China’s expanding force of dual-capable missiles is creating a growing source of ambiguity in U.S.-China deterrence. The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) operates conventional and nuclear missile forces, including systems capable of supporting either mission. Beijing continues to declare a no-first-use policy, and there is no straightforward evidence that Chinese leaders have deliberately lowered the threshold for nuclear employment. The more consequential concern is operational. During a crisis, U.S. forces may track a Chinese missile unit without knowing whether it is supporting a conventional or nuclear mission. A conventional strike against such a system could therefore be interpreted in Beijing as an attempt to degrade China’s nuclear deterrent.

Nuclear-Conventional Ambiguity in the PLARF

China’s stated nuclear posture remains comparatively restrained. Beijing describes its nuclear force as defensive and intended for retaliation and Fiona Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel find that Chinese strategists have viewed nuclear escalation as difficult to control once nuclear weapons are employed. Dual-capable systems therefore should not be treated as evidence that China intends earlier nuclear use. They do, however, complicate an adversary’s ability to distinguish conventional and nuclear operations.

The DF-26 provides the clearest example. The road-mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile can threaten Guam and conduct conventional land-attack, anti-ship, and nuclear missions. The U.S. Department of Defense assesses that the DF-26 was designed to allow rapid changes between conventional and nuclear warheads. Identifying a launcher, therefore, does not necessarily reveal its assigned mission. James Acton describes this as pre-launch ambiguity. An opponent may know the missile launch system while remaining uncertain whether it is configured for conventional or nuclear use.

China’s command arrangements reduce some risk but do not eliminate this ambiguity. A 2024 China Aerospace Studies Institute assessment finds that nuclear launch authority remains centralized under the Central Military Commission, while conventional PLARF forces can operate through joint campaign command structures. David Logan likewise argues that Chinese nuclear and conventional forces are less entangled than some assessments suggest, although risks remain around dual-capable systems. Organizational separation may reduce unauthorized-use risk, but it does not allow U.S. decision-makers to identify a dispersed unit’s mission with confidence.

Pathways to Inadvertent Escalation

The greatest escalation risk arises when U.S. conventional operations threaten assets that China associates with the survivability of its nuclear forces. In a

Taiwan conflict, U.S. forces could have strong incentives to strike PLARF launchers, sensors, communications systems, or command nodes supporting conventional missile attacks. Caitlin Talmadge has shown that such operations could also affect systems relevant to China’s ability to retaliate with nuclear weapons. Beijing could therefore struggle to determine whether U.S. attacks were limited conventional operations or the opening phase of a broader counterforce campaign.

China might respond by dispersing nuclear units, increasing readiness, or altering command-and-control procedures to preserve its retaliatory capability. Although Beijing could view those steps as defensive, U.S. officials might interpret the same activity as preparation for nuclear employment. Acton’s research on escalation through entanglement shows how attacks on systems supporting both nuclear and conventional missions can produce this kind of misread warning. Actions taken to preserve deterrence on one side can therefore appear threatening to the other.

The literature cautions against treating this pathway as inevitable. Wu Riqiang concludes that the overall probability of inadvertent U.S.-China nuclear escalation remains extremely low, citing the likely survivability of much of China’s nuclear force and strong controls over nuclear use. Logan similarly finds less entanglement than some earlier studies implied. These findings weaken claims that conventional conflict would naturally progress toward nuclear use, but they do not remove the narrower concern that dual-capable forces can make wartime actions harder to interpret.

The scale of that problem may grow as China expands its missile forces. The 2026 Nuclear Notebook estimates approximately 300 DF-26 launchers across eight brigades, while noting that not all are assigned nuclear missions. Henrik Staalhane Hiim, M. Taylor Fravel, and Magnus Langset Troan describe an “entangled security dilemma” in which measures to improve security taken by either China or the U.S. can increase the other side’s concern about nuclear-force survivability. Ambiguity can therefore shape broader perceptions of intent during a crisis.

Implications for Strategic Stability

U.S. planning should treat nuclear-conventional ambiguity as both a targeting and crisis-management problem. Before striking a PLARF launcher, sensor, communications system, or command node, planners should assess whether the target may also support nuclear operations and whether its destruction could be interpreted as part of a disarming campaign. This does not require excluding dual-use targets from conventional plans, but it does require weighing military value against escalation risk.

Risk reduction also requires mechanisms that can clarify intent during a crisis. Missile notifications, protected communication channels, and clearer procedures for signaling changes in nuclear readiness could reduce uncertainty without revealing sensitive operational details. China’s advance notification before its September 2024 Pacific ICBM test demonstrates that limited transparency around strategic missile activity is possible. U.S. and allied exercises should also include ambiguous PLARF movements and attacks on dual-use systems so that decision-makers confront these risks before an actual crisis.

China’s dual-capable missiles do not demonstrate that Beijing has abandoned no first use or deliberately lowered its nuclear threshold. The more important concern is that this threshold may become harder for an adversary to identify during conventional conflict. If U.S. operations threaten assets associated with China’s nuclear deterrent, defensive measures taken by either side could be interpreted as preparation for escalation. Managing that uncertainty will become increasingly important to strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Peyton Mayer is a doctoral student in Business Administration at Edgewood College whose research spans finance, Chinese military strategy, and international security. He is a U.S. Army veteran with six years of military intelligence experience and a professional background in trade compliance and export control policy. His published scholarship examines PLA doctrine and Indo-Pacific security, with broader interests in economic statecraft, emerging technologies, and strategic competition. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

China’s Dual-Capable Missiles and Inadvertent Nuclear Escalation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Space exploration has expanded dramatically in scope, actors, and applications. This growth has fueled innovation for humanity but also produced congestion, competition, and rising security concerns. As more States rely on satellites for national security and civilian needs, counterspace capabilities have evolved in parallel. Secure World Foundation declared co-orbital weapons as one of the counterspace capabilities in its Global Counterspace Threat Assessment (2026). It defines a co-orbital weapon as “weapons that are placed into orbit and then maneuver to approach the target to attack it by various means, including destructive and non-destructive.” 

Rendezvous and Proximity Operations (RPOs) technologies are inherently dual-use and come under the umbrella of co-orbital weapons. Rendezvous is the process of intentionally bringing two or more space objects into an orbit by orbital maneuvers such as “matching the plane altitude and phasing.” Proximity operations are a series of maneuvers a satellite does in the same or nearly the same orbit in the vicinity of another space object for a specific time duration to accomplish mission objectives. 

RPOs have civilian and commercial uses such as refueling, repairing, on-orbit inspection, and life extension. However, RPO technologies can come under counterspace capabilities, as the intention of maneuvering a satellite can be misinterpreted. States’ risk assessment plays a key role in perceiving an RPO satellite as a threat or not. Moreover, RPO satellites can perform functions such as surveillance, disruption, or decryption of signals, jamming communication, interference with optical sensors, grabbing a satellite, and releasing high- or low-velocity co-orbital kinetic anti-satellite weapons.  

RPOs are not a new phenomenon. However, States are increasingly building sophisticated RPO technologies amid today’s space competition. The U.S., Russia, and China have conducted multiple RPOs and exhibited their capabilities. The U.S. does not have any dedicated program for developing co-orbital counterspace weapons; however, it conducted multiple RPOs in both Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO). These activities included targeting, tracking, and hit-to-kill (HTK) intercept technologies that can be potential co-orbital anti-satellite capabilities. The U.S. conducted 5 RPOs in 2025 in GEO that maneuvered closely to their own satellites and Chinese satellites as well. Moreover, the Delta 180 mission was a showcase of offensive capabilities such as physical collision to destroy a satellite. 

Russia has actively invested in and performed various RPOs in recent decades in both LEO and GEO. Russia is building its anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities out of the mothballs of the Cold War. Many satellites of the Cosmos series and Luch satellites were launched under RPOs for purposes such as co-orbit inspection, intelligence collection, and surveillance. Some of these satellites, such the Cosmos series, were co-planar with U.S. satellites. Such RPOs can result in supporting target identification and tracking, intercepting broadcasts, or jamming radio waves, thus hampering satellite communications. Russia did not explicitly test co-orbit hit-to-kill (HTK) weapons. However, it has assessed deployment of aerosol or cloud, and multiple subsatellites or payloads at low and high velocities. There are speculations that the Burevestnik program may have been launched by Russia to develop a co-orbital ASAT program. Russia can develop a co-orbital ASAT weapon by deploying a high-velocity payload. 

China is also a major actor in space. It has conducted various RPOs in both LEO and GEO. The first RPO by China was conducted in 2010 that involved SJ-12 and SJ-06F satellites. In 2025, China launched SJ-21 and SJ-12 02 for RPOs. The latter came within 60 km of the U.S. satellite USA336. The closest RPO was conducted by SJ-17, which had a robotic arm, which approached the target satellite within 1 km for detailed inspection. The potential military utility of Chinese RPOs is to demonstrate on-orbit space situational awareness (SSA), satellite servicing, inspection, and imaging capability. There is no publicly known evidence that China has tested any offensive co-orbital weapons to destroy any space object. 

RPOs of major powers tighten the security dilemma as States perceive others’ actions as offensive. There is a legal loophole in the Outer Space Treaty (OST) (1967) on RPOs. Some general clauses explain how a State should conduct an RPO, however, it is largely founded in the basic guidelines. For instance, Article XI of OST obligates States to inform the UN Secretary-General, the public, and the international scientific community. However, States only provide generic descriptions and avoid transparency. Similarly, Article IV (Registration Convention) requires States to register specific details, but they can register information that meets a general function to avoid revealing potential dual uses. Article XI (OST) suggests that States shall act with “due regard” to the other States’ interests. “Due regard” is vague, as inspecting and surveilling a satellite might not be considered as offensive as kinetic ASATs. There is no legal way to limit the extent of proximity between two satellites involved in RPO. Another problem that international space law cannot address is the intent of an RPO. States can undertake RPO for military purposes but publicly project it as peaceful uses. The absence of baseline norms increases the risk of misreading intent, which can prompt sudden escalation. 

 Conclusion 

Addressing RPO-related risks requires a multi-pronged approach centered on dialogue, transparency, and verification. States should begin by discussing agreed definitions of behavior for military space activities, as the phrase “peaceful exploration” is vague. A shared definition of threatening RPOs will help avoid any misinterpretation by any country. States shall make pre-notifications and avoid going into others’ “keep-out” zones, i.e., high-value GEO assets. A multilateral Space Situational Awareness mechanism would reduce the threat for States with weaker tracker systems. Defining an escalation framework for RPOs using clear vocab, for example, “likely benign,” “warrants inquiry,” and “imminent threatening, will avoid any offensive response based on perceived worst-case scenarios. Direct, fast-channel, bilateral crisis hotlines should be established to reduce miscalculation risk. 

Ultimately, RPOs are dual‑use technologies that can quickly be perceived as offensive. All major powers use them for inspection and imaging, yet proximity to another State’s satellites will always raise alarms. Without norms and transparency, RPOs risk triggering dangerous episodes in outer space. Major powers must prioritize stability and take concrete steps to prevent escalation and preserve peace in an increasingly contested domain. 

Areesha Manzoor is a Research Assistant at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, Islamabad, researching space politics. Her authorship includes articles and research papers on space politics. The views of the author are her own. 

Rendezvous and Proximity Operations in the Legal Grey Zone of International Space Law was originally published on Global Security Review.

India’s strategy of escalation dominance, aimed at acquiring the ability to control the pace, intensity, and outcome of a conflict at each successive rung of the escalation ladder, as well as termination on its own terms, is underway. There are indications of development of such a strategy. Conventional superiority, strategic signaling, ready-to-use nuclear forces, and crisis management are all examples. Its strategy of escalation dominance, coupled with damage limitation, is supported by multilayered missile and air defense systems and canisterization of its nuclear-capable missile for a ready-to-use force, as well as cyber and space capabilities.

These capabilities are considered key to a state’s escalation dominance strategy. However, India’s escalation dominance in South Asia is not only accelerating the intensity of the security dilemma by increasing its own security but also deepening the threat perception of the adversary—weakening the strategic stability of South Asia.

In 2004, India revealed its Cold Start doctrine, a limited warfighting offensive plan to achieve conventional objectives within a limited time frame. Later, two more doctrines, known as the Joint Doctrine for Indian Armed Forces and the Land Warfare Doctrine, were issued in 2017 and 2018.

Recently, the Indian government announced a joint exercise by the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force, named Cold Start, in the first week of October 2025. The exercise aimed to test drones and counter-drone systems that officials labelled as the biggest such drill to be conducted since the May India-Pakistan conflict.

On September 25, 2025, the Indian Ministry of Defense announced that India had conducted a successful flight test of a rail-based Agni-Prime intermediate-range ballistic missile (MRBM). This is the first railway-based ballistic missile, which the minister called “under a full operational scenario.” A rail-based launcher is considered a significant development since the missile can move freely across the national rail network. This  increases the flexibility of the system in terms of its operational capability and survivability, as well as its ability to be deployed quickly.

The development is part of India’s ongoing military modernization program by fielding more types of weapon systems. A rail-based launcher, compared to fixed silos and road mobile launchers, has the advantage of quick deployment, maneuverability, and greater chances of survivability. With the test, India has joined a select group of nations with this capability.

India’s counterforce capability, followed by emerging trends in its nuclear posturing and technological developments, play into Pakistan’s fears. Indian ambitions for conventional counterforce capabilities only increases Pakistan’s fears. Reportedly, India is also pursuing a missile capable of carrying a bunker-buster. Its potential to cause massive destruction could cross Pakistan’s threshold for nuclear use, thereby leading to a serious crisis.

These ambitions require expansion of India’s nuclear arsenal in terms of more missiles, more warheads, and more fissile material to fulfill the requirements of its emerging nuclear posture, which is detrimental to regional peace and stability. India’s pursuit of an escalation dominance strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan could be perilous and lead to retaliation and war, as true escalation dominance is rarely attainable in any confrontation.

It is not something that is a feasible policy objective. Ending conflict on favorable terms remains a perilous policy objective. This is the capability of a state to dictate the endgame of a conflict, ensuring that peace is maintained on its own terms, not the opponent’s.

Nevertheless, India’s policy of escalation dominance in South Asia is escalatory, while remaining elusive. The recent four-day conflict is the latest example of India’s objectives to end the conflict on advantageous terms militarily, economically, and diplomatically. For instance, after its strike inside Pakistan, the Indian government immediately started to claim the success of Operation Sindoor, praising its military capabilities and technological strides.

On the diplomatic level, India anticipated the international community`s response to the attacks and support for the Indian stance to strengthen its regional and international standings. However, the failure of the Indian strategy was exposed at the military level when India faced tough retaliation from Pakistan, resulting in the reported loss of its six jets, besides damage to its key military installations, including its costly defense systems. At the diplomatic and economic levels, Trump’s repeated claims of credit for ending the conflict question its long-held stance of strategic autonomy and rejecting third parties’ role in resolving the Kashmir dispute. After the ceasefire, Trump claimed that to end the conflict between India and Pakistan, his threat of extremely high tariffs was instrumental in reaching a ceasefire agreement.

India has been unable to achieve the desired outcomes from the conflicts it has initiated many times over the past two decades. Latest statements from the Indian military leadership also show that India is unsatisfied with the outcomes of its strategy. It is more useful to treat escalation dominance as a philosophical aspiration than as a feasible policy objective, especially against a country that has a qualitative edge over the initiator of the crisis. Therefore, advanced technologies could be decisive in any future conflicts, but it could be that reciprocal development can offer a counter-capability in the same-domain deterrence and thus may challenge escalation dominance. Pakistan’s policy of full-spectrum deterrence is instrumental in countering Indian ambitions at every level of the escalation ladder. India’s pursuit of escalation dominance complicates the regional security dynamics, which already lack institutionalized Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), a nuclear risk-reduction mechanism, and an arms control framework aligned with the emerging technologies.

Sher Ali Kakar is an Associate Director of Research with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Atta Ullah is a Research Fellow with a focus on Nuclear and Strategic Affairs at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), at BUITEMS Quetta. Views express in this article are the Author’s own.

India’s Strategy of Escalation Dominance was originally published on Global Security Review.