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	<title>Topic:small modular reactors (SMRs) &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>The Interconnection of Nuclear Energy and Quantum Technology</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-interconnection-of-nuclear-energy-and-quantum-technology/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Hira Bashir]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Jun 2026 12:16:41 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: June 16, 2026 One might think nuclear energy and quantum technology as unrelated. One concerns power plants, uranium, and electrical grids. The other revolves around next-generation computers, ultra-precise sensors, and advanced encryption. However, both are built on the same scientific foundations: quantum physics, or the study of how matter and energy behave at the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-interconnection-of-nuclear-energy-and-quantum-technology/">The Interconnection of Nuclear Energy and Quantum Technology</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: June 16, 2026</em></p>
<p>One might think nuclear energy and quantum technology as unrelated. One concerns power plants, uranium, and electrical grids. The other revolves around next-generation computers, ultra-precise sensors, and advanced encryption. However, both are built on the same scientific foundations: quantum physics, or the study of how matter and energy behave at the smallest scales. A nuclear reactor and a quantum computer are governed by the same physical laws. Increasingly, tools developed in one field are becoming useful to the other.</p>
<p>The connection already works in both directions. Nuclear science has quietly contributed to quantum computing for years. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has <a href="https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/ion-beams-enable-developments-in-quantum-technology">highlighted</a> how ion beams — streams of charged particles — produced by accelerators used in nuclear research are now used to manufacture quantum devices. A well-established process known as ion implantation allows scientists to place individual atoms inside materials such as silicon and diamond with extraordinary precision. Those atoms make up qubits, which are the basic units of information inside quantum processors, many times smaller and faster than traditional computer information bits. The infrastructure built for atomic research is now the basis for creating machines capable of simulating atomic behavior more accurately than ever before.</p>
<p>Once that connection becomes clear, the next question is obvious: what can quantum technology do for the nuclear energy industry? The answer is substantial.</p>
<h3>Quantum Computing Can Dramatically Speed Up Nuclear Simulations</h3>
<p>Operating a nuclear reactor safely requires understanding the behavior of neutrons inside a reactor core. Those particles collide, scatter, and are absorbed by fuel, continuously changing the temperature and pressure of the surrounding system. Since these interactions are driven by statistical processes, quality information can only be obtained through large number sampling, often around a quadrillion (or a million billions) of interactions. Suffice it to say that designing safer reactors or testing new fuels requires simulations of enormous complexity.</p>
<p>The primary computational method used to track neutrons is the <a href="https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Viewpoint-Quantum-computing-and-the-nuclear-indust">Monte Carlo method</a>, which tracks particles as they move through materials and interact with reactor components. The method is essential for reactor physics and the transport of radioactive materials, but it is computationally expensive. Complex simulations can take days or weeks on classical computers and still rely on approximations because no conventional machine can model the entire system directly.</p>
<p>Quantum computers offer a different approach to the computer application. Because they operate according to quantum principles, they can model nuclear interactions more naturally. A UK <a href="https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Viewpoint-Quantum-computing-and-the-nuclear-indust">research project</a> led by ANSWERS Software Service, <span data-olk-copy-source="MessageBody">part of Amentum</span>, alongside Oxford Quantum Circuits, the National Nuclear Laboratory, Sellafield, and the University of Cambridge, has already demonstrated that quantum algorithms can accelerate Monte Carlo simulations beyond the capabilities of classical systems. Algorithms complete in thousands of steps that calculations on conventional hardware would require millions. For an industry where regulatory approval can take years, reducing simulation times from weeks to hours could significantly alter reactor development timelines.</p>
<p>Both the nuclear and quantum computing fields, however, face the same obstacle: instability. Quantum computers are sensitive to environmental interference, a problem known as quantum noise. The <span data-olk-copy-source="MessageBody">Amentum</span> ANSWERS project has evaluated methods for reducing interferences on working hardware. The more stable quantum computers become, the more dependable they are for the complex calculations that reactor design demands.</p>
<h3>Quantum Computing Can Find Better Reactor Materials</h3>
<p>Faster simulation is only one positive aspect of quantum computing. Quantum computing may also address one of nuclear energy’s most persistent challenges: materials degradation. The inside of a reactor is one of the harshest environments on Earth: extreme heat, intense radiation, and corrosive chemicals slowly degrade every component. Developing better materials traditionally requires years of testing as damage occurs at the atomic level. Engineers create samples, expose them to reactor conditions, measure the damage, and repeat the process. The cost and duration of that cycle contribute heavily to the slow development of advanced reactors, including <a href="https://www.iaea.org/topics/nuclear-power-reactors">Small Modular Reactor</a> projects.</p>
<p>Quantum algorithms could shorten that process dramatically. By modelling atomic interactions under radiation and heat, quantum computers may predict how metal alloys and ceramics will behave before they are physically produced. That capability could reduce development costs and accelerate the deployment of advanced reactor designs.</p>
<h3>Quantum Computing Can Make Nuclear Facilities Safer and More Secure</h3>
<p>Quantum technology also has practical applications for reactor safety and security. Inside nuclear facilities, early detection is critical. Minor changes in neutron levels, temperature, or structural integrity can determine whether a problem remains in routine maintenance or indicates a larger concern. <a href="https://www.nist.gov/quantum-information-science/quantum-sensing">Quantum sensors</a>, based upon quantum computing components and which can measure radiation, magnetic fields, and temperature with great precision, may provide details that aid in safety analysis.</p>
<p>Security is another concern. <a href="https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-and-verification">The IAEA safeguards system</a> — the international network of inspectors, cameras, seals, and radiation detectors designed to prevent nuclear diversion — depends on securely transmitting sensitive information. Existing encryption methods may eventually become vulnerable to sufficiently advanced quantum computers. <a href="https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/whitepaper/quantum-key-distribution">Quantum key distribution</a> offers a potential solution. By using quantum-based systems to transmit encryption keys, the method makes interception immediately detectable. Applying it to safeguards communications would help protect nuclear security systems against future quantum-enabled threats.</p>
<h3>Quantum Computing Makes Fusion Possible</h3>
<p>The most consequential application of quantum technology may involve fusion power. Fusion reactors produce no long-lived radioactive waste, do not suffer from latent core overheating accidents, and rely on hydrogen fuel. Yet fusion remains elusive because plasma behavior is extraordinarily difficult to predict and control. Scientists must contain superheated plasma using complex magnetic fields while optimizing reactor conditions in real time. These are precisely the kinds of optimization problems quantum computers are expected to manage most effectively. Projects such as <a href="https://cfs.energy">Commonwealth Fusion Systems</a> and the international <a href="https://www.iter.org">ITER project</a> are pursuing fusion on timelines measured in decades. More capable quantum simulations could shorten those timelines and help solve fusion’s remaining engineering challenges.</p>
<p>The evidence linking nuclear and quantum technologies is already substantial. Research projects, work at U.S. national laboratories, and IAEA initiatives on ion-beam technology all point toward deeper integration. What remains limited is institutional coordination.</p>
<h3>What Remains to be Done?</h3>
<p>Nuclear engineering and quantum computing laboratories still operate in isolation. Governments and funding agencies need programs that bridge the two disciplines. The <a href="https://www.iaea.org">IAEA</a> and the <a href="https://www.oecd-nea.org">Nuclear Energy Agency</a> should also formally evaluate how quantum technologies can improve reactor safety, materials research, and safeguards systems.</p>
<p>Nuclear energy and quantum technology have been treated as separate fields for too long. They share the same scientific foundations, increasingly rely on the same tools, and confront the same technical problems. A future built on nuclear power will depend on quantum computing to design reactors, quantum sensors to monitor them, and quantum encryption to protect them. The institutions responsible for both technologies are only beginning to recognize how connected they already are.</p>
<p><em>Hira Bashir is an Associate Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu &amp; Kashmir. Her research focuses on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. She can be reached on X at @HiraBK5090 and on LinkedIn Hira Bashir. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/How-Nuclear-Energy-and-Quantum-Technology-Are-Becoming-Interconnected.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="209" height="58" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 209px) 100vw, 209px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-interconnection-of-nuclear-energy-and-quantum-technology/">The Interconnection of Nuclear Energy and Quantum Technology</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>India and Canada Thaw Frosty Relationship to Push Uranium Deal</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/india-and-canada-thaw-frosty-relationship-to-push-uranium-deal/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/india-and-canada-thaw-frosty-relationship-to-push-uranium-deal/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Musavir Hameed Barech]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Jan 2026 13:12:18 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32224</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>At the sidelines of the G20 Summit held in late November 2025 in Johannesburg, South Africa, the Prime Ministers of Canada and India agreed to enhance bilateral relations amid recent years of tense exchanges. Both leaders found consensus on a new uranium export deal worth 2.8 billion dollars, restarting a previous deal that ended in [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/india-and-canada-thaw-frosty-relationship-to-push-uranium-deal/">India and Canada Thaw Frosty Relationship to Push Uranium Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>At the sidelines of the <a href="https://sdg.iisd.org/events/g20-leaders-summit-2025/">G20 Summit</a> held in late November 2025 in Johannesburg, South Africa, the Prime Ministers of Canada and India agreed to enhance bilateral relations amid recent years of tense exchanges. Both leaders found consensus on a new uranium export deal <a href="https://carboncredits.com/india-canada-near-2-8-billion-uranium-deal-cameco-to-supply-nuclear-fuel/">worth</a> 2.8 billion dollars, restarting a previous deal that ended in 2020. Under the terms of the new uranium export deal, the Canadian <a href="https://www.cameco.com/">Cameco Corporation</a> will deliver 100 million pounds of uranium to India over a 10-year period—twice as long as the previous agreement. Although this uranium deal is expected to assist India in meeting its objectives of achieving clean energy, it comes at a time when diplomatic tensions are still strained between the two countries, suggesting economic benefits once again outweigh political strife.</p>
<p>India is the <a href="https://www.iea.org/reports/india-energy-outlook-2021">third-</a>largest energy-consuming country in the world, with a rapidly growing population and major developing industries. A <a href="https://angeassociation.com/location/india/">significant</a> amount (80 to 85 percent) of India’s needed energy comes from coal and crude oil, which are nonrenewable energy sources and more cost-effective than wind and solar. To acquire cleaner and cheaper energy, India sees nuclear energy as the best available option.</p>
<p>India <a href="https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3337634/indias-new-law-fuel-energy-needs-drive-nuclear-power-growth">intends</a> to produce 100 gigawatts of electricity solely from nuclear power by 2047. The uranium deal with Canada, therefore, will help to fuel India’s existing fleet of pressurized heavy-water reactors. However, the uranium supplied under this deal has the potential to aid civilian purposes, but it also can serve military purposes. While keeping the contentious past of India&#8217;s uranium misuse, one can predict that India can divert this material to military purposes as it has done by managing to divert plutonium produced in the CIRUS (Canada-India Reactor Utility Services) reactor.</p>
<p>The CIRUS reactor <a href="https://www.insightsonindia.com/2024/12/24/cirus-reactor/">was</a> a 40-megawatt heavy-water research reactor that Canada supplied to India in the 1950s for peaceful purposes. It later produced weapons-grade plutonium for the 1974 “<a href="https://outrider.org/nuclear-weapons/articles/smiling-buddha-nuclear-tests-have-complicated-legacy-india">Smiling Buddha</a>” test and enough material for dozens of warheads by the time it shut down in 2010. India’s Dhruva reactor, modelled on CIRUS, has operated since 1985 and continues to <a href="https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/estimating-indias-nuclear-weapons-producing-capacity/">produce</a> 20–25 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium annually outside full safeguards. Canada no longer builds reactors in India and will only supply uranium for safeguarded civil reactors. Still, this agreement can free up India’s domestic uranium holdings for its unsafeguarded, military-linked facilities.</p>
<p>As a signatory to the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Canada was <a href="https://nbmediacoop.org/2024/05/16/canadas-plutonium-mishap-in-india-was-50-years-ago-this-week-is-history-repeating-itself-now/">shocked</a> to discover its reactor supported the Indian nuclear weapons program, ending a nuclear relationship with India that had been ongoing since the 1950s. However, Canada quietly <a href="https://www.ccnr.org/india_pak_coop.html">restarted</a> a relationship with India in 1989 at the behest of Atomic Energy of Canada Limited and the CANDU Owners Group.</p>
<p>Although still staunchly opposing proliferation, Canada has relaxed certain restrictions in its relations with India to <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/canada-india-agree-restart-trade-talks-says-indian-government-2025-11-23/">expand</a> overall trade between the two countries to $30 billion by 2030. This was likely one such response to smooth over numerous diplomatic disputes between the two countries, resulting from allegations that India had been involved in the death of a Canadian citizen. Hardeep Singh Nijjar, a Canadian citizen and Sikh separatist activist, <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/article/canada-india-nijjar.html">was</a> shot and killed outside a gurdwara in Surrey, British Columbia in June 2023. A few months after Nijjar’s assassination, former Prime Minister Justin Trudeau <a href="https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/trudeau-indian-government-nijjar-1.6970498">said</a> agencies were investigating “credible allegations” of possible involvement by Indian government agents.</p>
<p>Despite India and Canada expelling each other’s diplomats after the killing, the new uranium deal shows that economic interests generally outweigh political interests over time. The uranium agreement further illustrates the double standard in many global nuclear arrangements: many large countries often temporarily or permanently suspend or relax the rules for their favored trading partners. Although India is not a signatory to the NPT, it has received <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2018/02/eyes-on-the-prize-indias-pursuit-of-membership-in-the-nuclear-suppliers-group?lang=en">support</a> from many states to join the multinational Nuclear Suppliers Group.</p>
<p>India is also pursuing thorium and small-modular reactors (SMRs) to tap its vast thorium reserves in its three-stage nuclear program. While thorium is <a href="https://www.nti.org/risky-business/does-thorium-based-nuclear-fuel-cycle-offer-proliferation-resistant-future-not-necessarily/">touted</a> as more proliferation-resistant—thorium itself is non-fissile and only breeds the fissile isotope uranium-233 while in the reactor core— India&#8217;s reprocessing expertise and unsafeguarded facilities could extract the material from spent fuel for military users. SMRs will increase risk through mass deployment across Indian sites that have spotty oversight being a non-NPT state; therefore, expanding dual-use options rather than limiting them.</p>
<p>Even though the new uranium agreement between New Delhi and Ottawa aims to enhance India’s energy policy, several challenges and concerns remain regarding stability in South Asia. Namely, India is continuing to develop its nuclear arsenal. The international community should play a role in promoting greater balance: real non-proliferation means the equal and consistent application of non-proliferation policies, not the selective and convenient exemptions granted to India. By fostering greater equality among states, the risks associated with an unstable nuclear order can be reduced.</p>
<p><em>Musavir Hameed Barech is currently serving as Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network, Quetta, Pakistan. He can be reached at his email: </em><a href="mailto:musavirkhan88@gmail.com"><em>musavirkhan88@gmail.com</em></a><em>. The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/India-and-Canada-Thaw-Frosty-Relationship-to-Push-Uranium-Deal.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32091" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png" alt="" width="230" height="64" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/2026-Download-Button-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 230px) 100vw, 230px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/india-and-canada-thaw-frosty-relationship-to-push-uranium-deal/">India and Canada Thaw Frosty Relationship to Push Uranium Deal</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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