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		<title>Modern Escalation Dominance Is Essential to Effective Deterrence and Assurance</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/modern-escalation-dominance-is-essential-to-effective-deterrence-and-assurance/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joe Buff]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 26 Nov 2024 13:29:35 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29444</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Defense commentators note that adversaries, prior to acting aggressively, will first calculate risks and rewards. Significant to this calculus is an evaluation of how, if at all, America is likely to respond at different stages of any intensifying aggression, that is, at different rungs on the escalation ladder. Historically, adversaries, ranging from Imperial Japan to [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/modern-escalation-dominance-is-essential-to-effective-deterrence-and-assurance/">Modern Escalation Dominance Is Essential to Effective Deterrence and Assurance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/rethinking-risk-great-power-competition">Defense commentators</a> note that adversaries, prior to acting aggressively, will first calculate <a href="https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joc_deterrence.pdf">risks and </a>rewards. Significant to this <a href="https://www.cna.org/reports/2013/understanding-an-adversarys-strategic-calculus">calculus</a> is an evaluation of how, if at all, America is likely to respond at different stages of any intensifying aggression, that is, at different rungs on the <a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2007/R3235.pdf">escalation ladder</a>.</p>
<p>Historically, adversaries, ranging from Imperial Japan to Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, badly miscalculated American resolve. This was, in part, because the US did not effectively communicate national will and the country’s ability to generate combat power.</p>
<p>While nuclear deterrence held during the Cold War, a worrisome erosion of America’s nuclear deterrence appears underway. A combination of <a href="https://fas.org/publication/strategic-posture-commission-report-calls-for-broad-nuclear-buildup/">unilateral cuts to the American arsenal</a>, <a href="https://www.gao.gov/blog/over-budget-and-delayed-whats-next-u.s.-nuclear-weapons-research-and-production-projects">sluggish nuclear modernization</a>, and “<a href="https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2024/sep/26/russian-induced-nuclear-psychosis-runs-rampant-thr/">nuclear psychosis</a>” (fear of one’s own nuclear arsenal) likely led Russian President Vladimir Putin to develop an <a href="https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/russias-escalate-win-strategy-peter-huessy">escalate to win</a> nuclear doctrine. The same factors may also contribute to China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia issuing <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/cooperation-between-china-iran-north-korea-and-russia-current-and-potential-future-threats-to-america?lang=en">mounting conventional and nuclear threats</a> against the West.</p>
<p>Americans need to remember that <a href="https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/escalation-tool-be-considered-not-dismissed">escalation dominance</a> is an essential ingredient in effectively maintaining deterrence of adversaries and assurance of allies. Escalation dominance means having the option to retaliate up or down the escalation ladder—at America’s choosing. This means developing and fielding capabilities that at least achieve <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/dynamic-parity-a-new-approach-to-american-nuclear-deterrence/">parity</a>, if not <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/dynamic-parity-a-new-approach-to-american-nuclear-deterrence/">superiority</a>, at each rung of the escalation ladder.</p>
<p>Without the US investing in the needed capabilities for full-spectrum conflict, all-domain escalation dominance, adversaries can study America’s capabilities and identify gaps. They can then develop and execute successful <a href="https://www.rand.org/topics/asymmetric-warfare.html">strategies</a> that exploit those gaps. They can also incorrectly believe gaps exist, because of a failure of American messaging. Either way, American deterrence might fail.</p>
<p>The US once <a href="https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/escalation-tool-be-considered-not-dismissed">understood</a> the art and science of escalation dominance—including how to weigh and manage <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/articles/2024/how-to-manage-escalation-with-nuclear-adversaries.html">uncertainties and unavoidable risks</a>. At the most dangerous point in the Cold War, the <a href="https://www.jfklibrary.org/learn/about-jfk/jfk-in-history/cuban-missile-crisis">Cuban Missile Crisis</a>, the US out-thought, outmaneuvered, and overmatched the Soviet Union. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev backed down. President Ronald Reagan successfully escalated <a href="https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/permanent-exhibits/peace-through-strength">an arms race while also waging economic warfare</a>. The Soviet Union collapsed.</p>
<p>America now faces multiple adversaries it must engage across the spectrum of conflict. Both horizontal and vertical escalation are certain. With the potential for conflicts to start in the <a href="https://carnegieendowment.org/posts/2022/12/what-the-russian-invasion-reveals-about-the-future-of-cyber-warfare?lang=en">cyber</a> or <a href="https://nipp.org/information_series/stone-christopher-m-deterrence-in-space-requirements-for-credibility-information-series-no-471/">space</a> domain, the United States must have the ability to limit damaging incursions and malicious interference, while out-escalating an adversary.</p>
<p>History shows that America’s enemies, whomever they might be, tend to be relentless, brutal, casualty acceptant, and even <a href="https://theconversation.com/4-ways-to-rein-in-china-and-russia-alleged-superpower-perpetrators-of-atrocity-crimes-212299">genocidal</a>. Current events, in conflict zones around the world, prove that this <a href="https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2024/10/russian-casualties-have-topped-600k-us-says/400181/">has not changed</a>. Appeasement is as ill-advised today as it was with Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. Restraint is also as ill-advised now as it was then.</p>
<p><a href="https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/Yeaw_Escalatory-Attraction-of-Limited-Nuclear-Employment-2021-10-22D.pdf">Sound theories of American victory need to be developed</a>. Sound American strategy requires the proper matching of objectives to means. Without these in place, <a href="https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/spaceanddefense/vol15/iss1/15/">deterrence might not hold</a>.</p>
<p>The stakes could not be higher. Conventional war is still almost always a prolonged and very bloody business, in which <a href="https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/more-women-and-children-killed-gaza-israeli-military-any-other-recent-conflict">civilians are caught in the middle</a> and <a href="https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-civilian-casualties-increase-missiles-b4702b77b170ad94fab56cac8cbcdc2b">have no safe refuge</a>. If America’s strategic deterrence ever fails, the <a href="https://breakingdefense.com/2024/10/the-homeland-is-no-longer-a-sanctuary-warns-new-transcom-boss/?utm_campaign=BD%20Daily&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;_hsenc=p2ANqtz--uvT_kG9VahdJAQ_1J4Ger6SKX58WhjmPyHcCcnuF_f0exSz0H3Cn0pqRUadj1T5JtXkVwrP6NElWF_rQFiwB-7I3QUw&amp;_hsmi=328975222&amp;utm_content=328975222&amp;utm_source=hs_email">homeland might suffer devastating attack</a>. Destruction in Ukraine is a small example of what such destruction could look like.</p>
<p>Nuclear war would likely prove unimaginably worse. Nuclear deterrence demands the ability to respond with <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/nuclear-deterrence-is-not-a-theoretical-game/">proportional retaliatory strikes</a>. It also requires the ability to match enemy escalation. The US cannot allow itself to be <a href="https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/News/Display/Article/3706553/rethinking-the-relevance-of-self-deterrence/">self-deterred</a> by either a lack of will or a lack of capability. Self-deterrence is to give license to adversaries.</p>
<p>Yet <a href="https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/escalation-tool-be-considered-not-dismissed">some in the US</a> continue to advocate for policies that eschew escalation at any cost.  This is a theory of defeat, not victory. Attempts to avoid risks only increase the cost of risk.</p>
<p>Such advocates need to be reminded that <a href="https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/relearning-escalation-dynamics-win-new-cold-war-rebeccah-heinrichs">bullies will always test those they despise</a>. <a href="https://www.google.com/search?q=escalation%3A+a+tool+to+be+considered+not+dismissed&amp;oq=escalation&amp;gs_lcrp=EgZjaHJvbWUqCAgAEEUYJxg7MggIABBFGCcYOzISCAEQRRg5GJECGLEDGIAEGIoFMgYIAhBFGEAyDQgDEAAYkQIYgAQYigUyCggEEAAYsQMYgAQyDAgFEAAYQxiABBiKBTIHCAYQABiABDIHCAcQABiABNIBCTU0NzhqMGoxNagCCLACAQ&amp;sourceid=chrome&amp;ie=UTF-8">Saving face and taking safe off-ramps</a> are not a priority. For the US to be unable or unwilling to respond with sufficient force when necessary will only <a href="https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/relearning-escalation-dynamics-win-new-cold-war-rebeccah-heinrichs">invite further and far worse aggression</a>.</p>
<p>In the Cold War now underway, there is a danger of rapid escalation. To cede the military initiative to adversaries, to abandon America’s time-honored strategic culture of retaining full-spectrum escalation dominance, is to invite a nuclear strike against the nation and/or its allies. <a href="https://www.marketwatch.com/story/u-s-adversaries-are-targeting-races-for-congress-too-with-their-disinformation-campaigns-04382610">Adversary malign-influence campaigning</a> is underway and now pervades American information.  Succumbing to these efforts to convince <a href="https://www.npr.org/2024/02/18/1232263785/generations-after-its-heyday-isolationism-is-alive-and-kicking-up-controversy">American society</a> that isolation and pacifism are the nation’s best option is a mistake.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.heritage.org/defense/commentary/escalation-tool-be-considered-not-dismissed">Appeasement</a> never satisfies autocratic aggression. The United States must instead invest in the capabilities required to <a href="https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/spaceanddefense/vol15/iss1/15/">re-master</a> the art and science of <a href="https://www.hudson.org/defense-strategy/relearning-escalation-dynamics-win-new-cold-war-rebeccah-heinrichs">strong-stomached escalation dominance</a><em>. </em>This will support deterrence of America’s adversaries, assurance of America’s allies, and defense of the homeland. Now is the time to act.</p>
<p><em>Joe Buff is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own. </em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/Modern-Escalation-Dominance-is-Essential-to-Effective-Deterrence-and-Assurance.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-28926 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/modern-escalation-dominance-is-essential-to-effective-deterrence-and-assurance/">Modern Escalation Dominance Is Essential to Effective Deterrence and Assurance</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Self-Deterrence, Narrative Control, and Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Israel</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/self-deterrence-narrative-control-and-nuclear-deterrence-the-case-of-israel/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/self-deterrence-narrative-control-and-nuclear-deterrence-the-case-of-israel/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Aaron Holland]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Feb 2024 13:20:58 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=27259</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p> The theory of self-deterrence has emerged as a pivotal factor in shaping the behavior of nuclear-armed states. At the heart of this concept lies the intricate interplay between reputational concerns, precedents of nuclear use, and the credibility of nuclear deterrence. When leaders are self-deterred from employing nuclear weapons due to the fear of tarnishing their [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/self-deterrence-narrative-control-and-nuclear-deterrence-the-case-of-israel/">Self-Deterrence, Narrative Control, and Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Israel</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong> </strong>The theory of <a href="https://www.tvpaul.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/Self-Deterrence-Article-PDF.pdf">self-deterrence</a> has emerged as a pivotal factor in shaping the behavior of nuclear-armed states. At the heart of this concept lies the intricate interplay between reputational concerns, precedents of nuclear use, and the credibility of nuclear deterrence. When leaders are self-deterred from employing nuclear weapons due to the fear of tarnishing their international standing or setting dangerous precedents, the credibility of their nuclear deterrent is called into question.</p>
<p>Consider the following scenario: a nuclear-armed state faces a significant threat to its security but refrains from resorting to nuclear weapons use out of concern for reputational damage and the global perception that the country is no longer a responsible nuclear stakeholder. While this decision may seem prudent from a moral and ethical standpoint, it inadvertently undermines the credibility of the state’s nuclear force. Its adversaries may perceive this reluctance to employ nuclear weapons as a sign of weakness, emboldening them to act with impunity—disregarding the state’s nuclear deterrent.</p>
<p><strong>The Crucial Role of Narrative Control</strong></p>
<p>The crux of the matter lies in <a href="https://nielsbohrmann.com/control-the-narrative/">narrative control</a>. In a world where <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvc77bx3">perception</a> is often more potent than reality, the ability to shape public opinion and control the narrative surrounding nuclear capabilities is of paramount importance. Leaders must project strength, resolve, and a willingness to employ nuclear weapons. This is necessary for instilling fear and uncertainty in the minds of adversaries.</p>
<p>Achieving narrative control is no easy feat. In the age of social media and instantaneous communication, <a href="https://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR661.html">information warfare</a> is the new battleground for shaping public opinion. States contend with an onslaught of propaganda, misinformation, and alternative narratives, making it increasingly challenging to maintain a coherent and convincing message.<strong> </strong></p>
<p><strong>Israel’s Narrative Struggles</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>The case of <a href="https://www.cnn.com/middleeast/live-news/israel-hamas-war-gaza-news-02-07-24/index.html">Israel’s war with Hamas</a> serves as a poignant example of the perils posed by <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/dec/21/israel-losing-war-against-hamas-netanyahu-idf">losing the narrative war</a>. Israel is being painted as the <a href="https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2022/02/israels-apartheid-against-palestinians-a-cruel-system-of-domination-and-a-crime-against-humanity/">oppressor</a> by large swaths of the <a href="https://globalaffairs.org/bluemarble/see-how-32-countries-moved-away-us-and-israel-latest-un-cease-fire-vote">international community</a>, even though Hamas initiated the war with their <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7-attack-visualizing-data">October 7, 2023</a>, attack. Despite possessing a formidable nuclear arsenal and clear escalation dominance in the region, <a href="https://www.nti.org/countries/israel/">Israel</a> was utterly incapable of deterring conflict with Hamas. In fact, Hamas <a href="https://www.newstatesman.com/world/middle-east/2023/10/israeli-deterrence-hamas-gaza">never believed Israel will use [its?] nuclear arsenal</a> in a Gaza conflict. The Israelis have also failed to deter further escalation of aggression from Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies.</p>
<p>Admittedly, nuclear weapons were never intended to deter all forms of aggression. It is possible that past Israeli strikes on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities are serving as a deterrent to Iran going nuclear because they fear an actual Israeli nuclear strike. This is speculation but serves to highlight the challenge of deterrence.</p>
<p>Israel has struggled to gain international acceptance and legitimacy for its action in Gaza with the <a href="https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/12/1144717">United Nations condemning Israel</a>, calling for a cease-fire, and even lending legitimacy to claims of genocide. This is a claim that prominent political scientists <a href="https://www.aljazeera.com/program/the-bottom-line/2023/12/16/john-mearsheimer-israel-is-choosing-apartheid-or-ethnic-cleansing">John Mearsheimer</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I_Sh-ERypMA">Norman Finkelstein</a> supported in the past weeks. The prominent commentator and former judge, <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HFb8Av76Gug">Andrew Napolitano</a>, also asserts that Israel has lost the public relations war.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the psychological impact of narrative victory empowers non-nuclear entities to resist traditional deterrence strategies. Adversaries, fueled by a sense of righteousness and global support, become more resilient to the deterrent effect of escalation dominance and nuclear superiority.</p>
<p>This resilience poses a significant challenge to the US and Israel, who find themselves contending with <a href="https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/01/houthis-wont-back-down-after-us-and-uk-strikes-yemen">adversaries undeterred</a> by their joint military superiority in the region. Even irrational decisions, in a quantitative sense, do not strike fear in adversaries that believe they dominate public support and will obtain divine vindication and retribution in their cause.</p>
<p><strong>Reclaiming the Narrative Initiative</strong></p>
<p>As a result, Israel finds itself caught in a precarious position, where its nuclear deterrent is weakened by perceptions of ambiguity, mistrust, and self-deterrence. Its adversaries are emboldened by this perceived weakness coupled with global support for their struggles. They may be more inclined to continue challenging Israel’s security interests, knowing that the costs of nuclear escalation are mitigated by doubts surrounding Israel’s willingness to employ nuclear weapons in conflict. This is a challenge with maintaining a <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010-11/wrestling-nuclear-opacity">nuclear posture of opacity</a>.</p>
<p>To regain the narrative initiative, Israel must invest in <a href="https://hbr.org/2016/03/how-to-build-a-strategic-narrative">strategic narrative</a> crafting. Emphasizing shared values with allies, just causes, and a commitment to peace can reshape perceptions and counteract the narrative of oppression. Israel wants to be seen as a liberator and defender, not as the oppressor or the extension of an <a href="https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2023/nov/30/americas-undying-empire-why-the-decline-of-us-power-has-been-greatly-exaggerated">American empire</a>. Israel has much work to do to change their current international reputation and reclaim the moral high ground. Strengthening international alliances and engaging in diplomatic efforts in the Middle East are essential and a good place to start. This is not to say Israel is not engaging in such efforts. They certainly are, but to little effect.</p>
<p>By influencing global narratives, Israel can garner support for their actions and create a more balanced perception of the current conflict. Launching targeted public diplomacy campaigns can bridge the gap between military actions and public understanding. Providing transparent and compelling narratives about strategic objectives can counter misinformation and build domestic and international support. Additionally, recognizing the power of cultural and ideological narratives is crucial. Israel should continue to tap into historical narratives that showcase their commitment to democracy, freedom, and human rights, countering portrayals that paint them as aggressors and oppressors.</p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>The nexus of self-deterrence, narrative control, and nuclear deterrence is of utmost importance in the contemporary strategic environment. As states grapple with the complexities of nuclear strategy, the ability to shape public perception and maintain credibility is essential for maintaining peace and stability. Failure to do so risks undermining the very foundations of global security, with potentially catastrophic consequences for all nations involved. Only by mastering the art of narrative control can states hope to navigate the treacherous waters of nuclear politics and ensure the continued survival of the international order.</p>
<p><em>Aaron Holland is an Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
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<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/self-deterrence-narrative-control-and-nuclear-deterrence-the-case-of-israel/">Self-Deterrence, Narrative Control, and Nuclear Deterrence: The Case of Israel</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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