In his “Ile Longue” speech on March 2, 2026, French President Emmanuel Macron delivered a message that will echo across European capitals for years to come. For the first time, a European leader publicly articulated that France’s nuclear deterrent carries a distinctly “European dimension.” While the ultimate authority to launch remains the prerogative of the French President, Macron made it clear that an attack on a key European partner could trigger a French nuclear response. This is not a symbolic gesture: it reflects a growing recognition that Europe can no longer rely solely on the United States to guarantee its security. In a world where great-power priorities are increasingly transactional, Europe is beginning to define its own strategic boundaries.

The 2026 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) reinforced this reality. By designating Russia as a “European responsibility,” the strategy signals a deliberate shift: Washington will focus its conventional forces on the homeland and the Indo-Pacific Theater, leaving Europe to confront the Russian threat largely on its own terms. The nuclear umbrella remains intact, but the implicit promise of automatic conventional reinforcement is fading. Even seemingly peripheral actions, such as elevating Greenland to a primary U.S. homeland interest alongside the Panama Canal, highlight an unmistakable message: European security is now secondary to America’s own global priorities. Transactions, not guarantees, define the relationship, and Europe is taking note.

This strategic recalibration has deepened a credibility gap that European policymakers cannot ignore. Repeatedly questioning of NATO’s relevance, combined with explicit demands for Europe to “Buy American,” has underscored a harsh truth: the U.S. is no longer a guaranteed partner for long-term security. European arms imports from the U.S. surged to $68 billion in 2024, a fivefold increase over the 2017–2021 average, while American threats of trade countermeasures in response to “Buy European” procurement rules have reinforced the perception that collective defense is contingent on economic acquiescence. For many in Berlin, Paris, and Warsaw, the lesson is stark: security can no longer be assumed; it must be actively prepared.

Europe’s response has been both practical and psychological. The continent is actively building a more integrated and networked continental defense architecture, driven by a growing demand for strategic autonomy—particularly in areas such as drone defense, air and missile defense, and long-range strike capabilities. This effort reflects a gradual shift toward forward deterrence, in which credible conventional capabilities are positioned to signal readiness and resilience in the face of potential aggression. Forward deterrence, therefore, is not simply about stationing troops or deploying hardware; it represents a broader strategic mindset in which Europe seeks to reduce its structural dependence on external guarantees. While European defense infrastructure is not yet fully independent of Washington, ongoing investments and integration efforts indicate a clear trajectory toward greater operational autonomy, with more robust capabilities expected to mature between 2025 and 2030.

Meanwhile, France and the United Kingdom through the Northwood Declaration are exploring ways to “Europeanize” their nuclear forces, offering broader protection to allied partners while retaining national control over launch decisions. Macron’s speech embodies this principle: strategic assets—including Rafale jets and the planned next-generation nuclear submarine, “The Invincible”—can now be dispersed across allied territory to provide strategic depth and complicate adversary calculations. For the first time, non-nuclear partners such as Germany and Poland are participating in joint exercises that directly interface with French nuclear capabilities. The psychological message is clear: Europe is beginning to assert a sovereign layer of deterrence that complements, rather than replaces, NATO’s structures.

Poland’s recent statement that it may eventually seek its own nuclear weapons, as President Tusk indicated, also highlights the accelerating sense of urgency in Eastern Europe. So here the question arises that While Macron’s “Europeanized” nuclear deterrent provides a layer of strategic depth, then why Poland seeks to own nuclear weapons? The answer is that Macron’s forward deterrence is not scaled to cover the entire continent comprehensively, particularly in regions most exposed to Russia. For Warsaw, the calculus is simple: if U.S. guarantees are increasingly transactional, and if NATO’s nuclear planning remains centered in France and the U.K., then relying solely on allied deterrence is insufficient.

This development illustrates two broader dynamics. First, it highlights the limits of “second-layer” nuclear deterrence. Even with France operationally dispersing assets and including non-nuclear allies in exercises, some countries may feel compelled to consider independent capabilities to ensure credible protection. Second, it signals that Europe’s forward deterrence is moving from theory into practice, not only in doctrine and exercises but in actual national policy deliberations. Warsaw’s potential pursuit of nuclear weapons is less a provocation than a symptom of the same trend already evident in France and Germany’s expanded conventional and nuclear postures: Europe is taking responsibility for its own security.

Hence, Macrons’ speech represents a redefinition of European strategic autonomy. Between 2021 and 2024, EU defense spending rose by 30 percent, reaching €326 billion, signaling a growing recognition that reliance on Washington alone is no longer sustainable. European governments are investing not just in hardware, but in doctrine, interoperability, and the credibility of their deterrent posture. Strategic autonomy, once rhetorically flourishing, has become an existential imperative. Forward deterrence and strategic autonomy are complementary layers of security designed to mitigate the risk of over-reliance on an American partner whose priorities may shift.

Europe is thus navigating a delicate balance. It is neither abandoning NATO nor discarding the U.S. nuclear guarantee. Instead, it is learning to prepare for a future in which guarantees are no longer unconditional. The era of unquestioned extended deterrence is ending, and the continent must act with foresight. Forward deterrence is more than a strategic posture; it is a signal to Moscow, to Washington, and to Europe’s own citizens that the continent is willing and able to take responsibility for its own defense.

Europe is no longer a passive theater under American protection. It is a region preparing to defend itself, thoughtfully and decisively, in a strategic environment defined by uncertainty, transactional alliances, and shifting global priorities. Macron’s “Ile Longue” speech may have been delivered in France, but its message resonates across the continent: the future of European security will be determined not by the automatic extension of U.S. deterrence, but by Europe’s own willingness to claim responsibility for its survival.

Qurat-Ul-Ain Shabbir, a PhD scholar at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, is currently serving as a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies AJK. Her research interests lie in the global nuclear order and geopolitical dynamics. The views of the author are her own.

Beyond the American Umbrella: Europe’s Turn to Forward Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific increasingly occurs in the grey zone, the space between routine statecraft and open armed conflict. China, North Korea, Russia, and Iran employ a range of coercive tactics designed to alter the strategic environment without triggering a conventional military response. These activities include cyber operations, maritime harassment, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, and limited military provocations. Because these actions remain deliberately below the threshold of war, they often exploit the reluctance of states to respond with force. As grey zone competition intensifies, the question confronting policymakers is not only how to deter such activities, but also how to ensure that responses to them are credible. In this context, a nuclear alliance could serve as the ultimate strategic backstop for military responses to persistent grey zone coercion.

Grey zone strategies rely heavily on ambiguity and escalation management. The states that employ these tactics understand that their adversaries—particularly democratic states—are cautious about escalating disputes into major military confrontations. By operating just below the threshold of armed conflict, grey zone actors seek to gradually erode the strategic position of their opponents while avoiding a decisive response. Maritime coercion in disputed waters, persistent airspace incursions, cyber intrusions, and limited military demonstrations all serve this purpose. Over time, these actions can reshape the operational environment, undermine alliances, and weaken the credibility of deterrence.

The difficulty lies in crafting responses that are both proportionate and credible. Conventional military responses to grey zone activities risk escalating a crisis if they are perceived as excessive, yet insufficient responses can embolden further coercion. This dilemma has led analysts to argue that deterrence in the grey zone requires a layered approach that combines political, economic, and military tools. However, even robust conventional responses may prove insufficient if adversaries believe that escalation dominance ultimately rests in their favor. It is in this context that nuclear deterrence retains enduring strategic relevance.

A nuclear alliance would not be designed to deter grey zone activities directly. Nuclear weapons are instruments of last resort intended to deter existential threats and large-scale conventional aggression. Nevertheless, the presence of a credible nuclear backstop fundamentally shapes the broader strategic environment in which grey zone competition occurs. By reinforcing the credibility of allied military responses, nuclear deterrence can prevent grey zone crises from escalating into major wars while simultaneously discouraging adversaries from testing the limits of conventional deterrence.

In practical terms, a nuclear alliance would strengthen escalation management in the Indo-Pacific. If regional states believed that their security rested on a collective nuclear deterrent, they would be better positioned to respond firmly to grey zone provocations. Maritime patrols, cyber countermeasures, and limited military deployments could be undertaken with greater confidence that adversaries would hesitate to escalate beyond the conventional level. In this sense, nuclear deterrence functions as a strategic umbrella under which lower-level military responses can occur without triggering uncontrolled escalation.

The experience of the Cold War offers a useful historical precedent. During that period, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization relied on nuclear deterrence to prevent large-scale aggression by the Soviet Union while simultaneously engaging in conventional competition across multiple domains. Although grey zone tactics—including espionage, proxy conflicts, and political interference—were common, the presence of a credible nuclear deterrent helped ensure that such competition did not escalate into direct war between nuclear powers. A similar logic could apply in the Indo-Pacific today.

In the contemporary regional context, a nuclear alliance could involve close coordination among the United States and key Indo-Pacific partners. Such an arrangement would not necessarily require the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Instead, it could mirror existing extended deterrence frameworks in which nuclear-armed states provide security guarantees to non-nuclear allies while maintaining operational control over nuclear forces. Through mechanisms such as joint planning, strategic consultation, and integrated command structures, allied states could strengthen the credibility of collective deterrence without undermining existing non-proliferation commitments.

Importantly, a nuclear backstop would also reinforce political resolve among allied states. Grey zone strategies often aim to exploit divisions within alliances by testing whether partners will respond collectively to incremental coercion. If adversaries perceive hesitation or disunity, they may conclude that the risks of escalation are manageable. A formal nuclear alliance could signal a high level of strategic commitment among participating states, thereby increasing the perceived costs of continued grey zone pressure.

Critics may argue that linking nuclear deterrence to grey zone competition risks lowering the nuclear threshold or introducing unnecessary escalation dynamics. These concerns highlight the importance of clearly defining the role of nuclear weapons within a broader deterrence framework. The objective would not be to threaten nuclear retaliation for minor provocations, but rather to ensure that adversaries understand that attempts to escalate beyond the grey zone could encounter a unified and credible deterrent response. In this sense, nuclear deterrence functions as a stabilizing force that sets clear limits on how far coercion can be pushed.

As the Indo-Pacific becomes the central arena of strategic competition, the persistence of grey zone tactics will continue to test existing security arrangements. States that rely solely on conventional responses may find themselves locked in a cycle of incremental coercion that gradually shifts the balance of power. By contrast, a nuclear alliance would provide a strategic foundation that reinforces the credibility of allied military responses across the escalation spectrum.

Ultimately, understanding grey zone actors and the tactics they employ is essential for effective deterrence. Yet deterrence also requires credible escalation management and the assurance that adversaries cannot exploit the space between peace and war indefinitely. In the Indo-Pacific, a carefully structured nuclear alliance could provide the strategic backstop necessary to ensure that responses to grey zone coercion remain both credible and effective while preventing escalation into catastrophic conflict.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 3: A Nuclear Alliance as the Ultimate Backstop to Grey Zone Coercion was originally published on Global Security Review.

According to Reuters, the first point calls for “Ukraine’s sovereignty to be reconfirmed.” It does this by partitioning a sovereign state victimized by unprovoked aggression. Equally odd is the fact that the agreement would be signed by a regime in Moscow that does not recognize Ukraine as a sovereign state.

The second point suggests, “There will be a total and complete comprehensive non-aggression agreement between Russia, Ukraine and Europe.” However, such agreements were in force in 2014 when Russian President Vladimir Putin launched his first invasion of Ukraine.

In 1994, Russia pledged to “refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.” In 1997, Russia signed a treaty with Ukraine pledging “mutual respect, sovereign equality, territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders, the peaceful settlement of disputes, [and] the non-use of force or threat of force.” Russia violated all of these pledges.

The third point suggests “There will be the expectation that Russia will not invade its neighbors, and NATO will not expand further.” In addition to the 1994 and 1997 agreements, the United Nations Charter and Helsinki Final Act include the “expectation” that Russia does not invade its neighbors. Russia currently occupies parts of Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) embraces an open-door policy. Any external limitation on this policy impinges upon NATO’s independence, encroaches on the sovereignty of 32 member-states, sentences NATO aspirants to Russian vassalage, and serves as a green light to further Russian aggression.

Putin and his defenders believe Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 because Ukraine wanted to join NATO, but they have it precisely backwards; Ukraine wanted to join NATO because Putin invaded in 2014. Sovereign nations seek NATO membership because they distrust Moscow and view NATO as the surest route to security in Europe.

The fourth point stipulates, “A dialogue between Russia and NATO, moderated by the United States, will convene to address all security concerns and create a de-escalatory environment.” The US is a founding member of NATO—not a disinterested third party. To suggest the US could be a moderator between NATO’s chief adversary and NATO’s members is to undermine NATO’s unity.

The fifth point states, “Ukraine will receive robust security guarantees.” The guarantees are not robust by any reasonable definition of the term. They are limited and conditional.

To make matters worse, point six stipulates that, “The size of the Ukrainian Armed Forces will be capped at 600,000.” This undermines Ukraine’s sovereignty. Given Russia’s size, capabilities, actions, and aims, agreeing to this would jeopardize Ukraine’s future security.

The seventh point requires that “Ukraine agrees to enshrine in its constitution that it will not join NATO, and NATO agrees to pass in its bylaws not to accept Ukraine at any point in the future.” Not only did Putin make these demands before his 2022 assault on Ukraine, but it is now known that this 28-point plan is based on Russian proposals.

The eighth point guarantees that “NATO agrees not to station any troops in Ukraine.” This obliterates the notion of robust security guarantees and would leave Ukraine exposed to further Russian aggression. NATO members, if not NATO itself, will need to play a role in postwar Ukraine’s security.

The ninth point states that “European fighter-jets will be stationed in Poland.”
The use of “European” here, rather than “NATO,” raises further questions about the transatlantic bond, which has ensured deterrence in Europe since NATO’s founding. Are we to infer that US fighter-jets will not be stationed in Poland? They are there now on a rotational basis.

The tenth point states that American security guarantees are forfeit “if Ukraine invades Russia” or “fires a missile at Moscow or St. Petersburg.” This is gratuitous. Ukraine did not invade Russia in 2014 or 2022. Ukraine’s incursions and missile-strikes in Russia are a response to Russian aggression.

The thirteenth point states that Russia will be “re-integrated into the global economy” and “invited back into the G8.” Russia was expelled from the G8 because it invaded Ukraine in 2014. It is important to remember that the G7 was founded as a club of wealthy, industrialized, free-market democracies. Yeltsin’s Russia was none of those when it was invited into the G7 in 1998. Putin’s Russia is none of those today.

The fifteenth point says, “A joint US-Russian security taskforce will be established to promote and enforce compliance with all of the provisions of this agreement.” Elevating Russia to the status of American security partner ignores the fact that Russia is the main threat to the security of Ukraine and the rest of Europe. Sidelining NATO from any role in postwar security shows a disregard for the transatlantic community, for NATO’s capabilities in peacekeeping operations, and for NATO’s postwar planning.

The drafters of the 28-point plan are oblivious of the fact that NATO has an entire command focused on security assistance and training for Ukraine and that the British army developed plans to lead a multinational force in Ukraine. Are they opposed to NATO playing those roles?

The seventeenth point stipulates that “The United States and Russia will agree to extend nuclear non-proliferation control treaties, including the START I Treaty. This is fine in theory, but Russia is in violation of numerous arms-control treaties that served as the foundation of post-Cold War stability and security in Europe.

The eighteenth point is particularly troublesome for Ukraine. It requires, “Ukraine agrees to be a non-nuclear state.” In 1994, Ukraine surrendered its entire nuclear arsenal in exchange for Russia’s commitment to respect Ukraine’s “sovereignty” and “existing borders.” The free world’s failure to back up those words after Putin’s 2014 invasion not only set the stage for 2022, it crippled the cause of nuclear nonproliferation.

Russia’s war on Ukraine serves as an object lesson of the deterrent power of nuclear weapons—and the danger of not having them. Ukraine, South Korea, Poland, and others are pondering that lesson.

The twentieth point calls on Ukraine and Russia to “commit to education programs in schools and throughout their society that promote the understanding and tolerance of different cultures” and for “all Nazi ideology…renounced and forbidden.” Of course, Putin has pushed the lie that Ukraine is “not a real country,” that Ukraine was “entirely created by Russia,” and that Ukraine is governed by “a gang of drug addicts and neo-Nazis.” The irony about “Nazi ideology” is that by concocting phantom enemies, rewriting history, trying to rebuild a dead empire, and waging aggressive war, Putin is the one who is imitating the Nazis.

The twenty-first point recognizes Russian control over the territories it currently occupies; requires Ukrainian forces to withdraw from their own territory, which “they currently control;” and calls for that territory to be turned into a “demilitarized buffer zone.”

The twenty-second point calls on Russia and Ukraine “not to change these arrangements by force.” Force is the only language Putin understands. He has employed military force in Ukraine and Georgia and is probing NATO with drone attacks and sabotage operations.

The twenty-third point stipulates that “Russia shall not obstruct Ukraine’s use of the Dnieper River.” This underscores the perverse nature of this document. Russia should have no role, no say, and no ability to obstruct Ukraine’s use of the hundreds of miles of the Dnieper River that run through the heart of Ukraine.

The twenty-fourth point establishes “a humanitarian committee” to deal with issues related to prisoners, hostages, and “family reunification.” Such initiatives are only necessary because Russia abducted Ukrainian children; imprisoned Ukrainian civilians in “filtration camps;” and forcibly transferred thousands of Ukrainians to Russia.

Point twenty-five demands that Ukraine hold elections within 100 days. This echoes Putin’s talking points. The only way Ukraine and its NATO partners should agree to this is if Russia also holds OSCE-monitored elections within 100 days.

The twenty-sixth point declares that “All parties involved in this conflict will receive full amnesty for wartime actions.” This is another bonus for bad behavior. There would be no need for amnesty were it not for Putin’s war crimes.

The first of these crimes is the very way the war started; the 2014 assault on Crimea and the 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine constitute a war of aggression. However, that was only the beginning of Putin’s war crimes, which include targeting hospitals, population centers, and energy, food, and water supplies; destroying schools and places of worship; torturing and massacring civilians; and conducting a campaign of sexual violence.

Point twenty-seven declares the agreement will be “monitored and guaranteed by a Board of Peace, chaired by President Donald J. Trump.” The president of the United States has plenty of responsibilities to occupy his attention. Proconsul of postwar Ukraine should not be added to that list.

Finally, point twenty-eight calls for a ceasefire once the parties agree to the plan. The good news is that the plan presented by Washington is a dead letter. The better news is that European leaders used it as a starting point for a peace initiative that focuses on Ukraine’s sovereignty, Europe’s security, and NATO’s unity. Let’s hope a US-Europe compromise plan will emerge that brings Ukraine a step closer to an endpoint all people of goodwill can agree on, a sovereign and secure Ukraine in a stable and peaceful Europe.

Alan Dowd is director of the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.  Views expressed are his own. 

Points, Counterpoints, and Starting Points was originally published on Global Security Review.

Given these doubts, European political leaders have expressed a determination to increase their defense budgets and upgrade their armed forces and defense industrial bases. For example, European Community leaders met in early March to discuss the urgency of rearmament and the possible shift in American commitment to the defense of Ukraine and/or Europe altogether. The president of the European Commission noted that Europe faces a “clear and present danger” from the possibility of an asymmetrical peace agreement favorable to Russia followed by a more ambiguous American commitment to the defense of Europe.

European concerns are understandable, but the possibility that free Europe can establish a self-sufficient deterrent against further Russian political coercion or military aggression, apart from US security guarantees, is remote. An effort to bisect American national security from that of Europe would be politically unwise, weaken deterrence, and open the door to piecemeal disintegration of the transatlantic partnership that served leaders during the Cold War and thereafter. Four aspects of this issue merit specific consideration.

First, NATO is the strategic and military embodiment of shared security commitment and risk among member-states. NATO’s totality of conventional and nuclear military strength, supported by its political unity, is the linchpin for credible deterrence against Russian revanchism. Collectively, NATO members have the resources, including conventional forces for modern combined arms battle and the defense industrial base for protracted conflict, to deter any repetition of Russia’s invasion against Ukraine or any Russian attack on the alliance. American commitment to European defense ensures that its strategic nuclear forces support deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict, including possible Russian nuclear political coercion or first use.

Second, President Trump, on his best and worst days, tends to see international relations as entirely transactional. This may work when dealing with trade or tariff matters but not matters of war and peace. American entanglement with the security of Europe is not only transactional; it is also existential. European and American defense and deterrence requirements are joined at the hip, notwithstanding occasional spats and acrimony over the details of military planning and defense economic priorities. American politicians complain that the United States should try to avoid getting stuck in another “forever war” in Ukraine but Ukraine is not Iraq or Afghanistan.

A victory for Putin in Ukraine opens the door to European vulnerability that Russia will later exploit at a higher cost in blood and treasure for the United States and its European partners.

Therefore, it follows that the US decision in early March to suddenly suspend American military assistance and intelligence sharing with Ukraine was ill advised and poorly timed. Although holding back equipment deliveries might take some months to impact events at the front, failure to share timely intelligence could impact immediately on Ukraine’s ability to strike key Russian targets, including logistics hubs, command centers, and troop concentrations. Thus, the suspension sent the wrong message to Ukraine and to Russia about allied steadfastness as preliminary ceasefire and peace negotiations were taking place in Saudi Arabia.

Third, messaging of American commitment to peace and security in Europe also involves the decisions about modernization of the American nuclear deterrent and supporting infrastructure. This has a number of components. First, the US is replacing all three legs of its strategic nuclear triad. The Trump administration also wants to deploy the sea-launched cruise missile, to replace some existing nuclear warheads with upgrades, and to provide additional limited nuclear options for contingencies short of general nuclear war.

Fourth, American defense planning for each potential theater of war will continue to emphasize a spectrum of options including both conventional and nuclear weapons. The US must maintain credible deterrence against the combined forces of China and Russi, not only with respect to the possible outbreak of conventional war in Asia or Europe, but also with regard to the threat of nuclear first use or first strike against American allies or the American homeland.

In this respect, another challenge to deterrence lies in the increasing capability of conventional weapons for use against targets previously assigned to nuclear weapons, and, conversely, the attractiveness for some parties of low-yield nuclear weapons for use against targets previously assigned only to conventional weapons.

The challenges in meeting the preceding standards for deterrence in Europe and beyond are enormous. First, they include the evolving international security environment in which an emerging multipolar realignment places a coalition of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia at cross-purposes with US and allied visions for world order in Europe and Asia. Second, the challenges involve the significance of emerging technologies for long-range precision strike, missile and air defenses, cyber deterrence and war, space conflict, and continuing developments in autonomous warfare. Third, the costs for maintaining deterrence in Asia and Europe are enormous and Europe cannot expect the United States to foot the bill.

Some American allies in Asia and Europe expressed a willingness to increase their defense budgets and their degrees of readiness for local or regional conflict. More demanding times are ahead. In short, there is no “Eurodeterrent” without the United States and vice versa.

Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a distinguished professor at Penn State-Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Euro-deterrence and the Quest for Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.