The previously concluded and now cancelled US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) revealed a paradox at the heart of the Middle East security landscape. Both sides have been negotiating back and forth on de-escalation, a compromise on enriched uranium, and freedom of passage through the Strait of Hormuz. However, beneath these ongoing diplomatic efforts is a reality that is becoming increasingly clear. For the Iranian regime, a regional environment of managed conflict is more strategically valuable than a sustained peace agreement. This explains why, even after signing the 60-day ceasefire memo, Iran still attacked ships in the Strait of Hormuz, prompting the U.S. to respond to discourage future Iranian violence.

Iran will likely avoid a full-scale war that risks its destruction, instead preferring a continued proxy-driven, tension-filled regional environment to maintain deterrence and project power without escalation. Recent talks on uranium and safe passage through the Hormuz Strait will fuel Iran’s resistance to normalization with the U.S. and GCC.

Instability As a Strategic Infrastructure

For Iran, pushing for regional instability or proxy confrontations is not merely a temporary policy dispute. It has become embedded in the state’s architecture itself. Iran has built and framed its domestic popularity and regional legitimacy around the concept of resistance against Western pressure, particularly from the U.S. and Israel. This narrative was deeply institutionalized within Iran’s regional strategy, military doctrine, and its main controlling security establishments, the IRGC and Basij forces. In this regard, a comprehensive peace deal with the U.S. would create profound structural questions inside Iran, including the rationale of the “resistance” doctrine in place for decades, the logic of maintaining extensive regional proxy networks, and preserving a missile- and drone-heavy militarized regional posture.

In different ways, a controlled conflict has become part of the regime’s survival and operating environment. Therefore, achieving a sustainable peace agreement can entirely destabilize internal balances of power more than maintaining them. This explains why, even during periods of increased international diplomatic efforts, Iran often preserves parallel escalation mechanisms in addition to never conceding any of its nuclear program development to date. Thus, pursuing negotiations alongside adding pressure on multiple fronts is not a contradiction within Iranian strategic thinking. Instead, they are complementary tools.

The Asymmetric Leverage

Iran’s ability to threaten and demonstrate control over maritime access to the Strait of Hormuz negatively impacted global oil markets and exposed the vulnerability of international energy flows to customer states. In this respect, around one-fifth of global oil flows transit through the Strait of Hormuz, making it one of the most globally strategic water passages. Accordingly, the ongoing Hormuz crisis reinforces Tehran’s preference for controlled instability.

Iran uses the Hormuz situation to benefit itself domestically and internationally, framing it to show that strategic, asymmetric disruptions give diplomatic leverage. Even after military pressure, the U.S. remains focused on negotiations to reopen Hormuz and restore shipping stability. This is Iran’s leverage that it does not want to cede. Tehran, specifically the IRGC, which appears to be the decision-making authority, believes that maintaining control of Hormuz but avoiding escalation preserves its bargaining power, especially since hardliners see concessions to the U.S. as losses. Iran wants full control of the Strait, knowing it cannot fight the U.S. directly, and employs asymmetric leverage to influence the strategic balance.

Iran’s air force and navy remain significantly limited compared to those of the U.S. and regional GCC states. Additionally, Iran’s economy suffers under sanctions and American quarantines. As a result, Tehran has spent decades developing a different form of deterrence, including ballistic missiles, drones, proxy warfare networks, and regional escalation networks across Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen. Among Iran’s regional proxy groups, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen remain one of the most critical factors in Iran’s current asymmetric model of confrontation. Since the start of the U.S.-Israeli confrontation with Iran, the Houthis have so far chosen not to fully participate in ground fighting. This is particularly concerning because the Houthis are currently Iran’s most strategically positioned proxy group in the Middle East, armed with a wide range of missiles and drones, capable of inflicting strategic damage across the Red Sea and Bab el Mandeb and potentially causing another global maritime shock like Hormuz. This allows Iran to effectively deploy a multi-chokepoint strategy at any time. Alongside their threat to maritime security, the proximity of the Houthis to GCC states and the group’s history of fighting Saudi Arabia from 2015 to 2022 give Iran additional leverage to pressure the region.

This asymmetric model works best for Iran when geopolitical friction persists. Even without fully going into a conventional war with the U.S., Iran can complicate Western military planning and generate political costs for its opponents. Therefore, a stable regional order with normalized relations would significantly reduce the strategic utility of all these tools.

Deterrence and The Regime Survival Dimension

Iran’s broader regional strategy relies heavily on maintaining a “forward proxy defense” doctrine beyond its borders to project influence. This approach has served several purposes simultaneously, including creating multiple escalation fronts and increasing the political cost of directly attacking Iran. From Tehran’s perspective, a low-level regional friction prevents the emergence of a fully consolidated anti-Iranian security order.

There is also an internal political dimension that Western analyses often overlook. For example, external confrontations in the hybrid warfare narrative, which often bolster regime unity as periods of increased confrontational pressure enable the Iranian leadership to suppress dissent and rally nationalist sentiment. They frame this to their local population as the West’s war on Islam, aligning it with the state’s ideological identity, deeply rooted in anti-Western and resistance narratives. An internationally accepted peace agreement with the U.S. could lead to unwanted domestic effects for Iran, such as reduced ideological cohesion and increased demands for broader political reforms. Ironically, a limited confrontation might seem safer for regime stability than reaching a peace agreement.

Regional Peace, Security, and Iran

During the recent confrontation, which culminated in April’s ceasefire, more than 80 percent of Iran’s missiles and drones were directed at GCC states. This suggests Iran was willing to strike neighboring countries outside the immediate conflict even though they were not directly fighting with Iran. Such actions undermine regional trust and raise questions about Iran’s willingness to function as a responsible contributor to regional security.

The central paradox of any U.S.-Iran negotiations is that peace itself will threaten some of the strategic foundations upon which Iran has operated for decades. Regional instabilities and relatively managed conflicts provide Tehran with bargaining leverage, geopolitical relevance, and a degree of deterrence it seeks to demonstrate. A sustained peace deal, by contrast, risks reducing Iran’s asymmetric advantages that it has been trying to capitalize upon while also exposing its internal political and strategic vulnerabilities. The U.S. must recognize this reality or risk negotiating without a clear understanding of Iran’s strategic intentions.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defence and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the EU Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defence cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.

Iran’s Strategic Logic of Instability was originally published on Global Security Review.

Persistent geopolitical instability surrounding the Strait of Hormuz has renewed the debate about Indo-Pacific energy security and the need to diversify supply sources. However, diversification alone may not eliminate strategic vulnerability, even with alternative suppliers beyond the Gulf for the Indo-Pacific region, because the challenge lies not only in where energy is sourced but also in the maritime networks through which it travels. 

Recent warnings from the Australian Food and Grocery Council highlight how geopolitical instability in the Middle East is already contributing to broader cost pressures across Australia’s supply chains, especially through increasing fuel and logistics costs, as an example of a region at the heart of the Indo-Pacific. 

The Indo-Pacific’s capacity to decrease its reliance on the Strait of Hormuz is limited not by geography but by a broader network of contested maritime chokepoints influenced by proxy conflicts, especially the Bab el-Mandeb corridor connecting the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In the event of a disruption in Hormuz, states such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand could theoretically turn to alternative suppliers in the Americas, Africa, or the Atlantic basin. 

However, diversifying suppliers does not necessarily reduce risk. Many of these alternative supply chains still rely on the same vulnerable maritime routes, exposing them to similar transportation and security dangers. For example, Bab Al-Mandeb (Red Sea gateway) continues to face significant disruptions from Yemen-based Houthi attacks. Meanwhile, Somali pirates have become more active due to the current regional crisis involving Iran, which raises risk premiums and causes delays in the Gulf of Aden. 

As a result, proxy warfare, rather than a formal state blockade, may also limit Indo-Pacific states’ ability to rely on alternative supplies. For example, non-state actors and proxy forces (especially in Yemen), along with regional instability, can disrupt the straits without owning them. Under these conditions, proxies can exert strategic influence over maritime corridors without officially controlling them. 

This indicates a shift in the international order where effective control of maritime corridors no longer requires sovereign ownership; disruption capability alone can achieve similar strategic results. Meanwhile, strategic geography links Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb together; disruption in one can increase pressure on the other. 

Proxy maritime actors like Yemen-based Houthis disrupt the Red Sea, while Somali piracy networks remain a persistent risk that could increase costs and uncertainty for shipping transiting the Gulf of Aden. As a result, energy security diversification in the Indo-Pacific region is limited not by a lack of alternative suppliers but by the concentration of global maritime energy flows at politically contested chokepoints. Therefore, these contested chokepoints are truly a security dilemma for the Indo-Pacific’s states. 

The growing capacity of proxy actors and non-state groups to disrupt these corridors transforms maritime geography into a web of vulnerabilities, undermining the effectiveness of traditional diversification strategies. Therefore, the Indo-Pacific’s energy security strategy must consider proxy-driven disruptions within maritime chokepoint networks, rather than relying solely on supplier diversification as a resilience measure. 

To address this risk, the Australian Defense Force has participated in coalition-based maritime security operations in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. However, its role has remained limited to multilateral frameworks rather than unilateral action. The escalating instability linked to Iran-related regional tensions and the widening insecurity from the Middle East to the Horn of Africa may increasingly pressure Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Thailand to reassess their strategic posture toward key maritime chokepoints, including the scope, depth, capacity, and autonomy of their future engagement. 

This is especially significant as Iran continues to violate the current ceasefire with the U.S. and is eyeing Bab el-Mandeb, the only chokepoint after Hormuz that connects Asia, the Middle East, and Europe with the purpose of inflicting damage on the global economy and achieve a more robust position in its negotiations with Washington. 

Unlike Australia and Thailand, countries like Japan and South Korea are highly vulnerable to these threats because they are consistently among the top liquid natural gas and crude oil importers worldwide. This has led Seoul and Tokyo to sign a strategic agreement to strengthen energy cooperation despite longstanding historical disputes. 

A collective security action may be necessary if Indo-Pacific countries are to ensure energy security and strengthen domestic resilience amid rising geopolitical instability and the growing prevalence of regionally based asymmetric warfare. State and non-state actors increasingly employ coercion, sabotage, proxy forces, and physical attacks against critical supply lines to undermine political stability and disrupt economic activity. Because global and regional energy markets, maritime trade routes, and supply chains are highly interconnected, disruptions in or around a single country can cascade across the broader region. Consequently, Indo-Pacific nations have a shared interest in strengthening collective maritime security. By working together to deter threats, reduce vulnerabilities, and secure access to vital energy resources, regional states can enhance their ability to withstand external shocks and preserve the economic and social stability upon which long-term resilience depends. 

Shad Sherko is an independent journalist and security analyst specializing in Middle Eastern defense policy, regional proxy dynamics, and cross-border insurgencies. His work focuses on contemporary security threats across the Middle East and beyond. The views of the author are his own. 

Proxy Wars Threaten Energy Security in the Indo-Pacific Amid Regional Turmoil in The Middle East was originally published on Global Security Review.

The Strait of Hormuz crisis and the continuing crisis in the Bab al-Mandab Strait have shown that narrow maritime passages can and will be used as political weapons in future conflicts. The state actors in Tehran and the non-state actors in Sanaa, however, may not be the only ones that may leverage these choke points in future. For example, Oman’s ports could present an essential part of any land route alternatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) that avoid both the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Hormuz. However, they have also faced drone attacks in the current war and will likely face political instabilities in future. An alternative that has come into greater focus is the North Sea Route (NSR) or the Arctic route. Surprisingly, recent reductions in Arctic ice levels have increased the feasibility of using the NSR, now potentially facilitating the movement of goods. 

Iran asserts its right to regulate shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Under its 1993 law, innocent passage is subject to prior authorization based on Iran’s national security. The present crisis created by the Iran war has highlighted how the food security of many countries is connected to oil through fertilizer prices, which have witnessed a price surge. Before the war, around 30% of global fertilizers were exported by gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz. Additionally, 20% of global liquified natural gas is used as the feedstock for making fertilizers and much traveled through the Suez Canal before the Houthis disrupted trade. While the rest of the world will face higher food prices, the Gulf countries, which import up to 85% of their food, are still affected. Asian countries like China, India, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Singapore are highly dependent on oil imports from the Middle East and must now find alternatives. In the present crisis, increased imports from the U.S. have provided relief to these countries, but the Cape of Good Hope route, needed for this transport, is time-consuming and increases costs.  

The NSR is also not without its share of complex legal matters. Russia has established laws and codes for regulating passage through NSR. Russia classifies the NSR as its internal waters and does not recognize the international right of innocent passage through it. All ships need prior authorization while foreign warships must notify their intended passage 90 days in advance. Ships may be required to use the services of Russian icebreaker escorts and pilots. Russia justifies its claim under article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Known as the “Arctic Exception,” it applies to all “Ice-covered areas.” It grants coastal states the right to enforce non-discriminatory laws in their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) to prevent marine pollution in the ice-covered areas. The U.S. and other countries argue that UNCLOS protects innocent passage through territorial seas and hence the Russian law is contrary to the provisions of UNCLOS. 

Unlike the Middle East shipping passages, however, the NSR has been in conflict and has not had any kinetic combat or active armed conflict. The free navigation operations may operate here because the U.S. may be reluctant to indulge in hostilities against and may not be equipped to do so. Simultaneously, there may be U.S. interest in selling its oil to East, Southeast, and South Asia through this route. Russia may also find advantage in developing this route and is seeking partners to develop it. Several countries have already reached agreements with Russia to take advantage of the NSR. 

Russia is already using its Arctic coast seasonally to deliver LNG from its Yamal project to Europe and Asia. With increasing arctic warming and higher investment in icebreakers, this may change to round-the-year operations. The present bonhomie between Putin and Xi Jinping had already led to the October 2025 Harbin agreement to make NSR a strategic Arctic trade corridor. NSR suits China for another reason. It reduces heavy Chinese dependence on transit through the Malacca Strait, where India is developing an island base with potential to choke that passage. 

India is diplomatically very heavily invested in the Middle East and has been seeking a route to Europe through Iran and through IMEC. If India were to shift to oil and gas imports through NSR it could face strong pushback and heavy geopolitical pressure. The shift will come with another risk; the conflict zone in the Middle East will be swapped for the possible U.S.-Russian tensions in the narrow Bering Strait and make India dependent on a Sino-Russian architecture beyond its control. Even so, that scenario may still be a long way off. A positive aspect is India’s long-standing trade and military engagement with Russia that has proved its strength in crises. In December 2025, Russia and India signed an agreement formalizing Indian military access to Russia’s Arctic naval ports. Long-term contracts for oil and gas and equity participation in the Arctic infrastructure and shipping capacity may follow. 

For India and Southeast Asian countries, the year-round availability of the NSR will increase overall energy resilience by creating an alternative route that will dampen price surges during the frequent Middle East crises. It will make it more feasible for these countries to tap into multiple oil and gas sources including Russia and the U.S. and, in addition, provide a faster sea route to Europe. There is also the feasibility of synergy between the energy needs of India, the ship-building capacity of South Korea, and the NSR. While the Arctic route will not be a silver bullet for Asian countries to have risk-free access to oil and gas, the shift of focus from the tropics to the North Pole shall reduce the historic leverage by the Middle East and will help keep prices and access stable even during the recurring Middle East flare-ups. 

R.N. Prasher is a retired member from Indian Administrative Service (IAS). His primary expertise is in geopolitics where he has published in RealClear Defense, Asia Times, and The National Maritime Foundation. He has published the book “Geopolitics: Impact on Energy Transition and Energy Security” and has an upcoming publication “Revisiting the Chinese Screen” The views are the author’s own.

The North Sea Route as an Alternative to the Hormuz-Red Sea Conundrum was originally published on Global Security Review.

The failure of the U.S.-Iran negotiations that took place in Pakistan marks a decisive inflection point in the current Middle Eastern security course. This is not a diplomatic setback; it is the transition from a fragile de-escalation phase into a more volatile period defined by coercive pressure, military signaling, and elevated risk of miscalculation. This risk is driven by the threat Iran continues to pose to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and by its remaining ballistic capabilities, which allow it to erratically target neighboring Arab states and regional U.S. allies.

Furthermore, the announcement of a U.S.-led maritime blockade over Iranian ports fundamentally alters the operational and strategic landscape aimed at confining the Iranian threat. The main question now is no longer whether tensions will rise, they already have, but whether the current trajectory leads toward controlled escalation, negotiated recalibration, or systemic full-scale conflict.

Structural Drivers of Escalation

At the core of the U.S.-Iran negotiations lies a set of structural but irreconcilable objectives. The U.S. continues to frame its demands around three pillars: curtailment of Iran’s nuclear development program, limitations on ballistic missile capabilities development, and the rollback of Iran’s regional proxy networks. Iran, on the opposite side, views these elements as essential to regime survival and sovereign deterrence. Accordingly, this is not a negotiation gap; it is a strategic contradiction.

Iran’s nuclear posture has evolved from a bargaining chip into a core pillar of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) and the regime’s survival. Any perceived concession risks undermining internal legitimacy and external deterrence credibility. Accordingly, ongoing diplomatic negotiations are performative rather than transformative, thus aimed at managing escalation rather than resolving underlying disputes. Additionally, the U.S. decision to impose a maritime blockade represents a calibrated escalation designed to exert economic and psychological pressure without the need to immediately resort back to kinetic operations. However, the strategic implications are profound.

Iran’s economy relies mainly on maritime oil exports. A blockade directly targets this vulnerability, threatening revenue streams, which then impacts the domestic stability, in addition to regional influence operations funded through such revenues. From Tehran’s perspective, failure to respond would signal weakness not only to the U.S. but also to its network of non-state groups across the region. This creates a classic escalation dilemma for Iran. On one hand, not responding risks strategic erosion of the IRGC and the current regime’s image. On the other hand, the response risks triggering military confrontation, which Iran cannot withstand. In such conditions, even any Iranian action such as harassment of commercial shipping, or proxy attacks carry a high probability of escalation.

Another key driver for the escalation is the pre-positioned military capabilities. Unlike previous crises, the current environment is characterized by pre-positioned military assets and operational readiness on both sides. U.S. naval, air, and ground forces in the Middle East are already configured for rapid response operations, while Iran’s IRGC maintains asymmetric capabilities are carefully tailored for maritime disruption, drone attacks, ballistic missile launches, and regional proxy warfare.

Regional Spillover Risks

The Strait of Hormuz remains the most critical geographic variable in this confrontational equation given that one-fifth of global oil trade passes through this narrow waterway. Iran has long signaled its capability and strategic intent to disrupt traffic through asymmetric means, including naval mines, drones, and anti-ship missiles. While full closure remains unlikely due to the overwhelming U.S. response it would provoke, disruption has already been taking place via targeted attacks on passing vessels, which is more than enough to deter commercial liners. Even limited interference could generate outsized economic and political effects, particularly for energy-dependent economies. All that said, the Houthis in Yemen remain on standby mode to disrupt the maritime flow via resumption of attacks on vessels passing via Bab-el Mandeb to and from the Red Sea.

Iran’s strategic depth lies not in conventional military parity but in its network of regional proxies. Groups aligned with Tehran, including those in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, provide Iran with operational flexibility. Given Israel’s successful campaign in Lebanon against Hezbollah as well as the Iran-backed Iraqi militias preoccupied with the deterrence posed by the U.S. forces, the Houthis in Yemen remain the final card for Tehran. Intensified maritime threats from Houthi forces in the Red Sea are likely to reemerge at any moment. This allows Iran to impose costs on U.S. and allied interests without triggering immediate large-scale retaliation. However, the cumulative effect of a multi-chokepoint pressure strategy could compel a broader and internationally supported response.

Strategic Calculus: War vs. Controlled Escalation

Some believe that neither the U.S. nor Iran appears to seek full-scale war given that the costs (military, economic, and political) would be immense and unpredictable. For the U.S., a major conflict with Iran would disrupt global energy markets, divert resources from strategic competition with China, and risk regional destabilization affecting key allies in the Gulf Corporation Council (GCC). For Iran, a continuation of a direct war would expose critical infrastructure to sustained strikes and threaten regime survivability.

The most probable scenario over the next 2–3 weeks is a phase of controlled escalation characterized by maritime harassment incidents in the Gulf, limited proxy attacks, and intensified rhetoric and signaling. This scenario allows both sides to demonstrate resolve while avoiding irreversible steps toward war. However, it is susceptible to disruption by unforeseen incidents at any moment.

An increasingly possible scenario would be one that involves targeted military actions, such as U.S. strikes on IRGC assets or critical infrastructure vs. Iranian retaliatory indiscriminate strikes on U.S. regional allies. Such exchanges would likely be calibrated to avoid full-scale war but could easily escalate if casualties or strategic assets are impacted.

Lastly, a less likely but still possible scenario is the return to productive negotiations, driven by economic pressures including oil market volatility, as well as diplomatic intervention by third parties, including the Gulf states, China, or European actors.

The highest-impact and most consequential scenarios involve a rapid escalation into full-scale conflict, potentially triggered by Iran’s full refusal to give up on its nuclear program or ballistic missile development program. Other triggers for a full-scale conflict would include any major incident in the Strait of Hormuz, high-casualty attacks on U.S. forces, or a direct confrontation between U.S. and Iranian military assets. Such a conflict would likely expand beyond bilateral engagement, drawing in regional actors and severely disrupting global economic systems.

Key Indicators to Watch

Several indicators are going to be crucial in assessing the trajectory of the ongoing conflict. This includes maritime activity where increased Iranian harassment of shipping continues to take place. Proxy operations are also a critical indicator where the frequency and intensity of proxy attacks, and the Red Sea specifically start to rise. Finally, force posture changes remain one of the key indicators, as they are mostly based on advanced intelligence assessments, which are not available to the public or markets. That said, deployment of additional U.S. and allied assets to the region remains the clearest indicator of how the situation will move forward and provides early signs of shifts from controlled escalation to broader conflict.

For defense strategists, the imperative is clear: preparing for escalation, planning for contingencies across multiple theaters, and achieving consensus that in the current environment, the most dangerous outcomes are not those that are intended but those unintended.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. The views of the author are his own.

The Escalation Trajectory of U.S.-Iran Tensions After the Collapse of the Negotiations was originally published on Global Security Review.

(Editor’s Note: This article was submitted before the U.S.-Iran conflict began. We intentionally left the article as “forward looking” to signify the value of the analysis.)

The Red Sea theater sits in a fragile equilibrium. Commercial shipping lines have cautiously begun returning to the Suez corridor after months of rerouting around the Cape of Good Hope. Insurance premiums remain elevated but are no longer crisis-level. Western naval task forces maintain a visible deterrent presence. Meanwhile, the Houthis continue to signal both restraint and readiness. The question is no longer whether the Red Sea crisis of 2024-2025 can return. The question is what specific trigger conditions will lead to its return. Accordingly, the escalating U.S.-Israeli-Iranian confrontation will make the Houthis resume maritime attacks, if not also targeting different spots of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).

The earlier claims about trench networks around Hodeidah, Yemen and coastal missile positioning, whether fully verified or partly exaggerated, fit within a broader pattern: the institutionalization of a long-term defensive and deterrent posture by the Houthis along Yemen’s western coastline. When combined with February 2026 reporting that maritime traffic is resuming but threats persist, a clearer strategic picture emerges. This is not a de-escalation. It is a structured pause under tension.

The Current Operational Baseline

This month, several dynamics defined the Red Sea environment. This included the cautious resuming of shipping traffic via the Suez route; major new Houthi missile or drone strikes on international vessels were not confirmed in this window, and Western naval forces remained deployed. However, Houthi rhetoric tied potential future maritime action to broader regional developments, particularly U.S.-Iran and Israel-related escalation scenarios. In this respect, the Houthis have announced that they will resume attacks on ships in the Red Sea.

The absence of active strikes should not be misread as capacity degradation. Instead, it reflects a conditional deterrence posture.

The Houthis have demonstrated in prior cycles that they calibrate attacks based on political timing rather than purely military opportunity. That suggests that the past few months’ relative quiet has been strategic, not structural. The Houthis were only preparing more for a bigger scale of maritime attacks.

Hodeidah and Coastal Entrenchment: Defensive Depth as Strategic Signaling

Whether or not the claims of the Houthis’ trench dimensions are independently verified, the logic behind coastal fortification is consistent with Houthi behavior. Hodeidah serves multiple functions for the Houthis. It serves as a coordination hub, a political stronghold, and a strategic maritime access point as well as a symbolic center of resistance. If significant defensive works are underway or expanded, they serve three interlocking objectives.

Firstly, for the purpose of anti-assault preparation, large-scale trenches are classic anti-armor and anti-vehicle barriers. They complicate any amphibious or ground-based incursion supported by regional actors. Secondly, for the purpose of airstrike mitigation, defensive depth complicates targeting and disperses assets such as mobile launchers. When it comes to psychological signaling, massive projects communicate permanence. They project the message: “We are not a temporary militia. We are entrenched.” The current environment, characterized by paused attacks but intact infrastructure for renewed confrontation, aligns with this.

Iran-U.S. Tensions as Activation Factor

The strategic linkage between the Houthis and Iran remains central to forecasting. While the Houthis maintain operational autonomy, their Red Sea campaign historically synchronized with broader regional escalation cycles involving the U.S. and Israel. The emerging rhetoric linking maritime threats to wider geopolitical friction suggests a conditional doctrine: The Red Sea is a pressure valve for the Houthis as directed by Iran.

If the U.S.-Iran tensions spike, whether via direct strikes on Iranian assets or Israeli escalation involving Iran-backed actors, then the Red Sea becomes a low-cost, high-visibility response domain. This makes the Red Sea maritime security in 2026 structurally fragile.

Maritime Deterrence Architecture in 2026

Western naval presence in the Red Sea has shifted from reactive escort to semi-permanent deterrence architecture. The key characteristics of such a strategy included layered missile defense at sea, preemptive ISR monitoring of launch sites, rapid retaliatory strike frameworks, and European naval coordination alongside U.S. military assets.

However, this architecture carries its escalation risk. A single successful Houthi strike on a high-value commercial vessel could trigger renewed U.S. or allied airstrikes inside Yemen, re-divert global shipping flows, and force insurers to re-rate the corridor. Thus, deterrence holds, but it is deterrence under tension, not deterrence under resolution.

Forecast: Strategic Scenarios for 2026

There are multiple scenarios that one could anticipate. However, the most likely scenario would be a triggered escalation where the current regional military action involving Israeli-Iranian confrontation or direct U.S.-Iran confrontation activates Houthi maritime operations. Critical indicators from the Houthis to watch for would include repositioning of coastal missile batteries, increased drone launch activity, and explicit linkage in Houthi statements between Yemen and external theaters.

Another scenario would be the Houthis’ internal consolidation and strategic freeze. Here, the Houthis prioritize internal governance and economic stabilization over external projection. In such a scenario, regardless of any U.S.-Iran military confrontation, the Houthis’ maritime attacks remain suspended, and Red Sea threats become rhetorical rather than operational. However, structural drivers, including ideology, alignment, and leverage utility, make such a scenario highly unlikely.

Structural Realities and Final Strategic Assessment

Three enduring factors ensure persistent volatility. Firstly, the geographic leverage is critical where the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint, a narrow passage that connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, is irreplaceable in global trade. Disruption has a disproportionate economic impact. Secondly, the asymmetric cost structure of the Red Sea maritime attacks grants the Houthis leverage, where their drones and missiles are low cost, the Western defensive interception and naval deployment that are much higher cost. Thirdly, attacks in the Red Sea generate global headlines, thus providing the Houthis with a political signaling value. That makes the theater attractive for indirect signaling. Thus, even if the current situation is relatively calm in the Red Sea, the underlying incentive structure for renewed maritime disruption persists, and threats continue to increase.

The current situation does not reflect the active Red Sea crisis levels of 2024-2025. However, it reflects something equally important: institutionalized readiness. The Houthis appear neither demobilized nor strategically exhausted. Defensive consolidation around Hodeidah, if confirmed, suggests the Houthis’ preparation for future confrontation, not abandonment of maritime leverage. The Red Sea will remain quiet only so long as broader regional dynamics remain contained. The moment those dynamics fracture, most notably with the U.S.-Iranian confrontation, the maritime corridor becomes the fastest and most globally visible arena for escalation. Accordingly, the conclusion is clear: the Red Sea is not stabilizing. It is waiting.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a Doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management – France, an MBA from the EU Business School- Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. He regularly authors articles addressing defense cooperation, counterterrorism, geopolitics, and emerging security threats in the Middle East and Africa. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Red Sea Uncertainty: A 2026 Forecast for the Houthis Actions was originally published on Global Security Review.

The ceasefire is fragile and does not apply to all shipping. It was on July 7, 2026, that the Houthis struck a Liberian-flagged cargo ship in the Red Sea. The threat to maritime safety and regional security posed by the Houthis persists. Unfortunately, it is difficult to fully eliminate the Houthi threat. This was a challenge even the United States found daunting.

The answer lies not just in firepower or military presence but in the complex interplay of geography, asymmetric warfare, intelligence dynamics, and the limitations of conventional maritime doctrine that lacks ground operations. The Houthi threat endures because it defies traditional military logic and thrives in the gaps of established security architecture. Prior to American airstrikes on Iran, the Houthis announced that they would resume attacks on American ships if the US participated in attacks on Iran.

As a proxy for Iran, Houthi aggression now serves as an indicator of Iran’s seriousness in reaching a deal with the United States. There is ample reason to look with great scepticism on any real agreement with Iran.

Naval Power Alone Cannot Neutralize a Land-Based Threat

At the heart of the issue is a basic operational reality; sea power cannot fully degrade threats on land. While advanced naval systems can intercept drones or missiles once launched, they cannot destroy the infrastructure, personnel, or supply chains that enable those attacks. Although airstrikes from the US, the United Kingdom, and Israel took place on Houthi infrastructure, the Houthis’ armed capabilities appear to be far from effectively degraded.

The Houthis operate deep in Yemen’s mountainous interior, far from the coastlines where naval assets patrol. Their launch teams are mobile, embedded in terrain that offers natural cover, and often operate without electronic communications, making them extremely difficult to detect via traditional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance methods. As a result, naval operations remain fundamentally reactive—capable of defending shipping lanes but unable to effectively dismantle the source of the threat.

A Strategic Use of Terrain and Simplicity

Unlike other non-state actors such as Hamas or Hezbollah, the Houthis have constructed an insurgent model that leverages geography, minimalism, and adaptability. Houthi missile-launch platforms, embedded in Yemen’s mountainous terrain, remain inaccessible to naval gunfire or airstrikes launched from the sea. In addition, many of the launch platforms are highly mobile and concealed within civilian zones. Additionally, the Houthis work in small, independent groups that use very little communication, which helps them avoid being tracked by signals since many of their units do not use radios or satellites, making it hard for traditional signal intelligence to find them.

Among the challenging features of the Houthis operational model is their geographic depth, where their bases are located far inland, making them nearly impossible to strike without a sustained ground presence. Moreover, they have effortless access to the coast. When needed, they move toward Yemen’s Red Sea coast to launch attacks, then retreat to the mountains before they are targeted. This cycle—emerge, strike, vanish—is extremely difficult to disrupt without coordinated land operations or robust human intelligence networks on the ground.

Asymmetric Tools, Strategic Impact

The Houthis do not rely on expensive platforms or sophisticated technology. Their toolkit is based on low-cost, high-impact weapons such as drones, cruise missiles, remote-controlled explosive boats, and sea mines. An example of such a cost-effective weapon is found in a $20,000 Houthi missile that was able to bring down a $30 million Reaper drone. Houthis do not need to win a naval war. Their objective is to undermine confidence in the maritime security system and inflate the cost of commercial activity while utilizing relatively low-cost tech in their attacks.

Their asymmetric maritime doctrine relies on the fact that each successful strike, even if not strategically decisive, has a massive economic and psychological impact, including disrupting Suez-bound shipping routes and reinforcing the narrative of Western and Arab military impotence.

This doctrine aims to disrupt commerce and challenge perception. Even a single drone strike that damages or delays a ship can increase global insurance premiums, force shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, and, most importantly, undermine confidence in Western and regional naval dominance.

This economic and psychological toll is precisely the kind of impact the Houthis seek, demonstrating that a modest insurgent force can challenge global trade routes and project defiance against superior powers. In doing so, the Houthis sustain more local support and project symbolic power across the region—energizing other non-state actors and defying deterrence models based on superior force.

Intelligence and Great Power Enablers

What complicates the threat further is the suspected intelligence support the Houthis receive from external state actors—primarily Russia and China. Western defense sources indicate that satellite data and targeting assistance is helping the Houthis refine their maritime strikes. Accordingly, the Houthi campaign cannot be understood in isolation from its transnational intelligence ecosystem and other global geopolitical considerations that may include benefiting from the targeting of Western nations’ trade and shipping interests in the Red Sea.

This raises the conflict to a new level. It is no longer just a regional security issue—it is also a theater for proxy competition, where great powers use irregular actors to undermine Western-led security efforts.

This means that efforts to counter the Houthi threat must go beyond naval interception and include counterintelligence operations, diplomatic pressure to isolate enabling states, and cyber defense and spoofing to disrupt targeting. This again requires regional and international security cooperation built upon solid intelligence fusion from all nations at risk from Houthi activities.

The Political and Legal Dilemma of Land Operations

Many military planners agree that land operations are required to degrade the Houthi threat. This would require human intelligence operations, special forces, airstrikes on inland launch facilities, and proxy-supported sabotage missions. However, this runs into several challenges, including sovereignty concerns over operating in Yemen, lack of consensus among international actors, and the advancing risk of escalation with Iran.

Thus, the most effective solutions remain off the table politically, leaving naval forces to operate in a defensive posture while the Houthis continue to regenerate their capabilities from protected inland zones. To respond effectively, maritime strategy must evolve from defensive naval posturing to integrated hybrid operations that allow for effective land-sea-air doctrine integration.

Mini-Lateral Coalitions vs. Multilateral Limitations

The lack of mini-lateral groupings, such as maritime security coordination between Egypt, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, is preventing faster, more focused responses compared to that of the existing larger multilateral effort, like combined maritime forces (CMF). Mini-lateral formats and security frameworks between countries facing the same direct threat from the Houthis will allow for tighter intelligence sharing, better regional synchronization, and security integration, as well as greater operational agility towards theater-specific interoperability. Such mini-lateral coalitions are tactically nimble and more politically aligned than broad-based multilateral organizations such as the CMF or European Union naval force, which are encumbered by consensus-based mandates and diluted strategic clarity.

The lack of mini-lateral coalitions with international legitimacy, institutional resources, and long-term political sustainability only leads to the fact that no security arrangement can fully secure the region’s maritime corridors. This fragmented architecture, where some international actors act swiftly but lack reach and other regional actors have legitimacy but not urgency, has created gaps the Houthis exploit.

Rethinking Strategy in the Red Sea

The Houthis are not invincible, but they are well-adapted to the nature of modern warfare. Their strength lies in asymmetry, geography, and strategic patience, while their adversaries rely on conventional superiority constrained by politics and doctrine.

To change this equation, regional and international actors must shift from defensive naval operations to proactive hybrid strategies; reinvest in human intelligence, covert operations, and regional partnerships; and adapt legal and institutional frameworks to allow pre-emptive action against embedded threats.

A regional mini-lateral coalition of nations surrounding the Red Sea is a must, which then would allow for a tactically agile and politically aligned grouping that can possibly be plugged into US-led multilateral legitimacy and a sustainable burden-sharing operational model that would also build upon the existing US deterrence capabilities within the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Until then, the Houthi threat will persist, not because of its strength, but because the system built to counter it is designed for another kind of war.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

Why the Houthi Threat Persists was originally published on Global Security Review.

An American submarine also fired thirty Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) against surface infrastructure targets at Isfahan. As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Dan Caine described it, the entire operation was a complex timed maneuver requiring exact synchronization across multiple platforms in a narrow piece of airspace.

American deception tactics contributed to surprise as neither Iraqi fighters nor their surface-to-air missile defenses attempted to interdict the American bombers and their supporting fighter aircraft, all of which returned safely.

According to General Caine, Operation Midnight Hammer involved more than 125 aircraft, including the seven B2 stealth bombers, numerous fourth- and fifth-generation fighters, and dozens of refueling tankers. Some 75 precision-guided munitions were used in Midnight Hammer, including fourteen GBU-57 MOPs, which were used for the first time in combat.

The operational excellence of Midnight Hammer doubtless constituted a setback to Iran’s nuclear enrichment programs, although exactly how much of a setback remains to be determined.  Battle damage assessment is dependent on overhead photography unless and until further information is obtained from intelligence sources near or at the affected sites.

There also remained unsettled issues relative to American and allied strategy going forward. The Trump administration’s declaratory policy wants to draw a line between going to war with Iran, on one hand, and neutralizing its nuclear capabilities and potential, on the other.  This is a fine line to draw and Iran response, and follow-on condemnations, suggest they see the American position as a distinction without a difference.

Ater the strikes, President Trump indicated that Iran should come to the diplomatic table and negotiate the status of its nuclear future. Iran rejected further negotiations. This left the American and Israeli defense communities to await whatever diplomatic or military response the Iranians offered, including possible military attacks against American forces deployed in the Middle East.

Based on experience, Iran would likely respond with continuing missile strikes against Israel and asymmetrical warfare against the United States. With regard to the latter, Iran’s options included: (1) disrupting the flow of maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz; (2) committing cyberattacks against American military or societal targets; (3) committing missile or insurgent attacks against American military personnel in Iraq or elsewhere in the region; (4) supporting protest demonstrations or terrorism in the American homeland, perhaps making use of prepositioned cells made up of illegal aliens; and/or (5) encouraging Iranian proxies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Yemen to further harass American, Israeli, and allied interests.

Thus far, Iran limited its response to employing a small number of missiles against Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, even giving the Americans advance warning of the strike. For the Trump administration, this is the best possible outcome. Already, imagery intelligence suggests Iran is digging out its capabilities at Fordow and Esfahan. What the future may hold is uncertain. Whether Iran is simply buying time and learning lessons for future success or whether the regime truly desires peace is up in the air.

Future options for Iran have their positives and negatives. Disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz would harm Iran’s own economy, which needs the infusion of cash from oil sales to China.

Cyberattacks are a low-risk, low-cost option that may appeal to Iran in the near term, but they present a more serious potential threat to civilian targets compared to more heavily defended military ones. They will also draw severe reprisals from very competent American and Israeli cyber forces.

Additional attacks against American military personnel and facilities in Iraq are an option, as are missile or unconventional warfare against other regional states hosting American military bases. However, this path was not successful the first time.

Support for antiwar demonstrations or outright terrorism in the American homeland, including “lone wolf” terrorists recruited online, are still a possibility. New stories of Iranian illegal aliens arrested by Immigration and Customs Enforcement are almost a daily occurrence.

As for Iranian proxies, Hamas and Hezbollah are on the ropes, momentarily, due to prior engagements with Israel, but the Houthis declared their intention to plus-up their disruptions of commerce in the Red Sea in the wake of Midnight Hammer. Whether this is possible is yet to be seen.

With respect to Iran’s future nuclear options and American responses, they may proceed in one of three ways: (1) a continuing “whack-a-mole” competition in which Iran continues surreptitious enrichment and the US and Israel continue to monitor its progress and, if necessary, repeat Midnight Hammer, or worse; (2) Iran undergoes a change of regime due to domestic opposition, leaving uncertain for a time exactly who is in charge and who controls the supplies of enriched uranium and nuclear infrastructure, never mind the armed forces and security police; or (3) Iran agrees to negotiate with the US and representatives of the international community another deal to limit its stockpiles of fissile material and its levels of enrichment.

These are possible options, but by no means the only options. Iran may pursue an unexpected path in an effort to outthink the United States and Israel. Whatever the future holds, President Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu must keep a close eye on a regime that is built on destroying both countries. Hope is critical to human perseverance, but it is not a strategy.

Dr. Stephen Cimbala is Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State university, Brandywine. He is currently a senior fellow with the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

Midnight Hammer and After was originally published on Global Security Review.

Current responses, ranging from US, UK, and Israeli airstrikes to maritime task forces, aim to degrade the Houthis’ operational capabilities. Except for recent American bombing efforts, they have fallen short of effectively neutralizing the group’s capacity to pose a critical threat to maritime trade in the Red Sea as well as the wider threat of destabilizing the region.

What it would truly take to dismantle the Houthi threat, in a sustainable and strategic manner, requires a multi-dimensional, coalition-led effort that combines kinetic force, strategic isolation, regional realignment, and political recalibration. Many of these key strategic components are still missing in the current response to the Houthis’ actions.

The Houthi Threat: Tactical Capabilities, Strategic Leverage

Beginning in 2023, the Houthis began escalating their attacks against civilian and military vessels in the Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and even the Gulf of Aden—utilizing Iranian-supplied drones, cruise missiles, and unmanned suicide boats. These attacks achieved several objectives for the group and its backers in Tehran. First, the attacks successfully disrupted global shipping, raising insurance rates and negatively impacting Egypt’s Suez Canal, which saw a decrease of almost 60 percent of its annual revenue from $10.3 billion in 2023 to $4 billion in 2024. Second, the Houthis’ attacks provided a clear projection of Iranian deterrence without a confrontation with the US. Third, the attacks repositioned the Houthis as a pan-regional “resistance” actor, not merely a Yemeni faction.

Despite Israel’s effective strike on Yemen’s sea port of Hudaydah followed by another set of strikes a day later, including ones on the main airport in Sanaa, which probably prompted the Houthis to inform the US that they “don’t want to fight anymore,” the Houthi leadership still exists and their armed capabilities are far from degraded.

If anything is beneficial out of such ceasefire, it is only for the Houthis as it would ultimately allow them to reorganize their resistance and offensive capabilities. Furthermore, the Houthis’ obvious ballistic missile and drone capabilities pose a threat to Israel more than ever before.

The Inadequacy of Current Approaches

Western-led responses include airstrikes on Houthi launch sites, naval deployments like Operation Prosperity Guardian, and diplomatic pressure via the UN Security Council. Yet, these actions failed to produce long-term deterrence for four main reasons.

First, Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Egypt, lack strategic unity regarding Yemen. Conflicting Arab views on how to engage the Houthi threat, along with differing opinions on the alignment of the US military response to the Houthis, are significantly limiting the effectiveness of the US efforts to degrade Houthi capabilities.

Second, Houthi adaptability and decentralized operations make targeting difficult. Houthi leadership, in several interviews, praised their unique structure and claimed it is different from that of Hamas and Hezbollah in terms of not relying on any communication technologies within the group and yet having a decentralized distribution in the mountains in Yemen.

Third, Iranian support continues uninterrupted through land and maritime smuggling. Reports from 2024 revealed that UN mechanisms failed to inspect most ships heading to Houthi-controlled ports.

Fourth, the proximity of civilian infrastructure to military targets limits the rules of engagement for Western forces. Furthermore, there is no insufficient political strategy to undercut Houthi legitimacy among Yemenis, and still, many of the Yemeni population appeal to the Houthi group. Based on the above, an effective strategy for neutralizing the Houthis’ capabilities requires escalation dominance across the military, economic, information, and political domains.

A Multi-Domain Campaign to Neutralize the Houthis

A shift to precision airstrikes by the United States was necessary, but more is needed. This includes high-value targeting of command-and-control (C2) nodes, drone operation sites, missile production sites, and technical assembly sites. Covert special operations strikes by Arab and American forces, to sabotage radar arrays, smuggling depots, and launchpads in areas like Al-Hudaydah and Sa’ada, is also needed.

Furthermore, border security cooperation from Oman is crucial in addition to placing an effective security cooperation framework with Eastern African states, where much of the Iranian weapons smuggling is taking place. Enforcement of naval dominance will occur through the establishment of exclusion zones in the Red Sea, supported by AEGIS destroyers and Gulf-based airpower.

Although the US Navy is taking the lead role in such functions, establishing a regional US-Arab naval cooperation is a key factor in eliminating the threats posed by the Houthis as well as further preventing the smuggling of weapons, missile components, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) components to the Houthis via the sea. Cyber disruptions targeting the Houthis’ satellite navigation, drone-control networks, and internal communications is needed. This function is far more complex than it may appear, given that reports indicate that Russia supports the Houthis with targeting data.

Furthermore, it is also reported that the Houthi leadership coordinates directly with Chinese officials regarding safe passage for Chinese vessels. In addition to US sanctions against Chinese satellite and shipping firms, providing evidence that China’s technological support strengthens Houthi capabilities is needed.

Accordingly, effective US-Arab intelligence cooperation should be further enhanced to isolate Houthi access to foreign powers. This military approach must be continuous, not episodic, and paired with intelligence fusion centers involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egyptians.

Strategic Isolation of the Houthis from Iran

Without eliminating the Houthi connection to Tehran, no solution can succeed. This requires the interdiction of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps maritime routes, especially between the Bandar Abbas–Socotra–Horn of Africa corridor. Hence, the situation ultimately requires enhanced maritime domain awareness, including the use of satellites to ensure effective monitoring of vessels coming to Yemen, not to mention the essential need for regional security cooperation among all the nations surrounding these locations.

The financial isolation of the Houthis and associated members by pressuring banking entities and crypto exchanges that facilitate Iranian transfers to Houthis requires improvement. Continuously drying up the cash sources provided to the Houthis is a key factor in dismantling their operational capabilities. Additionally, increasing regional pressure on Oman to improve its border monitoring and security efforts is crucial for reducing overland routes used for arms and cash smuggling.

Overall, Iran’s support for the Houthis is part of its “ring of fire” doctrine. To dismantle this arc, the Houthis must be made a liability, not an asset, for Tehran.

Recalibrating the Regional Arab Response

Arab unity is a missing ingredient in the fight against the Houthis. A new Red Sea Defense Compact is required, comprising a joint command structure involving the US, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Bahrain, and, ultimately, Oman. Having a regional naval and airbase integration with a primary role for Egypt and Saudi Arabia would provide a forward-operating presence across the Red Sea. Given that Houthi disruption of Red Sea commerce and maritime passage directly threatens Egypt’s economic security, strategic re-engagement is particularly important. Such an arrangement would also create a strategic opportunity for a further deepening of US-Egypt defense cooperation and alignment of mutual regional interests.

The need for a Saudi-UAE reconciliation over Yemen’s future is essential, possibly via American mediation. Otherwise, even after neutralizing the Houthi threat, the region risks a politically unstable Yemen. If Arab states continue to act independently, they risk being played against each other, benefiting Iran and prolonging the conflict.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector.

What It Takes to Neutralize the Houthi Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.

For Arab states, the current situation in the Middle East, US, and regional Arab partners presents an opportunity to work on realigning strategic interests and unify stances on critical files, including but not limited to the conflict in Gaza and Lebanon, the rising tensions in Syria, Iran’s regional agenda, the war in Sudan, and the increasing instability in Africa. This is all made worse by Russia’s growing influence across the continent, including but not limited to Libya and West Africa.

There are three main pathways Middle Eastern governments should pursue in navigating the complex dynamics of Trump’s second term. These approaches can further enhance US-Arab cooperation.

First, they should strengthen regional security cooperation with the US. The Trump administration adopted a more “hands-off” approach during his first term, encouraging regional players to take greater responsibility for security issues. While this may seem advantageous, as it motivates America’s regional Arab partners to fortify their security frameworks, bolster the development of their defense capabilities, forge regional alliances, and cultivate rapid-response capabilities to manage intricate and intensifying threats, the region has never experienced such a high concentration of security risks and geopolitical tensions.

Accordingly, Trump’s return to the White House could significantly alter American engagement in Middle Eastern conflicts on a diplomatic as well as a military front. While Arab and American defense and security cooperation, particularly with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations, steadily improved over the past several decades, escalating regional tensions necessitate closer security cooperation.

Furthermore, Arab states face multifaceted threats from non-state actors and cross-border insurgencies. The Houthis in Yemen, for instance, continue to pose a serious risk through their use of drones, missiles, and other asymmetric tactics. Given the Trump administration’s prior backing of Saudi operations against the Iranian-backed Houthis, Arab states should use this time to rally support for a collective defense strategy.

This should involve the creation of a coalition to monitor Houthi activities in Yemen and across the Gulf, establish missile defense systems, and coordinate intelligence-sharing to counter both Houthi and Iranian influence in the region, which is likely to increase if not countered proactively. Regardless of the geopolitical context of the Houthis’ missile attacks on Israel, the firing capabilities they possess presents an existing threat to regional Arab states, especially those states perceived by Iran as American allies.

The situation with the Houthis in Yemen is even more complex than it seems. While it seems that Iran is the main influencer over the Houthis’ actions, concerns are growing over the possible support the Houthis are receiving from Russia. There is also a belief that Iran is facilitating negotiations with Russia to supply advanced missiles to the Houthis. If confirmed, this strategy already proved successful for Russia in West Africa. There, Russia succeeded in supplanting the West’s influence in the region. It appears that Russia is likely pursuing a similar strategy through the Houthis to expand its influence in the region surrounding the Red Sea.

The Red Sea remains strategically vital, not only for Arab states along its coast but for global energy markets and trade. With American forces taking the lead in trying to mitigate the Houthi threat to international maritime security, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will need to take a leading role in jointly securing these waters. Undoubtedly, the Red Sea requires enhanced security coordination. A joint Arab-Western naval task force could assist in patrolling shipping routes, countering smuggling and piracy, and monitoring hostile activities from Yemen. Establishing a formalized security alliance with a mandate to promptly respond to Red Sea threats would also empower Arab states to protect this vital trade route from disruptions caused by the escalating regional tensions.

Second, the Arab states should establish clear strategies for key regional conflicts. Trump already demonstrated a strong pro-Israel stance and a preference for rapid conflict resolution in areas like Syria and Yemen. Middle Eastern states should prepare for a Trump-led push toward “finishing” ongoing conflicts quickly. By articulating clear positions on key conflicts, Arab states can ensure their voices are considered in any accelerated diplomatic initiatives or negotiations aimed at de-escalating the rising tensions in the Middle East.

Iran’s influence in the Middle East remains a unifying concern for most of the Arab states, especially those in the Gulf. Trump previously adopted a “maximum pressure” policy against Iran, along with stricter sanctions and renewed efforts to isolate Tehran diplomatically. To capitalize on this stance, Arab states might consider forming a Gulf-led coalition that directly addresses Iran’s regional activities, particularly in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria.

Iran is also trying to influence the conflict in Sudan and other parts of Africa via different means, including the supply of drones. Enhanced joint counterterrorism programs, intelligence sharing, and military exercises with Arab, African, and Western states would ultimately improve their collective capacity to deter Iran’s influence and destabilizing operations.

Iran’s nuclear program remains a daunting issue. Iran continues to progress its nuclear capability and may one day decide to break out of current restraints.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially the Gaza situation, remains a flashpoint with the potential to escalate regional instability given the growing humanitarian crisis in Gaza. Trump is likely to adopt a pro-Israel stance, perhaps further supporting Israel’s objectives in Gaza and across the West Bank, which could lead to intensified confrontations.

Arab states, especially those participating in the Abraham Accords, are likely to strike a delicate balance. Arab states will mostly maintain new alliances with Israel to counter Iran and its proxies in the Middle East while simultaneously supporting Palestinian civilian and humanitarian rights. Establishing diplomatic channels and regional communication frameworks dedicated to de-escalating potential violence in Gaza and supporting humanitarian efforts could prevent larger-scale disruptions.

Third, engage proactively with the US on trade and economic reforms. Trump’s “America First” policy often includes economic demands, which could translate into renewed expectations for favorable trade agreements or investments. Arab states should be ready to highlight their contributions to American economic interests, particularly in energy, infrastructure, and tech investments, including artificial intelligence and the acquisition of advanced defense and security platforms. By advancing reforms that make their markets more attractive to American investors, Arab nations can enhance their economic relationship with the US and position themselves as valuable trade partners, thus securing a foothold in Trump’s strategic calculus.

However, Trump’s likely shift to a more confrontational stance toward China could offer both challenges and opportunities. Middle Eastern states, particularly those heavily involved in China’s Belt and Road Initiative and oil exports, should prepare for potential pressures from Washington to limit Chinese economic influence. To balance these dynamics, Arab states could focus on diversifying alliances beyond the US-China dichotomy, enhancing relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe.

That said, the ambitious India-Middle East-Europe corridor (IMEC) project announced during the 2023 G20 summit still holds great potential for regional integration and trade. Furthermore, the project which mainly involved India, Israel, Jordan, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), and the UAE has the full support of the US. In this respect, despite the challenges facing IMEC, it still presents an opportunity for all the involved nations to strategically engage with Trump on an economic front.

Understanding the internal divides within the US will be crucial for Arab states as they navigate the Trump administration. Trump’s “America First” base and his support among conservative Americans may reshape US foreign policy in ways that do not align with traditional Arab interests. By strengthening ties not only with Trump but also with Congress, local leaders, and both major US political parties, Arab states can foster a more balanced approach and create broader support for their long-term interests within American policy circles.

Trump’s return to the White House brings new opportunities and challenges for Arab states, particularly during a period of reshaping the region’s geopolitical power. By proactively engaging with the US, strengthening alliances, and enhancing their regional security frameworks, Arab nations can adapt to the changing American foreign policy landscape. In doing so, they will be better positioned to secure their interests and foster regional stability amid Trump’s renewed presidency.

Now That Trump Is Back, What Should Arab States Do? was originally published on Global Security Review.

The democratic transition in Sudan was halted in October 2021 when General Abdel Fattah al-Burhane conducted a military coup. Ongoing confrontations between the Rapid Support Forces and the Sudanese Armed Forces keep the country in perpetual instability. They have also drawn civilians into the bloodshed.

Guinean president Alpha Condé was ousted in a September 2021 coup, and his successors pledged to bring in a civilian government by 2024. This has yet to happen.

Two coups occurred in Mali within a short period of time. The first coup occurred in August 2020, and the second one took place in May 2021. The military government promises to restore civilian control. It has not.

Shortly after Gabon’s President, Ali Bongo Ondimba, was re-elected in August 2023, a military coup d’état removed him from power, casting doubt on the legitimacy of the election. Ondimba is but one more example of this trend.

Leaders of these coups frequently use security and governance failures as justification for the actions taken. In reality, they tend to worsen stability and undermine democratic processes. The frequent occurrence of military takeovers in such politically unstable countries adds complexity to diplomatic endeavours and presents substantial obstacles to regional development, stability, and security, including the proliferation of insurgencies and terrorist organizations.

However, a notable trend among these nations in recent years is the steady rise of Russian presence and influence. Over the past few months, there were significant events involving Russian armed groups in Africa, which highlighted Moscow’s growing influence and strategic interests in the region. Russian actions have far-reaching consequences for countering Western influence, especially from the European Union and the United States.

Russia is already strengthening its military ties with several African nations, including those that saw political upheaval in recent years. In May, Russia began implementing a military cooperation agreement with São Tomé and Príncipe, which involves joint exercises, education, training, and logistics.

Guinea-Bissau further strengthened connections with Russia, as President Umaro Sissoco Embalo engaged in discussions with Russian officials regarding diverse areas of collaboration. These include military training and oil exploration.

Russia is also working towards establishing a logistics center on the Red Sea in Sudan. This will strengthen its naval capabilities and strategic presence in the region. Sudan has restated its dedication to Russia in building a naval base on the Red Sea. This development is because of the growing military cooperation between Sudan and Russia, showcasing Moscow’s wider aspirations to enhance its military influence in strategic African nations.

According to experts, there is concern that Russian armed groups are taking advantage of migration routes, specifically those that pass through the Sahara. This exploitation could potentially result in a rise in irregular migration towards Europe. Russia may be seeking to create instability in European nations by intensifying the refugee crises, with the intention of impacting elections and weakening support for Ukraine.

Russia is also actively pursuing economic engagements and resource extraction deals in Africa. Russian officials explored cooperation on infrastructure and natural resource projects, particularly in Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Russia also sought to dominate the uranium market by acquiring assets in Burkina Faso and Chad. President Vladimir Putin’s strategy to support local regimes, coups, and insurgencies facilitates these economic engagements, as evidenced by recent developments in West Africa.

Furthermore, Russian paramilitary groups, particularly the Wagner Group, or as it is now known, Africa Corps, remained active in supporting local regimes and insurgencies with activities in different African nations, including Sudan, Burkina Faso, the Sahel, the Central African Republic, and Libya. In Libya, for example, Russian forces protect oil and gas interests, which constrains Western access and increases European dependence on Russian energy.

Regardless of the obvious fact that Russia, along with China, has a strategic interest in controlling Africa’s natural resources, Russia has a clear objective of countering the West’s influence in Africa. The impacts manifest on several fronts.

First, when it comes to strategic military positioning, cementing the presence of its paramilitary forces while also establishing military bases and logistical centers in key African locations enhances Russia’s ability to project power and influence regional dynamics—potentially disrupting Western naval operations and trade routes.

Second, by exploiting African migration routes to Europe, Russia can create social and political instability within the EU countries, thus influencing elections and weakening public support for EU policies, including sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine.

Russia’s investments in African natural resources also provide alternative revenue streams and reduce the impact of Western economic sanctions. Control over critical minerals and energy resources increases Russia’s leverage in global markets, including control of gold mines in Sudan and oil exploration endeavours in various African nations. Russia’s expansion of influence through military cooperation has benefited the latter. Strengthening military cooperation with African nations did indeed help Russia build a network of supportive regimes, limiting Western influence in these countries. Furthermore, by forging closer ties with African countries, Russia is proving successful in undermining Western diplomatic efforts in the region, complicating Western economic strategies, and creating votes and positions in international forums that align with Russian interests.

Russia’s specific involvement in Libya is also important to consider. Controlling significant oil and gas resources is the central focus of Russia’s presence there. By maintaining influence over Libyan oil fields, Russia will constrain Western access to these resources and increase European dependency on Russian energy supplies. The increasing presence of its paramilitary Wagner Group, which is influencing and supporting strongly armed factions within Libya and safeguarding Russian interests, cements this control.

This involvement includes securing key infrastructure and providing military support to local allies. Russian involvement in Libya includes smuggling oil and gas, generating revenue, and undermining EU efforts to cut off Russian energy imports.

Another critical aspect is Libya’s role as a transit point for migrants heading to Europe, which allows Russia to influence migration flows and destabilize European nations—exacerbating the refugee crisis. Overall, Libya’s strategic location on the Mediterranean Sea provides Russia with significant geopolitical leverage, allowing it to project a threat into the Mediterranean and challenge the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s presence.

The actions of Russian paramilitary groups in different African countries, along with their emphasis on safeguarding Russia’s economic interests, are fuelling the rise of terrorism in the region. The growing presence of Russian forces is already exacerbating regional conflicts and heightening local tensions, potentially fuelling the rise of terror groups. This is particularly concerning as organizations with ties to ISIS are gaining momentum in West Africa and the Sahel. The withdrawal of French forces from Mali and Niger, along with the departure of American forces from Niger, resulted in a significant rise in extremist groups in the region. This is having a detrimental impact on the West’s counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Overall, the situation in some African states is proving increasingly worse. The growing influence of Russia comes at the expense of Western powers, resulting in proxy conflicts and potentially destabilizing the continent even more. This can create environments that are conducive to the growth of terror groups. Russia’s manipulation of migration flows can result in worsening the refugee crisis. Terror groups can take advantage of this to bolster influence, bases, and activities in Africa and beyond. The dangers of worsening local conflicts are becoming more pronounced and the escalating violations of human rights in numerous African countries pose a range of intricate consequences that could potentially affect the stability of African.

In short, Russian action in Africa is bad for its inhabitants and bad for the West. At some point the West must counter Russia’s malicious efforts.

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management-France, an MBA from the EU Business School-Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St. Andrews, UK. Views expressed in this article are the author’s own. 

Russia’s Influence in Africa: Understanding the Big Picture was originally published on Global Security Review.

Consequently, both nonproliferation and deterrence are under sustained attacks on multiple, interactive fronts as is any concept of international order or security. These threats challenge not only Washington but also allies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. This is leading to significant increases in conventional and nuclear weapons spending in Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia (India) and East Asia in reaction to Russo-Chinese, Russo-North Korean, and other threats.

It is important to understand that these nuclear and conventional threats are linked. In Ukraine, Putin began brandishing nuclear threats early in the war to allow the Russian army to proceed without the threat of Western intervention or sustained weapons supply. Iran too uses its accelerating nuclear, missile, and drone programs to extend its deterrence to its terrorist clients so that they can put Israel and Red Sea shipping at risk. The Russo-North Korean alliance similarly raises the likelihood of Pyongyang acquiring new satellite, missile, and, possibly, nuclear technologies with which it can emulate Moscow and Tehran. Meanwhile, China continues to threaten Taiwan, the Philippines, and even India, always with the threat of more attacks in the background. At the same time, Chinese aid to Russia, in the form of technology exports, is probably vital to Russian aggression.

Thus, deterrence, nonproliferation, the international order, and, more specifically, the US and its allies are all under growing threat. Rhetoric aside, the next president after the November 2024 elections must confront these unpalatable facts and speak frankly about how the nation must meet them. To sustain and reform, and it is clear the Pentagon is failing to meet the challenge, it is necessary to rebuild both conventional and nuclear deterrence as allies in Europe and Asia are doing.

To do that, the American economy requires reinvigoration. The necessity for higher defense spending is competing with unprecedented levels of social spending at a time when the nation now spends as much each year to service the national debt as it spends on defense. This economic approach is unsustainable. Unfortunately, there is no royal road to fiscal stability other than raising taxes. The best hope for the country is to grow the economy and exercise fiscal discipline while rebuilding the nation’s military.

The revitalization of American defenses requires extensive and continuous modernization of both the conventional and nuclear forces. That probably includes both a qualitative and quantitative increase in the nuclear arsenal. Undoubtedly the partisans of anti-nuclear policies will be outraged by this. But the conclusions of governmental reports and America’s adversaries’ unrelenting nuclear programs are stubborn facts that these partisans refuse to acknowledge at ever-rising risk to international security. The only way to prevent or at least arrest proliferation and threats to deterrence is this dual-track policy of conventional and nuclear modernization and reform. And this truth applies as well to allies who have already begun to implement this policy.

An improved allied conventional capability in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East allows the United States and its allies to deter future threats at the lowest level of deterrence or thwart aggression because of improved strategic unity and military superiority, backed by economic primacy. This will also deter attempts to use, for example, Russian nuclear weapons as a shield for a failed conventional war in Ukraine. It is also important to deter terror groups like Hamas and Hezbollah from attacking Israel, the United States, or other Western targets. This includes Houthi attacks on international shipping.

Moreover, the launching of such projects will also make clear to Putin, for example, that his attempts to globalize the failed war in Ukraine to rescue his regime by threatening nuclear or peripheral wars are doomed to failure. If the United States and its allies engage in the efforts suggested, it is also likely that Beijing will conclude that it cannot overcome allied deterrence in India, the Philippines, the South China Sea, Taiwan, or elsewhere. The objective is always the maintenance of peace.

Critics will complain that this program of defense growth and strengthening is a wartime program. Unfortunately, they have yet to realize that the American-led international order is under sustained and continuous attack and has been for several years. China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia are all states that validate the American radical Randolph Bourne’s insight that “[w]ar is the health of the state.” Indeed, it is the only way they can sustain their states. Therefore, in a nuclear world they must be deterred now before they can infect others with their poison.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. Views expressed are the author’s own.

The Emerging Nuclear Scenario was originally published on Global Security Review.

The recent helicopter accident, which claimed the lives of Iran’s president and foreign minister, is expected to have an adverse effect on the region soon. The incident is already drawing international attention, with many countries closely evaluating the potential implications for regional security. The incident also occurred in an already geopolitically tense context after a month of confrontation with Israel.

The death of Iran’s foreign minister, Amir Abdollahian, will complicate Iran’s foreign policy, international relations, and diplomatic engagements. Abdollahian was instrumental in critical negotiations, including the deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) that was brokered by China in February–March 2023 and indirect talks with the United States via Oman, regarding key topics related to regional escalation in the Middle East—including Yemen’s Houthi attacks as well as Iran’s nuclear developments. Anticipating the development of these discussions is crucial, as it is likely to impact Iran’s foreign policy and engagements.

The death of Iran’s president, Ibrahim Raissi, also poses a test for Iran’s internal stability and order. Middle East instability since October 7, 2023, makes this incident even more significant. Thus, how events in Iran unfold in the coming weeks have domestic and regional consequences, including the direction of Iran’s proxies in the region. Conspiracy theories are circulating in Iran as to who was responsible for the crash.

Even though Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, is the country’s actual ruler and the presidential position has limited authority, Raissi’s death thrusts Iran into an uncertain future. Experts believe that Raissi, 63, was preparing to succeed the 85-year-old supreme leader. They also believe that Raissi and Khamenei’s son, Mojtaba Khamenei, are potential successors to the supreme leader. This suggests that Mojtaba, known for his strong ties to Iran’s military and intelligence services, as well as to Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), is a strong contender.

Iran’s constitution mandates the temporary assumption of the presidential role by Mohamed Mokhber, the first vice president, and the holding of elections within 50 days. Regardless of the timing and identity of Iran’s next president, the informally chosen successor to the supreme leader is likely to delay such elections. The unpredictability of the country’s overall course poses a significant risk and threat to the region, as there is a possibility that Iran may adopt a more assertive stance in response to recent events, thereby demonstrating its power to the international community. Of course, the actions of its proxies in the region and advancements in the nuclear program already signal this, which necessitates an anti-Iran alliance.

The absence of an anti-Iran alliance is perhaps explained by what political scientist Randall Schweller referred to as “under-balancing” or the inability or unwillingness of nations to form the kind of blocking alliances that the balance of power theory would predict. This also sheds light on why states facing threats fail to recognize present dangers and do not react or respond except in a minimal way.

Iran appears to be the winner of recent escalations. Maritime safety in the Red Sea is low because of Houthi militias. Iran is also the most influential player in Iraqi politics and controls Shiite militias. Iranian influence in Syria is one of the main reasons Syrian autocrat Bashar al-Assad remains in power. Furthermore, in Lebanon, Iran-controlled Hezbollah remains the dominant force in Lebanese politics and probably the main first line of defense for Iran in the region.

Iran’s continued support for militant groups across the Middle East amplify the urgency of an anti-Iran alliance. The Iranian regime already has a long history of providing financial, military, and logistical assistance to terrorist organizations. These groups not only undermine the sovereignty of their host countries, but they generate violence, chaos, and instability. For example, Houthi attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden over the past few months have significantly impacted maritime safety. In this regard, the US called on Iran to halt “unprecedented weapons” transfers to the Houthis, which enables the attacks. Iran’s history of provocations along the Strait of Hurmuz also poses a threat to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nations if regional tensions continue to escalate. Iran’s drone diplomacy is also proving successful, with many of its attack drone capabilities playing a central role in different fights, including the Russia-Ukraine war and Yemen’s Houthi maritime attacks.

The regime’s expansionist agenda and support for proxy groups are already destabilizing the fragile balance of power in the Middle East. Iran’s involvement in conflicts in Iraq, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen fuel sectarian tensions and prolonged civilian suffering. However, Iran’s growing empowerment of proxy groups in these nations presents a serious threat to other neighboring nations, particularly the Arab countries that Iran views as US allies.

According to reports, Jordan successfully thwarted a suspected plot by Iran-backed militias to smuggle weapons from Syria into Jordan for sabotage purposes. On another front, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen continued to launch attacks against the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) until 2022. Even though China mediated a between Saudi Arabia and Iran in 2023, ongoing developments in the Middle East, fueled by the Gaza war and the actions of Iran’s proxy groups, are testing China’s influence in the region and the viability of the KSA-Iran deal. Although the Iran-backed Houthis warned, in a statement, that KSA would be a target if it supported the US-led strikes on their locations, the recent events, particularly the death of Iran’s president and foreign minister, will likely have an impact on the development of KSA-Iran relations.

Furthermore, Iran’s nuclear ambitions continue to present a serious threat to regional and global security. Despite international efforts to curtail its nuclear program over the past decade, Iran continues to expand its nuclear capabilities, raising concerns about the high possibility the regime will field nuclear weapons. Following his recent visit to Iran, Rafael Grossi, the director general of the United Nations Nuclear Agency, declared that Iran has never been closer to achieving a nuclear bomb, estimating a matter of weeks if Iran’s ruler decides to proceed in this direction.

Kamal Kharrazi, a senior advisor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, said that Iran would have no choice but to modify its nuclear doctrine if Israel threatened its nuclear facilities or the regime’s very existence. However, it is safe to assume that Iran is using the narrative of Israel and the Gaza war, along with Arab sentiment, to advance its nuclear program.

Several key Arab states continued to encourage Washington to help manage Middle East security and contain Iran’s destabilizing activities on different fronts in order to prevent a broader regional war. Thus, it is expected that any anti-Iran alliance is led by the United States. KSA is already close to a deal on a bilateral defense pact with the US. The US and UAE also continue to work on advancing their bilateral defense relationship, and during the 34th US-Egypt Military Cooperation Committee (MCC), both sides agreed on the importance of advancing American-Egyptian military cooperation through joint training, exercises, and a strong desire to expand regional cooperation and security.

Arab nations clearly share Israel’s concerns and threat perception about Iran’s regional activities, particularly its growing influence through proxies. This serves as an area of dialogue, potentially reducing regional Arab tensions stemming from the ongoing Gaza war. Despite the perception of Iran as a threat, many Arab states remain reluctant to engage in direct confrontation with it. This is understandable since economic development projects fundamentally require regional peace. Regional peace, however, is not achieved without an anti-Iran alliance with a proper level of deterrence that is designed to at least halt, if not degrade, Iran’s activities and influence.

A Middle East Security Alliance (MESA), later dubbed by the media “Arab NATO,” was first announced during former US President Donald Trump’s visit to KSA in 2017. The announcement described MESA as an alliance that contributes to peace and security in the region and the world, encompassing all GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, and the US. Even though nothing has progressed in this proposal since then, ongoing developments in the Middle East do call for the need to revive such a proposal, with an emphasis on countering Iran.

By forming an anti-Iran alliance, countries in the region, in partnership with the US, can work together to address challenges as they emerge and anticipate different courses of action. Curbing the influence of Iran’s proxies and disrupting Iran’s support networks should remain a common and near-term goal for the international community.

Iran’s nuclear program also remains a core threat to the region and the world. A nuclear-armed Iran undoubtedly destabilizes the delicate balance of power in the region and heightens the risk of a catastrophic conflict with Israel as well as neighboring Arab states. Therefore, by forging an anti-Iran alliance, countries can coordinate efforts on multiple fronts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and avert a nuclear crisis in the Middle East.

Moreover, Iran’s aggressive foreign policy and expansionist activities exacerbate tensions in the region. Iran’s intervention in countries such as Iraq, Syria, and Yemen undermine efforts toward peace and reconciliation, underscoring the imperative need to establish an anti-Iran alliance. Only coordinated action can effectively mitigate the threats emanating from Iran, paving the way for a more peaceful Middle East.

Mohamed El Doh is a business development and consulting professional in the defense and security sector. Mohamed holds a doctorate degree from Grenoble École de Management, France, an MBA from the European Union Business School, Spain, and an Advanced Certificate in Counterterrorism Studies from the University of St Andrews, UK. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

The Middle East Needs an Anti-Iran Alliance was originally published on Global Security Review.

The bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission’s report suggests that Russia and China’s large-scale nuclear programs pose “qualitatively new threats of opportunistic aggression” and raise the risk of future “cooperative two-theater aggression.” In their report and testimony, commission members clarify that written Russian strategy and doctrine envision limited first use of theater nuclear weapons to deter the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), coerce war termination on favorable terms, and suggest larger-scale employment of theater nuclear weapons to defeat NATO in war, if a loss is likely.

And yet Russian emphasis on new nuclear weapons hardly ends here. Russia’s walkout from the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) reopens possibilities for it to test nuclear weapons. Indeed Putin warned that he is prepared to resume nuclear testing.

Stationing nuclear weapons in Belarus likewise adds to the threat of nuclear war in Europe. Russia also seeks to build nuclear power plants in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. These could become a basis for nuclear material exports back to Russia or other countries.

Chinese imports of nuclear materials from Russia hit a record high in 2022, stimulating widespread fears that Moscow is making it easier for China to produce weapons-grade uranium for its missiles. Moscow has also backtracked on its 2013 insistence that China must take part in any future arms control negotiations because China still refuses to do so. As Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Rybakov said in 2013, “We cannot endlessly negotiate with the United States the reduction and limitation of nuclear arms while some other countries are strengthening their nuclear and missile capabilities…. Making nuclear disarmament a multilateral process is becoming a necessity.”

However, Russia evidently cannot now insist on Chinese participation despite the Chinese nuclear threat to Russia. Thus, Rybakov now reiterates the official view that Chinese nuclear weapons do not threaten Russia even though several independent analysts argue to the contrary. Similarly, Russia’s newfound amity with North Korea is stimulating anxiety that Pyongynag’s natural demand for a quid pro quo for the one million artillery shells it gave Russia will lead Putin to support North Korea’s missile, nuclear, and space programs. It is already known that Moscow promised to help Pyongyang build satellites and followed through on that pledge recently—regarding its most recent launch. Other observers maintain that it would not be excessively difficult for Russia to provide North Korea with nuclear assistance.

Here again, there is a parallel precedent. Recently, Putin, in conversation with General Zhang Youxia, vice chairman of China’s Central Military Commission, stated that building on existing plans, Putin advocated closer cooperation in space with China, “including high-orbit assets, and new prospective types of weapons that will ensure strategic stability (i.e. likely nuclear weapons) of both Russia and the People’s Republic of China.”

Beyond these actions undermining nonproliferation, in general, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in particular, Russo-Iranian military cooperation is reportedly unprecedented, growing in scope, and comprises ballistic missile cooperation. There is also little doubt that Iran is coming closer to actually possessing a nuclear weapon.  

Indeed, Russia told the United Nations (UN) that it no longer needs to obey UN restrictions on giving Iran missile technology since Resolution 2231 (2015) recently expired.  And, at the same time, Iran is actively soliciting Russian help with its nuclear program.  Providing such help would, like all of the aforementioned activities, either break the spirit or even the letter of the NPT. In invading Ukraine, Moscow actually violated the NPT, which openly commits signatories not to invade non-nuclear states.

All of these Russian moves undermine nonproliferation and the NPT. And this list does not include the almost nightly wild nuclear threats to be heard daily on Russian TV and even among supposed experts. Certainly, experience repeatedly shows that the UN is unlikely to do more than inform and provide reports on the process.

Moscow and her friends are dismantling the structures of nuclear security. China, Iran, and North Korea are apparently intent on destroying the “guardrails” of international security, in general, and against nuclear use, in particular—all to obtain a free hand in realizing their imperial and aggressive dreams. This trend not only puts smaller states at increased risk, but it obligates the US and its nuclear allies to invest more in new and improved nuclear weapons. This is needed to restore deterrence that only justifies these aggressors’ paranoia, which drives them to nuclear weapons in the first place.

As the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States recommended, the US needs to update and renovate its nuclear arsenal to make it more fit for service in regard to today’s and tomorrow’s threats. This means technological renovation, more precision, greater flexibility, and very likely additional nuclear weapons. Yet at the same time America and her allies, in both Europe, Asia, and the Middle East need a conventional buildup as well to preserve deterrence at lower levels in both Europe and Asia so neither Russia nor China can start a conventional war in the expectation that it can use nuclear blackmail, as in the Ukraine, to deter NATO from defending vital interests.

Likewise, the United States and her allies abroad must also update and modernize conventional forces to deter either by punishment or deny lower-level threats that could also escalate—the Houthi threat to Red Sea shipping—in the belief that the organizers of these threats could control escalation and that the US is afraid to widen existing conflicts. Thus, as noted above, in the nuclear sphere too many states lost their reason and are tempting fate. Consequently, judgment in nuclear and other security areas is left to states who, as the record shows, are all too willing to behave as brutish beasts. Therefore, they must be stopped sooner than later.

Stephen Blank, PhD, is a Senior Consultant at the American Foreign Policy Council and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.

Proliferation’s Rising Threat was originally published on Global Security Review.