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		<title>Congratulations on Becoming the Secretary of Defense</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/congratulations-on-becoming-the-secretary-of-defense/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Michael Fincher]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 13 Feb 2025 13:14:57 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30044</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Secretary Hegseth, It is good to have a combat veteran as the new Secretary of Defense. It is also good to have someone who, while writing a book on the current state of the military, came to understand the difficulties service members face, why they choose not to resign or not re-enlist, and how hard [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congratulations-on-becoming-the-secretary-of-defense/">Congratulations on Becoming the Secretary of Defense</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Secretary Hegseth,</p>
<p>It is good to have a combat veteran as the new Secretary of Defense. It is also good to have someone who, while writing a book on the current state of the military, came to understand the difficulties service members face, why they choose not to resign or not re-enlist, and how hard it can be for some once they leave the service. That same research will also help you to eliminate the politicization that left the military hurting for recruits.</p>
<p>This understanding and experience will be helpful in correcting the course of the Department of Defense. Prioritizing warfighting capabilities and lethality over supporting the mission creep of bureaucracy is critical but antithetical to everything that is Washington, DC. The Pentagon was focused on budgets and bureaucratic infighting long before you arrived. The five-sided puzzle palace will fight back and has a long institutional memory.</p>
<p>Just remember, of <a href="https://www.fedsmith.com/2024/10/25/federal-employees-and-2024-political-donations/">all services and the department</a> itself, only the US Air Force Airmen gave more money to Republicans than Democrats. There is at least one ray of hope.</p>
<p>For decades the military has had its combat forces slashed, bases closed or consolidated, and weapon systems and platforms reduced or retired—all while the Chinese, Iranians, North Koreans, and Russians expanded their military capabilities and plotted the destruction of the international order Americans built. While the war on terror was lost by the very people who hate the fact that you are Secretary of Defense, you have an opportunity to right the ship before it is too late.</p>
<p>No doubt, you will receive more input on what you should do than you can possibly digest. Let me offer a quick list.</p>
<p>First, a sovereign state, by definition, controls its borders. That is a military function. Help President Trump secure the border. There is no such thing as acceptable illegal immigration.</p>
<p>Second, adopt the Weinberger Doctrine as your overriding strategy for the use of military force. You will never go wrong if you do.</p>
<p>Third, the military may be the best socialist system in the world, but it is time to overhaul the personnel system and bring it into the twenty-first century. The military is unique, but do not let that be an excuse.</p>
<p>Fourth, modernization and expansion of the nuclear arsenal must be your top spending priority. A bigger Army, conventional Navy, or conventional Air Force will not deter China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia; only a robust strategic and theater nuclear arsenal can achieve that objective.</p>
<p>Fifth, service members, particularly junior enlisted, have lived in <a href="https://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/photos-us-military-bases-show-mold-mice-roaches-brown-water-rcna168368">toxic base housing</a> for far too long. This problem should not make this list, but after two decades it has yet to be solved.</p>
<p>Sixth, remove the cancerous social and political activism that inundates the military. Nothing harms unity more than pitting servicemembers against one another because of their race, gender, or some other contrived distinction. Based on your initial actions, your efforts are already moving ahead.</p>
<p>Seventh, there is simply too much duplication across the services and within the services. Ensuring command opportunities should not lead to the creation of unneeded commands. The services are too small to be inefficient.</p>
<p>Eighth, <a href="https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/reforms-needed-reduce-delays-and-costs-us-shipbuilding">expand the number of combatant</a> ships, missile defense systems, and the combat air force. Neither the Navy nor the Air Force has the capability to wage a sustained campaign against a peer. Not only does the nation lack the delivery platforms, but it will go Winchester in a matter of days. Thus, every kind of weapon is also needed.</p>
<p>Ninth, take the time to reset the baseline and see what the military really needs to defeat the Axis of Autocracy. Is it <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/drone-swarms-new-threat-us-bases/">drone swarms</a>, <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/donald-trumps-iron-dome/">missile technology</a>, robots? Whatever the answer may be, it is unlikely exactly what we already have.</p>
<p>Finally, get very good at telling the American people why it is more important to spend tax dollars on the military than the entitlements they know and love. This is perhaps your biggest task. In 2024, the federal government took in $4.4 trillion and spent $4.6 trillion on entitlement programs alone. That is unsustainable. The federal government was never meant to take care of the health, retirement, and education of Americans. It was specifically tasked to defend the nation.</p>
<p>You have a big job ahead of you. Good luck. Americans want nothing more than your success. The safety of the country depends on it.</p>
<p><em>Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Congratulations-Secretary-Hegseth.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/congratulations-on-becoming-the-secretary-of-defense/">Congratulations on Becoming the Secretary of Defense</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/peace-through-strength-enhancing-americas-nuclear-deterrence-today/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/peace-through-strength-enhancing-americas-nuclear-deterrence-today/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin&nbsp;&&nbsp;Kirk Fansher]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 06 Feb 2025 13:39:18 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29995</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Immediately after being sworn in as the nation’s 29th Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth established three guiding principles: (1) restore the warrior ethos in everything we do, (2) rebuild the military, and (3) reestablish deterrence. According to Secretary Hegseth, “We don’t want to fight wars; we want to deter them.” This captures the essence of [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/peace-through-strength-enhancing-americas-nuclear-deterrence-today/">“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Immediately after being sworn in as the nation’s 29th Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth established three guiding principles: (1) restore the warrior ethos in everything we do, (2) rebuild the military, and (3) reestablish deterrence. According to Secretary Hegseth, “<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XxjK3bycsK4">We don’t want to fight wars; we want to deter them</a>.”</p>
<p>This captures the essence of the doctrine of “peace through strength.” As President <a href="https://www.rev.com/transcripts/trump-speaks-at-commander-in-chief-inaugural-ball">Trump described</a> during the commander-in-chief inaugural ball, “We will measure our success not only by the battles we win but also by the wars we end—and perhaps most importantly, the wars we never get into. It’s called peace through strength. Through our power and might, we will lead the world to peace, our friends will respect us, our enemies will fear us, and the whole world will admire the unrivaled greatness of the United States military.”</p>
<p>“Peace through strength” <a href="https://politicaldictionary.com/words/peace-through-strength/">refers</a> to accumulating and displaying forms of national power to create a favorable international environment. The phrase originates from the Roman Emperor Hadrian, who said, “Seek peace through strength, or failing that, peace through threat.” This concept shaped the strategy and goals of Western deterrence during the Cold War and should today. While America squandered its deterrence capabilities, its adversaries relentlessly pursued a deliberate strategy of “subjugation through intimidation.”</p>
<p>The ripening <em>entente</em> between Russia and China, alongside the alarming <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Article/3241858/remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-at-the-us-strategic-command/">rate of their expanding and diversifying nuclear arsenals</a>, is further complicated by an expanding <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10472">North Korean</a> nuclear capability. A <a href="https://www.ida.org/research-and-publications/publications/all/a/am/americas-strategic-posture">collaborative campaign of deliberate and opportunistic aggression</a> fueled by revisionist ambitions torments the South China Sea, is devastating Ukraine, and threatens Taiwan. These <a href="https://oxfordre.com/internationalstudies/display/10.1093/acrefore/9780190846626.001.0001/acrefore-9780190846626-e-607">malcontent states</a> seek to sow chaos, undermining the existing international order by altering its rules, resource distribution, recognition, territorial boundaries, and economic dominance. To impede these “mavens of malice,” the USA will need to rely on its most formidable hard-power option––nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Secretary Hegseth must drive the urgent regeneration of America’s nuclear deterrence capability and credibility. This will require an expanded and more capable American nuclear arsenal to effectively counter the mavens’ growing forces. The ongoing <a href="https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/american-nuclear-arsenal-guarantees-peace-213744/">$1.1 trillion nuclear enterprise modernization</a>, designed to meet the previous decade’s <a href="https://www.powerthesaurus.org/threatscape/definitions">threat</a>, is plagued by delays in nearly every major system and is insufficient to meet the growing threat of the next decade. The United States requires additional nuclear capacity to ensure deterrence tomorrow. Here are four proposals that President Trump and Secretary Hegseth could initiate tomorrow to enhance the warrior ethos and strengthen deterrence.</p>
<p>First, the United States should suspend participation in New START, as Russia <a href="http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70565">did</a> in February 2023. Regardless of Putin’s grievances, Russia’s actions purposefully undermine the rules-based international order. Given Russia’s consistent <a href="https://thehill.com/opinion/international/4443781-history-shows-that-no-ceasefire-or-treaty-with-russia-can-be-trusted/">history of treaty violations</a>, China’s <a href="https://nipp.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/Grant-OP-for-web.pdf">violation of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)</a>, and recent <a href="https://2021-2025.state.gov/2024-report-to-congress-on-implementation-of-the-new-start-treaty/">revelations</a> Moscow exceeded New START warhead limits in 2024, new arms control treaties are unlikely for the foreseeable future. Moscow perceives military and political advantage by not engaging in these matters, instead pursuing escalation dominance without fear of American reprisal. Participating in any treaty alone devalues the treaty process and demeans American credibility.</p>
<p>Second, the US must immediately cease all warhead dismantlement and begin urgent refurbishment of the remaining <a href="https://www.energy.gov/nnsa/transparency-us-nuclear-weapons-stockpile">2,000 retired warheads</a>. The provisions of the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act, including salvaging B83 nuclear bombs and W72-2 warheads from retirement, must be implemented immediately. In conjunction with the 2023 decision to build a <a href="https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3571660/department-of-defense-announces-pursuit-of-b61-gravity-bomb-variant/">B61-13</a>, the president should direct the reconditioning and deployment of every weapon in the active and inactive stockpiles to achieve full mission capability as soon as possible.</p>
<p>Third, the president should promptly adjust the posture of America’s current nuclear forces to strengthen deterrence. This includes redeploying stored warheads to re-MIRV the Minuteman III with <a href="https://www.twz.com/35352/test-of-minuteman-iii-icbm-with-three-reentry-vehicles-sure-seems-like-a-warning-to-russia">three warheads per missile</a>—as <a href="https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/24-07_02-29-2024_transcript.pdf">recently advised</a> by US Strategic Command’s commander, General Anthony Cotton. Adding nearly <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10519">800 warheads</a> demonstrates American resolve in the face of China’s and Russia’s nuclear modernization and expansion to reassure <a href="https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2024/02/06/Gallup-Chey-survey-North-Korea-nuclear-weapons-denuclearization/8841707211962/">allies whose populations</a> contemplate acquiring their own nuclear forces.</p>
<p>Reconfiguring denuclearized bombers to a nuclear-capable configuration and returning bombers to nuclear alert status is critical—with one-fourth of bombers postured for rapid takeoff to ensure survival. Dispersed bombers and supporting tanker aircraft on alert ensure a robust second-strike bomber capability, essential for credible deterrence, preserve employment options for the president, and complicate adversary targeting.</p>
<p>Adversaries cannot believe they can disrupt the crucial <a href="https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/america-needs-a-dead-hand/">detect-decide-direct </a>command and control chain necessary to respond to a nuclear first strike. They must never believe that a decapitating first strike could stop American retaliation. Therefore, alternative and mobile command centers should be continuously enhanced, staffed, and mobilized.</p>
<p>Fourth, rapidly deploying a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile (such as the TLAM-N or SLCM-N) is essential to counter the significant non-strategic nuclear weapons advantage held by both China and Russia. Former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger’s <a href="https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/annual_reports/1986_DOD_AR.pdf?ver=2016-02-25-102404-647.">report</a> emphasized these systems’ significance over four decades ago. Since 1984, the US regarded nuclear SLCMs on submarines and surface ships as cost-effective and operationally efficient options against a wide range of targets.</p>
<p>Weinberger favored nuclear SLCMs across multiple vessel types to complicate an attacker’s planning and enhance overall survivability of the force. At a minimum, the Navy’s <a href="https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169613/guided-missile-submarines-ssgn/">four <em>Ohio</em>-Class guided-missile nuclear submarines</a> could be rearmed with refurbished TLAM-N nuclear cruise missiles that <a href="https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/august/tactical-nuclear-weapons-sea">retired from service</a> around 2011. This would enhance the potential at-sea deterrent by 28 percent until the future SLCM-N comes online. Deployment of larger numbers of SLCMs will dramatically increase the size of the survivable sea-based deterrent and provide a viable nuclear-limited strike capability.</p>
<p>Increasing the number of bombers, missiles, and warheads in the active force enhances American military capabilities. <a href="https://nipp.org/information_series/keith-b-payne-and-mark-b-schneider-u-s-nuclear-deterrence-what-went-wrong-and-what-can-be-done-no-601-october-7-2024/">Once removed</a> from the constraints of New START, the <a href="https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169580/fleet-ballistic-missile-submarines-ssbn/"><em>Ohio</em>-class submarines</a> could be restored to their original capacity of 24 missile tubes, adding 56 submarine-launched (MIRVed) ballistic missiles. B-1 bombers should be <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/8th-air-force-commander-final-b-1-b-2-retirements/">retained rather than retired</a> and <a href="https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/b1rerole.pdf">reconfigured</a> for nuclear operations <a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/8th-air-force-commander-final-b-1-b-2-retirements/">to meet nuclear and conventional demand</a>s on an overburdened bomber force.</p>
<p>With global tensions escalating, the United States must reclaim its position of strength to maintain the peace through a powerful deterrent. Only swift and decisive action can preserve national security and safeguard the global order America forged. The strategic challenges presented by these mavens of malice demand the United States urgently strengthen its nuclear deterrent. Secretary Hegseth inherited a sluggish modernization effort that will not “<a href="https://www.airandspaceforces.com/hyten-says-us-must-be-clear-about-threats-and-act-faster/">go faster</a>”––unless it becomes a national priority.</p>
<p>A peace through strength doctrine urgently requires increased capacity and enhanced readiness. Suspending New START participation and returning to a pre-1991 deterrence posture sends a clear message. Any attempt to subvert the global order or threaten American interests will be met with resolute and overwhelming force.</p>
<p><em>Col. Curtis McGiffin (US Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. </em></p>
<p><em>Col. Kirk Fansher (US Air Force, Ret.) is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies, a graduate of the Yale School of Management, and President of Grey Wolf Advisors. </em></p>
<p><em> <a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Peace-Through-Strength.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></em></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/peace-through-strength-enhancing-americas-nuclear-deterrence-today/">“Peace Through Strength”: Enhancing America’s Nuclear Deterrence Today</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Peter Huessy]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Jan 2025 12:53:20 +0000</pubDate>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=29937</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>ICBM Ear for the Week of January 23, 2025 Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies Key Takeaways Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia: Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend. [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/">ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>ICBM Ear for the Week of January 23, 2025</strong></p>
<p><strong>Prepared by Peter Huessy, President of Geostrategic Analysis and Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrent Studies</strong></p>
<p><strong><u>Key Takeaways</u></strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Significant Military Budget Increase in Russia:</strong> Russia’s defense spending will rise by 25% to 13.5 trillion rubles (~130 billion euros), continuing its high military expenditure trend.</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Defense Leadership Changes:</strong> Senator Marco Rubio has been confirmed as Secretary of State, with several other key appointments, including Peter Hegseth as Secretary of Defense.</li>
<li><strong>Nuclear Policy and Strategic Posture Adjustments:</strong> Discussions on nuclear deterrence focus on the modernization of U.S. strategic forces, balancing deterrence against Russia and China, and the implications of extended deterrence.</li>
<li><strong>Iran’s Nuclear and Missile Capabilities:</strong> Reports indicate Iranian cargo vessels carrying crucial chemical ingredients for missile propellant, raising concerns about Iran&#8217;s growing missile capability.</li>
<li><strong>Ukraine Conflict and NATO’s Deterrence Mission:</strong> NATO leaders stress that a Russian victory would severely weaken the alliance&#8217;s credibility.</li>
<li><strong>U.S. Nuclear Strategy and Extended Deterrence Debates:</strong> Several officials emphasize the need for a robust and adaptable nuclear strategy to counter emerging threats from Russia, China, and Iran.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>International Developments</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Russia’s Defense Budget Expansion</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Russia&#8217;s military spending will increase to <strong>13.5 trillion rubles</strong>, estimated at <strong>7-8% of GDP</strong>, its highest post-Soviet military budget.</li>
<li>Significant investments in <strong>modernized nuclear and conventional forces</strong> to maintain strategic parity with the U.S. and NATO.</li>
<li>Russia’s total defense expenditure, when adjusted for purchasing power, rivals European military spending, highlighting its focus on long-term military capabilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Iran’s Missile and Nuclear Advancements</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Intelligence sources indicate <strong>Iranian cargo ships transporting missile propellant materials from China</strong>, raising alarms among Western security analysts.</li>
<li>Iran continues <strong>uranium enrichment</strong>, prompting <strong>warnings from the UN</strong> about Tehran’s growing nuclear capability.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>China &amp; Russia’s Nuclear Expansion</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>Reports predict that by <strong>2035, China and Russia will collectively hold over 11,000 nuclear warheads</strong>, posing a direct challenge to U.S. nuclear deterrence.</li>
<li>Concerns grow over <strong>China’s accelerated nuclear development</strong> and its integration into a broader strategic competition with the U.S. and Russia.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Key Strategic Issues on the Horizon</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Escalation Risks in Space Warfare</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>RAND Corporation study</strong> warns that <strong>Russia may escalate conflicts in space</strong> early due to its <strong>heightened fears of a U.S. first strike</strong>.</li>
<li>The study underscores Moscow’s <strong>increasing risk tolerance</strong> and potential responses to perceived U.S. threats in space.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>Ukraine’s Role in NATO’s Deterrence Strategy</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte</strong> warns that a Russian victory would weaken NATO’s credibility, requiring significant investments in deterrence.</li>
<li>U.S. extended deterrence remains <strong>under scrutiny</strong>, with debates over whether the <strong>Biden administration’s fear of escalation weakened deterrence against Russia</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>U.S. Strategic Nuclear Force Modernization</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>The <strong>U.S. Air Force confirms</strong> that the <strong>Sentinel ICBM and B-21 Raider</strong> will remain the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence until at least 2050.</li>
<li>Discussions continue over potential <strong>mobile ICBM systems, expanded long-range bombers, and additional dual-use aircraft</strong> to ensure nuclear survivability.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>‘Iron Dome for America’ Missile Defense System</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>President <strong>Trump’s proposal for a nationwide missile defense system</strong>—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome—is gaining momentum.</li>
<li>Critics call it <strong>overly ambitious</strong>, but proponents argue that it is essential to <strong>counter growing threats from China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Key Events</u></strong></p>
<p><strong>Upcoming NIDS Seminar (January 31, 2025)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Speakers:</strong> Shoshana Byren (Jewish Policy Center) &amp; Ilan Berman (American Foreign Policy Council).</li>
<li><strong>Topic:</strong> Iranian security threats to the U.S. and its allies, with a focus on Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong>NIDS conference at Truman Library (August 6, 2025)</strong></p>
<ul>
<li>A <strong>4-star USAF officer</strong> will serve as the featured speaker.</li>
<li>Expected discussions on <strong>extended deterrence, strategic stability, and nuclear policy</strong>.</li>
</ul>
<p><strong><u>Conclusion</u></strong></p>
<p>The <strong>ICBM Ear report for the week of January 23, 2025</strong>, highlights key developments in <strong>U.S. nuclear policy, global security challenges, and strategic deterrence issues</strong>. With <strong>Russia&#8217;s increasing military budget, Iran&#8217;s missile advancements, and China’s nuclear expansion</strong>, the U.S. faces <strong>a growing multipolar nuclear environment</strong>. Discussions on <strong>extended deterrence, arms control, and new strategic capabilities</strong> will shape U.S. defense posture in the coming years. The upcoming <strong>TRIAD Symposium and NIDS events</strong> will provide further insights into these critical security matters.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-Ear-for-the-week-of-January-23.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29877 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png" alt="" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ICBM-EAR-REPORT.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/icbm-ear-for-23-jan-25/">ICBM EAR for 23 Jan 25</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why SECDEF Austin’s Secret Hospitalization Really Mattered</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-secdef-austins-secret-hospitalization-really-mattered/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-secdef-austins-secret-hospitalization-really-mattered/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Curtis McGiffin&nbsp;&&nbsp;Adam Lowther]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Jan 2024 13:33:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=26826</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s recent hospitalization and revelations that key Pentagon and White House leaders, including President Biden, were unaware of his “incapacitation” for five days is concerning. The reason for such concern should transcend political criticism. Indeed, the real concern regarding the secretary’s uninformed absence relates to the negative impact on America’s nuclear [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-secdef-austins-secret-hospitalization-really-mattered/">Why SECDEF Austin’s Secret Hospitalization Really Mattered</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin’s recent hospitalization and revelations that key Pentagon and White House leaders, including President Biden, were <a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/us/did-pentagon-chief-austins-secret-hospitalization-break-rules-2024-01-09/">unaware of his “incapacitation” for five days</a> is concerning. The reason for such concern should transcend political criticism. Indeed, the real concern regarding the secretary’s uninformed absence relates to the negative impact on America’s nuclear deterrent.</p>
<p>One of the most valuable qualities of American nuclear credibility is its incorporation of responsible authority to ensure nuclear command and control (<a href="https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter2.html">NC2</a>), which is the exercise of authority and direction over nuclear weapons by the president as the chief executive and head of state. According to the Congressional Research Service’s <a href="https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10521"><em>Defense Primer</em></a><em>: Command and Control of Nuclear Forces</em>:</p>
<p>The US President has sole authority to authorize the use of US nuclear weapons. This authority is inherent in his constitutional role as Commander in Chief. The President can seek counsel from appropriate military advisors; those advisors are then required to transmit and implement the orders authorizing nuclear use. The President does not need the concurrence of the US Congress to order the launch of nuclear weapons, and neither the military nor Congress can overrule these orders.</p>
<p>The US Constitution and the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 <a href="https://www.usa.gov/presidential-succession">provide a framework for the order of succession</a> in the event of presidential incapacity or demise. If a president cannot fulfill the duties of the office, including those of NC2, another designated government leader will take over in a specific order. The secretary of Defense is sixth in line for the presidency, following the vice president, speaker of the House, president pro tempore of the Senate, secretary of State, and secretary of the Treasury. Any cabinet member or elected official in an office identified in the line of succession, but is <a href="https://www.factcheck.org/2008/05/presidential-eligibility-and-the-line-of-succession/">not a natural-born citizen</a>, cannot become president.</p>
<p>In addition to being one of the president’s key advisors during a nuclear decision event, the secretary of Defense is a key “designated survivor” option for presidential succession planning. During the Eisenhower administration, officials introduced “continuity of government” to prepare for a possible Soviet nuclear attack. Maintaining constitutional legitimacy during the Cold War was important if the president or his successor were killed. Because of the awesome responsibility, those in presidential succession <a href="https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/state-union-designated-survivor/story?id=28329585">receive appropriate training</a>. Knowing where each of those government officials identified in the presidential line of succession, like the secretary of Defense, remains paramount to national survival.</p>
<p>Two congressmen, Jimmy Panetta and Ted Lieu, <a href="https://ucs-documents.s3.amazonaws.com/global-security/letter-president-biden-nuclear-command-and-control-authority.pdf">requested</a> President Biden “consider modifying the decision-making process the United States uses in its command and control of nuclear forces.” The congressional authors noted, “You alone possess the authority to order the use of nuclear weapons, which assures that nuclear weapons remain under civilian control.” They also advocated that the secretary of Defense be required to certify that the “launch order is valid,” presumably even in a second-strike nuclear retaliation. However, adding this caveat to the president’s already compressed nuclear decision timeline could lead to negative impacts, especially in light of Austin’s incapacitation.</p>
<p>By the 1950s it was well known that the president’s office is vulnerable to a decapitation strike, especially a nuclear one. According to a 1975 Institute for Defense Analysis Study, “<a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA331702.pdf">The unique role</a> of the President as the Commander in Chief, as well as Chief Executive, and his particular statutory powers with regard to nuclear weapons, made the survival of the presidency—the office if not the man, indispensable for legitimate nuclear action.” A 1969 blue ribbon defense panel convened by President Nixon <a href="https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/19348-national-security-archive-doc-20-l-wainstein-et">concluded</a>:</p>
<p>It is stated US policy to retaliate only in the event of unmistakable attack, only by decision of the President or his constitutional successor, and with discrimination according to the source, magnitude, and type of attack to perform as desired [in an] environment of nuclear war would be extremely difficult at best. Yet, the possibility of a disruption of command which would either immobilize retaliatory forces, subject them to piecemeal destruction, or bring about a weak or uncoordinated response which an enemy might feel he could cope with, might offer an aggressor too tempting an objective and thereby dangerously weaken deterrence.</p>
<p>In order for nuclear deterrence to be effective, potential aggressors must view the United States’ nuclear capabilities, architecture, and process as credible. This means that the president must have his key advisors (secretary of Defense and US Strategic Command commander) available to assist in decision-making, and succession must be reliable and contribute to shaping the adversary’s decision calculus.</p>
<p>On the worst of days, good advice and presidential continuity is crucial in ensuring that a decision to retaliate can be made. To achieve this, the secretary of Defense or his clear designee must be available to the president. The ability to maintain credible nuclear command and control is essential to America’s deterrence threat.</p>
<p>Dr. Adam Lowther is Vice President for Research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Col Curtis McGiffin (U.S. Air Force, Ret.) is Vice President for Education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and visiting professor at Missouri State University’s School of Defense and Strategic Studies. Together, they have more than five decades of experience in uniform and DoD civil service serving America’s nuclear enterprise. Both authors co-host the popular weekly podcast: “The NIDS View” found on <a class="fui-Link ___1rxvrpe f2hkw1w f3rmtva f1ewtqcl fyind8e f1k6fduh f1w7gpdv fk6fouc fjoy568 figsok6 f1hu3pq6 f11qmguv f19f4twv f1tyq0we f1g0x7ka fhxju0i f1qch9an f1cnd47f fqv5qza f1vmzxwi f1o700av f13mvf36 f1cmlufx f9n3di6 f1ids18y f1tx3yz7 f1deo86v f1eh06m1 f1iescvh fhgqx19 f1olyrje f1p93eir f1nev41a f1h8hb77 f1lqvz6u f10aw75t fsle3fq f17ae5zn" title="https://thinkdeterrence.com/podcast-shows/" href="https://thinkdeterrence.com/podcast-shows/" target="_blank" rel="noreferrer noopener" aria-label="Link https://thinkdeterrence.com/podcast-shows/">https://thinkdeterrence.com/podcast-shows/</a></p>
<p>The views expressed in this article are the authors’ own.</p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Why-SECDEF-Austins-Secret-Hospitalization-Really-Mattered.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-26665 size-medium" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png" alt="Get this publication" width="300" height="83" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication-300x83.png 300w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Download-This-Publication.png 450w" sizes="(max-width: 300px) 100vw, 300px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/why-secdef-austins-secret-hospitalization-really-mattered/">Why SECDEF Austin’s Secret Hospitalization Really Mattered</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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