<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>Topic:rare Earth minerals &#8212; Global Security Review %</title>
	<atom:link href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/rare-earth-minerals/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/subject/rare-earth-minerals/</link>
	<description>A division of the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (NIDS)</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 11:10:58 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>https://wordpress.org/?v=7.0.2</generator>

 
	<item>
		<title>China&#8217;s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Holden Johansen]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Jul 2026 12:10:48 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Defense & Security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economics & Trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Government & Politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Africa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[alternative materials]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China–Japan Rare Earths dispute]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cobalt]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[copper]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[critical minerals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense procurement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[domestic production]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic coercion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[electric vehicles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[export]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[export restrictions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[F-35 fighter jets]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[geopolitical security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[graphite]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[industrial production]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[investment planning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lithium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military aircraft]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mineral reserves]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[National defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[price volatility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[processing dominance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[radar systems]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rare Earth minerals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[recycling technologies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[refining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[refining infrastructure]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[semiconductors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[solar panels]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[stockpiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic vulnerability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[submarines]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply chain]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[supply chain diversification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tomahawk missiles]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[U.S. dependency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[unmanned aerial vehicles]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=32858</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Published: July 2, 2026 China&#8217;s dominance of the rare-earth mineral supply chain gives Beijing a powerful tool of economic coercion against rival states. Vital rare-earth minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, and graphite are crucial inputs for products used in daily life and in national defense. These include electric vehicles, solar panels, military aircraft, and semiconductors. Ensuring control over [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/">China&#8217;s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Published:</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{}"> July 2, 2026</span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">China&#8217;s dominance of the rare-earth mineral supply chain gives Beijing a powerful tool of economic coercion against rival states. Vital rare-earth minerals like cobalt, copper, lithium, and graphite are crucial </span><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-africa-critical-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none">inputs for products</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> used in daily life and in national defense. These include electric vehicles, solar panels, military aircraft, and semiconductors. Ensuring control over the supply chains of these critical minerals is becoming a key aspect of geopolitical rivalry.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">Much of this competition is focused on Africa, which holds about </span><a href="https://www.unep.org/regions/africa/our-work-africa"><span data-contrast="none">30 percent</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the world’s mineral reserves. China has already secured dominant positions in essential parts of these supply chains, recognizing the strategic importance of controlling access to these critical resources.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">China produces nearly</span><a href="https://africacenter.org/spotlight/china-africa-critical-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none"> 70 percent of the world&#8217;s rare earth minerals</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and has reinforced this position through deliberate efforts to </span><a href="https://rareearthexchanges.com/news/chinas-critical-minerals-footprint-in-africa-projects-strategy-and-impacts/"><span data-contrast="none">control every stage</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the critical mineral supply chain. This process begins long before extraction, with Chinese banks and engineering firms securing involvement. Beijing then extends that control to the project&#8217;s end, pairing ownership of mines with ownership of the railways, roads, and ports through which these materials move. The result is a supply system in which China extracts, refines, and exports minerals from Africa which ensures that, in many cases, raw materials move on Chinese terms.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">China’s dominance in the rare earth mineral trade stems from its strategic approach to mineral supply chains, not just profit. This allows Beijing to maintain long-term control of mines during economic downturns. This is a luxury that profit-driven Western competitors do not have. Chinese firms enter the market fully prepared and offers financing, workforce, equipment, and logistics that often gain significant control over project execution from the start. This strategy has helped Beijing achieve “</span><a href="https://rareearthexchanges.com/news/chinas-critical-minerals-footprint-in-africa-projects-strategy-and-impacts/"><span data-contrast="none">processing dominance</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">,” meaning control over the refining system to the point that winning a mining contract in Africa does not ensure independence from Chinese supply chains. Although </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-executive-order-ties-us-critical-minerals-security-global-partnerships"><span data-contrast="none">China produces only about 10 percent of the world&#8217;s lithium, cobalt, and copper, it controls roughly 40-90 percent</span></a><span data-contrast="auto"> of the refining capacity for these materials. Therefore, a Western company extracting ore in sub-Saharan Africa has not truly succeeded if the ore must be processed through a Chinese refinery. For the United States, this distinction has far-reaching consequences beyond market competition.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The U.S. is highly exposed to supply chain disruption risks because critical minerals have uses that extend far beyond consumer products. They are key components of systems essential to national defense, including</span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions"><span data-contrast="none"> </span></a><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/consequences-chinas-new-rare-earths-export-restrictions"><span data-contrast="none">F-35 fighter jets, Virginia- and Columbia-class submarines, Tomahawk missiles, radar systems, Predator unmanned aerial vehicles</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and more. The U.S. maintains </span><a href="https://www.cfr.org/articles/us-critical-minerals-dilemma-what-know"><span data-contrast="none">only one domestic rare earth mine, possesses minimal refining infrastructure</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, and </span><a href="https://energycommerce.house.gov/posts/chairman-griffith-delivers-opening-statement-at-subcommittee-on-environment-hearing-on-the-beneficial-use-of-coal-ash-1"><span data-contrast="none">relies on China for 70% of rare earth imports</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. Expanding domestic mining and refining capacity </span><a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/trade-critical-supply-chains"><span data-contrast="none">requires significant capital investment and highly specialized expertise</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, limiting the speed at which domestic production can realistically offset exposure risks. The result is a situation in which the U.S. defense industrial base is significantly dependent on a strategic adversary for materials it cannot easily replace, and which are essential to the production and sustainment of advanced military capabilities.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The risks of relying on a strategic adversary like China for materials vital to American national security are clearly shown by the China–Japan Rare Earths </span><a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/10/japan-rare-earth-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none">dispute of 2010</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">. In September 2010, a Chinese fishing boat collided with two Japanese Coast Guard ships in the East China Sea, leading to the arrest and detention of the boat’s captain. In reaction, the Chinese government stopped exporting critical minerals to Japan. Tokyo, which depended on Beijing for nearly 90 percent of its rare earth mineral imports, saw prices for these goods rise nearly 10-fold in the year after the incident. Although the United States and Japan are in different positions within global supply chains, Japan&#8217;s experience demonstrates the broader strategic dangers that arise when a country becomes heavily dependent on a geopolitical rival for key resources.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><span data-contrast="auto">The coercive value of rare earth dominance lies not only in China&#8217;s ability to deny access but also in the threat of disruption. Even the possibility of export restrictions can drive price volatility, delay industrial production, complicate defense procurement, and undermine long-term investment planning. Japan’s response to the 2010 dispute reveals that dependency on rare earth elements is not unavoidable. Japan’s proactive approach included investing in recycling technologies, developing alternative materials, diversifying supply chains through overseas mining projects in Australia and other countries, and building stockpiles to secure reserves. As a result, Tokyo reduced its reliance on Chinese rare earths by </span><a href="https://www.weforum.org/stories/2023/10/japan-rare-earth-minerals/"><span data-contrast="none">about 30 percent</span></a><span data-contrast="auto">, demonstrating that policy actions can yield tangible results. More broadly, Japan’s experience underscores a key truth of modern strategic competition: dependence on an adversary for vital materials can create vulnerabilities that go beyond economics. Washington and its partners should take notice.</span><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><i><span data-contrast="auto">Holden Johansen is an independent researcher focused on geopolitical security risks. He holds a B.A. in Political Science from Miami University and completed coursework in European Politics and Security at the Danish Institute for Study Abroad in Copenhagen. The views expressed in this article are the author&#8217;s own.</span></i><span data-ccp-props="{}"> </span></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Chinas-Critical-Mineral-Strategy.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-32606" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png" alt="" width="198" height="55" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/2026-Download-Button26-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 198px) 100vw, 198px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/">China&#8217;s Critical Mineral Strategy and the Structure of Strategic Competition</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/chinas-critical-mineral-strategy-and-the-structure-of-strategic-competition/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/#respond</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Muhammad Shahzad Akram]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 09 Jun 2025 12:15:50 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control & Nonproliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Strategic Adversaries]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[accountability]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American exports]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American global leadership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arms Control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[consensus]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cyber warfare]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dialogue]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diplomatic relations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[disarmament]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[equilibrium]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fragmented world order]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[great powers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[innovation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military effectiveness]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Muhammad Shahzad Akram]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[multilateralism]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mutual respect]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[New START]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nuclear deterrent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[proliferation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[protectionist policies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rare Earth minerals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[restraint]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sanctions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[shipbuilding capacity]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[South Korea]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[tariffs]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[technological superiority]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trade disputes]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[transparency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[trust]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine conflict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Army Science Board]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US Navy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[verification]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30898</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Global arms control regimes are built on the pillars of trust, dialogue, transparency, mutual respect, restraint, verification, and, most critically, consensus among great powers. However, leadership in this domain risks deterioration at a time when the world urgently needs a renewed commitment to peace and stability. As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/">How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Global arms control regimes are built on the pillars of trust, dialogue, transparency, <a href="https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2023.2292812">mutual respect</a>, restraint, verification, and, most critically, consensus among great powers. However, leadership in this domain risks deterioration at a time when the world urgently needs a renewed commitment to peace and stability.</p>
<p>As great powers become entangled in trade disputes, the spillover effects threaten to undermine the cooperative spirit essential for effective arms control. These <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship">economic conflicts</a> erode bilateral relationships, making it even more challenging to negotiate future agreements on critical and emerging domains such as artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and the militarization of outer space.</p>
<p>Tariffs can disrupt trade, increase prices, stifle innovation, and agitate the <a href="https://www.theamericanconservative.com/ending-the-china-paradox/">supply chain</a>. Moreover, it can weaken American <a href="https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/contentious-us-china-trade-relationship">global leadership</a> as long-term allies face an American president unwilling to accept high tariffs on American exports while guaranteeing low tariffs on imports. American efforts to counter China are disrupted by tariff disputes as well, as allies and foes coordinate their strategies for countering President Trump’s effort to reduce tariffs on American exports. The president’s actions erode the confidence of allies in extended nuclear deterrence because allies begin to question whether the United States will continue to subsidize security, if they are demanding an end to protective tariffs.</p>
<p>The tariff dispute between China and the US, two large trading partners, severely affects arms control and <a href="https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trade-war.asp">strategic stability</a>. It exacerbates crisis, heightens mistrust, undermines confidence-building measures, and curtails the possibility of a constructive arms control framework. It is, however, not unexpected. The United States long tolerated protective tariffs and poor intellectual property protections by the Chinese. Thus, rebalancing should not come as any surprise, even if it is disconcerting.</p>
<p>American <a href="https://behorizon.org/china-u-s-tech-war-new-hegemony/">technological superiority</a>, innovation, cutting-edge military and civilian technology, and significant soft-power influence are the key components of its hegemonic status. Central to this dominance is access to rare earth minerals, which are critical for producing advanced weaponry, including missiles, drones, artificial intelligence (AI)–driven systems, and cutting-edge civilian technologies. However, the US faces a growing vulnerability in this domain, as China currently controls approximately <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c1drqeev36qo#:~:text=A%20US%20Geological%20report%20notes,%2C%20radar%2C%20and%20permanent%20magnets.">70 percent of the global supply</a> of rare earth elements. This strategic dependency seriously challenges American innovation and military effectiveness.</p>
<p>However, the American military is already in <a href="https://www.aei.org/foreign-and-defense-policy/americas-incredible-shrinking-navy/">decline</a> according to a report from the US Army Science Board, which reveals the limitations of the American industrial base. The report warned that the US may be “incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.”</p>
<p>The conflict in Ukraine underscores this concern, as the US struggles to maintain adequate production levels of artillery shells, drones, rockets, and missiles primarily due to insufficient stockpiles of critical components. Furthermore, structural deficiencies are increasingly evident within the US Navy. As of 2023, less than 68 percent of surface fleet ships were rated “mission-capable,” with only 63 percent of attack submarines meeting the same standard. Compounding these challenges, American shipyards are currently unable to produce more than <a href="https://news.usni.org/2023/03/21/osd-comptroller-says-u-s-shipyards-cant-build-3-destroyers-a-year">three destroyers annually</a>. By contrast, <a href="https://www.csis.org/analysis/threat-chinas-shipbuilding-empire#:~:text=Today%2C%20Jiangnan%20Shipyard%20alone%20has,support%20China's%20military%20industrial%20complex.">China</a> possesses 13 shipyards capable of constructing large and deep-draft vessels one of which reportedly surpasses the entire US shipbuilding capacity.</p>
<p>The ongoing US-China tariff dispute reflects a <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/08/us/politics/jd-vance-peasants-china.html">zero-sum</a> strategic mindset, intensifying hostilities and reducing incentives for restraint or cooperation. This economic confrontation has already narrowed the space for meaningful arms control dialogue. The imposition of sanctions on each other’s officials and entities alongside increasingly <a href="https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c20zd4k6d36o">provocative rhetoric</a> from senior officials risks further erosions of the fragile trust necessary for future diplomatic engagement, particularly in arms control and emerging domains such as AI, cyber warfare, and outer space.</p>
<p>Traditionally, <a href="https://www.newsweek.com/why-china-not-trust-america-nuclear-weapons-talks-1926809">China rejects</a> arms control as the US had far more weapons than China. Tarriff disputes reinforce the narrative that the US is using economic means to contain China’s rise, making China less likely to engage in future arms control discussions. Moreover, diplomatic relations and multilateralism will weaken and increase mistrust—leaving no room for constructive future arms control talks.</p>
<p>Arms control forums are increasingly fragile as mutual trust and respect for arms control and disarmament among the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424348">great powers</a> declines. Tariff disputes create mistrust, which complicates the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424348">verification process</a>, and the <a href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/424348">supply chain</a> supporting the global cooperative arms control verification limits the ability to enforce or verify compliance with arms control agreements.</p>
<p>Trade disputes deepen mistrust and normalize confrontation over cooperation, secrecy over transparency, and arms racing over arms control. This leads to proliferation while making accountability less relative and paves the way for a fragmented world order with little or no hope for future arms control.</p>
<p>Moreover, it increases the chances future administrations face a backlash for rolling back policies that demand equitable treatment of American trade goods, fearing internal backlash for being soft on China. This will permanently lock both states into an adversarial stance, reducing any flexibility in arms control. Moreover, if the US wants to reconsider any future arms control discussion, political costs may prove too high, leaving fewer options to prevent an arms race.</p>
<p>In 2019, President Donald Trump <a href="https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-withdraw-united-states-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces-inf-treaty/">withdrew</a> the United States from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, after Russian cheating became too hard to ignore.  Meanwhile, the future of <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2025-01/features/life-after-new-start-navigating-new-period-nuclear-arms-control">New START</a> remains uncertain and fragile.</p>
<p>At such a critical juncture, President Trump’s demand that American exports sent to foreign markets receive equal treatment to those foreign imports entering the United States, penalizing both allies and adversaries who enact punitive tariffs, may be unsettling for recipients of increased tariffs, but it should come as no surprise that an American president elected to stop the outflow of American wealth would seek equal treatment for American exports.</p>
<p>Many Americans are willing to see the subsidies to foreign nations—that are brought about by high tariffs on American exports and American extended deterrence—come to an end. This may lead to an erosion of confidence in American benevolence by some states.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/south-korea-s-quest-for-nuclear-weapons">South Korea</a>, for example, was shocked that the United States took offense to the very protectionist policies that allowed South Korea to become the third largest auto producer in the United States, all while effectively preventing American automobile sales in South Korea. Thus, South Korea is reconsidering their non-nuclear status and exploring an independent nuclear deterrent. As President Trump seeks to level the playing field by forcing down the tariffs of trade partners, under the threat of higher tariffs on imported goods, allies should come to understand that the United States is increasingly unwilling to subsidize others. While this may be a jarring fact, it is not a purposeful effort to destabilize arms control.</p>
<p>Thus, trade disputes may cause allies and adversaries to reconsider American willingness to accept unequal trade and disproportionate burden sharing. In the long run, equilibrium will return. It is just a matter of what that equilibrium may look like.</p>
<p><em>Muhammad Shahzad Akram </em><em>is a Research Officer at the Center for International Strategic Studies, Azad Jammu Kashmir. He holds an MPhil in International Relations from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is an alumnus of the Near East South Asia (NESA) Center for Strategic Studies, National Defense University (NDU), Washington, DC. His expertise includes cyber warfare and strategy, arms control, and disarmament.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/06/How-Trade-war-Threatens-the-Future-of-Arms-Control.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="238" height="66" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 238px) 100vw, 238px" /></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/">How Trade Disputes Threaten the Future of Arms Control</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/how-trade-disputes-threaten-the-future-of-arms-control/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>0</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Trump and Zelensky: Bad Manners or Strategic Disaster?</title>
		<link>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-and-zelensky-bad-manners-or-strategic-disaster/</link>
					<comments>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-and-zelensky-bad-manners-or-strategic-disaster/#comments</comments>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Stephen Cimbala]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 11 Mar 2025 11:45:22 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Allies & Extended Deterrence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Archive]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[A2AD]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[aggression]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[defense]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[diplomats]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[economic influence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Europe]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Far East]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fiasco]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Finland]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[free speech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[global leadership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[international influence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[meeting]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[military]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mineral deal]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Munich Security Conference]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NATO enlargement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[naval expansion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rare Earth minerals]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Russia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[security]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[strategic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sweden]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Taiwan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ukraine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[war]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[White House]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Zelensky]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://globalsecurityreview.com/?p=30251</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>By any standard, the February 28 White House meeting between President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was a breathtaking fiasco. After back-and-forth discussions, the conversation degenerated into a donnybrook of apparent misunderstandings and snarky exchanges that left expert commentators and others gasping. Professional diplomats in the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty [&#8230;]</p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-and-zelensky-bad-manners-or-strategic-disaster/">Trump and Zelensky: Bad Manners or Strategic Disaster?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>By any standard, the February 28 White House meeting between President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky was a breathtaking fiasco. After back-and-forth discussions, the conversation degenerated into a donnybrook of apparent misunderstandings and snarky exchanges that left expert commentators and others gasping.</p>
<p>Professional diplomats in the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies might have wondered if this was an unrehearsed skit from Saturday Night Live.  Only Alec Baldwin playing the role of Trump was missing. Allies do not talk to each other like in front of the media.</p>
<p>It was clear that Trump and Vice President JD Vance expected to have a pleasant conversation in front of the cameras, have a nice private lunch, and then publicly sign a mineral deal with President Zelensky. They did not expect the pushback and demands that came near the end of the conversation. As a famous French diplomat once said, with respect to another diplomatic blunder, it was “worse than a crime. It was a mistake.”</p>
<p>Zelensky ended up being unceremoniously escorted out of the White House without lunch or a deal. The agreement that would allow the United States to mine rare Earth minerals in Ukraine was that it would repay the United States for the more than $160 billion that American taxpayers have invested in Ukraine’s defense. Profits from American mining operations would also help rebuild Ukraine. American businesses operating in Ukraine would also offer de facto security guarantees to Ukraine. Absent such an agreement, it was feared that China may partner with Ukraine to mine these critical minerals.</p>
<p>While President Trump is likely genuine in his desire to see the killing end and Ukraine rebuilt, Ukraine is only a small part of a larger strategic game the United States is playing. The Trump administration believes that Europe is no longer the strategic pivot of international relations. Instead, the focal point of American diplomacy and military preparedness is the Far East, with a rising China as the main adversary standing in the way of American global leadership and international influence. Europe is a secondary theater of operations, and it is time Europeans bare the burden of their own defense.</p>
<p>This view is a tectonic shift in American focus, but understandable. China has ambitions that go well beyond military and political competition with the United States in China’s backyard.</p>
<p>China’s global strategy of multi-domain competition with the US includes all spheres of power and influence. Its tool kit includes explicit challenges to the United States in the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, the military use of space, artificial intelligence development, cyberwar, and economic influence.</p>
<p>China’s ambitious naval expansion may fall short of driving the US Navy from the high seas, but its combined arms approach to anti-access and area denial (A2AD) in East Asia is intended to deter and, if necessary, defeat any power that would oppose China’s mastery of its immediate sphere of influence, including Taiwan.</p>
<p>Nevertheless, recognition of the threat posed by a rising China does not invalidate the strategic significance of events in Europe. America’s commitment to the defense and security of a free Europe is not transactional, it is existential. This is embodied in the NATO alliance.</p>
<p>NATO is the result of symbiotic relationships among democratic states that provide collective security within a context of political freedom. Ironically, this is why JD Vance’s challenge to European allies at the Munich Security Conference was so interesting. Vance noted that the United States and Europe are linked, not only by procedures and financial commitments, but also by shared values, including free speech. He rightly urged the European members of NATO and the European Union to enhance their commitments to free speech that, in his view, are in decline across Europe.</p>
<p>Russia’s aggressive war against Ukraine, with its objective of destroying Ukraine’s armed forces, economy, infrastructure and its viability as a state is clearly grossly immoral. But evil in the world is nothing new, nor is it incumbent on the American taxpayer to fund every effort to eradicate all evil in the world. American efforts to impose liberal democracies where they do not exist has a poor track record of success.</p>
<p>Europe was the cradle of American civilization, but Americans fled Europe because of religious persecution, a lack of economic opportunity, and other reasons that are inconsistent with freedom. Doubtless, Zelensky and other European politicians drive their American partners crazy at times. During the Second World War, Charles de Gaulle drove British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight Eisenhower to distraction.  But the imperious de Gaulle was the symbol of French nationalism for those who opposed Germany and the Vichy regime.</p>
<p>An American abandonment of a free Europe would leave Europe to repeat its past mistakes, which the continent has repeated over and over and over again. Zelensky is far from an ideal partner. However, a Ukraine swallowed by Russia will result in a less stable Europe.</p>
<p>Vladimir Putin clearly sees a free Ukraine as a political and economic threat to Russia.  He denies that Ukraine is a distinct civilization or country. He constantly refers to Ukrainians as neo-Nazis. A negotiated settlement will not change this perspective. Any agreement with Putin must follow President Ronald Reagan’s dictum, trust but verify.</p>
<p>Ironically, one outcome of the war between Russia and Ukraine is the enlargement of NATO with the addition of Finland and Sweden. Thus, NATO added considerable strategic depth and an ability to prevent Russian ships from leaving port in the Baltic Sea. Without the United States, European NATO may waiver. In the end, President Trump’s efforts to push European states to play a larger role in their own security are important, but they should never lead to an American departure from the Alliance.</p>
<p><em>Stephen Cimbala, PhD, is a Professor at Penn State University at Brandywine and a Senior Fellow at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies.</em></p>
<p><a href="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/zelensky.pdf"><img decoding="async" class="alignnone wp-image-29852" src="http://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png" alt="" width="324" height="90" srcset="https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1.png 450w, https://globalsecurityreview.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/2025-Download-Button-1-300x83.png 300w" sizes="(max-width: 324px) 100vw, 324px" /></a></p>
<p><a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-and-zelensky-bad-manners-or-strategic-disaster/">Trump and Zelensky: Bad Manners or Strategic Disaster?</a> was originally published on <a href="https://globalsecurityreview.com">Global Security Review</a>.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
					<wfw:commentRss>https://globalsecurityreview.com/trump-and-zelensky-bad-manners-or-strategic-disaster/feed/</wfw:commentRss>
			<slash:comments>1</slash:comments>
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>
