At the time, the Soviet Union and United States committed to reducing their nuclear arsenals, eliminating an entire category of nuclear weapons, and allowing thorough onsite inspections to ensure treaty compliance. During the Cold War, the INF Treaty served as a crucial stabilizing mechanism in the global nuclear order. Historically, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) of 1972 and 1979 were the first of several agreements between the US and the Soviet Union. As a result, both sides agreed to reduce their strategic weaponry, which included ballistic missile defenses, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

In 1987, Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty. Additionally, they established inspection procedures to make sure both parties followed the agreement. Due to the treaty, 2,600 missiles were destroyed, marking a significant Cold War breakthrough. Despite decades of arms control, the US and Russia still field the largest nuclear forces. Although it is challenging to determine the exact extent of their stockpiles, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that the US possesses 5,328 warheads, while Russia has 5,580.

In August 2025, Russia declared it would no longer fulfil its commitments under the INF Treaty, citing increasing threats from the United States and other Western nations. When the US withdrew from the INF Treaty in 2019 because of Russian noncompliance with treaty limitations, Moscow stated that it would not use such weapons as long as Washington did not. This may have served as an effective ruse, but it served a purpose.

Questions are increasing about the utility of nuclear proliferation, the threat of arms racing, and the future of nuclear deterrence following the decision of Russia to fully abrogate the INF Treaty. The collapse of the INF Treaty represents a significant shift in the trajectory of international arms control.

The situation took a more dramatic turn as President Donald Trump announced that the US would move two of its nuclear-armed submarines closer to Russia in reaction to the “inflammatory statements” issued by former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. This action highlights the challenge that arises when arms control breaks down—the potential for misunderstandings and overreactions increase.

Among nuclear-armed states, communication, predictability, and a certain measure of self-control are essential elements of nuclear deterrence. They were shaped by the INF Treaty, which placed verifiable limitations on missile sites. With the failure of the INF Treaty, useful tools were removed.

The future deployment of intermediate-range systems in regions that were shielded from them may prove an urgent strategic issue. Once at the epicenter of Cold War nuclear worries, Europe may have to host such weapons once more, but with improved accuracy, shorter travel times, and, perhaps, lower yields.

Deterrence dynamics in the Asia-Pacific are more difficult, especially between the US, China, and Russia, after the INF Treaty. The great powers are now accelerating nuclear modernization, while non-nuclear states are reconsidering their nonproliferation commitments. A replay of the Cold War–era European missile crisis has emerged with the collapse of the treaty.

Now, both Russia and the US are free to use and develop short-, medium-, and intermediate-range missiles without any official restraints. One more issue concerns the intentions of other governments, who may be influenced by the deterioration of controls on nuclear systems. States that did not previously possess nuclear weapons may choose to acquire them. Modern arms racing may be fast, less predictable, and more destabilizing due to technological advancements, such as autonomous delivery systems, hypersonic weapons, and AI-assisted targeting.

There are limited prospects for cooperative tools to mitigate these risks of escalation between the US and Russia. The two largest nuclear powers have a special duty to control and limit the scope of their competition.

Measures that encourage openness, trust, and communication between nuclear and non-nuclear governments will be crucial. In the absence of a global treaty, regional security accords, tailored to today’s security challenges, can effectively restrict risky deployments and restrain great powers from further modernizing their nuclear arsenals.

Nations in the Asia-Pacific can, for example, agree to mutual missile deployment restrictions similar to those in the INF Treaty’s verification procedures, which include regular inspections and satellite monitoring by mutual compliance. This would prevent insecure military build-ups in the region and reduce mistrust between states. Whatever course nations take, the importance of preventing escalation to nuclear use is foremost.

Nazia Sheikh is a Research Officer at the Centre for International Strategic Studies, AJK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

The Uncertain Future of Nuclear Deterrence and Proliferation was originally published on Global Security Review.

Strategic Drivers

There are several strategic imperatives driving Israel’s likely military action against Iran. This includes the full neutralization of Iran’s regional military ecosystem. Israel’s continuous operations in Gaza and its persistent pressure on disarming Hezbollah in Lebanon are not isolated campaigns. They are shaping operations aimed at reducing the two-front (or three-front) threat Israel faces in a direct confrontation with Iran. By degrading proxy capacity now, Israel frees resources and attention for a larger, concentrated blow against Iranian assets without the burden of sustained high-intensity proxy retaliation.

Moreover, it might be viewed by Israel that the current timing is an opportunity to exploit internal Iranian fault lines where it can be obvious that Israeli intelligence may take advantage of the exploitable rifts in the Iranian leadership ecosystem. This includes the ongoing rifts between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the regular Iranian army, as well as between the IRGC and the Supreme Leader’s advisory council. Altogether, these seams, if widened, could limit Iran’s unified response and complicate its chain of command in the early hours of an Israeli strike.

Aligning a strategic military timeline within a political context is also another factor that may trigger a more expansive attack on Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s possible target date before October 7, 2025, is symbolically and politically loaded. Delivering a strategic blow before this anniversary serves multiple purposes, including but not limited to consolidating his domestic political standing, demonstrating Israel’s capacity to impose strategic costs on Iran, and shaping the broader narrative in the US.

Operational Indicators of Preparation

Mossad has already intensified intelligence and special operations inside Iran, including target acquisition and asset positioning. This was also very apparent in the drone attacks by Israel, that took place from within Iran, in the recent confrontation. They resulted in the successful elimination of many of Iran’s senior military members. These activities are not stand-alone intelligence-gathering missions; they are preparatory steps for synchronized special forces, air, and cyber composite operations. Accordingly, expanded Israeli intelligence and activity against Iran is highly likely with the operational aim to pre-emptively disable Iranian sensor grids, command nodes, and ballistic missile launch infrastructure.

Indications within the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) suggest a possible force regeneration, given the apparent contradiction between political calls for full Gaza occupation and the IDF chief of staff’s emphasis on giving forces a rest. This is consistent with a combat reconstitution phase. This also aligns with the doctrine of unit rotation, replenishment, and training for the demands of long-range precision strike and high-tempo air operations.

At this stage, signs of Iranian defensive mobilization are extremely important. Tehran’s formation of a National Defense Council under Ali Larijani and consolidation of 13 security agencies into three “super-agencies” is an unmistakable sign that Iran expects a broader confrontation. Such a restructuring’s purpose is to tighten internal security, improve rapid mobilization of conventional and unconventional forces, and streamline command and control. Ironically, such rapid reorganizations can create bureaucratic friction—an exploitable weakness during the chaos of an initial strike.

Political Leverage and Timing

US involvement and the “Trump factor” are critical for Israel. Netanyahu’s priority is securing at least limited US involvement or political cover. Persuading Trump to back a strike or provide overt/implicit support could blunt international pushback and potentially extend Israel’s operational window. Netanyahu’s engagement with the pro-Israel lobby in the US is also aiming to mitigate more isolationist resistance, which is anchored in Trump’s “end wars” philosophy.

Many currently view Israel’s great power triangulation as political leverage. For example, Israel is engaging in calculated quid-pro-quo diplomacy where it is coordinating with Russia in order to possibly avoid Russian obstruction in Syrian and regional airspace. In parallel, Israel is supporting Trump’s interests in Ukraine negotiations and the recently announced Azerbaijan-Armenia reconciliation in exchange for flexibility on Iran. This triangulation reduces the risk of multi-front geopolitical friction during the strike window.

The Anticipated Israeli Operational Concept

Consistent with IDF doctrine, a multi-domain composite strike operation is highly likely. Such a strike is likely to combine precision air/missile strikes and cyber-sabotage. Sequence effects would aim to blind Iranian radar, degrade command-and-control (C2) nodes, and neutralize ballistic missiles at launch sites within the first hours as well as exploit “left-of-launch” interception to deny Iran its most potent retaliatory capability. Additionally, ongoing operations in Gaza and along the Lebanese border serve as “maskirovka,” where a strategic deception fixes adversary focus away from the Iranian theater and provides live operational rehearsal for air-to-ground coordination, precision targeting, and strategic messaging.

However, Israel’s plan is expected to involve pre-emptive or concurrent action against Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF). This is very likely given the fact that Hezbollah vowed not to disarm and give armaments control to the Lebanese army. Accordingly, Iran’s proxy neutralization remains one of the most important steps ahead of a full-scale attack on Iran. This procedure is critical to prevent logistical and operational disruption to the main Iran-focused strike locations as well as protect regional Arab states indirectly supporting Israeli strikes on Iran from the latter’s proxies’ retaliatory actions.

International Pressure Tolerance and Timeline Assessment

Israel’s willingness to accept higher casualties and endure reputational costs has already been demonstrated in its Gaza and Lebanon campaigns, as well as the limited strikes it conducted against Iran. This signals a political readiness to withstand the diplomatic fallout of striking Iran, and a military posture aligned with completing decisive action before the strategic window closes.

Key risks exist with a full-scale attack on Iran. First, American political dynamics, where, for instance, isolationism and Trump’s Nobel Peace Prize ambitions could temper military participation or support. Second, the threat from Iran’s regional proxies still exists, where the risk of multi-proxy escalation is very likely. In this regard, full activation of Hezbollah, the Houthis, and the PMF would complicate Israel’s operational tempo. Third, there is the chance of an Iranian counter-surprise, where Tehran attempts its own pre-emptive measures (cyber, proxy action, or limited missile strikes). That said, Israel’s concept appears to be structured for first-mover advantage, assuming Iran’s reorganized security apparatus is slow to adapt in the initial strike window.

Forecast and Likely Outcomes

Given the current convergence of strategic necessity, operational readiness, and political opportunity, the probability of a renewed, larger-scale Israeli attack on Iran before year-end is very high. The planned operation will probably try to take advantage of divisions within Iran to create more chaos, reduce the chances of retaliation from its proxies, and cause major damage to Iran’s missile, nuclear, and command systems—all with an aim of shaping the regional balance in Israel’s Favor ahead of the October 7 anniversary.

If executed, such a strike would represent the most significant escalation between Israel and Iran to date as well as a defining test of Israeli air and missile defense capacity against retaliatory salvos, which then would reshape Middle East strategic alignment and potentially lock in a more aggressive Israeli doctrine of direct confrontation with regional adversaries, rather than proxy containment.

While forecasts will continue, the coming period may include several operational watch points. This includes anomalies in which sudden spikes in Israeli aerial reconnaissance occur over Iraq, Syria, or along Iran’s western approaches. Additionally, force posture shifts are a significant indication; noticeable redeployment or reinforcement of Israel’s Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow batteries are highly likely to be a main indicator of Israel’s reinforcement for defensive systems against any Iranian missile attack. Diplomatic traffic is also a key indicator, where intensified Israeli engagement in Washington, Moscow, and key Arab Gulf capitals may indicate Israel’s preparation for an expanded offensive on Iran.

Whatever may occur, vigilance is required. Without it, the implications are significant for nations and people across the region.

Mohamed ELDoh is a guest writer for Global Security Review.

Forecasting an Imminent Israeli Strike on Iran was originally published on Global Security Review.