In 2022, when Russia first invaded Ukraine, it did not domestically produce any Geran-2 (Shahed-136) drones. They initially purchased a small quantity (up to around 6000) from Iran and quickly set their sights on building manufacturing plants. By 2023 they had the Alabuga drone factory where they were able to produce around 200 Geran-2 drones per month. In 2024, they saw a major increase in production and by December of that year it was reported that they were able to produce up to 2000 Geran-2 drones per month. By May of last year, Russia’s production capacity was up to around 2700 Geran-2 drones and another 2500 ‘simulator’ drones used to overwhelm air defenses in a single month (according to Ukrainian intelligence), and production is likely to increase further.

Mass production of these drones has changed what it means to be ‘war ready.’ A massive reduction in Iran’s arsenal of missiles, air capabilities, and ground capabilities would weaken the regime but Trump’s pronouncement should not convince anyone they are no longer a threat. If Iran follows Russia’s blueprint, even heavy losses today are unlikely to prevent them from sustaining a long campaign of drone attacks tomorrow.

Besides, Iran’s strategy is to delay. They retain the ability to threaten American bases in the Gulf, as well as Gulf allies, with their current stockpile of drones and missiles. From almost anywhere in Southern or Central Iran they can launch a Shahed which could reach the Strait of Hormuz, meaning that even if missile and naval drone production slows, they will continue to threaten global trade flows, should the status quo continue.

Russia’s continuation of the war against Ukraine should have shown to the United States what modern war looks like, and how a state can remain a threat at a low cost. Iran is more than capable of continuing this conflict, and their recent statements reaffirming their lack of interest in diplomacy a makes that clear.

Iran’s current stockpile of Shahed-136 drones has not been made public. Before the war started, estimates indicated it could be up to around 80,000 drones. Considering Russia’s demonstrated ability to create and grow a drone industry whilst at war, there is no reason Iran’s drone industry will not grow similarly. Between 2023 and 2025 Russia’s Geran-2 drone production grew by 1250%. Iran will not require this level of growth and is in a better placed position to start having produced a significant quantity of these drones.

The significance of this threat lies in the unique importance of the Strait of Hormuz to the global economy. A sizable portion (around 25%) of the world’s oil supply passes through the Strait, so even limited disruptions can have huge consequences for energy prices. Crucially, Iran does not need to secure a complete shutdown of the Strait to achieve its aims, as even the threat of attacking merchant ships drives insurance premiums and forces ships to reroute. By demonstrating that the Strait can be reached, Iran has created an atmosphere of uncertainty and can maintain this very atmosphere without their arsenal of long-range missiles by building Shahed-136 drones. In this instance, drones are not strictly a military asset, but a way of exerting economic pressure on adversaries.

Securing the Strait of Hormuz to a point of trade continuation will prove to be almost impossible without either a negotiated settlement or a complete capitulation from the Iranian regime. If during this conflict Iran retains even a small portion of their current Shahed-136 stockpile, or the ability to manufacture them, then ships passing through the Strait cannot be guaranteed safe travel.

In short, claims that the Iranian threat has been significantly reduced are short sighted and ignore many of their existing capabilities. Their existing missile stockpile, combined with their production capacity, means that even heavy strikes will not eliminate their ability to project their power across the region. Just as Russia’s war in Ukraine has demonstrated, modern warfare requires cheap and easily mass-produced systems and Iran is very well positioned to meet these requirements. Until a diplomatic solution is reached, or the Iranian regime is somehow forced to end their war efforts, the threat to world trade and to the world energy market will persist.

Raphael Chiswick writes on Diplomacy, International Security, and the Defense Industry. He is based in the United Kingdom. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

From Shaheds to Strait Control: Why Iran Can Still Influence Global Trade was originally published on Global Security Review.

A new version, the Shahed-136B, is available for use in conflict. With an extended range of 4,000 kilometers, the increasing capability of Iran’s long-range drone raises important strategic questions as this weapon’s potential uses beyond Ukraine are considered. Consider Iran’s potential response to an American attack on its nuclear facilities, should the United States and Iran fail to reach an agreement that ends Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Shahed-136 in the Russia-Ukraine War

Iran is supplying the Shahed-136 to Russia as supply of the drone is available. Russia often uses the drone to target Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and military positions. The design of this Shahed-136 allows it to bypass traditional air defense systems due to its low radar cross-section and ability to deploy in swarms—ensuring the drone will always get through, at least some portion.

Military officials in Ukraine and the West identified the Shahed-136 as a persistent and cost-effective threat capable of overwhelming advanced air defense systems. In the case of the Shahad-136, quantity has a quality all its own. Russia’s use of this drone is giving Iran valuable battlefield data that allows designers to refine and improve the capabilities of the Shahed-136B, which is proving an even more lethal weapon.

Strategic Implications in a US-Iran Conflict

If tensions between the US and Iran escalate—particularly if the US conducts strikes against Iran’s nuclear sites—the Shahed-136B could become a key component of Iran’s retaliation strategy. With a 4,000-kilometer range, the Shahad-136B has the potential to strike American strategic assets across the region. With a large American presence spread across the Middle East, there are a large number of Americans and military targets that would make inviting targets. Although the Shahed-136B does not have the legs to strike targets beyond Southern Europe and the Middle East, the number of American bases and assets within the drone’s striking radius are significant.

Iran may also try to launch attacks from unfriendly nations in the Western hemisphere like Cuba or Venezuela or even work with Mexican drug cartels. This proximity, should such an approach work, could allow for attacks on critical targets in the United States. Iran believes the United States is seeking regime change, which will lead the regime to see any fight as a fight for survival.

While military analysts can debate the effectiveness and impact of such a response, the psychological effect achieved is significant. Israelis, for example, live in constant fear of attack from the air. An American attack on Iranian nuclear facilities or other assets would surely elicit an Iranian attack from Iran’s most advanced capabilities.

Iran has a sophisticated network of asymmetric capabilities that extend across the Middle East and Europe. This means any direct confrontation with Tehran could lead to severe and unpredictable consequences for American security. Ensuring Iran does not field a nuclear weapon may be worth the risk of an Iranian response, but it is certainly unknown just how Iran may respond and how effectively the United States and its allies can limit the effect of any response.

Rather than pushing the region toward war, President Donald Trump, who presents himself as a pragmatic negotiator, should consider engaging Iran in constructive dialogue. Despite the difficulties in recent efforts by President Trump to work with the Iranian regime, a return to diplomacy could prevent a devastating conflict that neither side can afford.

Keep in mind, the regime in Tehran feels the United States is attempting to end the regime. The desire for nuclear weapons was spurred by American forces in Iraq, Iran’s western neighbor, and Afghanistan, Iran’s northern neighbor. Ratcheting down tensions will require an American effort to create a sense of security within the Iranian leadership.

While the Shahed-136B is not the only tool in Iran’s toolkit, it is an example of the growing capability fielded by Iran. It is also a strategic consideration for the United States. Iran is unlikely to let any attack go unanswered.

Mohammad Hassan Sangtarash is an independent defense analyst in Tehran.

Shahed-136: Iran’s Long-Range Drone and Its Potential Role in a US Conflict was originally published on Global Security Review.