Since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the world followed the course laid out by the United States. The crumbling foundations of arms control and disarmament regimes, Russian invasion of Ukraine, the aggressive economic and diplomatic rise of China, and new multilateral arrangements by emerging states are all contributing factors to an ongoing reshaping of the global power dynamic that is challenging American leadership.

The uncertainty created by global institutions that are not effectively coping with Russian aggression, Chinese expansionism, and American retreat is exacerbating the threat of nuclear weapons use. This uncertainly is also causing some states to wonder if they need to pursue their own safety—in the form of nuclear proliferation. After all, the open threat of nuclear weapons use is occurring for the first time in the lives of many national leaders.

In the bipolar world that existed at the time, rivals were kept from attacking each other by competing in small technological battles over nuclear delivery vehicles, not the destructive power of their weapons. But, with the withdrawal of the Cold War era’s arms control arrangements, the threat of arms racing increased as the United States took a clear lead in conventional warfighting technology.

The ever-increasing distrust among rivals, coupled with the weakening of international institutions, is a central cause for the erosion of trust in the current world order. The perception of declining American power and interest in maintaining global order fuels a sense of self-reliance in the security realm, particularly for emerging powers. Careful not to criticize the United States publicly, Japan and South Korea, for example, wonder how reliable American extended nuclear deterrence remains in the wake of Chinese and Russian aggression that seems unchecked.

Closer to home, North Korea is already an established nuclear power and a looming threat that requires a robust defensive mechanism. A fear of extinction is ever present because reliance on a third party for security is always a risky endeavor.

On the other hand, active conflicts in the Middle East cannot be ignored. This is particularly true when a known nuclear state and an aspiring nuclear state are rivals and engaged in a shooting war.

Iran is known to have enriched uranium to at least 60 percent, and may soon, or perhaps already has, enriched uranium to weapons grade. Fortunately, Israel seems willing to rely on its conventional capabilities to win against Iran. This is a positive outcome in the midst of active conflict.

Repeated attempts to halt the Iranian nuclear program by the United States and Israel are proving insufficient. Wisely, Iran is abstaining from fielding a nuclear weapon, but this decision could change in the near future.

Efforts to prevent Iran from building nuclear weapons with the “Iran Nuclear Deal” (commonly known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)) were never supported by the left or right in the United States. Thus, President Trump ended the deal during his first term. American withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, due to Russian cheating; cessation of talks on New START since 2021; American withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty (OST) in 2020, due to Russian cheating; and the unresolved deadlock on the proposed Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) leave advocates of arms control unhappy.

The sense of mistrust that pervades also prevents confidence-building measures from playing any role. Emerging powers are also questioning the concept of a nuclear umbrella in the wake of President Trump’s clear desire to force Europe to bare a much greater share of their own security. Ukraine, the victim of Russian aggression, once inherited Soviet nuclear weapons, which they gave back in 1994 in return for security assurances—only to see Russia violate those guarantees at little expense.

At this current juncture, stability is hard to maintain. Erosion of trust in the United States is evident. Weakening and non-existent nonproliferation regimes are of great concern. States that once rested easy in American security guarantees are now thinking differently when it comes to their own survivability, security, and territorial integrity.

Ineffective international institutions have also become a driving factor in undermining the global narrative surrounding the validity international policing in crises. In such circumstances, states with potential capabilities are now looking to themselves more than ever before. Whether the world is headed for a period of anarchy or a new hegemon is uncertain. What is certain is that everyone will feel the results.

Muhammad Usama Khalid is a Research Officer at Balochistan Think Tank Network (BTTN), BUITEMS, Quetta.

How Global Instability Fuels the Nuclear Arms Race was originally published on Global Security Review.

As it stands, Ukraine cannot rely entirely on aid packages from Europe and especially not the US who, under Trump, is taking a much more careful role in European conflict. So far, support for Ukraine from the international community is limited, costly, and dependent on repayment either in natural resources or as the United Kingdom said, “the extraordinary profits on immobilized Russian sovereign assets.”

There are certain things which, due to their higher cost, Ukraine must receive from aid deals with foreign governments, such as missile systems and larger manned vehicles. These more expensive items must be produced by larger defense contractors as they have greater access to raw materials and a larger production budget. UAVs, however, can be produced as effectively by smaller companies which are able and willing to provide the Ukrainian government a better deal financially. Over the past few years, a German AI company, Helsing, has filled an important role in providing affordable drone systems to the Ukrainian military. Four thousand reconnaissance drones, designed and manufactured by Helsing, are already operational in Ukraine, and a recent deal was struck to provide 6,000 of their new HX-2 attack drones.

The HX-2 attack drones are similar in design to the Russian Lancet drone, produced by Russian aerospace giant ZALA, but come with a few key advantages and innovations. The HX-2 is technologically advanced and able to avoid signal disruption, a feature which can transform drone capabilities on the Ukrainian battlefield. The engagement range is also far higher, at 100 kilometers (km) compared to the Lancet’s 40–60 km. Helsing is the developer of an AI software which allows the drones to travel on missions in a swarm, where many are piloted by one individual, allowing for incredibly destructive capabilities.

The key advantage of a company like Helsing, over a larger aerospace company with a wider range of products, such as ZALA, is the significantly lower production cost, which Helsing offers. Helsing has plans to increase output, building “resilience factories” across Europe, which allow for countries to carry out domestic production.

The Ukrainian government clearly spotted some of the advantages in giving smaller defense companies the opportunity to develop new and innovative products. Brave1 is an initiative run by the Ukrainian government, where investors, engineers, defense companies, and military experts are able to meet to address some of the gaps and issues that Ukraine faces on the battlefield. The idea is to fix issues and fill gaps as fast as possible, and so far, it has been successful. The Ukrainian government incentivizes both smaller and larger technology companies to innovate by offering them a shot at a lucrative government contract.

Another similar program aimed at kickstarting innovation in the European defense industry is the Darkstar Coalition. Listed as one of the partners of Brave1, Darkstar is a team of European tech start-up owners and investors who joined forces to boost European defense. Darkstar hosted two boot camps, where small tech start-ups demonstrate their creations and compete for the winning prize: cash to expand their operations. A third boot camp will take place in Spring of 2025, with a total of €1.5 million awarded to the two most successful companies. Even companies which do not win the funding will benefit from attending, as they are given the opportunity to carry out field testing, network with other companies, gain technical advice, and potentially receive funding externally from other interested attendees. The success of the boot camps demonstrates the previously underutilized talent and innovative ability in Europe in sectors such as engineering, robotics, AI, and cybersecurity. When incentivized and supported, these smaller start-ups can have a real impact on the war in Ukraine and European security more broadly.

It is not just defense manufacturing companies that are stepping up to meet the changing requirements of the Ukrainian government, but also AI programming companies such as Swarmer are also innovating. Swarmer is a company that creates drone swarm programs with huge capabilities in modern warfare. It is also a company which is consistently present at Brave1 tech summits, meeting with investors and Ukrainian military officials.

As the war enters a new phase, with reduced support from the US and the prospect of limited support from Europe, stretching the Ukrainian defense budget as far is it will go will become even more of a priority. This is where these smaller defense and tech start-ups will thrive. Whilst giants such as Lockheed Martin, BAE, or Airbus typically fill a majority of the orders during long-term conflicts, Ukraine recognized the power in allowing smaller, newer, more nimble defense technology companies to innovate.

Raphael Chiswick is an independent author. Views expressed are his own.  

AI Defense Start-ups was originally published on Global Security Review.