in space, the EU reaffirms its commitment to norms and joined the US in condemning destructive anti-satellite missile (ASAT) tests. The strategy underscores the priority of dialogue with spacefaring nations and international organizations to ensure norm implementation. While the establishment of a structured dialogue on space norms between the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations (UN) is a step in the right direction, the strategy falls short in acknowledging that normative cooperation alone will not deter adversary behavior. This is due in part to Russia and China’s opposition for such norms and their rapid buildup in ASAT weapons and other offensive space forces. In short, the EU is posturing for resilience, not deterrence.

Resilience-based Posture

Back to the very core of the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, which is to “enhance resilience and protection of space systems,” the document emphasizes the need for a common resilience framework, proposing the creation of an EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC). In the realm of defense space systems, EU member states tend to develop indigenous capabilities. The United Kingdom leads with the sixth-generation Skynet for military telecoms, followed by France’s Syracuse, and Italy’s Sicral. Despite attempts at common definitions, a shared system remains elusive. An exception is the joint high-speed communication satellite Athena-Fidus by France and Italy. The EU Commission aims for the GOVSATCOM system, providing secure government communications. Observation satellites for reconnaissance see France pioneering with Helios, while European collaboration efforts falter due to national-centric approaches and protective industrial interests.

Strengthen EU Space Industry

Overall, the intention to reduce European strategic dependencies on foreign-produced critical technologies, while keeping the industrial base for its civilian and defense value chains sovereign and competitive, is a good goal. This will be easier said than done, considering the entanglement of Europe with technologically advanced economies such as the US and Japan. Moreover, challenges stem primarily from economic dependency on China. The solution has been defined as “de-risking” rather than “decoupling.” It is not entirely clear how that might work.

In conclusion, the new EU strategy addresses challenges and outlines goals for strengthening capabilities and cooperation in the space domain. Unfortunately, it fails to address gaps in deterrence measures and consider the evolving geopolitical landscape to ensure the security of EU space systems. While Russia showed some restraint in orbital warfare by relying on non-kinetic and reversible capabilities against Ukrainian and Western space assets, there is no guarantee China would similarly restrain itself. Are the EU and its allies ready for prime time in a major space conflict? The answer to that question might come earlier than we think.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin.

European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.