The immediate remedy is to provide, through NATO, the military capability Ukraine needs to restore its sovereignty and firmly demonstrate the resolve of the West to deter any further Russian escalation of the conflict. But to accurately answer why such a remedy is needed requires returning to the point at which American deterrence was undermined in the first place.

The Taliban’s swift defeat by December 2001 was brilliant. The defeat of the Iraqi military in 2003 was also brilliant. In both instances, the reaction of many allies and adversaries was to underscore the formidable capability of the US military. To that extent, deterrence was very much enhanced.

But the US and others assumed future wars would be very short duration and, consequently, the American industrial base need not be enhanced. Both assumptions turned out to be incorrect. As a result, much of the deterrent value of these two “successful” missions was lost after nearly two decades of nation building post 2003. The hasty 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan seriously undermined American deterrence. Despite American forces in Iraq, ISIS developed there, along with multiple Iranian-funded and -armed militias.

In 2008, well before the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US failed to forcibly respond to Russian incursions in Georgia and deterrence credibility was weakened. In 2014 Russia invaded Ukraine and the US administration announced that Ukraine was not critical to the nation’s security. The issue was made worse when the Obama administration placed an arms embargo on Ukraine, the victim of aggression. This was seen as peace at all costs, undermining deterrence.

With the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the US again lost deterrence credibility. America removed sanctions on Iran, released billions in escrowed funds, and then gave Iran a “right to enrich.” This allowed Iran to build an industrial-strength nuclear technology capability, which Israel described as a sanctioned pathway to a nuclear bomb.

In 2022, the US failed to prevent another Russian invasion of more Ukraine territory, further weakening American deterrence credibility. Over the next three years, the Biden administration publicly worried about possible escalation of the war in Ukraine, thus, refraining from providing Ukraine with advanced military technology as well as limiting the types of assets, especially on Russian territory, that could be used.

This took some conventional and nuclear deterrent capability off the table insofar as the United States could or could not use military capability to prevent the very Russian escalation the US most worried about. The US placed most of Russia’s key military and economic assets in sanctuary and signaled to allies and adversaries that the US was less than serious about deterring Russian escalation. In short, America ceded to Moscow the ability to pick and choose to implement the very escalating dangers feared.

Put another way, the US undertook a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy of impotence. To many in the US, and particularly in Congress, this again looked like a prescription for another endless and perhaps fruitless war.

Now the continued Russian threats to use nuclear weapons is what most worries many US policymakers. Ironically, these Russian threats are also thought by many others to be largely bluff, including many congressional supporters of enhanced assistance to Ukraine, which now numbers some 85 senators that support Chairman Lindsey Graham’s (R-SC) Ukraine funding legislation.

Assuming nuclear threats are bluff might be understandable if the US had a robust as opposed to somewhat minimal theater nuclear capability to deter the Russian use of theater or regional nuclear forces.

But as the Strategic Posture Commission October 2023 report underscored, Putin’s repeatedly threatened to escalate to the nuclear level in order to “win” or force the US to stand down. These threats are coming from Putin because Moscow thinks its 2,000 to 4,000 such weapons are enough to intimidate the US with only a hundred gravity bombs on short-range jets in Europe.

Enhancing American theater nuclear systems through the deployment of nuclear submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCM-N) is now proceeding, but such enhancements may take years. Short- and medium-range cruise missiles aboard aircraft could also be used to close the gap between NATO and Moscow, and those deployments could be forthcoming in a shorter time.

But as Israeli ambassador Dori Gold warned a decade ago, the bad guy’s “clocks” are moving at a different speed than those of NATO, and there is no guarantee that Putin’s threats to use nuclear weapons in the region will not materialize or be fully deterred by new and timely US conventional or nuclear technology.

However, if the United States is to restore Ukraine’s sovereignty, the US and NATO must have faith in the existing deterrent, emphasize determination to move forward, and provide Ukraine with the military capability necessary to achieve these objectives and, with all due speed, upgrade theater deterrent capability. After all, America did not work for decades to end the Soviet empire only to give it back to Moscow, one country at a time.

Peter Huessy is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Restoring Ukraine Sovereignty Requires Restoring Deterrence was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consider his transformation since February’s Oval Office meeting with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. Trump and Vice President JD Vance chastised Zelensky for being “disrespectful,” admonished Zelensky’s efforts to rally international support as “propaganda,” suggested it was Zelensky’s responsibility “to end the destruction of your country,” and described Zelensky as “buried.” Six months later, Trump is praising Ukraine’s “unbreakable spirit,” supports its “future as an independent nation,” and appears to realize that Zelensky is not to blame for Vladimir Putin’s war. It is clear that Putin is not entranced by “the art of the deal,” and that America must play a role in securing any postwar peace. The outlines of that peace are starting to come into focus.

Lurching

In early 2025, French military commanders floated the possibility of forming a “coalition of the willing” to send troops to Ukraine. Other North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members expressed support for the idea. By summer, 10 European nations offered to contribute troops to a 30,000-man “reassurance force” in postwar Ukraine. However, the Europeans emphasized they would need the US to provide “backstop” capabilities.

That was a nonstarter for Trump—at least until the hastily-arranged summit that brought the leaders of Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Finland, Ukraine, NATO, and the EU to the White House on August 18. Whether they came out of panic over the unsettling Trump-Putin Alaska meeting or in solidarity with Zelensky, or both, the result of the White House summit was positive.

For example, while Trump emphasized that he would not deploy American ground forces and explained that “European nations are going to take a lot of the burden,” he added, “We’re going to help them…we’ll be involved” in any peacekeeping mission.

Toward that end, he ordered Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine to work with allied militaries on the specifics of a European-led peacekeeping force. Perhaps with the US shouldering command-and-control responsibilities; offering American airpower and other enabling capabilities; and signaling support for a security guarantee for postwar Ukraine, peace may prevail. Predictably, administration officials then hedged on Trump’s promise to support the postwar peacekeeping mission in Ukraine—prompting a NATO diplomat to conclude, “The US is not fully committed to anything.”

What Trump’s transatlantic counterparts and those of us who are critical of Trump’s policies need to keep in mind is that this lurching, two-steps-forward-one-step-back approach to Ukraine’s security is better than what Ukraine endured between January and July. There was the Oval Office meeting, the suspension of military aid and intelligence-sharing, the mineral deal, the moral relativism, outright moral inversion, and the inexplicable deference to Putin. Trump now appears to be moving in the right direction.

Lessons

Zelensky made clear that Ukraine cannot sign a peace deal without concrete security guarantees—given Putin’s brazen violation of the Budapest Memorandum in 2014 and 2022. Eleven years of occupation and war have taught Ukrainians that words are not enough to ensure their security. A genuine security guarantee, bolstered by multinational peacekeepers and sustained military aid, is what Ukraine needs going forward—not to roll back Putin’s army to pre-2014 borders, but to deter it from another landgrab. The rest of Europe needs this too. A strong, stable, secure Ukraine will only enhance NATO’s ability to deter Moscow.

Such a guarantee will not be embodied by Ukraine’s accession to NATO—at least not anytime soon—but instead will be a thatch of bilateral commitments from individual NATO members and partners. “A group of now 30 countries, including Japan and Australia, are working on this concept of security guarantees,” NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte recently revealed.

To be sure, an American contingent on the ground in postwar Ukraine—working alongside partners that collaborated in other warzones under acronyms such as MFO, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR, and ISAF—would be preferable to what Trump is offering.

After all, American boots on the ground send an unmistakable message to aggressor nations. However, given where Trump was in February, it is important to look at the bright side; rather than taking an ambivalent or even antagonistic position towards Ukraine, Trump appears willing to support America’s closest allies as they secure a postwar peace. The Ukrainian people can then harden their territory against another Russian invasion. There are also two important historical realities.

First, American airpower has a proven track record of making a positive impact on the ground—whether in humanitarian, peacekeeping, deterrent, or combat-support missions. Consider the Berlin Airlift, which sustained a besieged city for 15 months and dealt Stalin a humbling blow. Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch, which protected Iraqi civilians from Saddam Hussein’s vengeance for 12 years and allowed Iraq’s Kurds to build an all-but-sovereign state is another. Operations Deliberate Force and Allied Force, which, in coordination with partners on the ground, brought Serb paramilitaries to heel in Bosnia, pushed Serb regulars out of Kosovo, and hastened the end of Slobodan Milosevic’s genocidal rule. The toppling of the Taliban after 9/11, which saw the US use airpower as a force-multiplier for indigenous fighters on the ground is but one more example. Finally, Operation Inherent Resolve leveraged airpower to assist ground units in rolling back ISIS in Iraq and Syria.

Of course, no one wants American warplanes directly engaging the Russian military. But it pays to recall that it is already happening on a routine basis—near Alaskan airspace, over the Baltic Sea, across Pacific Ocean, and in the Middle East. Moreover, given recent encounters between American and Russian forces—and American and Russian hardware—it seems unlikely Putin’s high command will want to challenge American airpower along or above a future Ukraine-Russia DMZ.

That brings to light a second set of historical lessons. Neither lingering territorial disputes nor simmering hostilities are dealbreakers when it comes to providing security guarantees to allies and partners in the crosshairs. Consider post–World War II Germany. After a period of disarmament and occupation, the country’s western half was rearmed and invited into NATO as a full member, despite massive Soviet bloc armies ringing West Berlin and despite West Germany facing an overwhelming military disadvantage across a heavily armed border.

In fact, the US did not formally recognize the post–World War II territorial-political settlement in Germany or across Europe until 1975. The people of West Germany never abandoned their hopes for German reunification. Those hopes were not realized until 1990.

Next, consider post–World War II Japan. The Red Army seized Japanese islands at the end of the war. To this day, Tokyo does not recognize Russian control over those islands. Despite this territorial dispute, the United States guaranteed Japan’s security in 1951 and entered into a full-fledged mutual-defense treaty in 1960. That treaty is still in force today.

Last, consider the Korean Peninsula. Despite territorial disagreements; despite the absence of a peace treaty; and despite, or perhaps because of, the threat posed by a massive hostile army north of the 38th Parallel, the US provided open-ended security guarantees to South Korea in the autumn of 1953. Those security guarantees are still in force. The people of South Korea still look forward to unification of the two Koreas under the banner of freedom. South Korea even has a cabinet-level government ministry focused on unification.

Predator

In none of these examples did the US or its allies agree to the permanent ceding of territory. Rather, they recognized the difficulty of liberating occupied territory and they envisioned the future prospect of the return of that territory. That is how Ukraine and its partners should view the imperfect peace that will emerge in the coming months—a peace that will leave some of Ukraine’s territory under Putin’s control.

It is also worth emphasizing that a European-led, US-supported peacekeeping force in Ukraine is necessary given Putin’s policies and plans: Moscow occupies swaths of Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine; threatens Poland; is conducting a campaign of sabotage operations across NATO’s footprint; has moved nuclear weapons into Belarus; is firing off intermediate-range missiles; and is diverting 35 percent of government spending into its war machine. As French President Emmanuel Macron concluded, Putin is “a predator…at our doorstep.” Putin will not stop until he is stopped. Securing Ukraine—while continuing the build-up of deterrent forces on NATO’s eastern flank—is key to stopping Putin.

Alan W. Dowd leads the Sagamore Institute Center for America’s Purpose.

Trump’s Path to an Imperfect Peace in Ukraine was originally published on Global Security Review.

However, when looking deeper, combining field developments, the Taliban’s contradictory conduct, and shifting regional dynamics, reveals a more complex reality. This enmity may not be as absolute as it seems. Instead, it could present a multi-layered game in which the Taliban leverages the ISIS-K threat to justify internal repression, gain regional legitimacy, and position itself as the “lesser evil.” In this light, ISIS-K might serve both as a tactical threat and a strategic asset for the Taliban—a manufactured crisis that enables the group to tighten its grip on power at home and increase its geopolitical leverage abroad.

Open Hostility or Controlled Competition?

Since appearing in Afghanistan, ISIS-K launched brutal attacks on civilians, from deadly bombings against religious minorities to assaults on hotels housing Chinese and Russian citizens. These incidents were widely publicized, framing ISIS-K as a dangerous destabilizing force in the public mind.

Yet, a closer look reveals an intriguing pattern: the majority of ISIS-K attacks occurred in provinces like Nangarhar and Kunduz, the very areas where the Taliban launched “anti-ISIS” operations to consolidate their own authority. The Taliban consistently portray their campaigns against ISIS-K as “heroic battles” against terrorism. Yet beneath this narrative lies a troubling question: could the Taliban be managing or even facilitating ISIS-K’s presence as a pretext to justify their own rule, gain international support, and ruthlessly crush opposition?

It appears ISIS-K never posed an existential threat to the Taliban. On the contrary, its existence allows the Taliban to brand themselves as “terrorism fighters” while targeting domestic opponents, civil society activists, former security personnel of the previous republic, and even ethnic groups like Tajiks and Uzbeks. In Nangarhar, for example, hundreds were detained on allegations of ties to ISIS-K, though many were once affiliated with the republican government.

For the Taliban, ISIS-K represents a “manageable threat,” dangerous enough to draw local and international backing, but not so strong as to undermine their own power. In fact, it provides an opportunity for the Taliban to further entrench themselves.

The Haqqani Network and Crisis Management

At the heart of this theory lies the Haqqani Network, a sophisticated and shadowy branch of the Taliban known for its long-standing ties with Pakistani intelligence services and transnational jihadist networks. Field patterns suggest that in eastern Afghanistan, there is a kind of covert coexistence between the Haqqanis and elements of ISIS-K. Major ISIS-K attacks in Kabul, including assaults on hotels frequented by Chinese and Russian diplomats, raise suspicions that these incidents may have occurred with either Haqqani facilitation or their tacit approval. There are also reports indicating that some mid-level ISIS-K leaders once cooperated with the Haqqanis.

This relationship can be analyzed through three possible scenarios. First, there is the direct management scenario. Here, the Haqqani Network actively directs parts of ISIS-K to operate within controlled limits.

Second, there is the limited influence scenario. In this scenario, the Taliban and the Haqqanis have some influence over ISIS-K and use it for political purposes.

Third, there is the independent ISIS scenario. In this case, ISIS-K acts independently, but the Taliban opportunistically exploit its existence for political gains.

Although there is no definitive evidence of full collusion between the Taliban and ISIS-K, the Taliban’s selective responses to ISIS-K’s activities suggest we are witnessing “crisis management” rather than an all-out war. Even if we dismiss the first scenario, there is sufficient evidence to support the second. While the Taliban may not entirely control ISIS-K, they at least seek to manage it, benefiting from its existence while preventing it from becoming a genuine threat to their dominance.

A Regional and International Bargaining Chip

For the Taliban, ISIS-K is not merely a domestic issue, it is also a key “bargaining card” in dealings with regional powers. By presenting themselves as the only effective barrier against ISIS-K, the Taliban have transformed from international pariahs into reluctant but necessary security partners for neighboring countries.

To China and Russia, they say, “Without us, ISIS-K will spread into Central Asia and Xinjiang.” To Iran, they warn, “Weakening the Taliban will empower ISIS-K on Afghanistan’s western borders.” To Pakistan, they remind, “Uncontained ISIS-K activity could jeopardize economic security and projects like CPEC.” By managing the ISIS-K threat, the Taliban position themselves as the lesser evil and draw financial and political support from regional actors.

Crisis Engineering: A Familiar Tactic

What the Taliban is doing today is not unlike Pakistan’s strategy in the 1990s, when Islamabad exaggerated the threat of al-Qaeda and the Taliban to extract financial and political concessions from the US and Saudi Arabia. The Taliban have now reproduced this model, creating and managing a more extreme enemy to bolster their own position. This tactic aligns with the theory of a “constructed crisis,” in which security actors inflate or even control threats to use them as tools for pressure and legitimacy.

It is likely, then, that the Taliban never intend to fully destroy ISIS-K. Its continued existence forms an essential part of their political and security survival strategy.

Targeted Attacks: Eliminating Opponents in Terror’s Shadow

In this geopolitical chess game, the Afghan people remain the primary victims. The Taliban’s “anti-ISIS” operations increasingly target civil activists, former security forces, and even ethnic minorities. Some ISIS-K attacks, like the one on the Taliban’s Foreign Ministry, fueled suspicions about the Taliban’s role, or at least their prior knowledge, of such incidents. Some reports even suggest that the Taliban warned their personnel in advance of certain attacks.

These operations may act as a tool for the “targeted elimination” of internal opponents, allowing the Taliban to avoid direct responsibility. Rather than weakening the group, this tactic reinforces the Taliban’s position in Afghanistan’s security equations.

Taliban and ISIS-K: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

At first glance, the Taliban and ISIS-K seem like sworn ideological enemies. But on closer inspection, field evidence and geopolitical logic suggest their relationship is far more complex than a simple rivalry. The Taliban leveraged ISIS-K’s presence to crack down on internal dissent, bolster their regional legitimacy, and present themselves as a defensive shield against terrorism and global threats emanating from Afghan soil.

As long as this intricate game continues, the Taliban can maintain their role as a “necessary but unpleasant” player in regional and global affairs, while Afghanistan remains trapped in a security quagmire with no easy way out.

For reasons of personal safety, the author has used a pseudonym.

The Taliban and ISIS-Khorasan: A Real Rivalry or a Strategic Game to Engineer Crisis? was originally published on Global Security Review.

Cirincione begins his article, “President Joe Biden has a terrible nuclear policy. A re-elected President Donald Trump’s would be much worse.” President Trump, should he win, will likely follow the path of every new president since 1994 and conduct a Nuclear Posture Review, and, like the last three presidents, follow a path that reflects the threat facing the United States. Until something concrete takes place, Cirincione is merely speculating by attributing the plan of some conservative organizations, Project 2025, to Donald Trump.

Cirincione also willfully misrepresents the record of the Biden administration when he writes that Biden has “authorized the largest nuclear weapons budgets since the Cold War.” This suggests President Biden supports nuclear weapons. The Biden Nuclear Posture Review called for the retirement of the B-83, the nation’s only megaton class nuclear capability. Biden also proposed canceling the sea launched cruise missile-nuclear (SLCM-N) and eliminating the nuclear hedge. Neither of these efforts are the actions of a man who supports the nuclear arsenal. Biden, however, had the misfortune of dealing with a reality that was inconsistent with his ideology, something that is never a problem for disarmament groups because they have no responsibility to protect the country.

Cirincione claims that Trump’s nuclear policy is informed by the “new conservative manifesto Project 2025.” When Trump was recently asked about Project 2025 he said that he has never heard of it. He even went on Truth Social to write, “I know nothing about Project 2025.” This is certainly not something Trump would lie about. Trump is, in fact, relying on a small number of officials from his first administration for advice and guidance. He does not need the Heritage Foundation or any other think tanks to tell him what to think.

Understood for what it says, rather than the conspiratorial insinuations of many progressives, Project 2025’s nuclear arsenal related proposals are largely accurate and well-reasoned. An honest assessment of the coming decade clearly indicates a need to expand the American nuclear arsenal to counter a growing Russian, Chinese, and North Korean nuclear capability. When Cirincione writes, “These proposals [from Project 2025] would add unnecessary new weapons to an already expansive nuclear arsenal” he is merely denying the reality facing the United States.

This country is already well behind Russia in the size and capability of its nuclear arsenal and will fall behind China within a decade. The United States will soon face three autocratic regimes with a collective arsenal several times greater than the American arsenal.

Cirincione goes on to criticize every nuclear policy prescription in Project 2025, suggesting that none are necessary. Nothing could be further from the truth. Contrary to his critique, prioritizing nuclear weapons programs over other defense programs is a wise move. Nuclear deterrence is the cornerstone of American defense policy—ensuring that adversaries think twice before considering aggressive action against the United States.

Interestingly, Cirincione fails to acknowledge that former President Barack Obama made an agreement with the US Senate in 2010 in which the Senate agreed to ratify New START in return for modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad. Presidents Obama, Trump, and Biden all honored this agreement in the main, even if they sought change on the margins.

Cirincione even goes so far as to criticize modernizing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Manhattan Project-era infrastructure and production complex. This is not a radical move but a sensible effort that was needed decades ago. The desire of Joe Cirincione and other disarmament advocates to allow the nuclear weapons complex to atrophy into obsolescence is a dangerous path that only wealthy idealists with tall fences can contemplate. It is only because of three decades of neglect that Americans are now forced to modernize all three legs of the nuclear triad.

In other words, Joe Cirincione and his fellow travelers in the disarmament community advocated for the actions that led the nation down the path it is now on. Today, both Republican and Democrat administrations recognize the trouble facing the nation, even as disarmament advocates complain about efforts to fix the problems they helped create. It is simply an example of the Dunning-Kruger effect at work.

Tying Donald Trump to Project 2025 and vilifying both is an effort to obfuscate and avoid having a substantive discussion about the nuclear breakout of China, Russia’s nuclear threats, and other meaningful issues that challenge the mantra of the disarmament community.

What is perhaps most disappointing is just how far the Bulletin has fallen. Rather than engaging in meaningful discussion on nuclear issues, the journal is increasingly publishing articles that read more like an excerpt from Antonio Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks or Herbert Marcuse’s “Repressive Tolerance.” They, like Cirincione’s own article, seem more interested in advancing the radical ideology of modern-day Marxists than having a fact-based debate over the role of nuclear weapons in national security. This penchant for the absurd makes it hard to take a once-conscientious publication and its contributors seriously.

James Ragland is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

Joe Cirincione is Wrong about Donald Trump was originally published on Global Security Review.