However, one area the report does not cover is how the United States can ensure the advantages created by an expanding critical space infrastructure will remain “enduring” under direct threat of space attack without the weapons systems capable of deterring or defeating such aggression. Without a US Space Force capable of achieving measurable space superiority against a continual growth in Chinese and Russian space attack forces, new technologies and capabilities for terrestrial advantage will create more targets and vulnerabilities.

At present, there is much to do in space to continue to maintain what advantages and leadership the United States has managed to keep in the past twenty years of passivity and talk. At present the Space Force and its combatant command cousin US Space Command, while capable organizations for enabling terrestrial actions and providing situational awareness of space activities, are fully incapable of addressing the threat of armed aggression in and from space. Having an ability to take a hit and not proactively retaliate in and from space creates more, rather than less, vulnerability for exploitation and weakness in times of conflict. Would the nation take this type of approach with other services? Take the Air Force as an example.

Suppose the US was seeking to maintain its airpower advantage through the improvement of fuel efficiency, navigation routes, wing design, air traffic control modernization, and speed and distance characteristics of aircraft. Meanwhile, the enemy is building vast integrated air defense systems of missiles and fighter-interceptors, and long-range bombers, to take out the industrial and operational infrastructure of American civil and military aviation.

While the US has the advantage of outstanding technology in the air, the adversary fielded an ability to deny, degrade, and destroy that advantage in rapid fashion. Instead of building a US Air Force that fights, the nation responds by building an Air Force that can conduct limited electromagnetic jamming, overhead reconnaissance, and movement of equipment.

The Air Force’s position is that the service can take the hits and replace the airplanes in a reasonable time frame. All the while, in a great-power war, airports, air bases, and aircraft that provide an enduring advantage in economic and military support are now smoking debris. Regardless of the advantage airpower provides in this scenario, the United States possesses no means for strategic attack or air superiority.

This is exactly where the nation is with the Space Force. The urgency of the times is having little effect in shaping the actions of planners or political leaders.

At the low end, the Space Force has a very small number of electromagnetic jammers and geolocation systems. While such a small number was good for rotating them over time into a largely uncontested Middle East operating environment in the Global War on Terror, such numbers are wholly inadequate for requirements in the Indo-Pacific theater, much less the entirety of combatant command requirements worldwide.

The United States lacks options that are known to friends, neutrals and enemies alike with a clear declaratory policy highlighting American willingness and ability to project force in and from space to deter or win a conflict in space. Knowing what is happening in space is important, but there is no such thing as deterrence by attribution. Americans knew the Russians were amassing troops outside Ukraine and communicated that publicly, but Putin still invaded. The United States is pushing for norms of behavior and bans on destructive ASAT testing—to mitigate long-lived debris fields—but Russia and China oppose these efforts and continue to test, deploy, and use their space forces on a near daily basis, as former Vice Chief of Space Operations, General David Thompson, noted before his retirement.

The time has come to fix this and to do so publicly and aggressively. Passivity and resiliency alone will not defend America’s critical space infrastructure and the advantage that it provides. Only with a force projection capability that can achieve space superiority in and from space, as the Chinese and Russians both believe is key to deterrence, can the nation achieve credible deterrence in the minds of our adversaries.

Christopher Stone is Senior Fellow for Space Deterrence at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and the former special assistant to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the US Government.

There Can be No “Enduring Advantage in Space” without Space Superiority was originally published on Global Security Review.

While no single agency oversees Russian cyberattacks, the amount of personnel involved in these operations continues to increase. There is a heavy reliance on criminal and civilian involvement to conduct offensive measures. Combining Russian interest in cyber and outer space has led to the “proliferation of handheld Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers, deployment of road-mobile jammers, and even development and testing of space-based jammers,” as reported on by Sarah Mineiro. She also warns that Russia can hack American ground control systems for the GPS constellation.

 Types of Satellite Cyberattacks

Though electronic means of interfering with satellite signals, such as jamming or spoofing, occur at a more frequent rate, attacks using cyber may prove to be more impactful and frequent in the next decade. Cyberattacks “target the data itself and the systems that use, transmit, and control the flow of data,” potentially causing irreparable harm for military commanders and civilians reliant on communications and navigation systems for decision-making.

Like other cyberattacks, those on satellites and their networks require four main components: “access, vulnerability, a malicious payload, and a command-and-control system.” Multiple methods and modes of attack can take out a satellite system or render it inoperable without using kinetic force. Adversaries can target the networks that satellites use, individual satellites, and the supply chains that produce satellite hardware and software. The Center for Strategic and International Studies describes three main types of cyberattacks: data intercept/monitoring, data corruption, and seizure of control.

First, there is data interception or monitoring, which is often seen as espionage. Adversaries may find spying to be a strategically sound decision to anticipate the next moves of the United States and leverage this knowledge in diplomatic or military channels. Secure World Foundation reports that many attempts of back door installations into American satellite networks were found in “Chinese electronics and Russian software packages.”

Additionally, the communications from the ground to a satellite and a satellite to the ground often use “open (unencrypted) telecom network security protocols,” Luke Shadbolt warns—making these systems vulnerable.

Second, data corruption, like a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, is accomplished through corrupting satellite data or even ransomware attempts to hold data hostage unless payment is received by the attackers. Secure World Foundation describes how a group of university students developed a DoS technique that causes GPS receivers to crash when they try to decode malicious signals. Reports in 1999 surfaced that an unknown actor hacked the United Kingdom’s Skynet satellite, requiring payment to become operational again. Though the British Minister of Defense described the claim as “impossible”  at the time, more of these instances may occur as computer systems advance and space networks fail to evolve with greater security.

Third, while American policymakers may focus mainly on protecting networks, defending against the seizure of a satellite remains equally important. Such seizures could result in the deliberate destruction of the spacecraft, creating considerable debris that threatens other systems on orbit.

Equally likely, a hacker could transfer ownership of a system, so the original user is completely locked out and the capability of a satellite is given to the adversary. In 1998, a German-American satellite was hacked and destroyed. Attackers fried the optics by turning the satellite towards the sun. Unfortunately, examples of hacked satellites continue into the twenty-first century. Bill Malik reports that “there are six known examples of hackers successfully interfering with or even commanding unauthorized maneuvers of NASA satellites before 2011.”

 Looking Forward: Addressing Cyber Threats

The US currently invests in multiple avenues to combat the possibility of satellite hacking, a challenge made more difficult by the same factors that affect other industries and targets. For general satellite protection, the Air Force Research Laboratory is beginning its fourth year of sponsoring a satellite hacking challenge to involve researchers across the country. The Hack-A-Sat competition opened for registration in February with this year’s format involving the use of an on-orbit satellite for the first time.

“Space cybersecurity is a global issue, which is why it is so important that Hack-A-Sat is open to the global security research community,” said Col. Kenny Decker. Across the Atlantic, the European Space Agency sponsors similar competitions with HackCYSAT.

Recently, the geospatial intelligence company, Orbital Insight, won a Department of Defense contract to identify intentional global navigation system disruptions. Orbital’s platform aims to use artificial intelligence to detect spoofing operations. According to the National Security Agency’s (NSA) Aaron Ferguson, it is a goal of NSA is to develop, “a way to characterize telemetry data so that as we deploy new satellites, we can make adjustments.” Finally, HDI Global Specialty argues that “the backbone of a cyber-resilient spacecraft should be a robust Intrusion Detection System (IDS).” Encryption and authentication must become priorities for the US government to implement in satellites and satellite systems.

Conclusion

Russia poses a large security threat to the United States even outside the future possibility of satellite hacking. Russian aggression in Ukraine demonstrated blatant disregard for Western ideals of a rules-based international order. It is no longer possible for policymakers to secure stability and prevent conflict by relying on post–Cold War paradigms.

Previous engagement through international communication channels is unlikely to reduce threats to critical infrastructure. As state-sponsored groups and proxy actors continue to target American assets, it is necessary to prepare for multiple modes of attack, especially in the space and cyber domains. A whole-of-government approach to defend against this new generation of conflict can increase reactivity in the event of an attack and aims to provide a deterrent against the targeting of satellites. As the twenty-first century evolves, implementing these solutions is one of the most important challenges the nation faces.

Russia and the Growing Danger of Satellite Cyberattacks was originally published on Global Security Review.