Its author, James Wilson, is a supervisory historian at the State Department. Wilson oversees the compilation and editing of declassified documents for publication of the Foreign Relations of the United States. His focus is Cold War national security policy and interactions with the Soviets. He previously wrote a book about the end of the Cold War with a focus on Mikhail Gorbachev. Wilson also writes for War on the Rocks.

His latest effort focuses on Paul Nitze, his life, and his role in American national security policy throughout the Cold War.

Paul Nitze is not a household name when it comes to 20th-century US history or even Cold War history. There are only a handful of books about him; four books were published from 1969 to 2006 mentioning him, usually in passing. Keep in mind, he authored NSC-68, which is arguably the most important national security document in the nation’s history. His relative obscurity is not surprising, though, as his opinion of political scientists was mostly negative.

One can see from James Wilson’s resume that he understands the influential events of history and works with official material on these matters every day, which means Paul Nitze is important beyond just authoring NSC-68. Nitze was not just an advisor, but someone known by all post–World War II presidents, and too important to be promoted to a cabinet-level position.

Paul Nitze was and is important for reasons other than just a historic memo and the Cuban Missile Crisis. This was a man who helped write the Selective Service Act, helped procure resources for the Cold War fight against communism, wrote the final reports of the US Strategic Bombing Survey, and authored the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). His conclusions on the turning and end points for the Axis Powers during the war informed his beliefs throughout the Cold War.

Some of today’s challenges would be familiar to Nitze. He warned of expanding NATO and was highly critical of the State Department’s lack of imagination and ability to adapt. He understood what was required to win a war and a nation’s vulnerabilities during war. If he were alive today, he would most likely find the US to be as provocatively weak as it was on December 7, 1941.

As a man who believed in peace through strength, he would be discussing the nation’s weak economy and supply-chain challenges and advocate for technological innovation across the Department of Defense. He would also oppose consolidating military and private-sector logistics.

One of his worst fears was that an attack on American military forces would push the president into choosing between a retaliatory nuclear strike or surrender. This is still a concern today.

Wilson offers readers a great read and tells untold stories that those interested in World War II and the Cold War will enjoy. The later chapters set up the major policy decisions and events that bring readers to the present day.

This work reminds us that we have been here before, and that achieving strategic superiority is not easy. It took advocates like Paul Nitze, with grit and determination over decades, to make it happen. The threats to the nation continue to evolve. Thus, a new generation of advocates for technological and strategic superiority are needed. American leaders need to look past credentialism and embrace the competent, from wherever they may come. Hopefully the story of Paul Nitze will be an inspiration to them.

One of the highlights of the book is the tale of the overnight negotiations that took place in Reykjavik, Iceland, on the weekend of October 11–12, 1986, when President Ronald Reagan sought to bring General Secretary Gorbachev around to his previously outlined positions regarding START. After an all-night haggling session, and some shuttle diplomacy with their respective bosses, came the morning after. Paul Nitze and Soviet delegation head, Sergei Akhromeyev, agreed that, under the terms of START, they would count gravity bombs and short-range attack missiles on heavy bombers as one warhead.

Nitze was never constrained by academic tenure or any other hindrances. He thrived as an investment manager in private equity, fund management, and foreign direct investment when not in government. That gave Nitze the financial autonomy that shielded him from employers’ and pressure groups’ retaliation. It provided him with the freedom and ability to perform his political activism at the highest level.

Nitze was a man of action who shaped the clockwork of history’s small and big wheels. That does not mean he despised thinkers who kept their fingers on the pulse of things. But what Nitze really loathed was ineffective theorists with no impact on real decision-making.

James Wilson’s biography of Paul Nitze, who experienced the Cold War’s “tension between opposites,” reminds us of the words of Sir William Francis Butler who wrote, “The nation that will insist on drawing a broad line of demarcation between the fighting man and the thinking man is liable to find it’s fighting done by fools and it’s thinking done by cowards.”

Michael Fincher is a Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies and a practicing attorney.

Christophe Bosquillon is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He has over 30 years of international experience in general management, foreign direct investment, and private equity and fund management across various industries in Europe and the Pacific Basin. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

America’s Cold Warrior: A Review was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent defense bill passed by Congress fully supports the Sentinel program. The Strategic Posture Commission report also supports the replacement of the Minuteman III ICBM, although the commission also recommends the US examine making some portion of the ICBM force mobile. The ACA rejects efforts to make ICBMs more survivable and recommends the elimination of all American ICBMs, a switch from their previous view that the US should keep the 54-year-old Minuteman III as an alternative to Sentinel.

ICBM mobility was reviewed by previous administrations in detail, but due to opposition from environmental groups and disarmament advocates, mobile ICBMs never received the political support needed. In 1977, just after President Jimmy Carter proposed the fielding of 200 mobile MX missiles, two senators, Howard Cannon (D-NV) and Frank Moss (D-UT), cleverly proposed to the Senate Armed Services Committee that Utah and Nevada would deploy one hundred mobile MX missiles but required another state accept the other half of the force. As they anticipated, there were no takers. Thus, the nation never fielded a mobile MX missile.

In 1983, a combined mobile and fixed ICBM force that included the multi-warhead Peacekeeper and the single warhead Small ICBM, were both recommended by the congressionally mandated Scowcroft Commission. The dual system approach, noted Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY), was made because “[y]ou cannot make an elephant a rabbit and you can’t make a rabbit an elephant!”

In 1986, the Air Force fielded 50 Peacekeeper missiles in silos, as part of President Ronald Reagan’s nuclear modernization. However, with the end of the Cold War and a 50 percent cut to warheads under START I, plans for road-mobile Small ICBM and rail-mobile Peacekeeper missiles were both terminated.

Now, four decades later, with a nuclear arsenal 90 percent smaller than during the Cold War, the ACA rejects ICBMs altogether, whether fixed or mobile. In reality, their idea makes nuclear war more likely and does not address new strategic developments.

The most likely use of nuclear weapons is no longer a massive bolt-out-of-the blue strike, which arms control advocates cite as part of their rationale for eliminating the ICBM. The recent Strategic Posture Commission report unanimously concluded, as Mark Schneider explains, the most likely use of nuclear weapons against the United States is a coercive, but limited, nuclear strike as part of a regional conflict by Russia or China.

Within Russian strategy, limited strikes are part of an escalate to win approach that does not include strikes on American ICBMs. In fact, the very point of employing lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons is to keep strategic nuclear weapons out of the fight.

Most at risk are American military targets in Europe, the Western Pacific, and the Middle East. Here the US is already at risk with no theater nuclear forces in Asia and fewer than 200 fighter-delivered gravity bombs in Europe.

Unilaterally retiring American ICBMs from the nuclear triad would do nothing to prevent the use of nuclear weapons at either the strategic or theater level. In fact, a Russian or Chinese nuclear attack might prove more likely. For example, without ICBMs, American nuclear force structure would be reduced to five bomber and submarine bases and a handful of submarines at sea. More specifically, killing ICBMs reduces the number of targets an adversary must strike from over five hundred to about dozen—with none requiring a nuclear strike. The American deterrent is now survivable and allows for a robust second strike.

Eliminating the ICBM force invites a disarming attack by Russia or China. For example, although a majority of American ballistic missile submarines are at sea at any given time and are highly survivable, submarines are highly susceptible to conventional attack in port or when entering or leaving port. An underseas technology breakthrough would allow even our submarines at sea to be targeted.

Destroying the bomber force’s two Weapons Storage Areas before weapons are onloaded could take the bomber force out of any fight. ICBMs alone force Russia and China to expend at least 1,000 warheads in hope of destroying the force, while also knowing hundreds of American ICBMs could retaliate even after a confirmed warhead strike on the US.

An American deterrent without ICBMs invites rather than prevents aggression because it reduces the uncertainty and risk of an attack. Reducing the US nuclear force to less than a dozen aim points invites cooperative nuclear-armed adversaries to hide their intentions, promise a “peaceful rise,” and at a time of their choosing aim a possible surprise disarming strike at the United States. It also eliminates a significant hedge option for the United States.

Like the nuclear freeze, which Americans rejected half a century ago, once again the disarmament community proposes a dangerous unilateral measure that would make the very nuclear war they seek to avoid more likely. The American people must once again reject a bad idea.

Peter Huessy is Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. The view’s expressed are the authors own. 

Killing ICBMs was originally published on Global Security Review.