The Indo-Pacific is rapidly emerging as the central theatre of global strategic competition. Unlike the Cold War in Europe, where nuclear deterrence involved two superpowers across relatively defined front lines, the Indo-Pacific presents a far more complex landscape. The region spans vast maritime distances, multiple potential flashpoints, and several nuclear-armed adversaries. North Korea continues to expand its nuclear and missile programs, China is rapidly increasing both the size and sophistication of its arsenal, and Russia maintains nuclear capabilities alongside a growing strategic presence in the Pacific.

In such an environment, the traditional model of extended deterrence, where the United States alone provides nuclear protection to its allies, may not be sufficient to address the scale and diversity of contingencies across the region. A new framework may be required, an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance built on shared responsibility, distributed deterrence, and sovereign nuclear capabilities among key allies.

Complicating the adversary: The logic of distributed deterrence

At the core of such an alliance would ideally be sovereign nuclear deterrents for Australia, Japan, and South Korea. This model would resemble the role of the United Kingdom and France within NATO. Both maintain independent nuclear forces and sovereign decision-making, while contributing to the alliance’s broader deterrence posture.

Applying this model to the Indo-Pacific would significantly strengthen deterrence. If Australia, Japan, and South Korea each possessed sovereign nuclear capabilities, adversaries would face a far more complex strategic calculus. Rather than confronting a single decision-maker in Washington, they would need to account for multiple independent governments capable of responding to aggression.

This distributed architecture would complicate adversary planning and raise escalation risks. Any state considering coercion or military action against an Indo-Pacific democracy would have to account not only for the United States, but for several nuclear-capable regional powers with distinct strategic interests and decision-making processes.

Geography reinforces this logic. The Indo-Pacific spans an immense area, from the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean approaches to Australia. The sheer distance between these theatres makes a purely centralized deterrence model increasingly difficult to sustain.

Flexible Deterrence through forward deployment and hosting

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would therefore require forward deployment and hosting arrangements across the region. Australia, Japan, and South Korea could host a range of nuclear capabilities designed to provide flexible deterrent options across multiple contingencies.

These could include submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM-N) on Ohio- and Columbia-class submarines; nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) on Virginia- and AUKUS-class submarines; B83 gravity bombs for platforms such as the B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider, alongside the rearming of the B-52 Stratofortress and B-1B Lancer; B61 nuclear bombs for the B61 nuclear bombs for aircraft including the B-2, B-21, B-52, and F-35A Lightning II; and Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO-N) nuclear cruise missiles for the B-21 and B-52. In addition, nuclear warheads could be assigned to land-based, mobile intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers.

By dispersing these capabilities across multiple allied territories, the alliance would establish a more resilient and survivable deterrent posture. It would be far more difficult for an adversary to neutralize. Hosting arrangements would also strengthen operational integration among allied forces. As in NATO’s nuclear-sharing model, partner nations could contribute dual-capable platforms capable of delivering nuclear payloads in extreme circumstances.

Australia, Japan, and South Korea could commit to dual-capable submarine (DCS), aircraft (DCA), and land-based missile launcher (DCL) missions within the alliance structure. Dual-capable aircraft would provide visible and flexible deterrence signaling. Submarine-based systems would ensure a survivable second-strike capability across the region’s vast maritime domain. While land-based mobile missile launchers would add a credible and responsive ground-based deterrent, reinforcing the threat of rapid retaliation.

Such arrangements would distribute both responsibility and capability among Indo-Pacific allies, reducing the burden on the United States while strengthening the credibility of deterrence. It would transform the region from one dependent on a single guarantor into a networked system of mutually reinforcing nuclear deterrents.

Why the Philippines should revisit extended nuclear deterrence

An Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would also require a reassessment of the policies of other regional partners. One notable example is the Philippines. For decades, the Philippines benefited from extended nuclear deterrence under its alliance with the United States. However, that relationship was complicated when the Philippines ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in February 2021. By joining a treaty that prohibits the development, possession, and use—or threat of use—of nuclear weapons, the Philippines has distanced itself from reliance on the US nuclear umbrella.
This decision sits uneasily alongside the increasingly contested security environment in the South China Sea. If Manila wishes to strengthen its security relationship with the United States and regional partners, it may need to reconsider its position. Reintegrating into the framework of US extended nuclear deterrence would provide a stronger strategic backstop against coercion or aggression in its maritime domain.

Restoring strategic stability through credible, distributed deterrence architecture

Ultimately, the purpose of an Indo-Pacific nuclear alliance would not be to encourage proliferation for its own sake. Rather, it would be to restore strategic stability in a region where the balance of power is shifting rapidly.

Deterrence works best when it is credible, distributed, and resilient. In a region as vast and strategically complex as the Indo-Pacific, relying on a single nuclear guarantor may no longer provide the level of deterrence required to prevent conflict.

By adopting a model like the United Kingdom and France within NATO, where allied states maintain sovereign nuclear forces while contributing to a broader alliance deterrence posture, Australia, Japan, and South Korea could build a more stable and credible strategic architecture.

Such an arrangement would ensure that any adversary contemplating aggression in the Indo-Pacific would face not one nuclear power, but several, each capable of defending its sovereignty and contributing to the collective security of the region.

Natalie Treloar is the Australian Company Director of Alpha-India Consultancy, a Senior Fellow at the Indo-Pacific Studies Center (IPSC), a Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS), and a member of the Open Nuclear Network. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Beyond a Pacific Defense Pact 4: Blueprint for an Indo-Pacific Nuclear Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cyber Shockwaves

Imagine a simple piece of computer code shutting down nuclear power plants, paralyzing transportation networks, and disrupting vital military systems. For more than a decade, cyberattacks against critical infrastructure have been more than just intrusions; they can have effects comparable to those of conventional acts of war, and threatening global stability. For nuclear democracies, the question has become crucial: at what point does a digital incident cross the threshold of severity required to trigger deterrence calculations, or even justify a nuclear response?

Cyberspace is now a theater of constant confrontation where adversaries seek to undermine each other’s trust, disrupt economies, and test resilience. This invisible competition weakens traditional deterrence mechanisms, which rely on clear signals. In cyberspace, nothing is clear, with uncertain effects and often unintentional escalation. Yet, the potential damage of a sophisticated cyberattack against an electrical grid or supply chains could exceed that of a conventional bombing. The problem stems from three major developments.

Critical Weak Spots

The first development is the increasing vulnerability of critical infrastructure, whose technical complexity creates countless points of weakness. Hospitals, refineries, water distribution systems, and railway networks rely on technologies that are sometimes outdated and rarely protected against determined state and non-state actors. A coordinated and simultaneous attack against multiple sectors could severely paralyze a country for weeks to months, causing economic chaos and widespread social disruption.

The second development concerns the strong integration of cyberspace and nuclear power. Command, control, and communication systems have become more digital than ever, and thus more exposed to cyberattacks. Even a non-destructive intrusion, subtly targeted and difficult to detect, could be interpreted as an attempt to undermine the capacity to retaliate. In such cases, the precise or approximate perception of risk becomes as dangerous as the attack itself, amplifying the potential for misunderstandings and unintentional escalation.

The third development, finally, is the bolder behavior of adversaries of democratic regimes, who use cyberspace as a tool for exerting pressure without incurring significant costs. Who would doubt that Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran regularly demonstrate their ability to disrupt the institutions of democratic regimes? The relative success of their operations encourages them to push the boundaries even further, as they are aware of the existence of a “gray zone” where traditional deterrence does not fully apply.

These major transformations lead to a fundamental question: should democracies clarify as quickly as possible that certain cyberattacks could cross a threshold triggering a major military response, including nuclear? The objective of a new doctrine would then not be to lower the nuclear threshold, but to re-establish a credible and robust level of deterrence. Because if adversaries believe that cyberattacks are “zero-cost,” they will continue to systematically target vital infrastructure, exploiting critical vulnerabilities with impunity and minimal risk to themselves.

Strategic High Stakes

A first argument for clarifying the doctrine rests on proportionality: a massive cyberattack targeting critical infrastructure could have consequences comparable to a bombing. In this context, it would be consistent to specify that the response is not limited to conventional means. Analysts point out that U.S. nuclear doctrine already considers the possibility of devastating consequences from non-nuclear strategic attacks, and they believe that the nuclear threat is not explicitly excluded, even if the no-first-use scenario remains dominant.

A second argument concerns strategic stability. Today, adversaries regularly stress the defenses of democratic regimes in the “gray zone,” without immediate risk of escalation. Clarifying the rules of engagement and explicitly integrating cyberspace into strategic thinking could strengthen deterrence and limit adversarial gambles in this gray zone. The United States, the United Kingdom, and France could thus reduce uncertainty regarding the potential consequences of sophisticated cyberattacks, one form of irregular warfare, while emphasizing that any major offensive would have significant repercussions.

A third argument concerns the protection of nuclear command. Even a limited attack on control systems could be interpreted as an attempt to neutralize the second-strike capability, creating an extreme risk of miscalculation, especially with the increasing use of artificial intelligence. By clearly announcing that such an intrusion would be considered a serious and unacceptable act, democratic regimes would strengthen their strategic stability, discouraging any hostile action and reducing the risk of unintentional escalation during times of international crisis.

Perilous Lines

This doctrinal shift, however, carries significant risks, notably the unintentional lowering of the nuclear threshold. Even if the clarification primarily aims to strengthen deterrence, it could be perceived as an excessive threat by non-democratic States, prompting them to rapidly modernize their nuclear arsenals or develop sophisticated offensive cyber capabilities. The proliferation of cyber threats with potentially physical effects creates a low-profile but ultimately strategic space for competition, paradoxically exacerbating tensions and instability.

Responding to a cyberattack with a nuclear strike requires absolute certainty as to its true perpetrator. Yet, operations in cyberspace often involve proxies, opaque international relays, and technical masking of the source. An attribution error could have profound consequences. Additionally, a cyber intrusion seen as preparation for a major attack might provoke an overreaction during a crisis. Any doctrine that includes the possibility of a nuclear response must therefore incorporate rigorous deconfliction mechanisms, otherwise the worst will happen.

However, these risks should not obscure a strategic reality: current doctrine dates to a time when cyberattacks could not paralyze a country in minutes. This is no longer the case. Adversaries of democratic regimes have understood that cyberspace offers them a means of inflicting considerable damage while remaining below the threshold for a nuclear response. Doing nothing would amount to accepting a structural vulnerability, especially since middle ground is emerging. This involves explicitly defining two categories of cyberattacks likely to trigger an appropriate military response:

1. Attacks causing massive impacts on the civilian population or critical infrastructure (hospitals and emergency services, water distribution networks, etc.).
2. Intrusions targeting the command systems of the armed forces, even without destructive effects, with the aim of degrading a country’s decision-making capacity.

Though it would not directly reference nuclear weapons, this clarification would connect strategic cyberattacks to potential responses, giving decision-makers flexibility while clearly warning adversaries. A more explicit doctrine should reduce the risks of accidental escalation and limit the audacity of State and non-State actors willing to test the nerves of democratic regimes, in line with recent analyses on the evolution of the U.S. nuclear posture in the face of new strategic threats that the war in Ukraine has only exacerbated.

About the Author

Gilles A. Paché is a Professor of Marketing and Supply Chain Management at Aix-Marseille University, France, and a member of the CERGAM Lab. His research focuses on logistics strategy, distribution channel management, and military studies. On these topics, he has authored over 700 scholarly publications, including articles, book chapters, and conference papers, as well as 24 academic books. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Hacking the Apocalypse: How Cyberattacks Could Trigger Nuclear Escalation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Their low cost, flexibility, and ability to operate without putting human pilots at risk make drones increasingly valuable in conventional military conflicts. Their capabilities already include reconnaissance and surveillance, long-range strike missions, electronic warfare, and precision killing.

With their precision-targeting ability, drones can be integrated into nuclear deterrence strategies. For instance, they could be used to ensure the survivability of a country’s nuclear forces by providing continuous surveillance and early warning against potential nuclear threats. Drones could also support a more viable second-strike capability, potentially increasing the credibility of nuclear deterrence by ensuring that a country retains a means to retaliate even after a nuclear first strike.

The use of drones in situations where nuclear escalation is a possibility could lead to unintended consequences. The increasing autonomy of drones raises the risk of misinterpretation, as drones could be perceived as a precursor to a larger attack, even when they are only conducting reconnaissance. This could trigger a preemptive nuclear strike by an adversary, leading to an inadvertent escalation into full-scale nuclear war. Cold War and subsequent histories show that the danger of inadvertent nuclear escalation is not trivial.

The possibility that expansion of the war in Ukraine from conventional weapons into nuclear first use could occur from Russian views of Ukrainian deep strikes into Russian territory, with NATO ballistic and cruise missiles, provides one example of concerns in this category.  Lewis A. Dunn suggests that President Donald Trump is faced with a world sliding into nuclear anarchy. He writes:

Brinkmanship among major nuclear powers is rising. China is relentlessly expanding its nuclear forces but rejecting serious engagement with the United States on arms control. US–Russia cooperation on nuclear matters, already in a dire state, has deteriorated further with President Vladimir Putin’s repeated nuclear threats in the course of Russia’s war in Ukraine. Recent reports based on information from senior US officials indicate that the United States, too, could modify its posture and expand its arsenal to strengthen deterrence of coordinated Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear adventurism. All these developments have eroded critical pillars of nuclear order and raised the risk of nuclear warfare.

Drones are relatively fast, low-cost, and difficult to detect, which makes them ideal for preemptive strikes against high-value targets. In theory, a nation could deploy a drone strike against an adversary’s nuclear command-and-control infrastructure or missile silos, aiming to disrupt or neutralize a potential nuclear retaliation before it can be launched. In addition, drones equipped with nuclear payloads or advanced conventional weapons could be used as part of a disarming strike. The ability to carry out such strikes could shift the strategic calculations of nations, as adversaries might feel more vulnerable to a preemptive attack, especially if they believe their nuclear retaliation capabilities could be neutralized by fast-moving drone strikes.

As drones become more autonomous, the risk of them making decisions without human oversight increases. In a nuclear context, where the consequences of any action are catastrophic, the delegation of decision-making to machines is highly controversial. The potential for autonomous drones to trigger a nuclear response or make fatal miscalculations due to algorithmic errors presents a possible threat to strategic stability.

Given that drones can operate autonomously, one challenge is ensuring that their actions do not trigger unintended escalation. Moreover, the reliance on technological systems for communication and control in a nuclear context raises concerns about vulnerabilities in these systems, especially if adversaries employ cyberattacks or electronic warfare tactics to disrupt drone operations.

Future generations of drones will interact with artificial intelligence that also supports other elements in the matrix of deterrence and defense. AI will privilege deterrence by denial compared to deterrence by credible threat of unacceptable retaliation. It will do so because states will have to quickly manage the deterrence and/or conduct conflicts in multiple domains: land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, and the information or knowledge domain. The knowledge domain wraps around all the others. It is the “gnostic center” that controls, connects, and prioritizes among the component parts of the various domains in order to provide for the correct response to threats or attacks.

AI-assisted attacks on the gnostic center will require immediate responses by AI-assisted defenses that can defeat or diminish the cost of those attacks. Absorbing the first blow and then retaliating may not be a choice that is available to beleaguered and time-pressed decision-makers. This situation poses an especially concerning challenge for nuclear deterrence. Decisions for or against nuclear war should allow policymakers sufficient time to deliberate alternatives with their advisors and to select the most appropriate option for the exigent circumstances. But the potential speed of AI-boosted attacks against space and cyber assets, together with the rising speed of kinetic strikes from hypersonic weapons, may leave leaders fearful of an enemy nuclear first strike to choose preemption instead of retaliation.

Just as we can conceive of drones as reconnaissance and strike platforms for offenses, it is also possible that drones can be part of any state’s comprehensive antimissile and air defense plan. One illustration is the use of drone swarms to defeat attacking drones tasked with reconnaissance or strike missions. Another example would be the use of drones for electromagnetic “hit to kill” within the atmosphere or, even more ambitiously, in midcourse intercept against attacking ballistic missile forces. Drones based on one or more lunar spaceports could protect American interests in cislunar space.

Futuristic drones with embedded AI and space-to-space weapons could defend orbital satellites against attack (so-called DSATs) or engage another state’s satellites that appear threatening (ASATs). Priority DSATs and ASATs would deter or defend against any threat to the viability of American satellites for warning and assessment; command, control, and communications; geolocation; and other missions.

Comparatively inexpensive drones could thus take over some of the strategic defense burden, otherwise requiring both upgraded terrestrial missile launchers and kill vehicles or, eventually, sophisticated ballistic missile defenses based on space-to-earth weapons such as lasers or particle beams. Future planners should expect a more crowded space domain, including newer generations of orbital satellites with diverse missions, space stations, and additional reconnaissance and strike weapons along with smarter drones and larger swarms.

The preceding discussion about drones and their possible relationship to nuclear deterrence has implications for nuclear arms control. It is important for a peace agreement to terminate the war in Ukraine for many reasons. One reason is so that the United States and Russia can resume negotiations about an arms control regime to succeed the New START agreement, due to expire in 2026.

The “beyond New START” consultations should include discussions about the two states’ arsenals of non-strategic nuclear weapons and protocols for nuclear first use. Vladimir Putin’s repeated warnings about the possibility of Russian nuclear first use in Ukraine is dismissed by some as bluffing for effect, a form of coercive diplomacy. On the other hand, Russia’s doctrinal shifts appear to move toward a more permissive standard as the war continues. In addition to clarifying this matter, the United States and Russia must acknowledge that China is an aspiring nuclear peer and include China in discussions about nuclear policy issues, including transparency about force structures and military doctrines. China is unlikely to be interested in arms reductions per se, but dialogue should be initiated at the expert level to clarify China’s thinking about strategy, arms control, and related issues.

The character of war changes with the advent of new technologies and strategic thinking.  But the nature of war is perennially the environment of competition and conflict, uncertainty, chance, and friction. The relationship between drones and nuclear deterrence represents a mixed blessing for military planners and arms control. Drones have the potential to enhance nuclear deterrence, but they also introduce significant risks in terms of escalation control and first-strike stability. As drone technology advances, it will be critical for policymakers to develop strategies that account for the unique challenges drones pose in nuclear deterrence and, as well, their future roles in space and cyber wars.

Professor Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Nuclear Deterrence and Drones: An Unpredictable Mix? was originally published on Global Security Review.