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		<title>Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/invest-dont-spend-peace-dividends/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 04 Aug 2025 12:45:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31287</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that the US no longer needed a robust defense budget. As a result, the nation went on what Lt. Gen. Garret Harencak called a procurement holiday or a “holiday from history.” Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/invest-dont-spend-peace-dividends/">Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it was assumed that the US no longer needed a robust defense budget. As a result, the nation went on what Lt. Gen. Garret Harencak called a procurement holiday or a “holiday from history.”</p>
<p>Many assumed it was indeed the end of history. After all, between 1987–1993, Washington and Moscow signed four notable arms control deals: the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties I and II (START), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Outer Space, and the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) treaty.</p>
<p>Russian strategic nuclear weapons were scheduled to drop from over 10,000 deployed to 3,500 by the year 2000. The INF treaty banned shorter range missiles altogether. And Warsaw Pact conventional forces in central Europe and Russia dropped precipitously.</p>
<p>President Reagan’s economic war against Moscow was successful. It ended the Soviet empire by pushing Moscow to the brink of insolvency. Russia could not financially maintain its formidable Cold War nuclear and conventional force levels.</p>
<p>From 1993–2001, the US did not enjoy the promised “end of history.” State sponsors of terror in Iran, Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq took the fight to the US, albeit in a different mode than threatening to send massive tank armies through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe.</p>
<p>The US responded with a war that would last more than a decade and cost Americans an estimated $7 trillion. It was all for naught and accomplished very little.</p>
<p><strong>Readiness and Modernization Shortfalls</strong></p>
<p>While spending trillions on nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan, the US Department of Defense (DoD) suffered from severe readiness and modernization shortfalls. The defense budget was roughly $305 billion in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and almost exactly that in 2001 before 9/11. In the interim the budget dropped to as low as $250 billion and it was only after 1996 that the budget gradually increased to $300 billion.</p>
<p>When adjusted for inflation (1991–2011), the defense budget of $300 billion (1991), aside from “overseas contingency operations,” should have grown to $480 billion by 2011, assuming a 3 percent growth rate. That did not happen. The shortfall in defense spending reached $1.25 trillion during the two decades following the Soviet Union’s collapse.</p>
<p>The base defense budget in 2011 was roughly $500 billion, and at first glance equal to that expected. Out of a defense budget of $656 billion, $160 billion was allocated for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the two decades from 2001–2021, the Department of Defense spent $1.56 trillion on nation building—an average of $80 billion annually.</p>
<p>Over three decades after the Cold War’s end, the US did not invest in the modernization of the military. The three-decade peace dividend, which saw $2.8 trillion fewer defense dollars spent, was instead spent domestically and on nation building. As a result, the modernization and recapitalization of the armed forces, especially nuclear forces, were postponed.</p>
<p>By September 11, 2001, the US nuclear forces were already in the field for two decades (<em>Ohio</em>-class submarines), three decades (Minuteman III), and five decades (B-52). The nuclear budget, $77 billion at the end of the Cold War, dropped to less about $25 billion, with most of those funds simply maintaining legacy nuclear forces.</p>
<p>It was not until 2009–2010 that the Obama administration and Congress agreed on a plan for upgrading and replacing nuclear forces—three decades after President Ronald Reagan rolled out his nuclear modernization and sustainment plans in late 1981. New systems are projected to begin fielding in 2031 with completion by 2050.</p>
<p>The failure to prioritize the planning and implementation for replacing aging systems included nuclear command-and-control systems, warheads, and all three legs of the nuclear triad. The belief that the world was safer was a fool’s errand.</p>
<p>By shifting federal dollars from defense to social spending, the US also ensured the workforce needed to build nuclear weapons, space and missile defenses, and cyber systems are no longer there. Vendors associated with the building of <em>Ohio</em>-class submarines and the Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) numbered in the hundreds once. Now, the nation is starting from scratch. The submarine industry lost 14,000 workers and now lacks the manpower to meet demand.</p>
<p>As for ICBMs, with the shutdown of the Peacekeeper production line, the US Air Force was left with a guidance and propulsion replacement program that over a period of more than a decade invested $8 billion in making sure the Minuteman III (1970) would stay in the force “through 2030.” Again, many hundreds of vendors no longer exist to make ICBM parts. Even worse is the current state of the available workforce. American universities grant more PhDs in the hard sciences to Chinese students than to American students. Across the board, the US has fewer workers in the hard sciences than needed, although industry is now reaching into the schools to bring students along a planned program of education that leads them to careers in the aerospace business.</p>
<p><strong>The Challenge Ahead</strong></p>
<p>The nation now finds itself in a precarious position at a time when China and Russia are at their most aggressive. The <em>Columbia</em>-class submarine, which will replace the <em>Ohio</em>-class submarine, was recently delayed two years, further increasing costs. And the herculean task of building 450 new ICBM silos armed with 400 missiles will prove costly. The US will maintain the current 400 ICBMs while simultaneously deploying 400 new missiles in new silos. The Sentinel ICBM, a technological marvel, is progressing toward production. It is a highly capable weapon that is planned for initial deployment in 2033.</p>
<p>Chairmen of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Roger Wicker (R–MS) recently concluded, “It will take several years of sustained investment and real growth beyond this down payment to keep pace with China’s military advances…. But to be clear: The cost of deterring war will always be dwarfed by the cost of fighting one.” This could not be more true. It is time the American people understand the challenge facing the nation and what it will take to overcome it.</p>
<p><em>Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/The-Consequences-of-Spending-the-Peace-Dividend-II.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="248" height="69" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 248px) 100vw, 248px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/invest-dont-spend-peace-dividends/">Invest, Don’t Spend, Peace Dividends</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Restoring Deterrence</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/restoring-deterrence/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/restoring-deterrence/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 14 Jul 2025 12:14:42 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=31159</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Victor Davis Hanson commemorated D-Day and reminded Americans of how difficult it was for the allies in WWII to recover from the May 26–June 4, 1940, evacuation from Dunkirk. For Nazi Germany it was assumed the British would not try a cross-channel invasion again, despite the rescue of 338,000 British and French troops. For Berlin, [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/restoring-deterrence/">Restoring Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Victor Davis Hanson commemorated D-Day and reminded Americans of how difficult it was for the allies in WWII to recover from the May 26–June 4, 1940, evacuation from Dunkirk. For Nazi Germany it was assumed the British would not try a cross-channel invasion again, despite the rescue of 338,000 British and French troops. For Berlin, the defeat at Dunkirk was assumed to eliminate any potential second front, leaving the Wehrmacht free to invade the Soviet Union.</p>
<p>It was not until June 6, 1944, four years later, that the allies landed on the Normandy coast. Over 200,000 troops, in a 48-hour period, in the largest amphibious operation in history, stormed the beaches to do what the Germans thought impossible. Eight months later, Germany was defeated.</p>
<p>The cost was high, however. With the German Army facing little opposition in the Rhineland, Austria, or Czechoslovakia, the German invasion West into the low countries and France was easy. Western Europe fell in a matter of three months from April to June 1940. At the end of the day, once deterrence was lost, World War II led to the death of over 60 million people. Getting deterrence back was a tough proposition.</p>
<p>In 1949, the United States withdrew its military from the Republic of Korea. Then, in January 1950, the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, asserted that the Republic of Korea (ROK) was beyond the US defense perimeter. In early June, the US Congress approved an aid package for the ROK, but it was not delivered until after the North Korean invasion that began on June 25, 1950. Undermining American deterrence of North Korea with Acheson’s speech ultimately cost 2 million Korean lives and nearly 200,000 allied casualties.</p>
<p>Although the US was able to reestablish deterrence in Korea seven decades later, in 2014, the United States lost effective deterrence once again—this time in Europe. That was the year Washington declared that Ukraine was not of interest to the United States, leaving Ukraine to the tender mercies of the Russian Army. Russia soon took Crimea and ultimately launched a brutal invasion in 2022.</p>
<p>In 2021, the US withdrew ignobly from Afghanistan, further signaling the nation’s enemies that the US was not in the deterrence business. The consequences of that act are still unknown.</p>
<p>Later in 2021, the administration hesitated in making it clear whether Washington would or would not defend Ukraine from further Russian aggression. Though the mistake was later rectified, the damage to deterrence was done.</p>
<p>Further harm came to Ukraine, the US, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) European member states when it became clear Washington was fearful of a Russian escalation of the conflict should the allies get serious about pushing back against Russian aggression. Russian President Vladimir Putin repeatedly threatened the use of nuclear weapons should Ukraine and the allied coalition get serious about rolling back Russia’s aggression—the successful use of Russian deterrence.</p>
<p>To counter the American loss of deterrence, Congress agreed to markedly increase defense spending and investments in America’s nuclear deterrent, space capability, and missile defense. Over time, and coupled with a sense of urgency, the United States can restore deterrence if these new investments are sustained.</p>
<p>The nation’s legacy nuclear deterrent, which is now between 35 to 65 years old, will soon age to obsolescence. The Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), <em>Columbia</em>-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), and the B21 Raider strategic bomber, along with the long-range nuclear cruise missile, once built, will markedly restore nuclear deterrence. An improved theater nuclear deterrent, with a new sea-launched nuclear cruise missile and a stand-off nuclear capability for the F-35, would also significantly improve deterrence.</p>
<p>These systems give the nation the capability required to deter China and Russia. However, the second part of deterrence is will. Whether the United States has the will to employ its deterrent capability is uncertain.</p>
<p>How the administration handles Iran will say a great deal about how adversaries see American will. The administration is committed to preventing Iran from getting a nuclear weapon. Washington said you could do this the easy way or the hard way. A negotiated deal is one way but military strikes on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure is the other.</p>
<p>With the Israelis and Americans on the same page and the war already begun, the die is now cast and the US does not have endless patience. But whether it is willing to use military force is uncertain. Although Henry Kissinger once said that diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect, the conventional wisdom in Washington is that no military action will be forthcoming.</p>
<p>The Trump administration carefully laid out a challenge to the Iranians. There were 60 days for negotiations. Now, it is widely known that on day 61 the Israelis, with US missile and air defense assistance, took out most of the above ground Iranian nuclear capability as well as the top Iranian nuclear leadership.</p>
<p>Perhaps Israeli deterrence credibility was restored, but whether that is true of the United States is far less certain. The Trump administration did what it said it would do. The Israelis did what they had to do. Both nations did what was necessary to restore deterrence. The Iranian nuclear capability is gone. How this will affect Chinese and Russian aggression, that requires more insight.</p>
<p><em>Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Restoring-Deterrence.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="220" height="61" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 220px) 100vw, 220px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/restoring-deterrence/">Restoring Deterrence</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Air Force&#8217;s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-air-forces-nuclear-deterrent-modernization-in-progress/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jun 2025 12:14:49 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30866</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The United States is currently undergoing a comprehensive modernization of its nuclear triad and strategic bomber fleet, with the goal of ensuring a cost-effective and credible deterrent in an increasingly complex global security environment. From new cruise missiles to next-generation bombers and upgraded ICBMs, these programs represent a significant investment in national security. Each faces [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-air-forces-nuclear-deterrent-modernization-in-progress/">The Air Force&#8217;s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The United States is currently undergoing a comprehensive modernization of its nuclear triad and strategic bomber fleet, with the goal of ensuring a cost-effective and credible deterrent in an increasingly complex global security environment. From new cruise missiles to next-generation bombers and upgraded ICBMs, these programs represent a significant investment in national security. Each faces unique challenges and demonstrates varying degrees of success according to a presentation by Lt Gen Andrew Gebara, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, on May 16, 2025, at a National Institute for Deterrence Studies event in Washington, DC.</p>
<p>One of the cornerstones of this modernization is the development of the B-21 <em>Raider</em>, the nation&#8217;s first <a href="https://www.northropgrumman.com/what-we-do/air/b-21-raider?utm_source=bingpaid&amp;utm_medium=search&amp;utm_campaign=air-b21raider&amp;utm_audience=customerhill&amp;utm_content=keywords&amp;utm_format=cpc&amp;code=APPLICANT_SOURCE-3-442&amp;source=APPLICANT_SOURCE-3-442&amp;msclkid=68ef6570ac181f25e1760d403e4be6e9">sixth-generation aircraft </a>and second stealth bomber. Poised to replace the B-1 and B-2 bomber fleets, the B-21 embodies the pinnacle of airpower, offering dual-use capabilities and unparalleled lethality. Currently, the B-21 is in its flight test phase, and with multiple aircraft progressing through the assembly line, the B-21 program is largely on schedule and within budget, a testament to its efficient development. Once deployed, this capability will present a significant challenge to potential adversaries and strengthen America&#8217;s capacity to project power and effectively threaten vital enemy targets. Low observable stealth and other on-board technologies can ensure successful penetration and retaliation, placing high-value targets at risk in any cost-imposing deterrence strategy, even against the strongest defenses. This threat, along with the fear instilled by the B-21, will certainly cause any aggressor to reconsider attacking the United States or its allies. While the Air Force is <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/allvin-more-b-21s-may-be-necessary-b-52j-upgrade-goes-awry/">currently funded to buy 100 B-21 bombers</a>, the US Strategic Command commander recently <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/stratcom-chief-b-21s-lrso-strategic-systems/">testified</a> that 145 units are needed “to cope with the increased threats to U.S. security.”</p>
<p>Complementing the B-21 and B-52 is the nuclear-tipped Long Range Stand Off (LRSO) missile. Designed to replace the 40-year-old nuclear-armed Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) currently deployed on the B-52, the LRSO is a crucial component of the air leg of the nuclear triad. Impressively, the LRSO program is <a href="https://docs.house.gov/meetings/AS/AS29/20250507/118208/HHRG-119-AS29-Wstate-GebaraA-20250507.pdf">presently on track</a> regarding schedule and budget, which is a welcome anomaly in major defense acquisitions. Its success is further highlighted by three successful flight tests in 2025 alone, demonstrating its maturity and readiness. The critical question, however, remains: how many LRSO missiles does the nation truly need to maintain a robust deterrent? This calculus involves intricate geopolitical considerations, technological advancements, and the evolving threat landscape. As of 2023, the Air Force plans to procure <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/lrso-production-decision-2027/">1,087 missiles</a>, with some 67 to be expended during the development phase.</p>
<p>Across the Atlantic, the NATO nuclear deterrent is undergoing its own transformation, centered on the F-35 fighter jet and the B61-12 nuclear gravity bomb. All planned units of the B61-12 have been produced, and the F-35 has achieved certification for nuclear operations. While several European allies have already certified their F-35 jets for this crucial mission, others are still awaiting delivery of their aircraft or are in the process of certification. This phased integration underscores the collaborative nature of NATO&#8217;s nuclear sharing arrangements and the ongoing commitment to collective security. The <a href="https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/478441/f-35a-lightning-ii/">F-35</a> is a nimble, adaptable, high-performance multirole fighter combining stealth, sensor fusion, and extraordinary situational awareness, enhancing the lethality of NATO’s nuclear deterrent capability.</p>
<p>The venerable senior citizen B-52H Stratofortress, a workhorse of the bomber fleet, is also receiving a suite of vital upgrades. These enhancements include new engines, radar systems, and upgraded nuclear communications systems.  While progress is being made on these upgrades, they are encountering higher costs and longer timelines <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/gao-b-52j-initial-operational-capability-three-year-delay/">than initially projected</a>. Nevertheless, the program is not &#8220;off the rails&#8221; and remains a critical effort to extend this enduring platform&#8217;s operational life and capabilities. When complete, the B-52J will be a more fuel-efficient, <a href="https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/lt_gen_gebara_written_posture_statement.pdf">reliable, modern, and better-integrated platform</a> going into the second half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Should the B-52J modernization effort be overly delayed or cancelled, it will likely be replaced with <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/allvin-more-b-21s-may-be-necessary-b-52j-upgrade-goes-awry/">additional B-21</a> bombers.</p>
<p>Finally, the Sentinel Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) program represents a monumental undertaking. Beyond merely replacing the now 50-year-old Minuteman III missile, Sentinel involves a complete overhaul of the vast infrastructure spanning five missile fields. Following a Nunn-McCurdy recertification last year, all three stages of the missile, including the post-boost section, have undergone successful testing. The next crucial steps include laying <a href="https://thedefensepost.com/2024/04/01/us-sentinel-icbm-delay/">some 7,000 miles</a> of fiber optic cables across five states to establish robust command and control capabilities for the deployed weapons. A significant cost driver that contributed to the Nunn-McCurdy breach was the <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2025/05/sentinel-icbm-program-needs-brand-new-silos-air-force-says/405077/">escalating cost of rebuilding</a> the individual launch facilities. General Gebara reminded the audience that with 450 launch facilities (LF), any growth or cost increases in one LF can be multiplied by 450. Therefore, a $1 million increase in the design, construction, or reconditioning of one LF equates to adding half a billion dollars to the program, highlighting the scale and complexity of this vital modernization effort. General Bussiere, commander of the Air Force’s Global Strike Command, <a href="https://www.afgsc.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3552578/continuing-peace-from-a-position-of-strength-afgsc-commander-outlines-moderniza/">describes the Sentinel ICBM project</a> as “the largest works project ever taken in fifty years [likely] since Eisenhower’s interstate program.”</p>
<p>The birth of the United States Air Force coincided with the dawn of the nuclear age and the rapid escalation of the Cold War. Nuclear deterrence quickly became a central and defining mission, profoundly shaping USAF structure, development, and doctrine throughout the Cold War and beyond. In today’s complex era of great power competition, the USAF is, as it should be, deeply committed to modernizing and revitalizing its nuclear deterrent. While programs like the LRSO and B-21 demonstrate impressive progress, others, such as the B-52 upgrades and Sentinel ICBM, face inherent challenges. These efforts, though costly and complex, are essential to maintaining a credible and effective deterrent in a dynamic global environment, ensuring national security for decades to come. This must be America’s number one priority!</p>
<p>As the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley once <a href="https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/AG19491021.2.40">affirmed</a>, as a believer in humanity, he deplored the use of the atomic bomb; however, as a soldier, he respected it. The United States should be prepared to utilize the full psychological and military impact of the bomb to prevent a war and, if attacked, to win the war. He was right in October 1949, and his sentiment remains valid today; the Air Force must ensure that its segment of the strategic nuclear triad is prepared to deter war well into the century.</p>
<p><em>Col. Curtis McGiffin </em>(US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National <em>Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. He has over 30 years of total USAF service. The views expressed are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/The-Air-Forces-Nuclear-Deterrent-Modernization-in-Progress.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="234" height="65" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 234px) 100vw, 234px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-air-forces-nuclear-deterrent-modernization-in-progress/">The Air Force&#8217;s Nuclear Deterrent: Modernization in Progress</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</title>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 19 Feb 2025 13:15:42 +0000</pubDate>
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					<description><![CDATA[<p>Key Takeaways from: ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025 Overview The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis. Key Themes &#38; Highlights Strategic Nuclear Posture &#38; Modernization: U.S. nuclear deterrence [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/">ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>Key Takeaways from: ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</strong></p>
<p><strong>Overview</strong></p>
<p>The report, prepared by Peter Huessy, comprehensively assesses nuclear deterrence, strategic security issues, and emerging threats. It includes key quotes from U.S. leaders, updates on nuclear modernization, policy discussions, and geopolitical analysis.</p>
<p><strong>Key Themes &amp; Highlights</strong></p>
<ol>
<li><strong>Strategic Nuclear Posture &amp; Modernization:</strong>
<ul>
<li>U.S. nuclear deterrence strategies are facing significant challenges, with adversaries such as Russia and China expanding their arsenals.</li>
<li>The U.S. Air Force has paused elements of the Sentinel ICBM program due to evolving requirements.</li>
<li>Modernization efforts include upgrades to the B61 and B83 nuclear gravity bombs, though concerns persist regarding the adequacy of U.S. capabilities against hardened enemy targets.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Policy &amp; Leadership Insights:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Secretary of Defense Peter Hegseth emphasizes the need to rebuild the military’s warrior ethos and align capabilities with threats.</li>
<li>House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Chairman Mike Rogers stresses the necessity of increased defense spending to counter global threats.</li>
<li>Former President Donald Trump calls for nuclear arms control talks with Russia and China, while also questioning the need for new nuclear weapons given existing stockpiles.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Geopolitical Developments &amp; Deterrence Challenges:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Concerns over a growing Sino-Russian-North Korean-Iranian alignment seeking to undermine the Western security order.</li>
<li>Debate over extended nuclear deterrence and the potential for allied nations to develop independent nuclear capabilities.</li>
<li>The future of U.S. nuclear triad strategy amid reports of China’s advancements in submarine detection technology.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Ukraine Conflict &amp; U.S. Policy:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Differing views on U.S. involvement in Ukraine, with some advocating for continued support while others argue for de-escalation and negotiations.</li>
<li>Analysis of Russian vulnerabilities, including internal instability and the potential for civil unrest post-Putin.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Congressional &amp; Budgetary Updates:</strong>
<ul>
<li>The House Budget Committee supports increased defense spending, with an additional $100 billion allocated for the next year.</li>
<li>Senate Majority Leader John Thune discusses priorities related to Air Force modernization, including the B-21 bomber program.</li>
</ul>
</li>
<li><strong>Emerging Threats &amp; Strategic Risks:</strong>
<ul>
<li>Reports suggest that China has developed new submarine detection technologies that could undermine the stealth advantage of U.S. nuclear submarines.</li>
<li>Analysis of the potential consequences of Vladimir Putin’s downfall, including the risk of nuclear proliferation due to internal instability in Russia.</li>
</ul>
</li>
</ol>
<p><strong>Download the full report</strong></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/ICBM-EAR-week-of-February-10.pdf"><img loading="lazy" decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="227" height="63" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 227px) 100vw, 227px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-week-of-february-10-2025/">ICBM EAR Week of February 10, 2025</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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