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		<title>Nuclear Deterrence and the Midterm Elections</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-deterrence-and-the-midterm-elections/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-deterrence-and-the-midterm-elections/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[gsharpe & Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 31 Aug 2026 12:09:02 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=33018</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: August 31, 2926 As the United States heads toward another set of midterm Congressional elections in November 2026, issues related to nuclear weapons, including deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation, will be important. Whether candidates will give issues of nuclear policy and strategy the attention that they deserve is another matter. Historically midterms have tended to focus on the state of the economy and the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-deterrence-and-the-midterm-elections/">Nuclear Deterrence and the Midterm Elections</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> August 31, 2926</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">As the United States heads toward another set of </span><a href="https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2026/07/23/as-the-2026-midterms-approach-economy-is-front-and-center/"><span data-contrast="none">midterm</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> Congressional elections in November 2026, issues related to nuclear weapons, including deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation, will be important. Whether candidates will give issues of nuclear policy and strategy the attention that they deserve is another matter. Historically midterms have tended to focus on the state of the economy and the personalities of the respective candidates. The 2026 midterms should also see debates about foreign policy issues and U.S. national security.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The first issue that U.S. politicians must address is the emerging new world order and the </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/special-initiatives/CRINK-Axis"><span data-contrast="none">coalition of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea (CRINK)</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> opposed to American and allied vital interests worldwide. In this regard, the efforts to set back Iran’s progress toward development and deployment of nuclear weapons will continue to meet with resistance among the other CRINKS, each with its own nuclear arsenal and an ongoing program of nuclear modernization. Russia remains the country with the world’s largest numbers of operationally deployed and stored nuclear warheads. China is rapidly building new long-range delivery systems and warheads on a trajectory that will enable it to deploy some 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons on land based, sea based and airborne launchers by 2035. North Korea is also increasing and diversifying its inventory of nuclear weapons and launchers in addition to supporting Russia’s war against Ukraine with thousands of DPRK infantrymen.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Given the preceding context, the U.S. must anticipate and plan for the contingency of two simultaneous large scale conventional wars in Europe and Asia. Either or both conflicts would be fought under the shadow of potential nuclear first use. Since the start of the Russian war against Ukraine in February 2022, Vladimir Putin has repeatedly </span><a href="https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/vladimir-putins-endless-nuclear-threats-are-a-sign-of-russian-weakness/"><span data-contrast="none">warned</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of Russia’s willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons in various circumstances. Russia has in fact exercised its nuclear command and control systems in various war games over the past several years as a direct strategic signal. NATO has responded with significant improvements in its military preparedness for protracted conventional war, and by enhancing its protocols for sharing U.S. and allied nuclear weapons with other members of the alliance in time of need. France has adopted a revised nuclear policy doctrine that includes a more explicit commitment for its nuclear </span><i><span data-contrast="auto">force de dissuasion</span></i><span data-contrast="auto"> to alliance wide deterrence in addition to deterrence of attack against French state territory. In the Far East, China is relatively ambiguous about the conditions under which it might engage in nuclear first use, but it would be safe to assume that the option remains open in case of a major U.S. military intervention to oppose a Chinese takeover of Taiwan. </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Second, and related to the preceding discussion about the possible behavior of existing nuclear powers, is the prospect of additional countries that decide to join the ranks of nuclear weapons states. In the Middle East. and especially in the aftermath of </span><a href="https://www.whitehouse.gov/releases/2026/03/operation-epic-fury-unmatched-power-unrelenting-force-of-americas-warriors/"><span data-contrast="none">Operation Epic Fury</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> and Iran’s reactions, some countries may be rethinking their commitment to nuclear abstinence. The most immediate concern among proliferation experts is Saudi Arabia. Riyadh has already decided to go forward with an ambitious civilian nuclear infrastructure plan as a hedge against future uncertainty in oil markets. At a certain level, this program would open the door to weaponization if the kingdom felt sufficiently threatened by Iran, since the latter has already targeted Saudi economic infrastructure and U.S. military bases throughout the region. In Asia, the threat posed by China and North Korea might increase interest in nuclear weaponization in Japan and South Korea. Although in theory, the U.S. nuclear umbrella extends as a deterrent that protects Japan and South Korea, a rising Chinese nuclear superpower and an unpredictable North Korea could shift public opinion and government policy in Seoul and-or Tokyo.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">In addition to the preceding challenges posed for U.S. national security and nuclear related defense policy, a third problem is the spread of technologies that are potential game changers for conventional war and/or nuclear deterrence. These technologies include hypersonic weapons, drones, artificial intelligence with strategic mind games, and space-based weapons. </span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="https://dsiac.dtic.mil/primers/what-are-hypersonic-weapon-systems/"><span data-contrast="none">Hypersonic weapons</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> reduce the time for opponents to close the OODA loop (observe, orient, decide, act loop) before disaster strikes. Drones have already changed the nature of the conventional battlefield in Ukraine and in the Middle East in myriad ways. Conceivably, they could eventually be nuclear armed with </span><i><span data-contrast="auto">tiny nukes</span></i><span data-contrast="auto"> or </span><i><span data-contrast="auto">mini nukes</span></i><span data-contrast="auto"> and even more precisely targeted than hitherto. Artificial intelligence will have enormous implications for the art of war, and deterrence: the applications are too numerous to mention in a single compass. But one immediate application of AI to strategy is the creation of strategic mind games for the purpose of deception. False images of political leaders making fake statements about military and political issues are already on offer. Future creative cyber warriors may, in the manner of William Randolph Hearst and the Spanish American war, be able to instigate public anger against one or more regimes and propel national leadership over the edge of brinkmanship into conventional or even nuclear conflict. Finally, space is now officially recognized as a domain for potential warfighting (along with land, sea, air, and cyberspace) and the deployment of space-based weapons by major powers is inevitable. Weapons once based in space will have to be defended against potential attacks from enemy space or terrestrially based weapons. The U.S. currently and prospectively depends at least partly on the safety and reliability of space-based assets for navigation, warning, command and control, and other components of the brain and nervous system for nuclear deterrence. Although the current environment for nuclear or space arms control among the great powers seems unpropitious presently, an eventual regime of “rules of the road” for orbital components of strategic power will have to be designed and agreed upon to avoid unacceptable celestial (and related terrestrial) chaos.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">In such a chaotic and uncertain strategic environment, citizens should know where their leaders stand on the challenges posed by foreign policy and nuclear war. Voters would be well served to demand those answers before a crisis arrives.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559739&quot;:0}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="none">Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;335559739&quot;:0}"> </span></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-deterrence-and-the-midterm-elections/">Nuclear Deterrence and the Midterm Elections</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-in-an-age-of-isolation-a-fading-hope/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-in-an-age-of-isolation-a-fading-hope/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Brandon Toliver]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 15 Apr 2025 12:14:57 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30540</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The delicate architecture of international security, built upon decades of painstaking negotiations and agreements, faces unprecedented challenges. From the erosion of established agreements and treaties to the resurgence of nationalist agendas, the world grapples with a shifting landscape where the specter of unconstrained nuclear proliferation is increasingly possible. President Donald Trump’s “America First” agenda is [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-in-an-age-of-isolation-a-fading-hope/">Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The delicate architecture of international security, built upon decades of painstaking negotiations and agreements, faces unprecedented challenges. From the erosion of established agreements and treaties to the resurgence of nationalist agendas, the world grapples with a shifting landscape where the specter of unconstrained nuclear proliferation is increasingly possible. President Donald Trump’s “<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwii35Og24SMAxVKCjQIHXfCBRwQFnoECB4QAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.whitehouse.gov%2Fbriefings-statements%2F2025%2F01%2Fpresident-trumps-america-first-priorities%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw1t1_KU71lk_FuFmjqGQZn5&amp;opi=89978449">America First</a>” agenda is perceived by many within the United States and among allies as American withdrawal from long-standing defense agreements. Thus, it is prompting a critical examination of the trajectory of global arms control.</p>
<p>Major events shaping the current arms control landscape include the unraveling of key treaties. The demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was triggered by Russian violations and the subsequent withdrawal by the United States—signaling a dangerous erosion of <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwid0r7O2oSMAxViFTQIHb8FCR4QFnoECBwQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fthebulletin.org%2F2019%2F11%2Fthe-death-of-the-inf-treaty-has-lessons-for-arms-control%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw1JBtuixiQjRar9xz0zi63f&amp;opi=89978449">strategic stability</a>. When coupled with the uncertain future of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjMppP424SMAxXXGDQIHW1hH9UQFnoECBkQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.state.gov%2Fnew-start-treaty%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2V0n26__cladV8fJsZ0Aph&amp;opi=89978449">New START</a>), which limits American and Russian operationally deployed strategic nuclear weapons, there are concerns about a return to unconstrained nuclear competition.</p>
<p>The last time such foundational treaties were absent the world was illuminated by the glow of vacuum tubes and dial telephones, not the intricate web of digital connectivity that now exists. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (<a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwiBlK2C3ISMAxVROTQIHWLpLuwQFnoECBcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2F2009-2017.state.gov%2Fe%2Feb%2Ftfs%2Fspi%2Firan%2Fjcpoa%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw0f9a2v8qnxyuCz_3kV5wIQ&amp;opi=89978449">JCPOA</a>), the Iran nuclear deal, also suffered a significant blow when the first Trump administration lost faith in its validity—fueling anxieties about Iran’s nuclear ambitions and the potential for <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwihubni2oSMAxUSIjQIHahjJJQQFnoECBoQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.iiss.org%2Fsv%2Fonline-analysis%2Fonline-analysis%2F2018%2F05%2Fus-abandons-iran-nuclear-deal%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw2HyGD3I2zYWEAGPB4UPaoG&amp;opi=89978449">regional proliferation</a>.</p>
<p>Trends in arms control are marked by a resurgence of great power competition and a decline in multilateralism. The rise of China as a military power, coupled with its rapid nuclear modernization, challenges the <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwi26aL22oSMAxWTFjQIHYBML_EQFnoECBcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.researchgate.net%2Fpublication%2F356235152_Chinese_nuclear_weapons_2021&amp;usg=AOvVaw0g1V4EaC5HHy79g2p92zE4&amp;opi=89978449">existing arms control</a> framework, which largely focused on Russo-American relations. It is noteworthy that the US sided with Russia against a Western-led effort to further punish Russia at the United Nations for Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. This was perhaps a move to spur Russian agreement to a truce in the conflict but is unusual.</p>
<p>The proliferation of advanced technologies, such as hypersonic weapons and artificial intelligence, further complicates arms control efforts, as these technologies have the power to threaten national sovereignty. The increasing use of cyber warfare and space-based weapons also creates new domains of conflict that are difficult to regulate.</p>
<p>Themes that dominate contemporary arms control discourse include the erosion of trust and the rise of strategic ambiguity. The breakdown of established treaties and the lack of transparency in military modernization programs are fueling distrust among nations. This apparent shift in doctrine may represent a genuine erosion of trust, or a calculated and abrupt pivot designed to reset a paradigm that is overly reliant on American leadership. The strategic ambiguity surrounding emerging technologies and the intentions of potential adversaries creates a <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwisqd2L24SMAxWOFzQIHSAvJP4QFnoECBkQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdirect.mit.edu%2Fisec%2Farticle%2F43%2F1%2F56%2F12199%2FEscalation-through-Entanglement-How-the&amp;usg=AOvVaw3j3L7FuGX_Fn-TN7AJwT-g&amp;opi=89978449">climate of uncertainty</a>. The rise of nationalist agendas and the decline of multilateral institutions can undermine efforts to build consensus on arms control and nonproliferation.</p>
<p>President Trump’s America First agenda and its associated call for allies to bare a larger burden of their own security impacts the arms control landscape. The withdrawal from the INF Treaty and the JCPOA was, for some, a rejection of multilateral agreements and a preference for unilateral action.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwj7ie2v24SMAxW8HjQIHQDzIFYQFnoECCcQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.foreignaffairs.com%2Funited-states%2Ftrumps-troubling-nuclear-plan&amp;usg=AOvVaw07yDXz55JiX0xro7azFNXX&amp;opi=89978449">This approach</a> stood to alienate allies and emboldened adversaries, undermining efforts to build international consensus on arms control. The Trump administration’s skepticism towards international institutions and its emphasis on American strength over international collaboration, which the administration sees as often at the expense of the United States, may contribute to the erosion of the remaining arms control framework. The reduction of funding for arms control initiatives and the appointment of officials with limited experience in this field signals a diminished commitment to nonproliferation.</p>
<p>The current arms control and nonproliferation landscape is marked by unprecedented challenges. The unraveling of key treaties, the resurgence of great power competition, and the rise of nationalist agendas create a volatile environment that may take unexpected turns. President Trump’s America First agenda and its efforts to require greater cost sharing leave adversaries wondering if the United States intends to leave existing alliances. Addressing the challenges posed by the changes requires a renewed commitment to multilateralism, transparency, and dialogue. Only through concerted international efforts can the world hope to mitigate the risks posed by <a href="https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&amp;rct=j&amp;q=&amp;esrc=s&amp;source=web&amp;cd=&amp;cad=rja&amp;uact=8&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjV3t3o24SMAxXEAjQIHbB3ERkQFnoECBgQAQ&amp;url=https%3A%2F%2Fdisarmament.unoda.org%2Fwmd%2Fnuclear%2Fnpt%2F&amp;usg=AOvVaw3z9W6saHMke4MxzRPAaks0&amp;opi=89978449">unconstrained proliferation</a> and ensure a more stable and secure future.</p>
<p><em>Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/arms-control-in-an-age-of-isolation-a-fading-hope/">Arms Control in an Age of Isolation: A Fading Hope?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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