Recently, it has become fashionable in news commentary and in political pronouncements by members of Congress, among others, to claim that the United States’ conflict with Iran is a defeat and a debacle. Ironically, sources that criticized the Trump administration for Operation Epic Fury starting on February 28, 2026, are now criticizing the President and his advisors for capitulating to Iran on issues like Iran’s nuclear program, shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and funds for Iranian reconstruction. Other critics argue that the regime in Tehran remains in power and that Iranian proxies, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, keep attacking Israel, America’s key ally in the Middle East.

There is no question that this war was started without many of the diplomatic and military precursors seen in past conflicts, such as consulting with major allies, the United Nations (UN), and briefing Congressional leaders beyond those required by the War Powers Act. There was also an ambitious list of political and military goals announced from the start, including hopes that Iran’s internal politics could be stirred into rebellion against the Ayatollahs, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and other parts of the ruling theocracy. Official objectives included destroying Iran’s missile capabilities and its capacity to produce brand new ones; annihilating its navy; ensuring that the world’s number one sponsor of terror can never obtain a nuclear weapon; and ensuring that the Iranian regime cannot continue to arm, fund, and direct terrorist armies outside of its borders. Additionally, Israel sought to weaken or remove Hezbollah in Lebanon, and both the U.S. and Israel intend to further contain other Iranian proxies, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hamas in Gaza.

The Memorandum of Understanding reached between the United States and Iran in mid-June expedited shipping through the Strait of Hormuz to provide immediate relief for global trade and, inevitably, generated significant revenue for Iran from its oil sales to China and other buyers. U.S. officials pointed to declining domestic gas prices as a positive sign, which also fostered a more optimistic economic outlook ahead of the U.S. midterm elections. President Trump continued to reassure Americans and others that the upcoming sixty-day negotiation period between Washington and Tehran would prevent Iran from developing or obtaining nuclear weapons. The U.S. claimed that Iranian negotiators had agreed to future inspections of Iran’s nuclear enrichment facilities by UN atomic inspection experts, though Washington also emphasized the need to include American inspectors. Some Iranian officials denied agreeing to this inspection requirement, but these denials might have been aimed at appeasing hardliners within Tehran’s postwar regime.

Now comes the harder part. Negotiating the end of a war involves more complexity than most observers may realize. This is true even when the stronger power, in military terms, has the capacity to inflict greater damage on the relatively weaker power. Losing powers, not fully defeated, may still retain bargaining chips. The weaker side can influence the transition from midgame to endgame, making it more or less costly for the stronger power, depending on how willing the stronger power is to negotiate and trade concessions rather than simply enforce a diktat.

Regarding Iran, the first aspect of its ongoing ability to stir trouble lies in its close influence over Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen. Israel continues to respond strongly to attacks by Hezbollah, and this back-and-forth creates a distracting layer for the ongoing U.S. negotiations with Iran. A second aspect of Iran’s postwar influence is its capacity to strike regional neighbors that support U.S. military bases or wish to maintain friendly relations with the U.S., including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. Third, Iran is already suspected of supporting assassination plots against President Trump or planning other anti-American terrorist activities. Fourth, Iran has used its own narratives about the war with the U.S. to portray its regime as a victim of a bullying superpower, a storyline that appeals to many observers who were already critical of U.S. support for Israel’s war against Hamas following the October 7, 2023, massacre by the latter. Fifth, Iran’s proximity to the Strait of Hormuz presents potential opportunities for disruptive actions against merchant ships and U.S. or other naval forces. Lastly, Iran’s ongoing close ties with Russia and China will gradually enhance its postwar military capabilities and economic rebuilding, while also reinforcing the stability of its political regime.

Notwithstanding the preceding cautionary notes against premature American irrational exuberance over Operation Epic Fury, a pessimistic assessment of U.S. military effectiveness, and talk of postwar U.S. political defeat, is unwarranted. Iran’s military capability has been seriously degraded, and major components of its nuclear program are buried under rubble, pushing back the estimated time for weaponization. Several rounds of anti-leadership targeting have scrambled the decision-making process within an already complexified regime structure. It is likely the regime will continue to maintain its powerful grip over the population unless, or until, home-grown opposition becomes much more motivated, better organized, and widespread. Meanwhile, we can assume that U.S. Central Command will maintain vigilant regional overwatch to keep Iran’s mischief within acceptable bounds.

Going forward, the endgame in Iran will test the ability of the United States and Israel to exercise both statesmanship and military power. Politics in the Middle East is as challenging as any. War in the Middle East, from ancient times to today, has been the graveyard of imperial ambitions and the source of frustration for efforts to spread democracy. Reshaping Middle Eastern political alliances for international peace and security requires high-stakes diplomacy, cultural understanding, and a strong dose of diplomatic and strategic realism. In the post–Epic Fury world, we stand on the brink of potentially historic breakthroughs that could lead to lasting regional peace, free from nuclear coercion, or, if they fail, sustain the cycle of theocratically motivated conventional or unconventional warfare.

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies, edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own.

The United States Did Not Lose the War Against Iran: The Harder Part is Postwar Peacemaking was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia’s nuclear strategy occupies a central place in global security debates. With the world’s largest and most diverse nuclear arsenal and a leadership that frequently employs nuclear rhetoric, Russia’s approach to deterrence is both consequential and deeply rooted in its historical experience. Scholars often analyze Russian nuclear doctrine through the lens of post–Cold War geopolitics or contemporary military reforms, but such approaches overlook the deeper historical foundations of Russian strategic culture. 

For better or worse, the origins of Russian nuclear deterrence lie in the Stalinist heritage, a political and strategic worldview forged in the crucible of revolution, civil war, industrialization, and global conflict. Stalin’s rule created the institutional, psychological, and ideological foundations that shaped the Soviet nuclear program and continue to influence Russian nuclear policy today. 

Stalin’s Strategic Mindset 

Joseph Stalin’s approach to security was shaped by a profound sense of vulnerability. He believed the Soviet Union was encircled by hostile capitalist powers and that survival required absolute centralization, militarization, and coercive statecraft. This worldview justified: rapid industrialization to support military power; expansion of the security apparatus; preemptive and punitive measures against perceived enemies; and readiness to accept extreme risks. Stalin’s strategic thinking fused Marxist-Leninist ideology, personal paranoia, and geopolitical realism. 

Stalin believed that only an overwhelming force could guarantee the survival of the Soviet state. This belief drove the massive industrialization campaigns of the 1930s, which prioritized heavy industry, armaments, and military infrastructure. This logic later translated into the nuclear age: nuclear weapons became symbols of national greatness and instruments of political leverage. Stalin’s domestic use of terror—purges, show trials, mass repression—was mirrored in his foreign policy. He believed that intimidation could shape adversaries’ behavior. 

The Soviet Atomic Project: Stalinist Governance in Science 

The Soviet atomic project began during World War II, but it accelerated dramatically after the U.S. bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Stalin immediately recognized the political significance of nuclear weapons. For Stalin, nuclear weapons were not simply military tools; they were instruments of political prestige and strategic leverage. The atomic project was organized into secret research centers, such as Arzamas-16, where scientists lived under surveillance and strict information controls. This system mirrored the broader Stalinist model of compartmentalization, elite isolation, centralized oversight, and security-service dominance. 

Despite postwar devastation, Stalin prioritized the nuclear program above all other sectors. Archival evidence shows that the atomic project received unlimited access to manpower, materials and funding, even during famine conditions. 

This reflected Stalin’s belief that nuclear weapons were essential to state survival, international prestige, and strategic parity with the United States. Soviet espionage in the Manhattan Project was central to the rapid development of the Soviet bomb. Agents such as Klaus Fuchs and Theodore Hall provided critical information that accelerated Soviet progress. Stalin’s reliance on intelligence reflected his broader belief that security depended on outmaneuvering adversaries through covert means. 

When the USSR successfully tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, Stalin’s response was characteristically understated but strategically significant. He viewed the bomb not only as a weapon of war but also as a political instrument that elevated the USSR to superpower status. This symbolic dimension remains central to Russian nuclear identity. Nuclear weapons are not merely tools of deterrence; they are markers of national greatness and geopolitical relevance. 

The Evolution of Soviet and Russian Nuclear Doctrine 

Stalin’s belief in overwhelming force evolved into the Soviet commitment to massive nuclear arsenals, redundant delivery systems, and the capability for assured retaliation. By the 1970s, the USSR possessed thousands of warheads, an approach rooted in Stalinist thinking about security through quantitative superiority. Stalin’s insistence on political supremacy over the military carried into the nuclear age. The Soviet command-and-control system was designed to ensure that only the top political leadership could authorize nuclear use. Modern Russia’s “nuclear briefcase” (cheget) is a direct institutional descendant of this model. 

For Stalin, industrial and military achievements were markers of national greatness. Nuclear weapons became the ultimate symbol of superpower status. This symbolic dimension remains central to Russian identity and foreign policy, as seen in Vladimir Putin’s emphasis on “invincible” new nuclear systems. Russian leaders continue to view the world as a hostile environment in which Western powers seek to weaken or encircle Russia. This worldview, rooted in Stalin’s belief in external hostility, justifies reliance on nuclear deterrence as the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty. Russia’s willingness to threaten limited nuclear use to compel adversaries to back down reflects a Stalinist belief in the coercive power of fear. Putin’s nuclear signaling by alerting forces, showcasing new systems, and issuing veiled threats echoes Stalin’s use of intimidation as a diplomatic tool. As Leon Aron has noted: 

Russia’s resorting to a nuclear strike to terminate a conventional conflict that was not going its way became known as an “escalate to de-escalate” theory. Intended to scare the enemy and coerce armistice rather than inflict massive damage and precipitate an open-ended strategic nuclear exchange, a “de-escalation” is likely to involve low-yield tactical weapons detonated away from densely populated areas.” 

Such an approach involves deterrence as ustrashenie (a sense of intimidation or scaring) rather than deterrence as sderzhivanie (a sense of holding back or restraining). Thus, one enduring Stalinist inheritance is psychological rather than doctrinal. This aspect includes security through strength, instead of trust; fear as a legitimate instrument of statecraft; occasional acceptance of extreme risk; and ambiguity as strategy. These attitudes shape how Russian leaders interpret international crises and how they wield nuclear threats. 

Conclusion 

Russia’s nuclear deterrence strategy is not merely a product of modern geopolitics or technological capability. It is also at least partly the continuation of a Stalinist worldview that equates security with dominance, deterrence with fear, and state survival with centralized, militarized power. Understanding this heritage is essential for interpreting Russia’s behavior today—from its latent and manifest use of coercive nuclear strategy to its insistence on maintaining a vast and diverse nuclear arsenal. 

Stephen J. Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous works on nuclear deterrence, arms control, and military strategy. He is a senior fellow at NIDS and a recent contributor to the Routledge Handbook of Soviet and Russian Military Studies edited by Dr. Alexander Hill (Routledge: 2025). The views of the author are his own. 

Russian Nuclear Deterrence and the Ghost of Stalin was originally published on Global Security Review.

In 1987, acclaimed feminist researcher Carol Cohn released a scathing gendered critique of Cold War nuclear deterrence. Cohn argued that the ‘technostrategic,’ masculinized language used to discuss deterrence strategy was not accidental. It obscured moral responsibility, normalized violence, and made nuclear war more plausible. As one of the most influential pieces within its subfield, Cohn’s conclusions are still cited more than three decades later in the growing cadre of women arguing that the existence of nuclear weapons is anti-feminist.

Cohn is part of a distinct group of political theorists referred to as international relations (IR) feminists. Rather than offering a causal explanation of war, IR feminists focus on exposing the gender hierarchies embedded in international politics. They specifically argue that the dominant classical IR theories, such as realism and liberalism, privilege masculinity and normalize violence through abstract language. War, in their view, is linked to masculinized norms of autonomy, aggression, and control. Nuclear weapons, as the ultimate instrument of war, are then the ultimate instruments of male violence.

So, what does it mean to be a woman working within the nuclear weapons complex today? Do all women who find themselves in such a position suddenly become anti-feminist? Given that the argument that nuclear deterrence is responsible for the sharp decline in major power conflict is quite persuasive, the answer is most certainly not.

At its core, feminism argues that women are affected differently than men for many things, yet still fundamentally deserve equal rights to life, liberty, and property. War, in particular, is a strong example of this. Unquestionably, sexual violence is a tactic used in genocides and ethnic cleansings; a type of violence that is predominantly perpetrated against women. Therefore, the prevention of war is also a feminist issue. Nuclear weapons are simply the key to deterring the very global wars that would result in mass atrocities like the Rape of Nanjing. These specific war crimes were enabled by a powerful, unchecked conventional army in an era without nuclear weapons.

Cohn’s critique of nuclear discourse is compelling on its surface, but it does not offer an alternative theory of deterrence. Nuclear war has not occurred since 1945, not because states abandoned violent thinking after World War Two, but because deterrence altered strategic calculations. Feminist IR theory does not explain this outcome.

The deeper issue is that feminist IR theory prioritizes deconstruction over explanation. Its intellectual roots in critical theory lead it to distrust policy-oriented thinking, viewing it as complicit in domination. As a result, IR feminist scholars often resist offering recommendations to leaders or engaging with strategic trade-offs. However, international relations theory exists to explain and manage conflict, not merely to critique it.

This gap becomes clear when IR feminists are asked the same question classical theories confront directly. Why do wars begin between states at particular moments? IR feminists often answer by pointing to patriarchy, masculinized institutions, or hierarchical gender norms. These may be part of the broader social environment, but they do not explain timing, escalation, or variation. Patriarchy exists in both peaceful and belligerent states.

States pursue deterrence because they cannot directly control their enemies’ actions and want to avoid war without capitulation. Deterrence is successful when a state’s credibility and capability are maintained. As Herman Kahn once bluntly put it, deterrence works because “the most convincing way to look willing is to be willing.”

Cohn critiques the language used to discuss this logic: “Nuclear strategic thinking is a calculus of the relation of one set of weapons to another. As such, it is utterly bankrupt of possibilities for thinking about peace or meaningful security.” Cohn gets the argument of deterrence wrong, however. Nuclear strategic thinking is a calculus of the relationship between one state’s risk threshold and another’s. So far, thankfully, no nation has determined that the military benefit of using nuclear weapons in a conflict is worth the risk that nuclear weapons will subsequently be used against it. This has fundamentally maintained global peace; the fear of nuclear escalation has prevented small wars from intensifying into world wars.

Another element of Cohn’s argument, and those of IR feminists at large, is that there is no such thing as objective, impartial knowledge. Contending with this premise is intentionally made difficult by IR feminists as they further argue requests for evidence are themselves masculine-coded; these are arguments of bad faith. Their arguments against nuclear weapons have the same fallacies. Deterrence is measurably less aggressive than the alternatives of armed conflict.

Whether morally troubling others or not, deterrence operates within a realist framework in which adversaries’ perceptions determine outcomes. Feminist IR theory offers no alternative explanation for how nuclear war is avoided in a world where states cannot control their enemies’ choices. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher warned that while a world without nuclear weapons might appear desirable, “you cannot base a sure defense on dreams.”

Unfortunately, IR feminists have co-opted the broader interaction of feminism with international relations theory. It has since made it difficult for other aspects of feminist thought to combine with IR theories to produce more nuanced explanations of war that do not rely on critical theory. As explanations of war ultimately seek to offer paths of war prevention, feminist IR theory as it stands remains an incomplete theory.

To want war to be avoided is a core feminist issue. Acknowledging that nuclear weapons are the key to this is not anti-feminist. Deconstructing the language of deterrence strategy does not explain why nuclear war has been avoided for nearly eight decades, nor does it offer a credible alternative for preventing it. Preventing global war protects the very populations feminists seek to defend. Women can therefore work in the nuclear enterprise without being morally bankrupt, and feminists can support nuclear deterrence because the prevention of catastrophic war is itself a profoundly feminist objective.

Alexis Schlotterback is the screening editor for Global Security Review and an analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Her experience includes a Masters Degree from Missouri State’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies and participation in the National Nuclear Security Administration Graduate Fellowship. The views of the authors are her own.

Yes, You Can Be a Feminist and Still Support Nuclear Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

A nation does not need to lose a battle to look weak. Sometimes it only needs to miss a paycheck.

Washington often treats budget shutdowns as partisan spectacle, but America’s adversaries see something far more useful: a live demonstration of self-inflicted fragility. When the federal government allows frontline security personnel to work unpaid it interrupts critical security and health functions and publicly advertises institutional dysfunction. It weakens more than morale, it weakens deterrence. That is the real national security cost of a prolonged budget lapse.

Deterrence rests on more than missiles, submarines, and strategic doctrine. It also depends on the visible reliability of state capacity. Allies and adversaries alike measure whether the U.S. can sustain operations under pressure, protect its population, and maintain continuity during disruption. A shutdown tells them the opposite. It signals that even absent enemy action; the U.S. is willing to degrade its own readiness through political dysfunction. Even short lapses in appropriations disrupt defense planning, contract execution, and the broader machinery that underwrites operational readiness.

The most immediate damage appears in aviation security. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is not simply a travel inconvenience buffer. It is part of the nation’s daily homeland defense posture. Every checkpoint, screening lane, and visible officer contributes to deterrence by signaling that attacks or probes are likely to be detected and disrupted. That visible consistency matters because deterrence at the tactical level often begins with routine friction imposed on hostile actors.

Friction weakens when the workforce begins to crack. More than 460 TSA officers have already quit during the current standoff, while absentee rates have climbed to 10 to 11 percent nationally. Repeated funding disruptions are damaging morale, retention, and long-term staffing stability across the Department of Homeland Security. That is not merely a workforce problem. It is a deterrence problem.

Fatigue measurably degrades visual search performance, which is directly relevant to screening-intensive environments such as aviation security. TSA screening is not just procedural. It is cognitive work performed under repetitive, high-stakes conditions. When officers are exhausted, financially strained, or distracted by uncertainty, the quality of that work can decline even if the checkpoint remains technically operational.

Equally important, deterrence at the checkpoint depends not only on actual performance but on what potential attackers believe about the system. Airport security screening is perceived as a stronger deterrent when it appears visible, universal, and credible. That matters because deterrence is partly psychological. A security system that appears chaotic, understaffed, and politically neglected may still function, but it no longer projects the same confidence.

This erosion has consequences beyond the checkpoint itself. Long lines spilling into terminal lobbies and pre-screening corridors create soft-target conditions that sophisticated attackers have historically exploited overseas. U.S. airports have warned Congress that the current operational strain is serious, worsening, and potentially long-lasting. In practical terms, a shutdown does not just reduce security throughput. It redistributes risk into large, dense, unsecured public spaces and creates opportunity.

More troubling still is that recurring shutdowns create patterns. Adversaries watch for patterns. If hostile actors can reliably anticipate periods when U.S. aviation security is underpaid, understaffed, and politically distracted, then Washington has unintentionally handed them a calendar of vulnerability. Strategic competitors, transnational terrorist networks, and opportunistic lone actors all benefit when a defender repeatedly broadcasts when its systems are under stress.

The same logic applies beyond airports. Health security is often treated separately from deterrence, but that is a categorical error. In an era defined by pandemics, synthetic biology, fragile supply chains, and the weaponization of disruption, public health capacity is national security capacity. A country that cannot sustain surveillance, biodefense coordination, and health system continuity under fiscal pressure is not demonstrating resilience. It demonstrates exploitable weaknesses.

That is precisely why the shutdown’s impact on the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should concern strategists as much as its effect on TSA. HHS’s own FY 2026 contingency staffing plan states that 23,128 employees, roughly 31 percent of its workforce, would be furloughed during a lapse in appropriations. The plan further notes that numerous non-excepted functions would be paused or curtailed, including elements of grant oversight, data collection, validation, analysis, and portions of public communication. That may sound bureaucratic, but it is not.

Health system functions form the connective tissue of national preparedness. Surveillance, analytics, research oversight, and continuity of clinical and administrative operations are what allow the U.S. to detect biological threats early, understand cascading risks, and sustain resilience under stress. Public health emergency management is foundational to biodefense capacity, particularly in areas such as interagency coordination, situational awareness, testing, surveillance, and surge resilience. When those systems are interrupted, the country does not simply lose paperwork, it loses awareness, agility, and recovery capacity.

This point is reinforced by broader preparedness of scholarship. Public health emergency preparedness in the U.S. has long suffered from uneven and declining support, leaving critical state and local response systems more vulnerable to disruption. In deterrence terms, disruptions lower the cost for an adversary seeking to exploit a biological event, amplify public panic, or overload institutional response capacity.

System disruption and deterrence is where budget shutdowns become strategically self-defeating. The U.S. invests heavily in advanced military capability, but periodically undermining the civilian systems that make that capability credible is defeatist. No adversary needs to destroy American resilience if Washington is willing to suspend parts of it on its own. That contradiction sends a damaging signal to both allies and competitors.

For adversaries such as China and Russia, recurring shutdowns offer a useful strategic readout. They reveal domestic political brittleness, weak continuity discipline, and a governing system vulnerable to self-imposed paralysis. That does not automatically invite direct confrontation, but it does encourage gray-zone opportunism. Cyber probing, disinformation, infrastructure stress campaigns, and strategic influence operations all become more attractive when the target appears distracted and internally divided. Shutdowns are self-inflicted wounds. In a deterrence environment, self-inflicted wounds are still wounds.

For U.S. allies, the signal is quieter but equally corrosive. Extended deterrence relies not only on military capability but also in the confidence of American competence and continuity. Partners want to know that the U.S. can manage crises at home while sustaining commitments abroad. A federal government that struggles to keep airport screening and health preparedness stable during a budget fight risk is undermining that confidence at exactly the wrong moment.

For these reasons, shutdowns should no longer be treated as routine political leverage when they affect core homeland security and resilience institutions. Congress should establish automatic continuing resolution mechanisms for agencies and functions that are central to deterrence. This includes transportation security, emergency preparedness, biodefense, and public health surveillance. Political disagreement is unavoidable; however, institutional self-sabotage is not.

Deterrence is often discussed in the language of force posture, strategic messaging, and escalation dominance. This all matters. Yet, deterrence lives in the ordinary machinery of a functioning state: an airport screening lane that stays open, a health surveillance system that keeps collecting data, and a workforce that knows the government will not ask it to defend the nation for free. When that machinery stalls, deterrence does not collapse overnight. It thins. It flickers. It becomes easier to stress. That is the danger of a shutdown. It does not merely interrupt government. It advertises vulnerability.

Brandon Toliver is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views of the author are his own.

Deterrence on Layaway: A Shutdown’s Quiet Assault on American Security was originally published on Global Security Review.

Two parties have watched Operation Epic Fury (OEF) from a distance. China has been taking notes. The United States Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) has tracked munitions consumption rates of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). Both the PRC and INDOPACOM know that what is happening above, in, and around Tehran will impact Beijing’s plans to take Taiwan. And they know Washington plans to prevent that.

Opposing Forces

The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) strongman Xi Jinping declared Taiwan “must and will be” absorbed. He has even set a deadline of 2027 for his military to be ready to seize Taiwan. The Pentagon reports that Beijing “continues to refine multiple military options” to take Taiwan “by brute force.” Xi is assembling the capabilities to execute those options. This includes 420,000 troops, 750 fighter-jets, 300 bombers, 158 warships (including 50 landing ships) and hundreds of missile systems, all in the Taiwan Strait region.

In response, Taiwan has increased defense spending from 2% of GDP in 2019 to 3.3% of GDP in 2026, with plans to invest 5% of GDP on defense by 2030. Taiwan is using those resources to produce homegrown antiship, air-defense, land-attack and air-to-air missiles; expand production of attack-drones; and build a fleet of submarines. Taiwan recently received ATACMS missiles and HIMARS systems. Taipei is still awaiting delivery of dozens of F-16V fighters and TOW antitank systems, which is part of a $21 billion backlog of U.S. arms. Taipei also wants F-35s and additional Patriot systems. In short, Taiwan is racing to construct “a porcupine defense”—one that would make an invasion so painful as to dissuade Xi from even attempting it.

The United States Response

While Xi has been clear about his plans for Taiwan, Washington has been vague. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, neither side of the Taiwan Strait knows exactly what Washington would do in the event of war.

The INDOPACOM commander, Adm. Samuel Paparo, is doing his part to send a clear message. If Beijing attacks Taiwan, he plans to “turn the Taiwan Strait into an unmanned hellscape.” The drones and missilery of “hellscape” would come from multiple directions. Further supporting this clear message is that in 2024, the U.S. Army moved Typhon missile systems to the Philippines, and in 2025 the Pentagon created Task Force-Philippines and deployed a Marine unit armed with anti-ship systems to the Philippines. Lastly, in 2026, the Pentagon unveiled Army Rotational Force-Philippines, which will deploy missile and drone assets.

Currently the Pentagon is revitalizing airfields in the Philippines, Tinian and Wake Island; basing top-of-the-line fighters on Okinawa; and rotating B-52s through Australia. Army units on Palau have tested land-based missiles against seagoing targets. And F-35s are now carrying long-range antiship missiles tailormade for targeting a PRC invasion fleet.

Near the end of his tenure, however, commanding U.S. Army-Pacific, Gen. Robert Brown reported that his PRC counterparts “don’t fear us anymore.” This is regrettable, but understandable. America’s Navy deploys fewer than 300 ships which, like America’s commitments, are spread around the world. Those commitments expend finite assets: OEF has exposed the limitations of U.S. weapons stockpiles and production capacity, and it has forced the Pentagon to shuffle assets from the Indo-Pacific to the Middle East.

Allied Response

America’s not-so-secret weapon is its interconnected system of alliances. America’s alliances serve as force-multipliers, layers of strategic depth, and outer rings of America’s own security, which enable power projection through prepositioning, basing, overflight, and resupply. Even though U.S. allies are critical, China has no real allies.

Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi describes an attack on Taiwan as a “threat to Japan’s survival,” indicating Japan would assist the U.S. in defending the island. In hopes of preventing such a scenario, Japan has bolstered defenses across its southwestern territories, placing F-35Bs on Kyushu, anti-ship systems, air-defenses, and electronic-warfare units on islands south of Kyushu; and air-defense and missile-defense units on Yonaguni Island (70 miles east of Taiwan). In addition, Japan is fielding 22 attack submarines, acquiring 500 TLAMs, producing missiles domestically, and upconverting ships into aircraft carriers armed with F-35Bs.

Australia is partnering with the U.S. and Britain to deploy a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines, and Australia has opened its territory to U.S. Marines, submarines and B-52s.

Briain and France have stepped up in production of a key element needed for TLAM production due to China shutting off the supply. Norway is supplying the U.S. with antiship missiles and joint strike missiles. A U.S.-Israeli partnership is manufacturing loitering munitions, which are likely part of Paparo’s “hellscape.” Japan, Australia, Britain, Canada, France, and Germany have conducted freedom-of-navigation operations through the Taiwan Strait further supported by Britain, Italy, and France coordinating deployments of their aircraft carriers in the Pacific.

Enhancing A Deterrent Posture

China’s commitments and assets, conversely, are focused on its neighborhood. If Xi moves against Taiwan, his arsenal will be better positioned than the U.S. and is more sophisticated than Iran’s.

Deterring Xi from making that move will require more capability and more defense spending.

Sen. Roger Wicker has unveiled a plan to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP. Similarly, the Commission on National Defense Strategy recommends lifting defense spending to levels “commensurate with the U.S. national effort seen during the Cold War.”

Although the president recently called for more military spending, the administration’s FY2026 defense budget was just 3.2% of GDP. The Cold War average was more than twice that.

The Way Forward

It is time to maintain a policy of “strategic ambiguity” to one of strategic clarity because of the great danger it presents. The secret alliances that led to World War I remind us that there is a greater risk in leaving defense guarantees opaque. The open defense treaties that followed World War II, and prevented World War III remind us that the prudent course is clarity of commitment.

There is a blueprint for deterring war over Taiwan: Washington needs to be clear about the nature of its commitment to Taiwan. Washington needs to view alliances not as liabilities to cut, but as resources to nurture. “We cannot afford,” as Churchill once counseled, “to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength.”

Alan Dowd is a regular contributor to Global Security Review and a senior fellow with the Sagamore Institute, where he leads the Center for America’s Purpose. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

A Blueprint for Deterring War Over Taiwan was originally published on Global Security Review.

Advances in space technology are making the extraction of lunar and asteroid materials increasingly feasible. These capabilities promise the potential for significant economic gains, greater energy security, and new avenues of geopolitical influence for any spacefaring nation capable of developing and sustaining resource-extraction operations. As competition accelerates, the question is no longer whether space mining will occur, but who will shape the rules, norms, and capabilities that govern it.

To preserve American power in space, the United States must take formative policy action and protective research and development (R&D) measures to define the future of space mining before rival nations do. Building on the strategic momentum established in the space domain during the first Trump Administration, namely the creation of the U.S. Space Force, securing an early foothold in space mining will help counter adversarial efforts to undermine American leadership and preserve space as a key frontier for American power.

Formative Policy Action in Space Mining

In emerging domains, the first actors often leave a legacy that serves as a reference point for subsequent laws and behavior, such as the Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union pushed outer space beyond its initial symbolic and scientific uses. Concerns over nuclear escalation prompted the creation of a legal framework that addressed non-weaponization and restrictions on national sovereignty. Despite approaching its 60th anniversary, the OST remains a foundational pillar of outer space governance, demonstrating how proactive U.S. leadership defined the rules of engagement and established operational precedents in an emerging domain. Sustaining this proactive approach is critical if the U.S. is to seize the strategic opportunities in outer space.

Space mining is among the more recent technical opportunities to emerge, alongside satellite constellations, orbital maneuvering, and AI-enabled platforms. Yet space mining is unique in that it offers potential energy security and trillions of dollars in economic value to those possessing return-to-Earth capabilities (currently limited, forcing a focus on in-situ resource utilization (ISR) for propulsion and life support). According to NASA’s Asterank database, extracting resources from the ten most cost-effective asteroids could yield profits exceeding $1.5 trillion. The promise of energy resilience and economic gain has captured the attention of global powers and middle-state actors alike, leading to a growing number of spacefaring nations and sparking geopolitical friction.

The U.S. and Luxembourg were among the first to formalize space mining in their legal frameworks, recognizing outer space resources as property subject to ownership and commercial trade. Conversely, Russia cites the Outer Space Treaty’s designation of space as the “province of all mankind” as a basis for prohibiting resource extraction and ownership. In response to the Trump Administration’s proposed lunar mining initiatives, Russian officials went so far as to accuse the U.S. of orchestrating an “invasion” of the Moon, likening it to “another Afghanistan or Iraq.” Russia’s actions, however, contrast sharply with its public stance, given its willingness to explore an agreement on space mining with Luxembourg in 2019.

Yet American space mining laws have been relatively insulated from further international criticism because they align with formative international frameworks. For example, the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act of 2015 reflects Article II of the OST, which prohibits national appropriation of celestial bodies. Additionally, the 2020 National Space Policy aligns with the Artemis Accords by emphasizing transparency in national space policies and space exploration plans, as well as the sharing of scientific information. The legitimacy of U.S. legal principles has been strengthened by demonstrating its commitment to sharing the space domain as a collaborative partner while advancing its own interests and strategic advantages.

Critical questions about access to mining sites, extraction limits, and fair participation remain unanswered because frameworks such as the OST predate the concept of space mining. Addressing these questions and providing certainty before capabilities mature or competing nations establish their own frameworks is essential to preserving a U.S. strategic advantage in space.

Protective R&D Measures for Space Mining Capabilities

As the future of space mining and its economic potential threaten to catalyze geopolitical tensions, it is crucial for the U.S. not only to be among the first to establish governance frameworks but also to develop tangible space mining capabilities. Yet space is no longer a domain of uncontested U.S. dominance, as China has evolved from a near-peer to a peer competitor. Initiatives such as the Tiangong Space Station and the International Lunar Research Station underscore China’s growing space capabilities and its ambitions to assume a leadership role.

China’s rapid rise may be attributed in part to its exposure to U.S. space technologies, as bilateral cooperation agreements have provided avenues for interaction with U.S. research and development efforts. Despite the Wolf Amendment, which prohibits bilateral cooperation with China without explicit authorization from Congress and the FBI, numerous violations of the provision have likely conferred strategic benefits on China, eroding the competitive edge the U.S. seeks to maintain. In 2024, the Office of the Inspector General investigated a state University for violations of the Wolf Amendment and announced in December that the University agreed to pay $715,580 to resolve civil allegations. When applying for and receiving NASA research grants, the University failed to disclose a professor’s affiliations with and support from the Chinese government. Similarly, according to a report published by the Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the U.S. and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), hundreds of articles crediting NASA funding were identified that were jointly published by U.S. researchers (including public universities and federal research entities) and CCP institutions. In early February 2026, the University of Texas at San Antonio agreed to pay nearly $130,000 in penalties after federal investigators alleged that the lead principal investigator for a NASA-funded Center for Advanced Measurements in Extreme Environments failed to disclose affiliations with researchers in China.

China’s sustained intellectual property theft is eroding U.S. dominance in space and diminishing the impact of formative U.S. space mining policy measures. Prioritizing R&D for space mining, particularly return-to-Earth capabilities, is a central focus for spacefaring nations and must be a priority for the United States. However, R&D initiatives must be paired with enforceable oversight structures that protect intellectual property from adversarial appropriation. Enforcement entities should also demonstrate a clear commitment to implementing protective measures and punishing violators. Without such protections, any research investments risk benefiting adversarial states as much as the U.S., as evidenced by instances in which China has capitalized on U.S.-funded advancements.

Conclusion

Although the U.S. is facing increasing demands across emerging warfighting domains, with numerous competing national security concerns, space resource governance and capability development can no longer be sidelined. The U.S. must act decisively and with strategic clarity to build the legal and behavioral foundations for space mining, and to enact protections for space mining R&D, as competitors advance their own initiatives. Space mining has become a strategic imperative, one that this Administration must seize to ensure that American values, interests, and leadership define this emerging domain, resource governance and capability development resource governance and capability development.

Rachel Butler is a doctoral student in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University. She holds master’s degrees in history and strategic studies, with research interests focused on ethical and cognitive warfare. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Seizing the High Ground: The Case for U.S. Leadership in Space Mining was originally published on Global Security Review.

Why Trust and Continuity Matter

Recent trust surveys show that public confidence in both government and business has declined, with many people believing institutional leaders are not honest with them. The 2025 Edelman Trust Barometer, for example, highlights a “crisis of grievance,” in which large segments of the population feel left behind and are more inclined to distrust complex policy and technology initiatives.[2]​

This erosion of trust is particularly dangerous at a time when artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and advanced biotechnologies are central to economic and military competition. A report submitted to Congress by U.S.–China policy experts emphasizes that both countries now treat these technologies as strategic industries, tying them directly to national power and long-term security.[4]​

Building Durable Relationships with Legislators

For technology companies, increasing national trust starts with treating Congress as a long‑term strategic partner, not simply as an annual budget gatekeeper.[4]​

• Institutionalize bipartisan technology engagement: Firms can create recurring, nonpartisan briefings and workshops with relevant committees to explain how artificial intelligence (AI), quantum, cyber, and bio tools affect national resilience, economic competitiveness, and workforce opportunity. By engaging members and staff from both parties, companies reduce the perception that emerging technologies are aligned with a single political faction.[5]​
• Lead with ethics, safety, and security: Research on public attitudes toward AI suggests people are more supportive when they see clear safeguards, transparency, and accountability mechanisms within the tech industry. Companies can build trust by proactively presenting their AI safety frameworks, data-protection policies, and supply‑chain security measures, aligning them with federal guidance and international norms on responsible technology use.[6]​

Securing Sustained Funding for Critical Technology

Trust is reinforced when technology programs are clearly tied to enduring strategic missions and supported through stable, multi‑year funding rather than fragile pilots.[5]​

• Connect capabilities to mission portfolios: Instead of scattered line items, technology programs can be organized into mission‑driven portfolios—such as quantum‑resilient communications, AI‑enabled national preparedness, or biosecurity infrastructure—that span research, prototyping, and deployment over several years. Multi‑year authorizations and appropriations make it harder for any single administration to abruptly cancel essential capabilities.[4]​
• Use innovation tools that protect both government and industry: Policy analyses highlight the value of mechanisms like Other Transaction Authority and structured public‑private partnerships to bring nontraditional vendors into national security and infrastructure work more quickly. By pairing these tools with clearer intellectual property protections and streamlined oversight, legislators can encourage top-tier tech firms to stay engaged in sensitive missions over the long term.[8]​

Embedding Technology in Law, Not Just Budgets

To prevent critical technologies from being swapped out with each political shift, their roles must be written into statute and tied to democratic oversight.[9]​

• Statutory roles for key technologies: Laws governing defense planning, critical infrastructure, and economic security should explicitly call for the use of AI, secure digital infrastructure, and advanced analytics in defined mission areas, such as threat detection, disaster response, and supply‑chain monitoring. Once these roles are codified, dismantling them requires visible legislative action rather than quiet executive changes.[9]​
• Multi-stakeholder governance in legislation: Legislated advisory councils and oversight boards that include government, industry, academia, and civil society should supervise high-impact technologies and publish regular reports. This structure signals that powerful tools are subject to ongoing, pluralistic scrutiny rather than being controlled solely by political appointees or corporate executives.[10]​

Quantum Networking Testbed Infrastructure

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) put forth by Congress each year does not typically use a single, generic phrase like “quantum networking testbeds” in isolation; instead, it authorizes and directs specific programs and experiments that collectively constitute quantum networking testbed infrastructure. Several provisions and related authoritative documents are especially relevant to the future of quantum technology growth.

A Senate Armed Services Committee fact sheet on the fiscal year 2024 NDAA highlights language that “authorizes increased funding for a distributed quantum networking testbed” and the development of a next-generation ion‑trap quantum computer at the Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL). While the fact sheet summarizes rather than reproduces the statutory text, it makes clear that Congress explicitly authorized a distributed quantum networking testbed as part of the defense Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) portfolio.[12]​

Within the fiscal year 2025 NDAA, Congress, “authorizes funding to create a ‘quantum communications corridor’ as part of Navy research, development, test, and evaluation.” This is an explicit description of support for a testbed or network to advance quantum communication research so the Navy and the Department of Defense (DoD) can securely transmit information resistant to quantum computer decryption.[15]​

Other recent NDAA cycles also include broader direction that reinforces these testbed authorizations, such as requirements for DoD to establish pilot programs for promising quantum computing capabilities and to identify near‑term use cases that can be fielded within two years. These provisions do not always use the word “testbed” in the operative clause, but they direct the department to stand up experimental infrastructure and pilots that, in practice, operate as quantum networking and computing testbeds for defense applications.[16]​

In parallel, the National Quantum Initiative framework and associated Department of Energy (DOE) efforts describe quantum networking testbeds as shared infrastructure for entanglement distribution and quantum communications, and Congressional action has repeatedly referenced these federal testbeds and network efforts as part of the broader quantum information science ecosystem that the DoD can leverage.[13]​

Ensuring key technologies not only protect the nation but are also provided with substantial investment and economic promise is a necessity for companies to further their developmental efforts. Demonstrating that quantum technologies are viable for multiple applications—within internal defense and external partnerships—is one possible solution as tech companies become increasingly concerned with the long-term payoff of their test bed programs. For now, defense authorization bills appear to be the most forward leaning avenue supported by government, but the long-term stability of this method has yet to be validated.

How This Approach Builds Public Trust

When the tech industry engages both parties and chambers in Congress, supports multi-year statutory programs, and accepts meaningful oversight, it demonstrates that emerging technologies are being developed within a framework of law, ethics, and long-term national interest. In such a system, citizens can see that AI, quantum computing, and other advanced capabilities are not partisan experiments or purely profit-driven ventures, but part of a durable national strategy subject to democratic control.[2]​

The tech sector can both strengthen U.S. strategic competitiveness and contribute tangibly to rebuilding public trust in government by positioning itself as a co-steward of national resilience, helping design governance mechanisms, committing to transparency, and working with legislators to hard‑wire critical technologies into law and funding.[5]​

Sources:

1. https://www.edelman.com/trust/2025/trust-barometer
2. https://cooleypubco.com/2025/02/11/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-grievance/
3. https://www.edelman.com/news-awards/2025-edelman-trust-barometer-reveals-high-level-grievance
4. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/Chapter_3–U.S.-China_Competition_in_Emerging_Technologies.pdf
5. https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/2024_Annual_Report_to_Congress.pdf
6. https://www.edelman.com/sites/g/files/aatuss191/files/2025-01/Global%20Top%2010%202025%20Trust%20Barometer.pdf
7. https://www.nationalsecurity.ai/chapter/executive-summary
8. https://ptacts.uspto.gov/ptacts/public-informations/petitions/1558121/download-documents?artifactId=z4DLuAiI8FBq5qxTCRlq-VPk-yx0lU4p_Mou2oSkOWL2OdIfZr8DAG4
9. https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/white-house-releases-2025-national-7517228/
10. https://www.biotech.senate.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/NSCEB-Full-Report-%E2%80%93-Digital-%E2%80%934.28.pdf
11. https://www.imd.org/ibyimd/audio-articles/restoring-faith-in-leadership-in-the-age-of-grievance/
12. https://defensescoop.com/2024/01/08/ndaa-2024-quantum-provisions/
13. https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/NQIA2018-NDAA2022-CHIPS2022.pdf
14. https://www.quantum.gov/wp-content/uploads/2024/12/NQI-Annual-Report-FY2025.pdf
15. https://www.emergingtechnologiesinstitute.org/publications/insights/fy2025ndaa
16. https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2024/12/fy2025-ndaa-angles-enhance-dods-ai-and-quantum-sciences-capabilities/401545/

Beyond the Next Administration: Building Enduring Tech–Government Alliances for National Power was originally published on Global Security Review.

That gap undermines American extended deterrence because Washington cannot reassure allies or deter aggressors without accounting for South Asia’s threat calculus. AI arms developments in this region stem from colonial legacies and mistrust of great power intentions, creating a volatile strategic environment.

India’s Governance Innovation in Defense AI

India’s governance model integrates civilian oversight with defense research and ensures ethical deployment of AI. The Responsible AI Certification Pilot evaluated algorithms for explainability before clearance. Its National Strategy for AI mandates ethical review boards for dual-use systems. Developers must document bias-mitigation measures and escalation pathways. Embedding accountability at design phase stabilizes deterrence signals by reducing inadvertent algorithmic behaviors.

The Evaluating Trustworthy AI (ETAI) Framework advances defense AI governance. It enforces five principles: reliability, security, transparency, fairness, privacy, and sets rigorous criteria for system assessment. Chief of Defense, Staff General Anil Chauhan, stressed resilience against adversarial attacks, highlighting the challenge of balancing effectiveness and safety. By mandating continuous validation against evolving threat scenarios, ETAI prevents mission creep and maintains operational integrity under stress.

India’s dual use by design philosophy embeds safeguards within prototypes from inception. This contrasts with reactive models that regulate AI after deployment. Civilian launch-authorization channels separate political intent from technical execution, ensuring decisions remain under human control and reinforcing credibility in crisis moments. Regular red-team exercises involving independent experts further validate system robustness and reduce risks of false positives in autonomous targeting.

Strengthening Extended Deterrence through Cooperation

US-India collaboration on AI verification can reinforce extended deterrence by aligning technical standards and testing protocols. The iCET fact sheet outlines secure information sharing and joint safety trials. Launched in January 2023, iCET has already enabled co-production of jet engines and transfer of advanced drone technologies. Building on this foundation, specialized working groups could develop common benchmarks for adversarial-resistance testing and automated anomaly detection.

A Center for Strategic and International Studies report recommends a trilateral verification cell blending American evaluation tools with India’s ethical reviews. Joint trials of autonomous air-defense algorithms would demonstrate interoperability and resolve. A shared “AI Red Flag” system would alert capitals to anomalous behaviors and reduce strategic surprise. Embedding cryptographically secure logging of decision path data ensures an immutable audit trail for post-event analysis and confidence building.

The INDUS-X initiative, launched during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s 2023 US visit, integrates responsible AI principles into defense innovation. By aligning standards, both countries ensure AI systems enhance strategic stability rather than undermine it. Expanding INDUS-X to include scenario-based wargaming with allied partners can stress-test ethical frameworks and calibrate thresholds for human intervention under duress. This model can extend under the Quad framework, pressuring authoritarian regimes to adopt transparency measures.

Institutionalizing Global AI Arms Control

A formal arms control dialogue should adopt India’s baseline standards for ethical AI governance. The UNIDIR report calls for universal bias audits and incident-reporting obligations to prevent unintended escalation. Carnegie scholars propose a tiered certification process under a new protocol for autonomous systems within the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, requiring peer review of algorithms before deployment. Embedding such certification in national export-control regimes would create global incentives for adherence.

The UN General Assembly has established an Independent AI Scientific Panel and a Global Dialogue on AI Governance to issue annual assessments on risks and norms. This mechanism can evaluate military AI applications and recommend confidence-building measures. Procedural transparency would coexist with confidentiality requirements, balancing security with mutual reassurance. Regular joint workshops on risk-assessment methodologies can diffuse best practices and diffuse mistrust among major powers.

Regional Applications and Future Prospects

India’s responsible AI framework must inspire regional adoption and confidence-building measures. Pakistan and China should engage transparency initiatives to prevent dangerous asymmetries in AI capabilities. Proposed measures include joint research on AI safety, shared performance databases, and collaborative development of detection algorithms.

Successful tests of India’s hypersonic ET-LDHCM system, capable of Mach 8 and a 1,500-kilometer range, underscore the urgency of governance frameworks before fully autonomous weapons deploy. The Quad’s model of Indo-Pacific cooperation provides a template for multilateral norms on responsible AI in defense. Extending these norms to confidence-building measures such as pre-deployment notifications and automated backchannels can reduce the risk of inadvertent escalation.

Looking ahead to the United Nations General Assembly meeting on AI governance in September 2024, American policymakers can leverage India’s experience. Joint verification exercises and an ethical audit regime will establish global norms for military AI. Integrating lessons from ETAI and iCET into the assembly’s resolutions can produce enforceable standards that bind both democratic and authoritarian states. This approach will reaffirm American extended deterrence and help prevent destabilizing AI-driven arms races worldwide.

By demonstrating that ethical AI development strengthens rather than weakens deterrence credibility, India’s model provides both technical solutions and normative frameworks for managing the military applications of artificial intelligence. Sustained international cooperation on these principles is pivotal for securing strategic stability in a rapidly evolving technological landscape.

Vaibhav Chhimpa is a researcher who previously worked with the Department of Science & Technology (DST), India. Views expressed are the Author’s own.

The Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race in South Asia was originally published on Global Security Review.

At the time, the Soviet Union and United States committed to reducing their nuclear arsenals, eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons, and allowing thorough onsite inspections to ensure treaty compliance. During the Cold War, the INF Treaty served as a crucial stabilizing mechanism in the global nuclear order. Historically, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972 and 1979 were the first of several agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. As a result, both sides agreed to reduce their strategic weaponry, which included ballistic missile defenses, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. Additionally, they established inspection procedures to make sure both parties followed the agreement. Due to the treaty, 2,600 missiles were destroyed, marking a significant Cold War breakthrough. Despite decades of arms control, the US and Russia still field the largest nuclear forces. Although it is challenging to determine the exact extent of their stockpiles, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the US possesses 5,328 warheads, while Russia has 5,580.

In August 2025, Russia declared it would no longer fulfil its commitments under the INF Treaty, citing increasing threats from the United States and other Western nations. When the US withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 because of Russian noncompliance with treaty limitations, Moscow stated that it would not use such weapons as long as Washington did not. This may have served as an effective ruse, but it served a purpose.

Questions are increasing about the utility of nuclear proliferation, the threat of arms racing, and the future of nuclear deterrence following the decision of Russia to fully abrogate the INF Treaty. The collapse of the INF Treaty represents a significant shift in the trajectory of international arms control.

The situation took a more dramatic turn as President Donald Trump announced that the US would move two of its nuclear-armed submarines closer to Russia in reaction to the “inflammatory statements” issued by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. This action highlights the challenge that arises when arms control breaks down—the potential for misunderstandings and overreactions increase.

Among nuclear-armed states, communication, predictability, and a certain measure of self-control are essential elements of nuclear deterrence. They were shaped by the INF Treaty, which placed verifiable limitations on missile sites. With the failure of the INF Treaty, useful tools were removed.

The future deployment of intermediate-range systems in regions that were shielded from them may prove an urgent strategic issue. Once at the epicenter of Cold War nuclear worries, Europe may have to host such weapons once more, but with improved accuracy, shorter travel times, and, perhaps, lower yields.

Deterrence dynamics in the Asia-Pacific are more difficult, especially between the US, China, and Russia, after the INF Treaty. The great powers are now accelerating nuclear modernization, while non-nuclear states are reconsidering their nonproliferation commitments. A replay of the Cold War–era European missile crisis has emerged with the collapse of the treaty.

Now, both Russia and the US are free to use and develop short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles without any official restraints. One more issue concerns the intentions of other governments, who may be influenced by the deterioration of controls on nuclear systems. States that did not previously possess nuclear weapons may choose to acquire them. Modern arms racing may be fast, less predictable, and more destabilizing due to technological advancements, such as autonomous delivery systems, hypersonic weapons, and AI-assisted targeting.

There are limited prospects for cooperative tools to mitigate these risks of escalation between the US and Russia. The two largest nuclear powers have a special duty to control and limit the scope of their competition.

Measures that encourage openness, trust, and communication between nuclear and non-nuclear governments will be crucial. In the absence of a global treaty, regional security accords, tailored to today’s security challenges, can effectively restrict risky deployments and restrain great powers from further modernizing their nuclear arsenals.

Nations in the Asia-Pacific can, for example, agree to mutual missile deployment restrictions similar to those in the INF Treaty’s verification procedures, which include regular inspections and satellite monitoring by mutual compliance. This would prevent insecure military build-ups in the region and reduce mistrust between states. Whatever course nations take, the importance of preventing escalation to nuclear use is foremost.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, there are at least two major areas of concern for an effective future USSF international strategy: divisive geopolitics in space and foundational issues of a real space defense strategy beyond support services. In addition to geopolitical and strategic quandaries, organizational politics stand in the way of a sound strategy.

Divisive Geopolitics

Europe acknowledges space as congested and contested but stops short of calling space a warfighting domain. Europe adamantly refuses to declare China as a threatening adversary in the space domain. Not only does Europe struggle with a China dependency, chasing elusive economic benefits, but mainstream European diplomacy emphasizes engagement with China as a preferred way to hedge against (allegedly) unpredictable American behavior.

China managed to deter Europe from taking any offensive space posture, further making sure the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) remains busy with relentless Russian threats. It remains unclear where Europe would stand in a collective space defense scenario resulting from a multi-theater conflict involving both Taiwan and Eastern Europe.

Strategic Quandary

The USSF international partnership strategy signals a service fixated on space support rather than getting after the real problem, which is defeating space threats. This cannot be achieved without offensive space capabilities that deter, and, if necessary, destroy enemy capabilities.

In Europe and the Indo-Pacific, France and Japan are technologically capable of developing offensive capabilities, but politics forbid them from fielding offensive weapons in space, leaving Russian and Chinese rendezvous and proximity operations and kill chains unchallenged. This means such partnerships are unlikely to support the US with truly offensive capabilities in space.

Effective Bilateral and Mini-lateral Partnerships

US Space Command shares space situational awareness data with 33 partner countries, including Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom (UK). Multinational Force Operation Olympic Defender (OOD) is a US Space Command operation to strengthen defenses and deter aggression in space, and involves more than six countries.

US Space Command and the US Space Force have agreements for exchange of personnel and liaison officers for these countries. Bilateral and mini-lateral partnerships include hosting payloads on allied systems such as Norway’s Arctic Satellite Broadband Mission (ASBM) and Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS aka Michibiki); Deep Space Advanced Radar Capability (DARC) with the UK and Australia; and Joint Commercial Operations (JCO) using commercial space domain awareness data with allies and partners. Such needed bilateral and mini-lateral agreements get more done and faster.

Challenging Multilateral Partnerships

Implementing wideband global satellite communications (WGS) to provide satellite communications (SATCOM) to NATO can be challenging when over twenty nations all want to have their own homegrown terminals that can use any nation’s SATCOM satellites. This is made worse by the NATO Communications and Information Agency imposing further rules.

Bottlenecks with extremely high frequency (EHF) communications for nuclear deterrence means all capitals want to have a chance to say yay or nay on who makes the decision and communicates through the EHF with allied command operations. Compared with bi- or mini-lateral agreements, multilateral partnerships are complicated to implement.

The GAO Report on Organizational Politics

An earlier report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the US Department of Defense (DoD) faces persistent challenges that impede its efforts to integrate allies and partners into space operations and activities by establishing joint goals. The unclassified version of the GAO report tackles organizational politics specifically.
The report identified that the DoD has several organizations that have overlapping roles and responsibilities for space-related security cooperation.

Several foreign government officials said that finding the appropriate DoD contact with whom to coordinate is difficult, resulting in confusion and missed opportunities. GAO found that USSF has not identified, analyzed, or responded to the risk of not filling positions within its service components, including space-related planning, information sharing, and security cooperation positions.

The USSF strategy acknowledges resource constraints: personnel, budget, and time are limited for all parties. Overclassification limits intelligence sharing and is a concern. Policy misalignment, lack of straightforward national policies, and interoperability risks hinder cooperation.

The USSF is already seeking $6 billion for its own unfunded priorities such as its nascent Military Network (MILNET) satellite constellation and various classified projects. Meanwhile, China appears eager to beat the USSF to the punch in space refueling. Hence the criticality of the USSF astroscale refueling deal. Europe and Japan remain in the process of developing elementary space-based surveillance and passive defense assets.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space?

Current USSF half-baked strategic and cooperation models, leadership alignment issues, capability gaps among allies, and inefficiencies in multilateral agreements are not helping the US to lead in solving allies’ collective space security quandaries, let alone guaranteeing the United States’ own homeland security. In a worst-case scenario, the US might need to be prepared to go it alone and add foreign capabilities as “nice to have.”

If the US has more robust space capabilities, partnering with the US is more attractive for allies. The ability to go it alone with the prospect of winning is what gains allies, many of whom will be sitting on the fence. Furthermore, allies of the US could be knocked out, one-by-one, by China and Russia in orbit, leaving the US to go it alone anyway.

If the USSF international partnerships strategy is to be relevant, the USSF needs to further evolve from support functions to offensive space warfare, which should form the backbone of any allied international counterspace capabilities. Ultimately, in space, as on Earth, one either leads, follows, or gets out of the way. The US is allowing itself to be paralyzed by committee, which is a sure-fire way to lose the war in space that already started.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. The views expressed are the author’s own.

Should the US Go It Alone in Space? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Russia continued its bombardment of Ukraine with drone and missile strikes, and the US weighed the possibility of additional economic sanctions on Russia, including secondary sanctions against states trading with Russia. Debates among the Washington cognoscenti about possible peace settlements focused on two “baskets” of topics: what kind of “land swap” might be agreeable to Ukraine and Russia and what sort of security guarantees would be necessary for a postwar Ukraine. Amid all of this, one elephant in the room received little attention: the status of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence in future relationships between Ukraine and Russia and between Russia and NATO.

President Donald Trump posted on social media in late July 2025, that Dmitri Medvedev, Russia’s former president, was a “failed former President of Russia” who had better “watch his words.” Trump was responding to earlier remarks by Medvedev, after Trump threatened economic sanctions against Russia unless Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to a temporary ceasefire and expedited peace talks with Ukraine.

In the earlier exchange, Medvedev called Trump’s ultimatum about peace talks a threat and a step toward war. Most recently, Medvedev again warned against nuclear danger by referring to the American television series The Walking Dead and reminded Trump that Russia retains the Soviet “Dead Hand” system for automatic nuclear launch even under the most extreme postattack conditions.

In response, President Trump posted on social media that he ordered two nuclear submarines to be repositioned in response to Medvedev’s threats. Trump said he ordered the submarines “to be positioned in the appropriate regions, just in case these foolish and inflammatory statements are more than just that.” In addition, the President noted that “[w]ords are very important and can often lead to unintended consequences. I hope this will not be one of those instances.”

Nuclear submarine movements are among the most highly classified information pertinent to military operations. If the reference was to American nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), this public announcement was unprecedented.

At one level, these interchanges between Medvedev and Trump are as much performative as they are substantive. During the early stages of Russia’s war against Ukraine beginning in February 2022, Putin issued frequent warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in response to actions taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that might be unacceptable to Russia. These warnings were dismissed by many Western political leaders and military experts as bluff to conceal Russia’s frustration at the prolonged military deadlock it faced in Ukraine, as well as distractions from looking too closely at Russia’s disappointing battlefield performances.

As Russia’s military operations on the ground seemed to improve in 2024 and 2025, nuclear threats became less frequent and less explicit. At present, Russia seems confident of maximizing its forward progress in military reach and operational control over the Donbass and other districts in the east and south of Ukraine.

Even a “small” nuclear war fought with tactical nuclear weapons would be a self-defeating endeavor for Russia. Fighting a conventional war under the shadow of possible nuclear escalation is sufficiently risky. If Russia were to cross the bridge into nuclear first use there would be a strong likelihood of a NATO nuclear response.

Russians need to interrogate their own military literature from the Cold War with respect to the challenge of conducting military operations in a nuclear environment. Troops seeking an operational breakthrough against enemy defenses would be fighting against the prompt and delayed effects of nuclear detonations that slow operational movement, inflict significant numbers of casualties, and corrupt the coordination and cohesion of combined arms. The Soviet Union could draw upon its ideological indoctrination and favorable memories of its victory in the Great Patriotic War (World War II) to maintain morale and avoid mass desertion, Russia cannot.

Nor would the economy of Europe, including Russia, survive anything beyond the very restrictive use of a few ultra-low-yield or low-yield in the sub-five kiloton range. In today’s world of social media and globally transmitted visual images, the meltdown of major financial and other institutions in Europe would trigger a global crash of markets, disrupt supply chains, let loose armed formations of criminals, and drive many leading politicians to abdication. Some in NATO might hope that Putin’s mistaken decision for nuclear first use would finally convince Russia’s military and security forces to overthrow their president and sue for peace, but Putin is not Lenin, and he is as likely to double down on escalation as he is to acquiesce to a nuclear ceasefire.

And therein lies the second danger, escalation to strategic nuclear war between the United States and Russia. Putin might calculate that he could hive off the nuclear deterrents of the British and French from their American allies and bully the former into submission while frightening the American government and public with separate threats of mass destruction. This would be a dangerous miscalculation because the nuclear forces of the United States are politically and operationally coupled to those of their European allies.

American nuclear weapons and American personnel deployed in Europe are effectively tied to the continent under Article V of the NATO charter. The idea that selective use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by Russia could be sealed off from wider and more deadly destruction, is beyond optimism.

In addition to misplaced optimism about escalation control during a major European war, there is also a lack of appreciation for the challenge of skillful crisis management that might avoid war altogether. Experience teaches that the requirements for nuclear and other crisis management include shared understandings and expectations about the risks of war and a willingness to consider the danger of misperceptions held by leaders in stressful situations. They may misjudge other national leaders as irrevocably committed to acts of conquest or aggression, when in fact those other heads of state may be undecided about their final judgments for or against war.

Communication between and among leaders may be incomplete and intelligence assessments can be blinkered by insufficient information or political bias. Examples of these and other maladies in crisis are provided by the July crisis of 1914 leading to the outbreak of World War I, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, and by numerous other crises.

Russians playing with the rhetoric of Armageddon are legitimizing nuclear coercion in a time of troubles. The arrangement of a prompt ceasefire and peace agreement between Ukraine and Russia is of the highest significance for many reasons. These include putting an end to the loss of life and the destruction of national infrastructure. This objective should be pursued with aggressive diplomacy and without the distraction of references to the possibility of a war that would have no precedent in its capacity to do irreparable harm to civilization.

Steve Cimbala is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Danger Remains in Ukraine Peace Settlement was originally published on Global Security Review.

Great care was taken to secure the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons following the collapse of the state for this very purpose. The Obama administration later held four nuclear security summits to inspire international cooperation for increasing physical security at nuclear facilities. Today, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) Office of Material Management and Minimization leads the effort to convert the fuel in various international civilian reactors from weapons-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) to less risky low enriched uranium (LEU).

Despite these successes, it remains difficult to definitively discern whether specific action prevented and deterred nuclear terrorism or if other factors are at play for why such an event never materialized. It is a fact that no terrorist group has yet successfully pursued a strategy to develop a nuclear device. Yet, it may very well be the case that no group has ever legitimately tried. Terrorism as a strategy of targeted political violence may be largely incompatible with the consequences of acquiring and detonating an improvised nuclear device.

In 2004, US President George W. Bush received unanimous support from the UN for a resolution calling on countries to enact stronger controls to block terrorists from acquiring biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Since then, American policy turned away from the global war on terror and back to the strategic competition found in the Cold War. The fourth International Conference on Nuclear Security (ICONS) held in May 2024 was the first of its kind to conclude without a ministerial declaration. Yet, the risk of nuclear terrorism has arguably not grown despite a shift in national security priorities.

In a 2019 piece written for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, authors Christopher McIntosh and Ian Storey argue that there are four main options for a terrorist group that acquires a nuclear weapon: blackmail, opacity, latency, and dormancy. These options fall on a spectrum from overt threats of nuclear use to keeping the existence of a nuclear device a secret until its detonation. In all of these strategies, however, deterring a nuclear attack is possible as the outcome for use is the same: guaranteed massive retaliation from state governments.

As outlined by Keith Payne in a National Institute of Public Policy report, some scholars incorrectly assume that terrorist groups are undeterrable because they are irrational and possess no territory to hold at risk for assured retaliation. Terrorism is a fundamentally local endeavor and maintaining the support from the surrounding populations is key to preserving the cause. A deterrence by punishment scenario therefore also involves inciting local communities to turn on the terrorists they harbor.

Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” The key word is “premeditated” and supports the argument that groups employing terrorism are indeed rational actors, with their decisions about organizational structure, monitoring of funds, and selection of recruits providing evidence to support this statement. As with any rational actor, deterrence is possible.

A deterrence-by-denial strategy, although more difficult, is also legitimate. Ensuring states make it as difficult as possible for groups to acquire material aims to deter groups from even trying. Convincing states to do this may then require assured retaliation from other states. Perhaps there is a reason why former Secretary of Defense William Perry’s fears of North Korea selling plutonium to the highest bidder never materialized. For a regime already well-familiar with the international community’s condemnation of its nuclear program, giving others another reason to take out its nuclear facilities by selling material to a group would be strategically unwise.

However, for a nuclear peer of the United States, such as Russia, holding it responsible for lax security is more difficult. In 2011, a Moldovan lawyer was caught attempting to sell HEU on the black market. Forensic analysis confirmed the material very likely originated from Russia. This is not the first time weapon-usable nuclear material has gone missing from Russia. Still, Russia, like any other state, is motivated to prevent nuclear terrorism within its borders; the likeliest place for such an attack to happen is near the facility where material goes missing.

In physicist Michael Levi’s opinion, deterrence credibility is better served with certain attribution following an attack. Going further than assessing a relationship between a state program and a terrorist group, nuclear forensics attempts to identify exactly which country interdicted material originated. At best, a state would be forced to admit poor security practices that led to the theft of material. If used in a terror device, this excuse may not hold up to international scrutiny with any community affected still demanding its pound of flesh.

Neither a strategy of deterrence by punishment or by denial requires the level of explicit policy that was seen in the early 2000s. While not unhelpful, it is rather the continued existence of nuclear-armed states with massive conventional superiority over terror groups that may be the most successful tool in combating the risk of nuclear terrorism. Deterrence against nuclear terrorism, for now, is holding.

Alexis Schlotterback is a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own. 

Deterring Nuclear Terrorism in the Era of Great Power Competition was originally published on Global Security Review.

So sure was Israel in its southern security that intelligence reports were downplayed; the military even redeployed troops from Gaza prior to the October 7. The brutality of the attack and horror at the hostage crisis left Israel so shocked that it delayed a ground invasion for 20 days.

Despite the delay, calls for ceasefire and accusations of genocide existed before Israel’s offensive began. All the same, every first-semester international relations student knew what would happen next: with Hamas no longer deterred, Israel’s only recourse was compellence.

Compellence theory is simply acting on the threat that keeps your adversary deterred. Israel needed to compel Hamas to surrender the hostages, disarm, and realize that attacking Israel is a bad idea—restoring deterrence. For nearly two years since, Israel has tested compellence theory; at best, with mixed results, not only with Hamas, but across the region.

The Lebanese terror group Hezbollah launched its own attack on October 8, 2023, which by the end saw the launch of approximately 10,000–15,000 rockets and 2,500 drone attacks that displaced at least 70,000 Israelis and killed 75 soldiers and 45 civilians. Israel’s effort to restore deterrence devastated Hezbollah, killing 2,500–3,000 fighters, eliminating the majority of its leadership, through an exploding beeper attack in advance of a ground invasion. Seeing their losses, the group agreed to partially disarm and stay out of further hostilities, being effectively compelled.

In Yemen, the Houthis likewise joined the attack on Israel with rocket and drone attacks, as well as targeting ships off its coast, causing significant supply-chain disruptions. The attacks prompted the United States (US) to designate them a terrorist group and launch an aerial campaign alongside the United Kingdom—on top of Israel’s responses.

The Houthis endured severe damage to its offensive infrastructure and lost hundreds of fighters but still managed to occasionally launch limited attacks. The Houthis are more weakened than compelled.

Iran, the financier of Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, for the first time acted against Israel directly. Retaliating against Israeli strikes, Iran launched ballistic missile and drone salvos against Israel in April and October of 2024. The tit-for-tat came to a head over 12 days in June 2025, as the two exchanged strikes while Israel tried to destroy Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Though the damage Iran’s nuclear capability took is debated, what is known is Israel’s air superiority destroyed nearly all of Iran’s defense framework and eliminated several senior military staff.

Israel endured significant damage as Iran managed to breach its defenses on a few occasions, and the two have since agreed to a ceasefire, while simultaneously pledging readiness to attack in the future. So perhaps, they are mutually deterred for now.

Syria recently entered a new phase of its civil war following the downfall of Assad, an Israeli push to expand its buffer region, and the emergence of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) faction. HTS is led by Abu Mohammed al-Julani, an Islamic State affiliate who recently began targeting members of Syria’s minority populations, largely the Druze.

Israel intervened to protect the Druze, striking HTS sites until Julani quickly agreed to withdraw his troops from the Druze-populated areas. Prior to that intervention, there were rumors of Syria joining the Abraham Accords. While compellence worked to protect the Druze in the short term, it may have derailed a long-term peace deal.

Hamas remains the outlier. Ceasefire talks are again looking to collapse. The message is that despite the devastation, loss of leadership, approximately 17,000 lost fighters, and thousands of civilians killed in the crossfire, it can endure more. Israel’s attempt at compellence was so intense, that it sparked worldwide protests and allegations of genocide. Yet, rather than agree to Israel’s terms, Hamas continues to hold out, giving a statement that they will continue to fight until a Palestinian state is established.

The US attempted to broker multiple ceasefires, with some success in November 2023 and January 2025, but a deal to end the conflict remains elusive. If the US wants real results, compellence should target Hamas’ hosts and financiers, Turkey and Qatar.

While publicly on good terms with the US, the argument that Turkey and Qatar are state sponsors of terrorism would not be difficult to make given the support and protection they have offered Hamas. President Trump could threaten to add Turkey and Qatar to the list of state sponsors of terror unless Hamas agrees to Israel’s terms of ending the war.

There are indications that this could work. At least publicly, the two countries recently joined with Saudi Arabia and Egypt in a call on Hamas to disarm and relinquish control of Gaza to the Palestinian Authority. This is a good first step, but the call has no “or else”–type clause that would actually pressure Hamas.

With that support gone, Hamas’ political leadership’s only choice would be deportation from its hosts which would likely jeopardize their finances and potentially put them within Mossad’s reach or accede to Israel’s conditions. Ever self-interested, the hope is they would be compelled to the latter. This type of diplomatic pressure directed at Hamas’ sponsors could trickle down to Hamas’ leadership and potentially be the last best hope for Gazan civilians as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu signals plans for a renewed military offensive in the enclave.

Whether deterrence is restored by Israel is yet to be determined. For the sake of civilians on both sides, let us hope it is restored and soon.

Justin Leopold-Cohen is a homeland security analyst in Washington, DC. He has written widely on national and international security issues for outlets including Small Wars Journal, the Wavell Room, and Inkstick Media. Any views expressed in the article are his own and not representative of, or endorsed by, any organization or government.

Failed Deterrence and Misplaced Compellence in Gaza was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consider his transformation since February’s Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump and Vice President JD Vance chastised Zelensky for being “disrespectful,” admonished Zelensky’s efforts to rally international support as “propaganda,” suggested it was Zelensky’s responsibility “to end the destruction of your country,” and described Zelensky as “buried.” Six months later, Trump is praising Ukraine’s “unbreakable spirit,” supports its “future as an independent nation,” and appears to realize that Zelensky is not to blame for Vladimir Putin’s war. It is clear that Putin is not entranced by “the art of the deal,” and that America must play a role in securing any postwar peace. The outlines of that peace are starting to come into focus.

Lurching

In early 2025, French military commanders floated the possibility of forming a “coalition of the willing” to send troops to Ukraine. Other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members expressed support for the idea. By summer, 10 European nations offered to contribute troops to a 30,000-man “reassurance force” in postwar Ukraine. However, the Europeans emphasized they would need the US to provide “backstop” capabilities.

That was a nonstarter for Trump—at least until the hastily-arranged summit that brought the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Ukraine, NATO, and the EU to the White House on August 18. Whether they came out of panic over the unsettling Trump-Putin Alaska meeting or in solidarity with Zelensky, or both, the result of the White House summit was positive.

For example, while Trump emphasized that he would not deploy American ground forces and explained that “European nations are going to take a lot of the burden,” he added, “We’re going to help them…we’ll be involved” in any peacekeeping mission.

Toward that end, he ordered Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine to work with allied militaries on the specifics of a European-led peacekeeping force. Perhaps with the US shouldering command-and-control responsibilities; offering American airpower and other enabling capabilities; and signaling support for a security guarantee for postwar Ukraine, peace may prevail. Predictably, administration officials then hedged on Trump’s promise to support the postwar peacekeeping mission in Ukraine—prompting a NATO diplomat to conclude, “The US is not fully committed to anything.”

What Trump’s transatlantic counterparts and those of us who are critical of Trump’s policies need to keep in mind is that this lurching, two-steps-forward-one-step-back approach to Ukraine’s security is better than what Ukraine endured between January and July. There was the Oval Office meeting, the suspension of military aid and intelligence-sharing, the mineral deal, the moral relativism, outright moral inversion, and the inexplicable deference to Putin. Trump now appears to be moving in the right direction.

Lessons

Zelensky made clear that Ukraine cannot sign a peace deal without concrete security guarantees—given Putin’s brazen violation of the Budapest Memorandum in 2014 and 2022. Eleven years of occupation and war have taught Ukrainians that words are not enough to ensure their security. A genuine security guarantee, bolstered by multinational peacekeepers and sustained military aid, is what Ukraine needs going forward—not to roll back Putin’s army to pre-2014 borders, but to deter it from another landgrab. The rest of Europe needs this too. A strong, stable, secure Ukraine will only enhance NATO’s ability to deter Moscow.

Such a guarantee will not be embodied by Ukraine’s accession to NATO—at least not anytime soon—but instead will be a thatch of bilateral commitments from individual NATO members and partners. “A group of now 30 countries, including Japan and Australia, are working on this concept of security guarantees,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently revealed.

To be sure, an American contingent on the ground in postwar Ukraine—working alongside partners that collaborated in other warzones under acronyms such as MFO, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF—would be preferable to what Trump is offering.

After all, American boots on the ground send an unmistakable message to aggressor nations. However, given where Trump was in February, it is important to look at the bright side; rather than taking an ambivalent or even antagonistic position towards Ukraine, Trump appears willing to support America’s closest allies as they secure a postwar peace. The Ukrainian people can then harden their territory against another Russian invasion. There are also two important historical realities.

First, American airpower has a proven track record of making a positive impact on the ground—whether in humanitarian, peacekeeping, deterrent, or combat-support missions. Consider the Berlin Airlift, which sustained a besieged city for 15 months and dealt Stalin a humbling blow. Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, which protected Iraqi civilians from Saddam Hussein’s vengeance for 12 years and allowed Iraq’s Kurds to build an all-but-sovereign state is another. Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force, which, in coordination with partners on the ground, brought Serb paramilitaries to heel in Bosnia, pushed Serb regulars out of Kosovo, and hastened the end of Slobodan Milosevic’s genocidal rule. The toppling of the Taliban after 9/11, which saw the US use airpower as a force-multiplier for indigenous fighters on the ground is but one more example. Finally, Operation Inherent Resolve leveraged airpower to assist ground units in rolling back ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Of course, no one wants American warplanes directly engaging the Russian military. But it pays to recall that it is already happening on a routine basis—near Alaskan airspace, over the Baltic Sea, across Pacific Ocean, and in the Middle East. Moreover, given recent encounters between American and Russian forces—and American and Russian hardware—it seems unlikely Putin’s high command will want to challenge American airpower along or above a future Ukraine-Russia DMZ.

That brings to light a second set of historical lessons. Neither lingering territorial disputes nor simmering hostilities are dealbreakers when it comes to providing security guarantees to allies and partners in the crosshairs. Consider post–World War II Germany. After a period of disarmament and occupation, the country’s western half was rearmed and invited into NATO as a full member, despite massive Soviet bloc armies ringing West Berlin and despite West Germany facing an overwhelming military disadvantage across a heavily armed border.

In fact, the US did not formally recognize the post–World War II territorial-political settlement in Germany or across Europe until 1975. The people of West Germany never abandoned their hopes for German reunification. Those hopes were not realized until 1990.

Next, consider post–World War II Japan. The Red Army seized Japanese islands at the end of the war. To this day, Tokyo does not recognize Russian control over those islands. Despite this territorial dispute, the United States guaranteed Japan’s security in 1951 and entered into a full-fledged mutual-defense treaty in 1960. That treaty is still in force today.

Last, consider the Korean Peninsula. Despite territorial disagreements; despite the absence of a peace treaty; and despite, or perhaps because of, the threat posed by a massive hostile army north of the 38th Parallel, the US provided open-ended security guarantees to South Korea in the autumn of 1953. Those security guarantees are still in force. The people of South Korea still look forward to unification of the two Koreas under the banner of freedom. South Korea even has a cabinet-level government ministry focused on unification.

Predator

In none of these examples did the US or its allies agree to the permanent ceding of territory. Rather, they recognized the difficulty of liberating occupied territory and they envisioned the future prospect of the return of that territory. That is how Ukraine and its partners should view the imperfect peace that will emerge in the coming months—a peace that will leave some of Ukraine’s territory under Putin’s control.

It is also worth emphasizing that a European-led, US-supported peacekeeping force in Ukraine is necessary given Putin’s policies and plans: Moscow occupies swaths of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; threatens Poland; is conducting a campaign of sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint; has moved nuclear weapons into Belarus; is firing off intermediate-range missiles; and is diverting 35 percent of government spending into its war machine. As French President Emmanuel Macron concluded, Putin is “a predator…at our doorstep.” Putin will not stop until he is stopped. Securing Ukraine—while continuing the build-up of deterrent forces on NATO’s eastern flank—is key to stopping Putin.

Alan W. Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

Trump’s Path to an Imperfect Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

The credibility of the nation’s nuclear deterrent, the ultimate guarantor of sovereignty, is inextricably linked to domestic well-being. Economic prosperity, social cohesion, and the trust citizens have in their institutions are all part of that amorphous concept. Adversaries like Russia and China understand that it is in their interest to undermine American societal health; it is time Americans realize the challenge facing the nation.

For decades, the logic of nuclear deterrence rested on a triad of capabilities, credibility, and communication. The United States fielded the world’s most advanced nuclear arsenal and communicated credibility effectively. But credibility—the unwavering belief in America’s will to act—is the lynchpin.

This is where the home front becomes the front line. A nation that is prosperous, unified, and optimistic possesses the strategic endurance to maintain its commitments. Societal well-being is not a “soft” issue separate from “hard” power; it is a foundational strategic asset that fuels long-term political resolve.

The mechanisms connecting a healthy society to a credible deterrent are not merely theoretical. They are etched into recent history. Consider the 1980s under President Reagan. An economic resurgence and a renewed sense of national confidence provided the political capital and financial resources for a sweeping modernization of nuclear forces that saw the Peacekeeper ICBM and the B-2 stealth bomber enter service.

This was not just a military build-up; it was a clear signal to the Soviet Union, born from a nation that had the resources and the will to compete over the long haul. High public trust, buoyed by economic stability, sustained the political commitment for these massive, multi-decade investments.

Contrast this with the period following the 2008 financial crisis. The ensuing economic pain, political polarization, and public discontent led directly to the Budget Control Act and sequestration, which imposed punishing cuts on the defense budget. Allies and adversaries alike watched as Americans debated whether they could afford to modernize an aging nuclear triad. The signal was one of constraint and introspection, raising quiet questions in foreign capitals about the long-term reliability of America’s security guarantees. A nation struggling with internal economic and social crises inevitably projects an image of distraction and dwindling resolve.

Adversaries did not miss this lesson. They astutely integrated America’s domestic vulnerabilities into their national security strategies. China and Russia are engaged in a relentless campaign of information warfare designed to exacerbate our societal fissures. State-controlled media outlets like CGTN (Chinese) and RT (Russian), amplified by armies of bots and trolls on social media, relentlessly spotlight American inequality, racial tensions, and political gridlock.

Their goal is twofold: erode the confidence of Americans in their own democratic system and persuade the world that the United States is a chaotic, declining power whose deterrence is brittle and promises are hollow. By turning societal metrics into weapons against Americans, adversaries aim to achieve strategic gains without firing a shot.

Of course, the relationship between societal health and defense is not without its complexities. A valid counterargument holds that a society enjoying high well-being might become complacent, preferring to spend its “peace dividend” on social programs rather than defense. The post–Cold War era saw this exact debate, as calls to shift funding from “guns to butter” grew louder.

This presents a genuine leadership challenge that requires articulating why investments in national security are essential to protecting the very prosperity and stability Americans enjoy. The choice is not always between a new healthcare program and a new submarine. A strong, healthy, and educated populace, free from economic precarity, is the very foundation that allows a nation to project power and afford the tools of its own defense. A robust social safety net and a powerful military are not mutually exclusive—they are mutually reinforcing pillars of a resilient state.

This calculus extends to the nation’s most critical strategic advantage: America’s network of alliances. The strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for instance, is not purely a measure of its combined military hardware. It is rooted in a collective commitment to democratic values and the shared societal well-being of its members.

A stable, prosperous, and unified America reassures allies and strengthens collective deterrence. Conversely, an America seen as internally fractured and unreliable invites doubt, weakening the very alliances that magnify American power. When allied societies are confident in American leadership, collective credibility soars.

Therefore, Americans must rethink national security for the twenty-first century by placing American well-being at the very heart of our strategic imperatives. Bridging the economic divide not only broadens our tax base but also strengthens social cohesion, enabling sustainable defense budgets without overburdening taxpayers. Revitalizing education fuels scientific breakthroughs and cultivates the skilled workforce needed to modernize our nuclear command, control, and delivery systems. Upgrading infrastructure, from critical ports and highways to resilient cybersecurity networks, enhances our logistical agility, accelerates force deployment, and bolsters the credibility of our deterrent. By fostering political unity, we project resolve to allies and adversaries alike, inoculating our society against foreign information warfare and ensuring decisive, coordinated responses in times of crisis.

The defining contest of this century will not be waged on traditional battlefields but in a struggle of systems: our free, prosperous, and cohesive society versus an authoritarian model of centralized control. To secure our peace, we must fortify America’s Silent Shield at home. The credibility of our nuclear deterrent, and, by extension, our global leadership, will always mirror the resilience and unity of the nation it protects.

Brandon Toliver, PhD, serves on the A4 staff of Headquarters Air Force. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States government, the Department of Defense, the United States Air Force, or the United States Space Force.

America’s Silent Shield: How Domestic Strength Sustains Nuclear Power was originally published on Global Security Review.

The United Kingdom’s Defense Issues

The United Kingdom’s military spent several decades downsizing its military. Still, the UK took part in major conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, showing that Britain continues to have some force projection capability.

Nevertheless, British Ministry of Defence (MoD) data shows recruitment shortfalls over the past five years. Recent data published by the UK Defence Journal show the biggest recruitment shortfalls are found in the army, where manpower gaps in land forces are most pronounced.

A major factor in recruiting failure was a several-year attempt to draw down spending, that included the army’s closure of half of its recruiting offices, according to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). A lack of recruiting offices only erodes the interaction between recruiters and the community. This lack of interaction dissuades civilians, who may not fully understand the benefits of military service, from joining.

Furthermore, an aging population, a rise in health risks, and an extremely long pipeline from recruitment to basic training can dissuade young men and women from choosing service. While Britain’s Air Force and elite Royal Marines remain formidable, further emphasis on naval power and regrowing the land forces is much needed.

Canada’s Rearmament Crisis

The Canadian Armed Forces are currently facing a readiness crisis. According to an internal overview by the Department of National Defence, only 58 percent of the military is ready to handle any situation. Canada’s lack of readiness is increasingly causing concern among the general public. War in Eastern Europe and Africa and brewing conflicts in Asia show the need for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member-states to bolster each region. Canada’s military is unready to face a crisis.

A major challenge is stagnation in the Air Force and Navy, where much equipment is neglected and degraded. Because logistics win wars, Canada needs to recruit and train support personnel such as technicians, maintenance, supply, and communications personnel.

Australia’s Defense Issues

Australia, a rising regional power in the Indo-Pacific, also faces challenges for the Australian Defence Forces. Being a member of the trilateral security partnership between Australia, the UK, and the US (AUKUS), Australia is currently awaiting the construction and transfer of three to five Virginia-class submarines from the United States, which may not come in time for Pillar II of the AUKUS agreement, due to stagnant American naval production rates.

Only 80 percent of the 69,000 recruits needed to enhance the Australian Defence Forces have either signed up or met recruiting requirements. Simultaneously, younger Australians feel they have better economic and social opportunities in the private sector than in the military, drawing potential recruits away.

Continuously growing defense spending over several decades will be critical in maintaining readiness. Decades of neglecting defense forced the Australian military into a position where it must catch up to other mid-sized powers like Japan and South Korea. Furthermore, as the Australian Strategic Policy Institute noted, confidence in the military remains low. Thus, efforts to change this view are needed in the information sphere if public institutions are to effectively remilitarize, in lieu of rising threats.

Recommendations for Each Country

The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia face major recruitment and militarization woes. However, steps can be taken for all three countries to push towards modernization and expansion. This is particularly important if these Anglo nations are to remain a close alliance.

British recruitment woes correlate with the lack of recruitment offices. The British Ministry of Defence must grow and lobby for more offices and events where promising youth can learn and gather information about military service. Furthermore, efforts are needed in the more neglected Royal Navy and Army.

The British have an opportunity to take a leadership position on the continent. Growing the British military will also support defense exports and further enhance and expand the military—albeit with an effort to increase the MOD’s budget.

Canada’s efforts must include broader government support for the military as Canadians question the credibility of a government that drew down the military to ineffectiveness. The Canadian Defence Ministry can also take lessons from NATO partners, such as Poland, Romania, Finland, and others, who are modernizing successfully.

Australia’s expansion of the military must take a two-pronged approach. First, show potential recruits the benefits of military service. Second, the government must instill a sense of patriotism and respect for the Armed Forces. The government can focus on brewing threats in the Indo-Pacific, which will eventually reach Australia, while explaining the benefits of military service.

The Commonwealth countries of the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada all have capable yet stagnant militaries. Addressing problems with recruitment, logistics, and maintenance can reduce stagnation and help restore these nations’ military strength. As close allies of the United States, their success matters.

Julian McBride is a former US Marine. He is a forensic anthropologist and independent journalist.

Commonwealth Defense and Recruitment Hurdles was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since January 20, Trump administration officials have announced an end to US participation in NATO military exercises; floated plans to relinquish NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander post (held by an American since NATO’s founding); proposed withdrawing 10,000 troops from Eastern Europe; threatened the sovereignty of NATO ally Canada; raised the prospect of using force to seize Greenland (a territory of NATO ally Denmark); derided “freeloading” Europeans; said of Vladimir Putin that America “should take him at his word”; torpedoed NATO’s unanimous declaration to “never recognize Russia’s illegal annexations of Ukrainian territory, including Crimea”; and suggested America’s NATO allies would not “come and protect us” in a time of crisis. This follows Trump’s 2024 invitation to Putin’s henchmen to “do whatever the hell they want” to allies failing to meet NATO’s defense-spending requirements; 2018 threat to withdraw from NATO; and a 2016 declaration that he would defend NATO members under attack only if they had “fulfilled their obligations to us.” Add it all up, and Trump’s view of NATO diverges dramatically from that of what was once known as the “Grand Old Party.”

For instance, as he took the reins as NATO’s first military commander, General Dwight Eisenhower—a future Republican president—called NATO “the last remaining chance for the survival of Western civilization.” President Richard Nixon viewed NATO as “a moral force.” President Gerald Ford believed NATO “protected the free world from the threat of aggression.”

President George H. W. Bush called NATO “an insurance policy.” Indeed, for America, NATO insures against the worst scenario: another European conflict triggering another global war. For the rest of NATO, the alliance is a security guarantee backed by the United States. Without that guarantee, there is no security in Europe, as history has a way of reminding those on the outside looking in, from Cold War Hungary to post–Cold War Ukraine.

President George W. Bush called NATO “the essential foundation of transatlantic security.” This essay did not forget President Ronald Reagan. However, many of those who claim Reagan’s mantle forget that he was an unwavering NATO advocate—during and after the Cold War. Rather than dismissing NATO as “obsolete,” Reagan called NATO “the core of America’s foreign policy and of America’s own security.” Rather than alarming NATO allies, Reagan reassured them by echoing the words of the North Atlantic Treaty: “If you are threatened, we’re threatened…. An attack on you is an attack on us.”

Rather than distorting NATO into a transactional protection racket, Reagan championed NATO as a “community of democratic states” and “a bond which has served us so well.”

Reagan never questioned NATO’s relevance, never browbeat NATO laggards, never threatened withdrawing from NATO, and never raised doubts about America’s commitment to NATO. Instead, Reagan championed NATO as “an antidote to chaos,” “a living commitment of the nations of the West to the defense of democracy and individual liberty.”

Importantly, Reagan did not think NATO’s mission was over when the Berlin Wall fell. In fact, he endorsed NATO’s continued growth. “Room must be made in NATO for the democracies of Central and Eastern Europe,” he declared after the Cold War thawed. And even after Moscow began walking the path of reform, Reagan cautioned, “We cannot afford to forget that we are dealing with a political system, a political culture and a political history going back many decades, even centuries…. We must stick with the strategy of strength.” In short, Reagan shrewdly saw NATO as a hedge against a Russia that might revert to revanchism—which is exactly what has happened.

Putin’s Russia violated nuclear treaties, conventional-weapons treaties, and its own pledge to “respect the independence…sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine”; warned NATO member Poland that its western territories were “a gift from Stalin”; dismembered NATO aspirants Georgia and Ukraine; countenanced and/or conducted cyberattacks against American energy infrastructure; interfered in elections throughout NATO’s membership roster; conducted sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint (including American targets); threatened use of nuclear weapons; aided and funded attacks against American forces; provided targeting data to support Houthi attacks against allied ships; and made “massive investments in its defense sector” (according to Trump’s own intelligence officials). In light of all of that—and the Kremlin’s long history of deceit—Reagan would never “take Putin at his word.”

GOP presidents, and their democrat counterparts, supported NATO because they recognized that NATO serves America’s interests. For 40 years, NATO helped deter Moscow and prevent the Cold War from turning hot. But that is just a fraction of how NATO has served America’s interests.

Thirteen current NATO allies deployed troops to assist America in defending South Korea. NATO militaries, infrastructure, and decades of interoperability served as the nucleus for the coalition that ejected Iraq from Kuwait, with NATO allies deploying thousands of troops to assist America.

The only time NATO’s all-for-one collective-defense clause was invoked was after September 11, 2001, when NATO allies rushed aircraft and personnel to this side of the Atlantic to guard America’s skies. NATO then bled with America in the Sisyphean campaign that followed, with 455 Brits, 158 Canadians, 86 French, 54 Germans, 48 Italians, 43 Danes, and 40 Poles dying in Afghanistan. When America withdrew from Afghanistan—20 years after the attacks on America’s capital, America’s military headquarters, America’s largest city—74 percent of the foreign troops deployed in the country that spawned 9/11 were not Americans. The vast majority were NATO allies. Trump is apparently unaware of this history.

In Operation Iraqi Freedom, 16 NATO allies sent troops when America asked for help. Hundreds of NATO troops—Brits, Italians, Poles, Bulgarians, Latvians, Danes, Dutch, Romanians, Hungarians, Czechs—died in Iraq, as did 18 soldiers from Ukraine, a country that is not a NATO ally but certainly acts like one.

In the post Iraqi freedom years, seven NATO members conducted airstrikes against the ISIS caliphate. Again, NATO was there.

Far from “freeloading,” NATO allies Britain, Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Spain are supporting operations in the Red Sea. Likewise, British, French, Italian, Spanish, and Canadian assets are promoting freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific.

European nations sent more aid to Ukraine than the US. Britain and France are organizing a peacekeeping force for postwar Ukraine.

NATO has eight battlegroups defending its most at-risk members along the eastern flank. Only one is American-led.

Britain leads the battlegroup in Estonia, supported by Denmark, France, and Iceland. Britain is committing resources to defend NATO’s northern flank. And the aircraft carrier HMS Prince of Wales just commenced a globe-spanning mission—the largest deployment of British naval airpower in a quarter-century.

Germany leads the battlegroup in Lithuania, backed by Belgium, Czechia, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway. Germany is building permanent bases in Lithuania for 4,800 German troops. Germany is spearheading a continentwide missile shield. And Germany’s parliament recently approved a massive defense-infrastructure fund.

Canada leads the battlegroup in Latvia, supported by 10 other NATO allies. France leads NATO’s battlegroup in Romania. Pouring almost 5 percent of GDP into defense, Poland fields NATO’s third-largest military. Sweden is quadrupling production of anti-tank weapons.

What NATO is doing and deterring underscores something General James Mattis observed almost a decade ago, “If we did not have NATO today, we would need to create it.”

This begs the questions: what if we did not have NATO? What if these first hundred days mark the last days of history’s greatest alliance for peace?

NATO is designed not to wage war, but to deter war. If there is any doubt about NATO’s collective-defense guarantee—and these first hundred days have created enormous doubts—Putin could be tempted to do in the Baltics what he has done in Ukraine. That would force NATO to blink or fire back. And that would lead to terrible outcomes. The former means the collapse of NATO—and with it, the entire US-led alliance system. The latter means great power war.

The best way to prevent such dire outcomes is through deterrent military strength, clarity of intent, and certainty of cause and effect. Trump’s words and actions have undermined all of these.

What the transactional Trump administration fails to recognize is that by undermining NATO, it is undermining America’s security. If a cyberattack or EMP blast or bioweapon paralyzes America; if ISIS or al Qaeda or some other terror group unleashes something worse than 9/11 or 10/7; if Moscow blinds America’s constellation of satellites; if Beijing moves against Taiwan; or if Pyongyang restarts the long-paused Korean War, America will call for help.

A post-NATO Europe may be unable or unwilling to answer.

Alan Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

FYI to the GOP on NATO was originally published on Global Security Review.

This is no diplomatic disagreement, it’s a brewing storm cloaked in trade deals and technology theft. Viewed through the unforgiving lens of a new Cold War, their discussion exposes the economic fault lines, ballooning trade deficits, strategic supply chain vulnerabilities, and the silent hemorrhaging of American innovation through intellectual property theft. As they unearth Cold War-era playbooks and contrast them with China’s modern hybrid strategies, a chilling pattern emerges: the past isn’t repeating, it’s evolving.

They delve to the heart of deterrence, revealing a precarious global balance that demands more than policy; it demands resolve. If America misreads the moment, it may sleepwalk into strategic irrelevance.

Watch

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Navigating the US-China Relationship: Myths and Realities was originally published on Global Security Review.

Maritime ports authorize customs clearance and are involved in regulatory checks, ensuring compliance with national and international law. Ports perform most of these functions digitally. Maritime ports are now under serious threat of malicious cyberattacks that can disrupt and compromise port operations worldwide.

Industry is deeply interconnected, and a cyberattack on one major port can send shockwaves through global trade networks. Consider a scenario where a major port, responsible for handling millions of cargo containers, suddenly halts operations due to a cyberattack. Cranes freeze, logistics systems collapse, and cargo ships are left stranded at sea. This is not a hypothetical scenario; it is a real and escalating threat to global trade.

The maritime industry, long seen as the backbone of international commerce, now faces an urgent cybersecurity crisis. Ports are no longer just about cranes and cargo; they have evolved into digital ecosystems reliant on interconnected networks, automation, and artificial intelligence. As ports become smarter, they are also becoming more vulnerable. Cybercriminals are increasingly exploiting these vulnerabilities, causing financial losses, operational disruptions, and even national security risks.

Maritime cyberattacks are no longer rare occurrences, they are becoming alarmingly frequent. In 2023, a ransomware attack crippled more than 1,000 vessels by targeting a software provider used across the shipping industry. The attack forced the shipping industry to shut down its ShipManager system, affecting global supply chains. A year earlier, the Port of Lisbon suffered a cyberattack that took its website offline for days, with the ransomware group LockBit claiming responsibility and alleging that it had stolen financial reports, contracts, and ship logs.

In Germany, a 2022 cyberattack on two oil companies disrupted fuel shipments, forcing Shell to reroute supplies and exposing the vulnerabilities of critical maritime infrastructure. The 2017 NotPetya ransomware attack, which paralyzed Maersk and caused an estimated $300 million in damage, remains one of the most devastating cyberattacks in shipping history.

Ports are among the most attractive targets for cybercriminals. The motives behind these attacks vary as some hackers seek financial gain, while others aim to steal sensitive trade-related data, and some may even use cyberattacks as part of hybrid warfare.

The economic consequences are staggering, from ransom payments and insurance hikes to delays that can ripple across global supply chains. Beyond financial losses, cyber threats to ports pose serious security risks. For example, a well-coordinated cyberattack on a major port could disrupt military logistics, cripple trade networks, or even manipulate cargo data to facilitate smuggling and illicit trade.

Hackers carry the potential for unauthorized intrusion into ports’ digital networks and interrupt ports’ routine operation through malicious software attacks. The workforce involved in port management may be trapped into revealing sensitive data by clicking on malicious links. The hackers can also disrupt digital networks that regulate critical port infrastructure, such as cranes, pumps, and valves. Supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems can come under cyber threats disrupting routine functions. Nonstandard computing hardware like sensors, actuators, or appliances that transmit data from the network wirelessly are vulnerable to data theft.

Hackers can steal data such as cargo manifests, crew information, and financial records. They can also manipulate data, such as altering cargo manifests, or manipulate navigation systems. Hackers can also steal intellectual property, such as trade secrets or proprietary software.

Another pressing issue is supply-chain security. Ports rely on a complex web of third-party vendors for logistics, software, and cargo management. If one vendor is compromised, the entire port system could be at risk.

Hackers can also use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance means or to attack port infrastructure, such as damaging equipment or disrupting power supplies. Ports may be exposed to cyberattacks through third-party suppliers, such as logistics providers or maintenance contractors. Ports may be exposed to cyberattacks through cargo and containers, which may contain malicious devices or software.

Cybersecurity in the maritime sector is often treated as an afterthought. Many ports still operate with outdated software and weak security protocols, making them easy targets. Given the critical role of ports in the global economy, the widening cybersecurity gap is a growing challenge. Strengthening port security necessitates urgent regulatory mechanisms, some of which are proposed below.

Regulatory Mechanisms

To mitigate the growing cyber threat, ports should adopt internationally recognized cybersecurity frameworks. First, ports should adhere to the rules and protocols of the International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) Maritime Cyber Risk Management Guidelines, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, and ISO 27001 standards. Implementing these frameworks will help establish clear security protocols and ensure that ports are prepared to defend against cyberattacks.

Second, network security should be reinforced by segmenting information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) systems, preventing malware from spreading across critical infrastructure. Regular penetration testing and vulnerability assessments can further identify weak points before attackers do.

Third, investing in cybersecurity training for port workers is equally crucial. Many cyberattacks exploit human error—phishing e-mails, weak passwords, and social engineering attacks remain among the most common entry points for hackers. A well-trained workforce can serve as the first line of defense against these threats.

Fourth, leveraging artificial intelligence and machine learning for threat detection can enhance ports’ ability to identify cyber risks before they escalate into full-scale attacks. Artificial intelligence (AI)–led systems can monitor network activity in real time, flagging suspicious behavior and predicting potential breaches before they happen. In this regard, the strict security assessments of third-party vendors and blockchain-based cargo tracking can enhance transparency and reduce the risk of supply-chain cyberattacks.

Fifth, beyond prevention, ports should also be prepared to respond effectively to cyber incidents. For this, establishing cyber incident response teams (CIRT) can ensure that ports have trained professionals ready to mitigate and recover from cyberattacks swiftly.

Sixth, regular cyber drills and crisis simulations should be conducted to test response plans. This ensures that when an attack occurs, the damage is minimized, and recovery is swift.

Seventh, international collaboration to deal with these threats is essential. Governments, port authorities, and private stakeholders should work together to share intelligence, standardize security protocols, and invest in collective defense mechanisms.

Public-private partnerships can play a key role in funding advanced cybersecurity infrastructure, while international regulatory bodies like the IMO must enforce stricter cybersecurity mandates across the industry. Finally, as ports transition into smart ports, powered by the internet of things (IoT), AI, and automation, cybersecurity should be at the forefront of maritime security strategies. Emerging technologies like quantum computing and zero trust architecture will play a crucial role in strengthening digital defenses, but ports should remain vigilant. The very technologies designed to enhance security could also introduce new vulnerabilities if not properly managed.

Cybersecurity is no longer just a technical issue; it is a fundamental pillar of modern port management. If cybersecurity continues to be treated as an afterthought, the next major cyberattack could bring global trade to a standstill. Ports are the lifelines of the world economy, and securing them is not just about protecting data, it is about safeguarding the stability of international commerce and national security.

Maryyum Masood is working as a Research Officer & Associate Editor at the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) Islamabad. She is an MPhil scholar in the Department of Strategic Studies at the National Defense University (NDU) Islamabad.

Rizwana Abbasi is an Associate Professor of Security Studies at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, a non-resident Fellow of the Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), Islamabad, and a Visiting Fellow at the Central European University of Austria.

Cybersecurity Framework for Maritime Port Management was originally published on Global Security Review.

Nuclear incidents could lead to catastrophic radioactive contamination and a global emergency. In this regard, the South Asian model for the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement is a milestone achievement in nuclear risk reduction. It was a breakthrough agreement that prevented two arch-rivals from attacking each other’s nuclear sites despite several intense standoffs. It played a crucial role in ensuring nuclear facilities remain off-limits by preventing catastrophic escalations and reinforcing stability.

Contemporary conflicts are increasingly defined by disruptive and cutting-edge technologies, such as drone and cyber attacks that introduce a new dimension to conflict and exposed nuclear infrastructure to unprecedented vulnerabilities. It is thus time for P-5 states and the IAEA to formulate an international non-attack agreement to ensure nuclear restraint. The world cannot afford another nuclear disaster due to the negligence of the international community and the absence of a proper enforcement mechanism.

After the nuclearization of South Asia in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, Smiling Buddha. Pakistan sensed a pre-emptive strike against its nuclear research labs. The rivalry got more intense when India hedged against blowing up Pakistan’s Kahuta Nuclear Research Laboratories. In return, Pakistan assured India that any attack on Kahuta would evoke a retaliatory strike on its Bhabha Atomic Nuclear Plant.

To avert such future scenarios, both states agreed to sign the bilateral accord. Since doing so, and despite several conflicts like the Kargil conflict (1999), the 2001–2002 military standoff, and the Pulwama-Balakot crisis (2019), neither state has targeted the other’s nuclear facilities. Therefore, the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement’s successful implementation in a highly volatile region, where nuclear-armed neighbors are eyeball-to-eyeball, sets a precedent that serves as a model for other states to follow.

The provisions of the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement, require that both states refrain from “undertaking, encouraging, or participating in any action aimed at causing the destruction or damage to any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.” This is a model for a global nuclear security non-attack commitment. The agreement clearly defines nuclear installations to include research reactors, uranium enrichment plants, reprocessing facilities, and storage sites for radioactive material.

The second provision of the agreement is the Classification of Protected Sites. The Annual Exchange of Nuclear Facility List is the most important clause. Under this clause India and Pakistan exchange lists of their nuclear facilities every January 1, ensuring transparency, avoiding miscalculations, and implementing risk mitigation. This agreement sets the ground rules that even hostile states can uphold nuclear restraint, and the international community must take a lesson from this model to formulate an international nuclear non-attack agreement.

Moreover, the Chernobyl disaster of 1986 is a stark reminder of the devastating consequences of nuclear incidents, with radiation leaks contaminating large areas and causing long-term ecological and health crises. While commenting on an attack, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said that a drone hit the concrete shelter, sparking a fire that caused significant damage, but radiation remained under control. Both Ukrainian and Russian officials released their respective statements, denying the responsibility for the drone strike.

The pertinent question here is not who is responsible, but rather the safety and security of nuclear facilities during conflict and the need for militaries to exercise restraint. The war might end one day, but the hazards of nuclear radiation persist far longer. Meanwhile, existing international laws provide some protections for nuclear sites, but they lack enforceable mechanisms to deter attacks. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I (1977) classify nuclear power plants as civilian objects that should not be targeted. However, these clauses are not binding under all circumstances, leaving loopholes for states to exploit during wartime.

Furthermore, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguard protocols primarily focus on nonproliferation and the safety of nuclear materials, rather than averting military strikes on nuclear sites. Here the absence of clear, legally binding enforcement mechanisms in international law means that states can act with impunity while targeting nuclear sites in conflict zones. Hence, the Chernobyl drone attack demonstrates the urgency for a comprehensive and enforceable global agreement.

The new international nuclear non-attack agreement should essentially address the weaknesses in existing laws. The P5 (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US) and the IAEA must spearhead a legally binding comprehensive treaty prohibiting any form of attack on nuclear infrastructure. This new agreement should explicitly include these several nuclear restraints. Starting from the military restrictions that should prohibit all military operations in the vicinity of designated nuclear sites. This includes ground forces, aerial strikes, reconnaissance missions, and drone activities near nuclear installations.

Further states must ensure annual transparency measures to prevent miscalculations. Each party must be required to exchange lists of their nuclear facilities annually, similar to the India-Pakistan model.

Most importantly, there must be severe consequences if any state violates the agreement by conducting a strike, covert operation, or cyberattack on nuclear facilities. Such a state must face severe economic sanctions, diplomatic consequences, and potential designation as a rogue state. Finally, there must be a prohibition on cyber and non-kinetic attacks.

The UN Security Council and leading nuclear powers, the P5 states, should take the responsibility of drafting and enforcing the agreement. These nations must set aside geopolitical rivalries and recognize that the threat of nuclear facility attacks endanger global stability. Additionally, the IAEA must play a more proactive role in integrating nuclear facility protection into global conflict prevention strategies.

The Chernobyl drone strike and the volatile situation in Zaporizhzhia is a wake-up call, a warning that nuclear security cannot be taken for granted in modern warfare. As conflicts become increasingly complex, nuclear sites will remain vulnerable unless strong, enforceable international agreements are put in place. The world cannot afford to wait for another disaster before taking decisive action.

Sana Ahmed is an MS scholar at the Center for International Peace and Stability (CIPS), NUST, and a researcher at the Islamabad-based independent think tank Strategic Vision Institute (SVI).

A South Asian Blueprint for Nuclear Risk Reduction was originally published on Global Security Review.

Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.

The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.

In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.

The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.

Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.

On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.

Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.

Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.

Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.

The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for security assurances—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.

At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.

Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.

How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race was originally published on Global Security Review.

Professional diplomats in the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies might have wondered if this was an unrehearsed skit from Saturday Night Live.  Only Alec Baldwin playing the role of Trump was missing. Allies do not talk to each other like in front of the media.

It was clear that Trump and Vice President JD Vance expected to have a pleasant conversation in front of the cameras, have a nice private lunch, and then publicly sign a mineral deal with President Zelensky. They did not expect the pushback and demands that came near the end of the conversation. As a famous French diplomat once said, with respect to another diplomatic blunder, it was “worse than a crime. It was a mistake.”

Zelensky ended up being unceremoniously escorted out of the White House without lunch or a deal. The agreement that would allow the United States to mine rare Earth minerals in Ukraine was that it would repay the United States for the more than $160 billion that American taxpayers have invested in Ukraine’s defense. Profits from American mining operations would also help rebuild Ukraine. American businesses operating in Ukraine would also offer de facto security guarantees to Ukraine. Absent such an agreement, it was feared that China may partner with Ukraine to mine these critical minerals.

While President Trump is likely genuine in his desire to see the killing end and Ukraine rebuilt, Ukraine is only a small part of a larger strategic game the United States is playing. The Trump administration believes that Europe is no longer the strategic pivot of international relations. Instead, the focal point of American diplomacy and military preparedness is the Far East, with a rising China as the main adversary standing in the way of American global leadership and international influence. Europe is a secondary theater of operations, and it is time Europeans bare the burden of their own defense.

This view is a tectonic shift in American focus, but understandable. China has ambitions that go well beyond military and political competition with the United States in China’s backyard.

China’s global strategy of multi-domain competition with the US includes all spheres of power and influence. Its tool kit includes explicit challenges to the United States in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, the military use of space, artificial intelligence development, cyberwar, and economic influence.

China’s ambitious naval expansion may fall short of driving the US Navy from the high seas, but its combined arms approach to anti-access and area denial (A2AD) in East Asia is intended to deter and, if necessary, defeat any power that would oppose China’s mastery of its immediate sphere of influence, including Taiwan.

Nevertheless, recognition of the threat posed by a rising China does not invalidate the strategic significance of events in Europe. America’s commitment to the defense and security of a free Europe is not transactional, it is existential. This is embodied in the NATO alliance.

NATO is the result of symbiotic relationships among democratic states that provide collective security within a context of political freedom. Ironically, this is why JD Vance’s challenge to European allies at the Munich Security Conference was so interesting. Vance noted that the United States and Europe are linked, not only by procedures and financial commitments, but also by shared values, including free speech. He rightly urged the European members of NATO and the European Union to enhance their commitments to free speech that, in his view, are in decline across Europe.

Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, with its objective of destroying Ukraine’s armed forces, economy, infrastructure and its viability as a state is clearly grossly immoral. But evil in the world is nothing new, nor is it incumbent on the American taxpayer to fund every effort to eradicate all evil in the world. American efforts to impose liberal democracies where they do not exist has a poor track record of success.

Europe was the cradle of American civilization, but Americans fled Europe because of religious persecution, a lack of economic opportunity, and other reasons that are inconsistent with freedom. Doubtless, Zelensky and other European politicians drive their American partners crazy at times. During the Second World War, Charles de Gaulle drove British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower to distraction.  But the imperious de Gaulle was the symbol of French nationalism for those who opposed Germany and the Vichy regime.

An American abandonment of a free Europe would leave Europe to repeat its past mistakes, which the continent has repeated over and over and over again. Zelensky is far from an ideal partner. However, a Ukraine swallowed by Russia will result in a less stable Europe.

Vladimir Putin clearly sees a free Ukraine as a political and economic threat to Russia.  He denies that Ukraine is a distinct civilization or country. He constantly refers to Ukrainians as neo-Nazis. A negotiated settlement will not change this perspective. Any agreement with Putin must follow President Ronald Reagan’s dictum, trust but verify.

Ironically, one outcome of the war between Russia and Ukraine is the enlargement of NATO with the addition of Finland and Sweden. Thus, NATO added considerable strategic depth and an ability to prevent Russian ships from leaving port in the Baltic Sea. Without the United States, European NATO may waiver. In the end, President Trump’s efforts to push European states to play a larger role in their own security are important, but they should never lead to an American departure from the Alliance.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Professor at Penn State University at Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Trump and Zelensky: Bad Manners or Strategic Disaster? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Science and education are part of strategic ties in recent years. The “Program of educational cooperation between the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Government of the State of Israel for the years 2023-2026” forms the basis for developing this vital field in mutual cooperation. As Azerbaijan strives to reform its education system in order to make schools future-ready and sci-tech focused, it benefits greatly from the exchange of teachers and education experts to train and learn from the Israeli experience.

Cooperation on climate change, high tech agriculture, green energy, and water are also part of the educational and scientific ties. Israel’s high-tech economy and agriculture and its experience in green energy and water desalination provide Azerbaijan a unique opportunity to diversify and develop the non-oil sector of its economy.

Cybersecurity is also part of the educational ties between the countries with staff at the Technion, a public research university based in Haifa, contributing to the training of Azerbaijani students on a cybersecurity program.

Food security with a focus on grain is another new angle in Azerbaijan-Israel ties. Israel’s food security, and specifically its requirement for grain, will be met by Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, following the disruption to supplies as a result of the Russia-Ukraine war. This will be a huge boost to both Israel’s and Azerbaijan’s food security, as Azerbaijan will receive advanced technology from Israel as part of the deal.

The high level of religious tolerance and historical lack of anti-Semitism in Azerbaijan form a strong basis for people-to-people relations between Azerbaijan and Israel. The village of Qırmızı Qəsəbə (Red Village) in the Quba region of Azerbaijan, home to an old community of Mountain Jews, is believed to be the world’s only all-Jewish village outside Israel and the United States. The opening of the Mountain Jews Museum in the village is also a testament to the positive role of Azerbaijan in Jewish-Muslim coexistence and the promotion of harmony and tolerance. Azerbaijani Jews form a strong bond between the people of the two countries and their significant presence in Israel also promotes bilateral ties.

An important development in the energy sector, a key part of the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Israel, took place in October 2023, when Azerbaijan’s state oil company SOCAR was granted a gas exploration license alongside British Petroleum and Israel’s NewMed to explore an area north of Israel’s Leviathan gas field in the Mediterranean. This is a significant boost to SOCAR, increasing its role in the world energy market and introducing a new aspect to Azerbaijan-Israel energy cooperation. Around 40 percent of Israel’s oil imports come from Azerbaijan.

Diversification of supply and non-reliance on Arab oil has been a key component of Israeli energy security over the years. Azerbaijani oil pumped to Turkey’s Mediterranean port of Ceyhan and transported onwards to world markets forms a major source of revenue for the Azerbaijani budget and, as such, has been crucial in the modernisation of the country’s infrastructure, armed forces, and the large-scale reconstruction in Azerbaijan’s liberated lands.

Azerbaijan’s energy policy forms the backbone of the country’s independent foreign policy. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline bypasses both Russia and Iran and has proved a key asset following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when Kazakh oil shipments, for example, most of which pass through Russia, have been disrupted.

Since the Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023, and the subsequent war in Gaza, Iran has singled out the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline as well as Azerbaijan, putting them under pressure to cut off the key crude oil supply to Israel and thereby to damage the basis for Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy.     Iran launched media propaganda against Azerbaijan. Leftist so-called nongovernmental organizations, financed by Western-donor political figures such as Greta Thunberg and Qatar-financed outlets such as the Middle East Eye, also criticized Azerbaijan.

The attacks reveal the range of political sides that are keen to damage and destroy the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Azerbaijan’s independent foreign policy. Attacks against SOCAR’s HQ in Istanbul, organized by pro-Hamas Islamists and leftists, with the tacit approval of circles within the Turkish government, were also part of the campaign.

Azerbaijan-Israel strategic cooperation, particularly in the energy sector, stood firm in the face of attacks from various circles, geopolitical turbulence, and pressure. The incoming Trump administration should value Baku’s role in the energy security of Israel, the European Union, and Turkey, which are key US allies.

Azerbaijan and Israel developed the defense component of their strategic partnership over the years. Israel is one of the main sources of Azerbaijan’s defense imports and modernization of the armed forces. Azerbaijan made skilful use of Israeli defence products in liberating its lands; most notably, Israeli’s Barak 8 anti-ballistic missile defense system intercepted an Iskander missile fired from Armenia over the capital Baku.

Israel, too, stood firm in the face of pressure during the war in 2020 and did not allow third parties to influence their defense cooperation with Baku. The defense cooperation also came under extensive media attack by pro-Armenia and pro-Iran elements who consider the Azerbaijani-Israeli defense partnership a threat to their interests. Iran feared Azerbaijan’s growing role since Baku’s victory in the Karabakh war and the high-level conduct of its armed forces.

A strong Azerbaijan on its northern border is a nightmare for Iran. Tehran invested heavily for decades to keep Azerbaijan weak, but this failed badly with the restoration of Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Azerbaijan-Israel defense cooperation is vital for regional security and the containment of rogue actors such as Iran, which pose an existential security threat to both countries.

With the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Israel and Turkey appear to have inflicted a strategic defeat on Iran. Considering the strained nature of Turkish-Israel relations, due to Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan backing Palestinian extremist groups, it is in the interests of both Israel and Turkey not to collide in Syria and to manage the risks.

In this regard, Azerbaijan can play a key role in coordinating and reconciling both Israeli and Turkish interests to avoid confrontation in Syria. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s foreign policy aide Hikmet Hajiyev visited Israel in December, where he had meetings with high-level Israeli officials including Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar and President Isaac Herzog. The trip was a positive development in reducing confrontational elements in Turkish-Israeli ties and keeping backchannel communications open.

It is in Azerbaijan’s interests to reconcile or at least reduce the negative atmosphere between its two key strategic partners Israel and Turkey, with Azerbaijan playing a significant role in the recent normalization process between the two countries. Baku also proposed setting up a trilateral regional format for strategic cooperation between Azerbaijan, Israel, and Turkey before the Hamas terrorist attack derailed the fragile Israeli-Turkish ties with Erdoğan siding with Hamas.

Overall, it is worth noting that both Azerbaijan and Israel benefit strategically from their partnership in various fields. The contribution of their relationship to the security environment of the South Caucasus and the Middle East is important as it also opens new opportunities.

The role of Azerbaijan in easing the tension in Turkish-Israel ties becomes more significant with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Azerbaijan and Israel have both stood firm during geopolitical crises, protecting their strategic ties and blocking third-party attempts to influence them, thereby proving that their partnership is reliable and mutually beneficial.

Rufat Ahmadzada is a graduate of City University London. His research area covers the South Caucasus and Iran. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Azerbaijan-Israel Strategic Relationship Proves Its Importance was originally published on Global Security Review.

This report asserts that the United States is at a critical inflection point in global security,  facing mounting threats from an increasingly assertive China, a resurgent Russia, and a shifting nuclear landscape characterized by rapid technological advancements and diminished international agreements. This week we underscore the critical juncture at which the US finds itself—facing nuclear, economic, and strategic challenges requiring unwavering resolve and bipartisan cooperation.  Here are some highlights:

Quotes of the Week

1. Chelsey Wiley (IISS): “US–China tensions could lead to heightened security concerns for allies.”
   • Editor’s note: The focus must remain on countering China’s threats, not shifting blame to the US.
2. Admiral Tony Radakin (UK): “The third nuclear era is more complex, with proliferating technologies and absent security architectures.”
3. Palantir CEO: “Adversaries need to wake up scared; peace comes through strength.”
4. Rep. Chuck Fleischmann (R-TN): “Modernizing our nuclear deterrent ensures the US remains the global superpower.”

Essay of the Week

“Call it Chinese Communist Imperialism” by Christopher Ford (NIPP)

• Explores China’s military expansion and its quest for global influence.
• Highlights its nuclear ambitions and parallels with historical imperialism.
• Advocates for robust US policies to counter these threats.

Congressional Update

• FY25 NDAA: Approved at $895 billion, fully funding nuclear initiatives and strengthening deterrence.
• Key provisions:
  • Full funding for ICBMs and submarine components of the TRIAD.
  • Establishment of a unified Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Matters.
• New Congressional Members:
  • 78 new members, with significant additions to defense committees.
  • Focus on battleground states with strategic implications for military readiness.

Strategic Developments

1. China’s Nuclear Expansion:
   • Accelerating development of fast-breeder reactors for weapons-grade plutonium.
   • Collaboration with Russia raises global security concerns.
2. CSIS Wargaming:
   • Highlights the risk of nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
   • Diplomacy and readiness key to preventing catastrophe.
3. Third Nuclear Age:
   • UK and US emphasize increasing complexity in global nuclear threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea.

Reagan Defense Forum: Key Takeaways

1. Panel 1: Indo-Pacific Challenges
   • Admiral Paparo stressed the urgency of deterrence in the face of China’s ambitions toward Taiwan.
   • Marine Corps General Eric Smith: “What would you pay not to lose a war? Everything and anything.”
2. Panel 2: Innovation in Defense
   • Heidi Shu: Encouraged bolstering supply chains and supporting small, innovative companies.
   • Senator Todd Young: Warned about biological threats and vulnerabilities tied to US-China economic ties.
3. Peace Through Strength:
   • Reinforced the need for defense investment to deter adversaries and maintain global stability.
   • Palantir CEO emphasized America’s role as a dominant power, inspiring both fear in adversaries and confidence in allies.

Read The Full Report

ICBM EAR Report December 8th was originally published on Global Security Review.

One example is instructive. The rate at which aircraft locations are electronically manipulated, “spoofed,” increased 500 percent in the first three quarters of 2024. An average of 1,500 flights a day were impacted by the beginning of September. In a recent survey of almost 2,000 flight crew members, 70 percent described their concerns about the impact on aviation safety as either “very high” or “extreme.”

The world depends upon signals from GPS and other global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) to underpin virtually every technology. Yet the essential positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) service they provide is incredibly vulnerable.

Weak and Vulnerable Signals

These signals from space are, of necessity, very weak. The sun shining produces stronger radio signals than a GPS satellite. Yet, through a miracle of technology, receivers on earth can find coded signals in the radio noise floor, decipher them, and tell Americans where they are and the exact time.

Exceptionally weak signals mean that almost any interference on the right frequency can prevent them from getting through. For less than ten dollars, delivery drivers looking to electronically hide from their employers, people worried about being tracked by their spouse or the government, and bad actors wanting to disable receivers can buy a GPS “jammer” from any number of internet vendors. Such sales are illegal in most countries, as is the use of such devices. However, enforcement is almost always lax or nonexistent.

Keep in mind, signal specifications were made public as part of GPS becoming America’s “gift to the world,” with the US government encouraging GPS’s broad use. Other GNSS operators did the same.

While incredibly successful in promoting the wide adoption of signals, it has also facilitated spoofing. Compounding the problem, advances in digital technology brought inexpensive software-defined transmitters into the world. Now, for a few hundred dollars, a reasonably sophisticated hobbyist can easily imitate GPS and other satellite navigation signals.

The necessity of PNT services for everyday life and over-reliance on GPS/GNSS for PNT makes the vulnerability of signals to denial and imitation a primary weapon in conflicts around the globe.

This impacts millions of those not involved in these conflicts because any receiver within line-of-sight of the interfering transmitter can be affected. Thus, cell phone systems in Finland are degraded by drone defenses in St. Petersburg. First responders across the Middle East must use paper maps because of ongoing conflicts. Ships and aircraft, hundreds of miles from military actions, lose their navigation and collision avoidance systems. Given the number of conflicts around the planet, many regions of the world are adversely affected.

To date, appeals by international maritime and aviation professional organizations have failed to make an impact on the problem. The same is true for resolutions by the United Nation’s International Maritime Organization and International Civil Aviation Organization. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU), which seems to have the principal jurisdiction for this, is proving similarly ineffective.

At its World Radio Conference in December 2023, ITU delegates approved what, at first glance, appears to be a strong resolution enjoining member states to refrain from interfering with GNSS signals. The only way the resolution could pass was with an exception allowing interference “for security or defense purposes.” It is hard to imagine any other reason for which a state would disrupt signals.

Despite the failures of international diplomacy to mitigate this growing problem, there is likely a path for it to be much more successful. Attacks on GPS and other GNSS signals are useful only because most nations and systems over-depend on them with few alternatives.

Fortunately, many countries are actively considering establishing robust and resilient terrestrial PNT systems to complement signals from space. These can provide GPS-like information, but do not have common vulnerabilities and failure modes with GNSS.

The US Department of Transportation, the lead in America for civil PNT issues, said that intelligently using a combination of independent signals from space, terrestrial broadcast, and fiber cable can be the foundation of a resilient national PNT architecture.

Establishing such a system of systems will not make the services invulnerable. However, it will make them hard enough to disrupt so that antagonists will look elsewhere for opportunities to create mischief. Some nations are already taking significant steps toward achieving such resilience.

South Korea and Saudi Arabia field high-power terrestrial systems that provide PNT. The United Kingdom fields a partial system and seems poised to expand it, as well as a deployable capability. Much of Russia is also served by such a system.

China has the world’s most complete and advanced resilient PNT architecture. It includes three constellations of satellites in different orbital planes, an extensive terrestrial broadcast system, and a 20,000-kilometer fiber timing network with 295 “timing stations.”

Yet much of the world remains vulnerable to disruption. Those who interfere are therefore incentivized.

International diplomacy, in the form of the United Nations, can help improve the inevitable transition to resilient PNT by encouraging states to implement sovereign terrestrial systems. These systems will complement and cooperate with GNSS, while also operating independently.

As part of this effort, international standards can be developed to ensure aircraft, ships, and vehicles are able to seamlessly transit between nations. Technical assistance can be provided to nations with little local expertise in the field.

These efforts will greatly reduce the incentive to interfere with GNSS, thereby making it safer and more reliable. It will also reinforce the sovereignty and security of every involved nation.

The alternative is to continue down the path of increasing interference and increasing risk to life and property. Safety margins are already impacted. Ships are already colliding, and passenger aircraft are nearly straying, unannounced, into hostile airspace, all because of spoofing. It is only a matter of time before the world witnesses an avoidable tragedy.

The international community, perhaps in the form of a United Nations task force, must intervene to protect these fragile signals from space and disincentivize future disruptions.

Safer and more reliable signals from space and resilient sovereign terrestrial PNT are in the long-term interest of every nation. Diplomatic efforts must illuminate that shared interest bring parties together and nurture progress for everyone’s benefit.

Dana A. Goward is President of the Resilient Navigation and Timing Foundation, www.RNTFnd.org, an educational and scientific charity. He is a member of the president’s National Space-based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory Board and formerly served as the maritime navigation authority for the United States. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

How Diplomacy Can Save GPS was originally published on Global Security Review.

Hypersonic technology encompasses both aircraft and missiles that travel at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound. These vehicles leverage advanced propulsion systems, such as scramjets (supersonic combustion ramjets), to achieve and sustain such high velocities. The potential applications of hypersonic technology are vast, ranging from rapid global strike capabilities to enhanced missile defense systems.

However, interest in hypersonic technology is not new. Scientific research began during the Cold War, but only in recent years have significant breakthroughs been made towards advancing hypersonic technology from theory to practicality. The primary drivers of this renewed focus include advancements in materials science, computational fluid dynamics, and propulsion technology. Nations such as the United States, China, and Russia are at the forefront of hypersonic research, each vying for technological supremacy, with China and Russia attempting to challenge the status quo.

The strategic advantages of hypersonic technology are multifaceted. One of the most significant benefits is the ability to deliver payloads at unprecedented speeds, drastically reducing the time available for adversaries to detect, track, and intercept these threats. This capability enhances both offensive and defensive operations.

Hypersonic vehicles can reach their targets much faster than conventional missiles or aircraft. This rapid response capability is crucial in scenarios requiring immediate action, such as neutralizing high-value targets or responding to emerging threats. The ability to strike quickly and precisely could deter adversaries from initiating conflict, knowing that retaliation would be swift and devastating.

The high speed and maneuverability of hypersonic vehicles make them difficult to detect and intercept. Traditional air defense systems, designed to counter slower, more predictable threats, may struggle to adapt to the dynamic flight paths of hypersonic weapons. This enhanced survivability increases the likelihood of mission success, particularly in contested environments.

Hypersonic vehicles can cover vast distances in a short amount of time, providing global reach without the need for forward-deployed bases.

This capability is especially valuable for nations looking to project power and influence across the globe. It also reduces the logistical burden associated with maintaining overseas bases and allows for more flexible deployment strategies.

Despite their potential, hypersonic technologies face significant technological challenges. Overcoming these obstacles is essential for the successful development and deployment of hypersonic systems.

One of the primary challenges is managing the extreme heat generated during hypersonic flight. At speeds exceeding Mach 5, air friction can cause the surface temperature of a vehicle to reach several thousand degrees Celsius. Developing materials and cooling systems capable of withstanding and dissipating this heat is crucial to maintaining the structural integrity and performance of hypersonic vehicles.

The materials used in hypersonic vehicles must endure not only high temperatures but also extreme pressures and aerodynamic forces. Advanced composites, ceramics, and metal alloys are being developed to meet these demanding requirements. Researchers are also exploring innovative manufacturing techniques, such as additive manufacturing, to create components with enhanced durability and performance.

Maintaining control and accuracy at hypersonic speeds is another significant challenge. Hypersonic vehicles must navigate through rapidly changing atmospheric conditions, requiring sophisticated guidance and control systems. These systems must be able to make real-time adjustments to the vehicle’s trajectory, ensuring that it stays on course and reaches its intended target.

Developing reliable propulsion systems capable of sustained hypersonic flight is a major technological hurdle. Scramjets, which operate efficiently at hypersonic speeds, are still in the experimental stage. Achieving a balance between thrust, fuel efficiency, and structural integrity is critical for the success of these systems.

The deployment of hypersonic technology has profound strategic implications for global security. As nations race to develop and deploy hypersonic weapons, the balance of power could shift, necessitating new defense strategies and international regulations.

The development of hypersonic technology has the potential to trigger an arms race among major powers. Nations may feel compelled to develop their own hypersonic capabilities or invest in advanced defense systems to counter these threats. This escalation could lead to increased military spending and heightened tensions on the global stage.

Hypersonic weapons could enhance deterrence by providing a credible and rapid response option. However, their deployment also raises the risk of miscalculation and escalation. The speed and unpredictability of hypersonic weapons could shorten decision-making windows, increasing the likelihood of accidental or preemptive strikes. That said, the opportunity to discuss potential gains and losses for both development and implementation of hypersonic weapons is an opportunity to help drive future strategy development.

Developing effective countermeasures against hypersonic threats is a priority for many nations. Advanced radar systems, directed-energy weapons, and missile defense systems are being explored as potential solutions. Integrating these technologies into existing defense frameworks is essential for maintaining a robust defense posture.

The proliferation of hypersonic technology underscores the need for international regulations and agreements. Establishing norms and guidelines for the development, testing, and deployment of hypersonic weapons could help mitigate the risks associated with their use. Diplomatic efforts to promote transparency and confidence-building measures are crucial for maintaining global stability.

Regardless of the naysayers, hypersonic technology represents the next frontier in military airpower, offering unparalleled speed, agility, and reach. While the strategic advantages are significant, the technological challenges and strategic implications cannot be overlooked. As nations continue to invest in hypersonic research and development, the race for air superiority will intensify, shaping the future of global security. Balancing the benefits and risks of hypersonic technology will be essential for ensuring a stable and secure international environment.

Joshua Thibert is a Contributing Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS) with nearly 30 years of comprehensive expertise, his background encompasses roles as a former counterintelligence special agent within the Department of Defense and as a practitioner in compliance, security, and risk management in the private sector. His extensive academic and practitioner experience spans strategic intelligence, multiple domains within defense and strategic studies, and critical infrastructure protection.

Hypersonic Horizons: The Next Generation of Air Superiority was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent decision by Hungary’s Prime Minister, Victor Orban, to open its borders to Russian and Belarusian immigrants is an example of a NATO member-state failing to see the large security implications of an act that is not directly tied to security. The mistake could, however, have broader implications for Europe.

Hungary’s recent decision to implement a liberal immigration policy, allowing Russian and Belarusian citizens to enter as guest workers without vetting or security checks, poses a significant threat because it will allow Russian agents, and there are certainly Russian agents mixed within the larger mass of migrants, to freely move within European Union (EU) member-states. With the policy also allowing guest workers to bring their family with them, without vetting for ties to the Russian military or security services, makes the concern that Russian agents will infiltrate Europe even more likely. Russian efforts to undermine European democracies through disinformation and misinformation is already well known. There is certainly no need to make the problem worse.

This policy flies in the face of an EU ban on Russian airlines to the Schengen Area (the borderless area inside the EU that does not require a passports for travel) and individual bans of hundreds of people connected to the Kremlin and the War in Ukraine. This is also contrary to the actions of many other EU countries. For example, Finland closed its border with Russia, preventing all immigration, noting serious security concerns.

Hungary did not consult with the EU or NATO. Strangely, this act took place while Orban is serving as the rotational head of the EU. The body is now considering legislation designed to halt Hungary’s immigration policy.

Orban is the only head of an EU or NATO member-state that maintains ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Orban is sometimes called a pawn of Putin and one of his “useful idiots”—a term used by Soviet leaders to describe unsuspecting collaborators in the West.

However, it is unclear whether or not Orban is aligning himself with Putin because of ideological similarity, economic necessity, or both. During his time in office, Hungary voted to sanction Russia in the European Parliament and even condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. More recently, however, Orban tried to rally Central Europe behind Russia.

The question regarding Orban’s motivations is vital because the EU needs to reverse this new policy as quickly and painlessly as possible or Russia will gain a significant strategic advantage. This is particularly important as NATO ramps up efforts to counter Russian aggression elsewhere across Europe.

The infiltration of Russian spies across Europe is no trivial matter. In Western democracies, personal freedoms make it harder to determine who is working for an adversary government. Once into the Schengen Area, movement is unchecked to 29 participating states. Given the recent attacks on the French high-speed rail line before the 2024 Olympics in Paris, there is clear reason to worry.

The attack that shut down France’s high-speed rail for almost a week was low-cost and required very little training on the part of the saboteurs. Simple arson and explosive attacks on the rail lines wreaked havoc on travel. The attack is suspected to have emanated from far-left French extremists, but that does not preclude Russia from encouraging, training, and equipping domestic groups from undertaking such attacks. The Russians also use their special forces for covert attacks against civil targets.

Hungary’s liberalization of immigration policy, favoring easy access for Russian and Belarusian citizens, is detrimental to the security of the European Union and NATO. At this early stage, Western leaders must ascertain whether it is possible to persuade Victor Orban away from openly supporting Russia in word and deed. This latest development gives Russia a strategic weapon that is useful in conducting warfare below the threshold of conventional war.

The Russians cannot be given greater operational freedom. It may become necessary to punish or alienate Hungary if it will not act in solidarity with other Western nations.

Dan Cox, PhD is a professor of political science at the US Army’s School of Advanced Military Studies. The views expressed are his own.

The Impact of Hungary’s New Liberal Immigration Standards was originally published on Global Security Review.

Vice President Kamala Harris certainly grasps the fact that voters respond to promise that their cost of living will come down, but they rarely understand the implication for the economy of government intervention. Harris’ calls for price controls on drugs and groceries and promises of tax cuts for the poor or benefits increases fails to explain how and who will pay for them.

At the same time, Donald Trump’s call for 10 percent tariffs on all imports and 60 percent tariffs on Chinese goods, plus his threat to deport many of the estimated 20 million illegal aliens currently in the United States, not only amounts to higher prices, but it will devastate the agricultural, restaurant, construction, and hospitality industries. It is certainly not a free trader perspective. Thus, neither party’s perspective offers a clear path to growth, offsetting tax hikes, like tariffs, or increased federal revenue with which to pay for all the benefits they are offering.

Since the US is both the principal and ultimate arbiter of international order, whose power rests on the sound management of its economy, both examples of this illiteracy endanger not just the American economy, but that of other states around the world. Worse yet, these examples of misconceived economic thinking come at a time when international challenges are rapidly multiplying. Indeed, bipartisan reports describe the American military as increasingly maladapted to contemporary and future threats.

These reports underscore the urgent need for comprehensive modernization, recapitalization, and increases of both conventional and nuclear arsenals due to mounting challenges from the axis of authoritarianism: China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Indeed, even the Biden administration, which cannot be accused of partiality towards nuclear weapons, has stated the need for modernization and investment in newer and more nuclear weapons and, recently, went so far as to alter nuclear employment guidance.

At the same time, Americans have equally urgent domestic pressures that must be seriously addressed but are not discussed. These include the need to reduce deficits, ensure long-term non-inflationary growth, increase the labor participation rate, maintain technological leadership, reform and simplify the tax code, and apply existing immigration law while determining if new laws are needed. Yet nobody is seriously raising these domestic issues let alone addressing the fact that a strong economy is needed to address defense challenges—and build the military needed.

For example, neither campaign mentioned that servicing the national debt, for the first time in history, exceeded defense spending in 2024. This fact represents an unmistakable sign of decline and is a canary in the coal mine that the nation must reduce domestic redistribution programs while also carefully employing military force when absolutely necessary.

Neither should a response to these challenges lead the nation, as some Republicans argue, into a new unilateralism that would isolate the US from its allies and lead to further chaos. Nor can the nation afford a progressive policy of ever greater spending on redistribution programs—without paying for them.

Both sets of delusional thinking ultimately bring about the worst of all possible outcomes. Americans will find themselves with a greater probability of war and lower economic growth.

It is time both campaigns’ economic policies are subjected to tougher scrutiny by the media and voters. They must be persuaded, if not compelled, by the exigencies of politics, to explain how they will pay for future needs, balance the budget, and confront well-known challenges.

This requirement should apply to defense modernization as well. If history is any guide, only a serious threat to the nation motivates government and industry to mobilize capability for the required defense buildup. The bipartisan reports, mentioned above, clearly suggest the United States is facing a similar threat to that faced by imperial Japan and Nazi Germany before World War II began.

Vice President Harris and former President Trump must address questions going far beyond the partisan bickering that is endemic of this election. Perhaps the September 10 presidential debate will offer some clarity on important issues.

Commentators suggest that this election is about generational change. This, however, is no guarantee that change is for the better. Eastern Europe experienced great change after 1945, but it was decidedly for the worse.

Thinking strategically about medium- and long-term challenges and consequences is imperative. The abiding delusion that American prosperity, world leadership, and security is unending and self-sustaining deserves a much more rigorous evaluation. The nation may very well be standing on a precipice, and it will be the next president who either pulls the nation back or sends it over the edge. Let’s hope it is the former.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The views expressed are his own.

Our Delusional Presidential Campaigns was originally published on Global Security Review.

It calls for a coordinated response using all available tools and those of member states. This includes dual-use space systems and services. However, the policy remains confined to an emphasis on resilience of space assets and confidence-building measures to clarify intentions behind various space activities. While this is not a bad thing, it does not express the European Union’s readiness to prevent and respond to space attack by deterring adversaries from hostile actions.

 Space Threat Analysis

The EU proposes an annual classified analysis of space threats called the Single Intelligence Analysis Capacity (SIAC), a system of systems where both civilian and military contributions are used for all-sources intelligence assessments. This integrates all space threat analyses within the broader EU threat analysis process. However, its key asset, the EU Satellite Center, requires timely geospatial and orbital intelligence capabilities. It needs to see that long-acknowledged technological shortcomings in early warning and conflict analysis  are effectively addressed.

Space Threat Response Architecture

When responding to space threats, the strategy calls for a comprehensive toolbox of joint EU state responses but goes no further in stating what these responses might look like. It does emphasize information-sharing and regular exercises. While the EU considers preventive and restrictive measures under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, it has yet to determine whether to treat attacks in the space domain as armed aggressions under Article 42(7) of the EU Treaty.

The EU rightly acknowledges the need to enhance the use of space for security and defense and intends to do so by integrating the space dimension into Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. Strengths include additional communication services through IRIS² and relying on assured independent access to space. IRIS² is the new EU secure satellite constellation which stands for Infrastructure for Resilience, Interconnectivity, and Security by Satellite. However, while IRIS² is a credible prospect, European independent access to space remains hindered by bureaucratic processes.

Indigenous Launch Capabilities

The EU made the strategic mistake of not developing any heavy lift reusable launch vehicles and the maiden flight of its expendable heavy lift launcher program, Ariane 6, is delayed until 2024. Even if successful, it will remain expensive and subsidized to survive. This led to contracting SpaceX for launch services for such EU mainstays as the Galileo navigation satellites.

Space Norms of Behavior

On norms for responsible behaviors in space, the EU reaffirms its commitment to norms and joined the US in condemning destructive anti-satellite missile (ASAT) tests. The strategy underscores the priority of dialogue with spacefaring nations and international organizations to ensure norm implementation. While the establishment of a structured dialogue on space norms between the EU, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the United Nations (UN) is a step in the right direction, the strategy falls short in acknowledging that normative cooperation alone will not deter adversary behavior. This is due in part to Russia and China’s opposition for such norms and their rapid buildup in ASAT weapons and other offensive space forces. In short, the EU is posturing for resilience, not deterrence.

Resilience-based Posture

Back to the very core of the EU Space Strategy for Security and Defence, which is to “enhance resilience and protection of space systems,” the document emphasizes the need for a common resilience framework, proposing the creation of an EU Space Information Sharing and Analysis Centre (ISAC). In the realm of defense space systems, EU member states tend to develop indigenous capabilities. The United Kingdom leads with the sixth-generation Skynet for military telecoms, followed by France’s Syracuse, and Italy’s Sicral. Despite attempts at common definitions, a shared system remains elusive. An exception is the joint high-speed communication satellite Athena-Fidus by France and Italy. The EU Commission aims for the GOVSATCOM system, providing secure government communications. Observation satellites for reconnaissance see France pioneering with Helios, while European collaboration efforts falter due to national-centric approaches and protective industrial interests.

Strengthen EU Space Industry

Overall, the intention to reduce European strategic dependencies on foreign-produced critical technologies, while keeping the industrial base for its civilian and defense value chains sovereign and competitive, is a good goal. This will be easier said than done, considering the entanglement of Europe with technologically advanced economies such as the US and Japan. Moreover, challenges stem primarily from economic dependency on China. The solution has been defined as “de-risking” rather than “decoupling.” It is not entirely clear how that might work.

In conclusion, the new EU strategy addresses challenges and outlines goals for strengthening capabilities and cooperation in the space domain. Unfortunately, it fails to address gaps in deterrence measures and consider the evolving geopolitical landscape to ensure the security of EU space systems. While Russia showed some restraint in orbital warfare by relying on non-kinetic and reversible capabilities against Ukrainian and Western space assets, there is no guarantee China would similarly restrain itself. Are the EU and its allies ready for prime time in a major space conflict? The answer to that question might come earlier than we think.

Christophe Bosquillon has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin.

European Union Space Strategy for Security and Defense was originally published on Global Security Review.