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	<title>Topic:sanctions evasion &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
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		<title>Survival Is Not Victory: How Iran Is Trying to Outlast a Militarily Superior Coalition</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/survival-is-not-victory-how-iran-is-trying-to-outlast-a-militarily-superior-coalition/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Mohamed ELDoh]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 03 Nov 2026 11:56:09 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Emerging Threats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Axis of Resistance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[drones]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic pressure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gulf States]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iran]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Israel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[maritime coercion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military escalation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[naval mines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[negotiated settlement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[oil exports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political denial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[regional proxies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sanctions evasion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sea denial]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[shipping disruption]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strait of Hormuz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic endurance]]></category>
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		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=33168</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: November 3, 2026 The renewed early September exchange of attacks between Iran and the US, including US strikes on three Iranian tankers after missiles targeted American warships, has not changed the conflict’s underlying equation. The US and Israel have inflicted extensive damage on Iran’s leadership, air defenses, naval forces, and military infrastructure. Yet Tehran [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/survival-is-not-victory-how-iran-is-trying-to-outlast-a-militarily-superior-coalition/">Survival Is Not Victory: How Iran Is Trying to Outlast a Militarily Superior Coalition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><em>Published: November 3, 2026</em></p>
<p>The renewed early September exchange of attacks between Iran and the US, including <a href="https://apnews.com/article/b3650799901c56a6deeca962cbaa4109">US strikes on three Iranian tankers</a> after missiles targeted American warships, has not changed the conflict’s underlying equation. The US and Israel have inflicted extensive damage on Iran’s leadership, air defenses, naval forces, and military infrastructure. Yet Tehran has prevented those operational successes from yielding a stable political settlement. Its regime remains intact, its coercive capabilities have not been eliminated, and the Strait of Hormuz remains severely disrupted.</p>
<p>Tehran has adopted a <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/irans-strategic-logic-of-instability/">strategy</a> designed to avoid a fast and decisive defeat. Iran’s principal objective is no longer to restore a favorable conventional balance. It is to survive, extend the conflict, and increase its opponents’ economic and political costs until Washington accepts a negotiated outcome less ambitious than the one military force was intended to initially deliver.</p>
<p><strong>A Strategy of Political Denial</strong></p>
<p>Iran’s approach rests on a distinction between battlefield performance and political effect. The US and Israel can destroy missile batteries, strike naval facilities, and decapitate command structures. But unless those actions compel Tehran to accept their terms, military success remains politically incomplete.</p>
<p>Iran has therefore treated time as a strategic resource. Every month that the regime survives allows it to argue that the campaign failed to force capitulation. <a href="https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/why-iran-will-prefer-ongoing-conflict/">Prolongation</a> allows Tehran to expose differences among the US, Israel, European governments, and the Gulf states. At the same time, Gulf states also have powerful reasons to prevent their territories and infrastructure from becoming permanent fronts in a US-Iran conflict.</p>
<p><strong>Hormuz as Coercive Leverage</strong></p>
<p>The Strait of Hormuz is the central instrument of this strategy. Before the conflict, approximately twenty million barrels of oil and petroleum products crossed the Strait each day. The <a href="https://www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz">International Energy Agency</a> estimates that available bypass capacity amounts to only 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day. Iran therefore does not need to close Hormuz completely to influence international decision-making. It is necessary to maintain sufficient risk to deter shipowners, crews, and insurers. Iran does not possess uncontested control of the Strait. <a href="https://apnews.com/article/iran-strait-hormuz-strike-united-states-6b098da673ac3161a266ee459d5eff44">American forces</a> have cleared mines, attacked coastal launch systems, and facilitated some commercial transits. Recent traffic illustrates the effect. For one late August week, only twenty-four vessels <a href="https://www.timesofisrael.com/us-forces-hit-iranian-launchers-preparing-to-fire-in-hormuz-irgc-targets-jordan-in-response/">reportedly</a> passed through Hormuz, compared with roughly 130 per day before the war. Tehran nevertheless retains a potent, still-relevant sea-denial capability through missiles, drones, mines, and the threat of unpredictable attacks.</p>
<p>This leverage, however, is self-eroding. Prolonged disruption damages Iran’s own exports, antagonizes Gulf neighbors and imposes costs on China and other Asian customers whose diplomatic neutrality Tehran crucially needs. It also encourages investment in <a href="https://www.dw.com/en/iran-war-strait-of-hormuz-gulf-states-oil-shipping-pipelines-alternatives-graphics/a-78336679">bypass</a> routes, greater international naval coordination, and more aggressive action against Iranian coastal capabilities.</p>
<p><strong>Iran’s Supporting Pillars Are Weakening</strong></p>
<p>Iran’s remaining missiles, drones, and mines still impose operational costs, but stockpile levels and replacement rates will become increasingly important. The question is whether it can sustain enough regime survivability while its economy, oil exports, production sites (including drones and missiles production), and distribution networks (including regional proxies) remain under pressure.</p>
<p>The regional proxy network has also performed below Tehran’s original expectations. Hezbollah in Lebanon has suffered extensive attrition and lost much of its former strategic depth in Syria. Iraqi militias remain divided by local political calculations. The Houthis continue to threaten Red Sea shipping and Saudi-linked interests, but their autonomy means activity in Yemen cannot automatically be converted into coordinated Iranian escalation. The <a href="https://www.belfercenter.org/research-analysis/degradation-irans-proxy-model">“axis of resistance”</a> remains dangerous but degraded. It no longer functions as a reliable unified deterrent system unless the Houthis manage to disrupt Bab El Mandeb.</p>
<p>Economic endurance presents a deeper problem. Iran also retains experience in sanctions evasion, informal financial channels, and covert trade. <a href="https://www.uscc.gov/research/enabling-iran-timeline-chinas-role-during-and-after-operation-epic-fury">China provides an important commercial and technological lifeline</a>, while Russia and China offer varying degrees of diplomatic protection. Yet these relationships are designed to prevent Iran’s total isolation, not to assume the costs of rebuilding its military or rescuing its economy. Sanctions evasion can postpone financial suffocation; it cannot reverse cumulative wartime destruction, lost exports, and declining currency confidence.</p>
<p><strong>Three Paths Over the Next Three to Six Months</strong></p>
<p>The first option is a managed but deteriorating stalemate. Iran will preserve enough missile and maritime capacity to keep Hormuz contested, while the US alternates between limited strikes, mine-clearing, sanctions, and enforcement of its blockade. Negotiations will periodically resume without resolving the nuclear issue, maritime access, and sanctions relief. Iran will remain capable of resistance but progressively less capable of setting the terms of the conflict.</p>
<p>A second, plausible option is a coerced interim bargain. Mounting economic damage, Gulf pressure and concerns about military readiness could lead Washington to accept a phased arrangement involving verified commercial passage through Hormuz, limits on Iranian maritime activity and partial sanctions relief. It would be an armistice managing the confrontation rather than resolving it.</p>
<p>Lastly, is an accelerated Iranian breakdown accompanied by wider escalation. Serious fractures within the security elite, an inability to finance the coercive apparatus or a rapid decline in missile-launch capacity could convince Tehran that time is no longer on its side. Rather than surrender, the regime might expand attacks against neighboring states, undersea cables, shipping, or American regional facilities to force immediate intervention by outside powers. Iranian weakness could therefore make the conflict more dangerous before it makes Iran more conciliatory.</p>
<p>The indicators to watch are commercial traffic and insurance premiums in Hormuz, Iran’s missile and drone launch rate, evidence of renewed minelaying, Chinese purchases and technological transfers, cohesion within the Revolutionary Guard, and whether Gulf governments move from advocating restraint to supporting sustained maritime enforcement.</p>
<p>Iran has demonstrated that a regional actor can temporarily deny a superpower an inexpensive political victory. But denial is not victory, and endurance is not recovery. Unless Tehran converts disruption into a negotiated settlement, the same strategy that preserved the regime during the conflict’s first six months will surely consume the economic, diplomatic, and military foundations required to survive the next phase.</p>
<p><em>Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defence and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the EU Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defence cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa.</em><em> The views of the author are his own.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/11/Survival-Is-Not-Victory-How-Iran-Is-Trying-to-Outlast-a-Militarily-Superior-Coalition.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32906 size-full" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/@-Download-Button-2026.png" alt="" width="250" height="80" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/survival-is-not-victory-how-iran-is-trying-to-outlast-a-militarily-superior-coalition/">Survival Is Not Victory: How Iran Is Trying to Outlast a Militarily Superior Coalition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Coming Crisis with North Korea</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-coming-crisis-with-north-korea/</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nathan A. Heard]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 16 Jul 2026 10:47:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[counterspace capabilities]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cryptocurrency theft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber operations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electromagnetic pulse]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[hypersonic missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[IAEA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[intercontinental ballistic missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Kim Jong Un]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[missile program]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nuclear Weapons]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[proxy warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sanctions evasion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[space warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[weapons of mass destruction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Yongbyon]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32897</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: July 16, 2026 Is North Korea winning? Along with the country’s expanding nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, North Korea continues to develop and demonstrate expertise in cyber and space warfare that soon may threaten U.S. vital interests and complicate the broader competition between great powers. North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia, including valuable lessons gained from its participation [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-coming-crisis-with-north-korea/">The Coming Crisis with North Korea</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233279&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> July 16, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Is North Korea winning? Along with the country’s expanding nuclear arsenal and delivery systems, North Korea continues to develop and demonstrate expertise in cyber and space warfare that soon may threaten U.S. vital interests and complicate the broader competition between great powers. North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia, including valuable lessons gained from its participation in Russia’s war against Ukraine, will further embolden an already aggressive regime. While each of these developments has been analyzed individually, their cumulative strategic implications have received far less attention. A comprehensive assessment is overdue. The world needs to understand how North Korea&#8217;s advancing nuclear, missile, conventional, cyber, and space capabilities, along with its growing strategic partnership with Russia, will influence the regional and global security environment in the coming decades.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233279&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">North Korea has proven to be adept at using its cyber capabilities to evade or mitigate the effects of economic sanctions. The </span><a href="https://decrypt.co/366241/north-korean-hackers-stolen-6-billion-crypto-trm"><span data-contrast="none">theft of cryptocurrency</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> and other assets from financial institutions has evolved into a complex and sustained effort. Pyongyang’s strategy now includes penetrating Western firms that unknowingly hire </span><a href="https://msmt.info/view/save/2025/10/22/26294780-c396-407d-bb33-88afe988cd96-The_DPRK%E2%80%99s_Violation_and_Evasion_of_UN_Sanctions_through_Cyber_and_Information_Technology_Worker_Activities_(MSMT_2025_2).pdf"><span data-contrast="none">North Korean IT workers</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. North Korea has been able to generate billions of dollars from these activities, </span><a href="https://constella.ai/blog/north-korea-stole-100000-identities-to-infiltrate-global-companies/"><span data-contrast="none">both through</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> earned income and the theft of intellectual property, and the funds are then used to finance the regime’s missile and nuclear programs: a lose-lose proposition for the U.S. and its allies.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233279&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">At present, Western governments are struggling to respond to these challenges even as </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/hidden-enablers-third-countries-north-koreas-cyber-playbook"><span data-contrast="none">China and Russia</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> continue to provide North Korea with cyber-related training and support. Coordinated cyber operations between these three powers will be a logical outgrowth. Accurate and timely attribution of cyberattacks is already challenging. In a crisis or conflict, North Korea could serve as a proxy for China and Russia to leverage against the U.S.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233279&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">North Korea has recently shown an interest in developing military capabilities in space. This includes surveillance and so-called “</span><a href="https://cdn.prod.website-files.com/66dcc6872f6ed23bce1db235/69d5402700ec843d95073a1e_SWF_Global_Counterspace_Capabilities_2026.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">counterspace capabilities</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">” to inhibit an adversary’s assured access to space. Russia is increasingly providing North Korea with space-related </span><a href="https://www.nknews.org/2025/08/how-russia-could-give-a-major-boost-to-north-koreas-satellite-launch-plans/"><span data-contrast="none">expertise</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, including launch infrastructure and launch assistance. With ongoing Russian support, North Korea could achieve significant technological breakthroughs that typically take other countries decades. It remains uncertain what restrictions Moscow is willing to impose on technology transferred to Pyongyang. Considering North Korea’s willingness and </span><a href="https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/is-the-facility-at-qusayr-syria-an-underground-nuclear-facility"><span data-contrast="none">history of proliferation</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, the U.S. might face new threats from other states seeking counterspace capabilities.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233279&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The U.S. is dependent on assured access to space for the functioning of its economy and to conduct military operations. Thanks to its missile program, North Korea could seek to develop a capability to knock out U.S. satellites. Additionally, North Korea has shown interest in using nuclear weapons at high altitudes </span><a href="https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/trecms/pdf/AD1135779.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">to generate an electromagnetic pulse</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> (EMP) to negate U.S. technological dominance. Because North Korea does not rely on space as the U.S. does, these developments would give the regime significant leverage in a future confrontation. As in the cyber domain, China and Russia may leverage North Korea as a deniable proxy actor in space to threaten or attack U.S. interests.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233279&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">As the U.S. watches from the sidelines, North Korea continues to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as well. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has </span><a href="https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/north-korea-sharply-boosting-nuclear-weapons-capacity-iaea-chief-says-2026-04-15/"><span data-contrast="none">stated</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> that the regime has recently added infrastructure at its Yongbyon complex, which will allow it to increase the yearly production of nuclear warheads. North Korea is developing and testing a wide range of missiles, including </span><a href="https://www.congress.gov/crs_external_products/R/PDF/R45811/R45811.53.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">hypersonics</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, some of which can hold the U.S. homeland at risk. North Korea is </span><a href="https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/golden_dome.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">expected</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> to have 50 intercontinental ballistic missiles by 2035. Worse yet, as North Korea’s nuclear-tipped ballistic missile arsenal grows, the existing U.S. missile defense architecture is at risk of being overwhelmed and becoming obsolete. </span><a href="https://www.war.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/4468089/department-of-war-showcases-progress-on-golden-dome-for-america-the-nations-nex/"><span data-contrast="none">Golden Dome for America</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> could strengthen homeland defense against North Korea by improving missile detection, tracking, and interception. As Pyongyang expands its missile arsenal, a layered and expanding missile defense architecture could diminish North Korea&#8217;s nuclear strike credibility and boost U.S. resilience.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233279&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">While significant emphasis is placed on analyzing North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, it is important to highlight that the regime is believed to possess a significant </span><a href="https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RRA2000/RRA2026-1/RAND_RRA2026-1.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">biological and chemical weapons</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> capability. Biological and chemical weapons provide an adversary with deniability. Continued investment in production and research </span><a href="https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/NKIP-Bermudez-Overview-of-NBC-061417.pdf"><span data-contrast="none">infrastructure</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> indicates the regime values these asymmetric capabilities despite international tones and laws. In February 2017, Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of North Korea’s leader Kim Jong Un, was </span><a href="https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/vx-nerve-agent-in-north-koreans-murder-how-does-it-work/"><span data-contrast="none">assassinated</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> in the Kuala Lumpur International Airport after being exposed to the VX nerve agent. North Korea’s ability to produce biological and chemical weapons at an industrial scale, along with its proliferation history and willingness to employ such weapons, presents significant challenges for the U.S.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233279&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">For decades, observers have confidently declared that North Korea is on the verge of collapse. Yet, despite years of domestic, economic, and geopolitical sanctions, the regime has not only survived but also thrived in measurable ways. Throughout its history, North Korea has shown a tendency for brinkmanship, coercion, and deception to achieve its goals. Furthermore, Kim Jong Un has integrated the proliferation of military technology, cyber-enabled theft, and sanctions evasion into his broader strategy for sustaining the regime and advancing its military modernization programs. Supported by China and Russia, North Korea has moved from being an isolated rogue state to a dangerous regional power with proxy potential. If Pyongyang effectively combines its growing cyber, space, and WMD capabilities into a coordinated denial and coercion strategy, the U.S. may have limited options during a crisis or conflict. Given the high stakes, Washington must holistically reevaluate its goals, objectives, and means toward Pyongyang before it is too late. The U.S. must ensure that North Korea cannot succeed in coercing the world, threatening the U.S. homeland, or fundamentally altering the strategic balance in Northeast Asia.</span><span data-ccp-props="{&quot;134233279&quot;:true,&quot;201341983&quot;:0,&quot;335559739&quot;:0,&quot;335559740&quot;:240}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Nathan A. Heard is a doctoral student in the Defense and Strategic Studies Program at Missouri State University, focusing on deterrence and strategic competition. Heard holds a master’s degree in defense and strategic studies and a graduate certificate in countering weapons of mass destruction from Missouri State University, as well as undergraduate degrees in business and information systems management. He authored the December 2025 graduate thesis, “A Novel Deterrence Strategy: Denial Through Space and Cyberspace.” The views expressed in this article are solely his own.</span></i></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/The-Coming-Crisis-with-North-Korea.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="202" height="56" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 202px) 100vw, 202px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/the-coming-crisis-with-north-korea/">The Coming Crisis with North Korea</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
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