The fundamental aim of Golden Dome is to protect the United States from air or space-based missiles armed with a variety of warheads: nuclear, chemical, biological, or conventional. Golden Dome will be made available to key allies should they deem it necessary for their own defenses in an increasingly complex global security environment. However, the level of interest these allies have in negotiating the terms of missile defenses from the U.S. remains to be seen.

While moving beyond the technical development of SDI, Golden Dome is not ushering a new age of missile defense strategy. A national missile defense policy has been in place since the 1990s following a hotly debated period in Congress where a “placebo defense” was finally deployed. The term “placebo defense” was coined by prolific political strategist Dr. William Van Cleave, who advocated for a layered concept of missile defense while he was a member of “Team B.” Team B was commissioned by the-then Director of Central Intelligence, President George H.W. Bush for the purpose of providing the government with alternative intelligence assessments and policy guidance regarding the Soviet strategic threat.

Dr. Van Cleave first used the term “placebo defense” in lectures at the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies at Missouri State University in 1996. While not officially defined in any academic paper, “placebo defense” describes the U.S. policy of deploying limited missile defenses incapable of defending against significant ballistic missile attack from either Russia or China. Rather, such limited missile defenses instead minimize the threat by rogue states like North Korea and Iran. The goal in part was to silence the critics who claim the U.S. must at least be able to defend itself from those rogue nations more likely to launch one or two missiles at U.S. forces overseas, or key coastal areas of the country.

The Team B concept of layered missile defense was supported by former SDI officials who advocated for a space-based laser (SBL) system to provide the most effective method of intercepting ballistic missiles. While this would be ideal for balancing technical feasibility and overall program cost, SBLs were not supported by Congress and follow-on administrations. Valuable research and development have since been neglected, making SBLs unlikely achievable anytime soon.

Golden Dome is now poised to move forward with some of the Team B concepts and additional strategists since the 1990s. To move Golden Dome forward rapidly, it is time to reconsider Brilliant Pebbles, which is also referred to as Future Space-Based Interceptors. Designed by Lawerence Livermore National Laboratory, Brilliant Pebbles envisioned placing small space-based interceptors (weighing around 10 kilograms) in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) capable of colliding with intercontinental ballistic missiles during the boost-phase of their trajectory. These interceptors would remain in orbit for only 18 months. Brilliant Pebbles was cancelled in 1993 due to a lack of political support in Congress despite some strategists arguing the technical feasibility of the program and its technical readiness for deployment in the near term.

Since the program’s end, the technical efficiency of small pump-fed engines and the impulse of solid axial engines, the areas of technological development that limited the concept in the late 1980s, have improved. It is now possible for an interceptor to reach 20g acceleration and cover a range of 800 km, well beyond the capabilities in the original project. Further mission analysis is still needed to determine the number of Brilliant Pebbles required to provide adequate missile defenses within the Golden Dome strategy. Furthermore, the cost to deploy Brilliant Pebbles using this concept will also be vastly reduced using current U.S. space launch capabilities provides by companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin.

The ability of Golden Dome to effectively protect the U.S. from air and space missile threats fundamentally relies on selecting the most effective space-based missile defense system. Brilliant Pebbles is a system whose maturity can be advanced quickly and cost effectively to provide a boost-phase intercept capability. This could finally put to an end to the “placebo” missile defense system which leaves the U.S. insufficiently defended.

Dr. Matthew Mowthorpe is currently working at BAE Systems where he is responsible for space control. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Brilliant Pebbles Can Provide a Real Space-Based Missile Defense for Golden Dome was originally published on Global Security Review.

Secretary Meink’s wake-up call deserves restating,

One area of particular focus for the US Space Force is “space control,” the ability to ensure that US satellites can operate without interference while denying adversaries the same freedom. Unfortunately, 10 to 15 years ago, some of our adversaries started to weaponize space, and weaponized space aggressively. We stood on the sideline, probably too long. We didn’t want to go down that path, but now we are pushing hard. We didn’t start the race to weaponize space, but we have to make sure we can continue to operate in that domain. Going forward, we can’t lose that high ground.

This long overdue improvement in strategic communication marks a turning point toward rebuilding a credible American space deterrent. China seized the high ground through a rapid build-up of space deterrence and warfighting forces, while Australia, Japan, and South Korea observed warily this tipping of the strategic balance. The US and Europe pretended it was not a problem at all.

This was part of a broader trend for the West to bury its head in the sand for most of the past 35 years, from nuclear deterrence to space warfare. As adversaries weaponized space, the US Space Force (USSF) acknowledges at long last it must focus on fielding credible and effective deterrence and warfighting forces in space.

The USSF published an International Partnership Strategy, where “strength through partnerships” aligns allies with US space efforts. There are challenges, however, for an effective USSF international strategy. These include divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues surrounding space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy. If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies.

It turns out allies make similar moves. The US and UK Space Commands conducted their first-ever coordinated satellite maneuver in early September 2025. Among Quad members, Japan’s new space domain defense guidelines spearhead rapid battlespace awareness and real-time detection and tracking of threats. This further reinforces the importance of disrupting adversary command, control, communications, computers, and information (C4I) and other expanding threats. India will develop “bodyguard satellites” after an orbital near-miss. France’s National Strategic Review 2025 makes space central to sovereignty and defense, to acquire rapidly deployable ground and space capabilities to deny, disable, or disrupt adversaries. Last, but certainly not least, Germany is ramping up its military space posture.

When Boris Pistorius, Federal Minister of Defense of Germany, announced a $41 billion investment to counter the “fundamental threat” posed by Russia and China, he mentioned their targeting and tracking of Western satellites. While flying over Germany on reconnaissance missions, two Russian Luch-Olymp spy satellites tracked two Intelsat satellites used by the German Bundeswehr.

Pistorius suggested the Bundeswehr could centralize Germany’s military space functions to quickly respond in conflict. That requires investment in hardened systems less prone to Russian and Chinese jamming, spoofing, and manipulation. Installing “guardian satellites” to provide defensive and offensive capabilities to boost deterrence is required.

Insufficient yet required functionalities need fixing. This includes resilience of satellite constellations and ground stations, secured launch functions, improved space domain awareness capabilities, and space surveillance satellites.

This does not happen in a capability vacuum and leaves some questions unanswered on how to square that with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Despite Ariane 6 and rocket ventures, Europe does not have the required launching capability and still depends on SpaceX. IRIS², the European security-oriented constellation, will not be operational until the 2030s. Until then, dependency on Starlink remains.

Industry partners, such as Eutelsat, SES Satellites, Airbus Defense and Space, Thales, and OHB SE, will get the contracts for the German and European military space systems, but are they financially fit-for-purpose and able to deliver quickly? It depends. Airbus and Thales have heavy defense order backlogs. Eutelsat must recover from its acquisition of OneWeb, and SES just acquired Intelsat.

The question of military space capacity building for non-US NATO allies further resonates outside NATO. Japan does everything to strengthen its military space industrial base, while India puts in a serious effort from space situational awareness to launchers to warfighting satellites. Allies will get there eventually, but it may not be fast enough vis-à-vis Russia and China.

One thing is clear, the center of gravity in deterrence is shifting to space-enabled, long-range, rapidly replaceable kill webs. With NATO officially calling space a warfighting domain, it is no longer a support area. Non-US NATO leaders need to build military space capacity. They should not wait another decade to adopt an Allied Space Operations Doctrine 1.0.

Indo-Pacific allies should endeavor for a similar effort, all while leveraging NATO’s military space experience. That might include some degree of coordination between NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, especially for areas of concern to all, such as the Arctic. Without delegated authorities, codified protect-and-defend protocols, attribution thresholds, tactically responsive launch (less than 96 hours), and common allied space rules of engagement, the good guys’ response times will miss the fight as adversaries dominate orbit.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

A Realist Shift in Western Military Space Posture was originally published on Global Security Review.

The perception of adversaries that western democracies are increasingly dependent on space for joint and integrated military operations gives them an incentive to threaten access to the assets that enable this capability prior to beginning of a conflict. The United States and its allies, including Australia, are now responding to this changing strategic dynamic, with a much greater focus on the challenges of undertaking space control as an important new task, along with the potential opportunities of establishing dedicated space forces.

The Policy Path to Space Control

In 2020, the then Morrison-led Coalition government sought for the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to play a more ambitious role in space. The release of the 2020 Defence Strategic Update and the accompanying Force Structure Plan represented the first significant formal policy recognition of the importance of space control and the importance of space as an operational domain. The 2020 Force Structure Plan stated that:

Defence will need capabilities that directly contribute to war fighting outcomes in the space domain using terrestrial and/or space-based systems. The Government’s plans include the development of options to enhance ADF space control through capabilities to counter emerging space threats to Australia’s free use of the space domain and that assure our continued access to space-based intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

It also aligned with the establishment of the Australian Space Agency in 2018 and the rapid growth of an Australian commercial space sector. This marked a truly fundamental shift from Australia’s previous approach of passive dependency on foreign states and commercial providers for space capabilities. Australia sought to become an active participant in a rapidly growing global space market, but also recognized that space access must be assured and protected in a contested and congested space domain.

The establishment of Australia’s Space Command (known initially as Defence Space Command) on January 18, 2022, also saw the release of the Defence Space Strategy which lists space control capabilities as a key objective towards “enhancing Defence’s space capability to assure joint force access in a congested, contested and competitive space environment.” The Space Command document states that “Defence will continue to identify space control gaps and opportunities to develop a credible Space Control capability, and space capability developers will actively seek to improve resilience of the space capabilities.” That would align with the decision by the following Albanese Labor government.

The Albanese government, which came to power in May 2022, largely sustained the previous coalition government’s approach to the ADF’s role in space. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) sought to highlight the importance of the space domain, “re-posturing” Space Command into Joint Capabilities Group. The subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) and Integrated Investment Program (IIP) lifted planned government investment for the ADF in the space domain from about $7 billion (Australian dollars) under the previous Morrison-led coalition government to between $9 billion and $12 billion, though the vast bulk of this extra funding would not appear until late in the current decade. On space control, the Albanese government largely followed the lead of the previous Morrison liberal-national coalition, with the 2024 IIP stating planned spending will include “measures to enhance Defence’s space control capability to deny attempts to interfere with, or attack, Australia’s use of the space domain. These will help ensure the ADF is able to continue using the space capabilities it needs to support its operations.”

Capability Options for ADF Space Control

If Australia is to acquire a space control capability, it is certain to be a
“soft kill” system that disables or denies rather than physically destroys a target. The Albanese government signed a ban on destructive testing of direct-ascent ASAT systems on October 27, 2022, and any acquisition of a “kinetic kill direct-ascent ASAT would violate such a ban.” A kinetic kill ASAT capability is not consistent with Australia’s policy of sustainable use of space.

In 2021 the Morrison government announced a new defence project (DEF-9358) that would explore options for a ground-based space electronic warfare capability. Such an approach would be consistent with a preference for reversible or scalable effects that disable or deny rather than destroy.

Space-based “co-orbital” space control could conceivably include space electronic warfare technologies such as on-orbit jamming or even high-power microwave weapons for electronic attack in orbit. It is also conceivable that a ground-based electro-optical laser dazzling capability could be considered, with Australian commercial space companies demonstrating capability expertise in such a system. Finally, ground-based cyber capabilities could be exploited in space control operations against both satellites in orbit and ground facilities undertaking satellite telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C).

Such soft-kill defensive, and potentially offensive, space control capabilities would contribute to assuring ADF space access by denying an adversary the ability to attack critical space support capabilities, such as ADF satellites for communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. This is consistent with the military strategy of deterrence by denial as laid out in the 2024 NDS. Other measures could be taken that include hardening key space support capabilities and potentially “silent spares” deployed in orbit.

To significantly strengthen ADF space resilience, the opportunity for the ADF to exploit emerging Australian commercial space launch capabilities is important. Embracing space lift as a means to assure sovereign space access makes eminent sense, given Australia’s geographic advantages for launch. By developing a responsive sovereign launch capability that can deliver small satellites into orbit, Australia can augment space support for the ADF and its allies in a crisis, or, if necessary, reconstitute lost capability in the aftermath of a counterspace attack.

Next Steps

Looking forward, the 2024 NDS established a biennial defence policy process, and the 2026 NDS and IIP represent the next best opportunity for Defence to more clearly conceptualize its approach to space control. Doctrinal documents within Space Command already suggest a role for space control, but greater detail is needed. Most importantly, there needs to be a public and unclassified policy explaining how the ADF will undertake this important task alongside allies and partners. Space control, like space domain awareness, represents an opportunity for the ADF to undertake a next step in its use of the space domain, beyond simply capability assurance and satellite communications, which was the perceived role of space in the 2023 DSR. In a contested space domain, Australia must burden share to a much greater degree in orbit and in acquiring the means to undertake space control tasks. This represents an important next step towards that outcome.

Malcolm Davis is a Senior Analyst in Defence Strategy and Capability at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

The Case for Space Control: An Australian Perspective was originally published on Global Security Review.